

Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago

by

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with the assistance of  
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## Abstract

The report presents the findings of an evaluation of CeaseFire, a Chicago-based violence prevention program. The program is administered by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP). Formed in 1999, it began to expand in Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois during the 2000s. At its peak it was active in about 25 program sites. CeaseFire focused on changing the behavior of a small number of carefully selected members of the community, those with a high chance of either "being shot or being a shooter" in the immediate future. Violence interrupters worked on the street, mediating conflicts between gangs and intervening to stem the cycle of retaliatory violence that threatens to break out following a shooting. Outreach workers counseled young clients and connected them to a range of services.

CeaseFire's interventions are "theory driven." The program is built upon a coherent theory of behavior that specifies how change agents could be mobilized to address some of the immediate causes of violence: norms regarding violence, on-the-spot decision making by individuals at risk of triggering violence, and the perceived risks and costs of involvement in violence among the targeted population. Some of the program's core concepts and strategies were adapted from the public health field, which has shown considerable success in addressing issues such as smoking, seat belt use, condom use, and immunization.

The evaluation of CeaseFire had both process and outcome components. The process portion of the project involved documenting how the program actually looked in the field. This included issues involved in selecting target neighborhoods, choosing local host organizations, and staffing, training, and management practices. The outcome evaluation used statistical models, crime hot spot maps and gang network analyses to assess the program's impact on shootings and killings in selected CeaseFire sites. In each case, changes in the target areas after the introduction of the program were contrasted with trends in matched comparison areas.

A large survey of clients found that they were high risk on many indicators. Once in the program they saw their outreach workers frequently, and many were active participants in CeaseFire activities. In interviews, clients reported getting a great deal of assistance with the problems they brought to the program. These included needing a job, getting back into school or a GED program, and wanting to disengage from a gang

An examination of the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings found that violence was down by one measure or another in most of the areas that were examined in detail. Crime mapping found decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots due to the program in more than half of the sites. There were significant shifts in gang homicide patterns in most of these areas due to the program, including declines in gang involvement in homicide and retaliatory killings.

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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of CeaseFire, a Chicago-based violence prevention program. The program is administered by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP), which is located at the University of Illinois' School of Public Health. CPVP was formed in 1995 with the mission of working with community, city, county, state and national partners in designing community violence prevention programs. Developing and implementing CeaseFire was but one of their roles, but it was a major one. CPVP began fielding an active program in 1999. During the 2000s, it expanded to encompass about 25 program areas in the Chicagoland region and other parts of Illinois. The decentralized, "local host" model that the central office adopted for delivering their neighborhood-based programming in numerous and diverse sites is a common approach to social service delivery, and the lessons learned from CeaseFire's experience may be applicable to a broad range of human service programs.

CeaseFire is "theory driven." It is built upon a coherent theory of behavior that emphasizes norms, risks and choices. Many of the program's daily activities target those factors, which, in turn are presumed to be linked causally to violence. The first section of this chapter describes CeaseFire's underlying theory in some detail, and relates it to the structures and activities that made up the program. The next section describes the evaluation of the program. A final section reviews the detailed chapters that follow.

### **Program Theory**

This section examines the theory lying behind CeaseFire, and the strategies involved in making it operational. The theory underlying a program is the model of how the "inputs" that are assembled and set in motion cause the "outcomes" that are the target of the intervention. A well-articulated program theory opens for inspection the "black box" of connections that link inputs such as staff roles to the outcomes that are valued, in this case violence reduction. It describes not what the participants are supposed to do and what they hope to accomplish, but also how these activities influence at least some of the important causes of the targeted behavior.<sup>1</sup>

In truth, not all programs actually have a thought-out theory in the background. Often it is left to the evaluator to assemble a sketch of a theory from the articulated assumptions, recorded decisions, and mental maps of the participants, and then to try to link the theory (which the evaluators developed) to the organization and strategies that they are evaluating. CeaseFire was not in this category. It was built upon a coherent theory of behavior changed and managed – to the extent possible – on the basis of systematic measures of its effectiveness. This chapter presents our understanding of the theory underlying CeaseFire. It is based on program documents, interviews with participants, and discussions that took place at meetings we

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<sup>1</sup>Leeuw, Frans L. 2003. "Reconstructing Program Theories: Methods Available and Problems to be Solved." *American Journal of Evaluation*, 24 (No. 1), 5-20.

observed. It organizes what we learned around a summary sketch of the theory, discusses each of its elements, and reports what some of the participants had in mind when they discussed its sometimes abstract components. How well this theory was implemented, and its outcome effectiveness, are issues that are considered in the chapters that follow. This describes what they thought they were doing.

## **Behavior Change Model**

The behavior-change goal of the CeaseFire was very tightly defined: their direct clients, other young men and women on the street, and gang members and leaders with whom they were in contact, were called upon to stop shooting. CeaseFire did not make larger demands upon them; there was no expectation that the often inadequately educated and under-employed young people they largely dealt with would – or could – “go straight” without a great deal of investment in turning their lives around. If clients were involved in abusive relationships with parents or partners, outreach workers would attempt to work with them to deal with the conflict. But they knew that their clients and other young people they encountered “had to make a living.” One violence interrupter described the plight of those he worked with: “All the skills they have is selling a bag on the corner. They got street skills.” An appeal violence interrupters commonly made to gang leaders was that shootings were “bad for business,” as gun violence brought the attention of the police. The message was kept simple – stop shooting and killing. The staff hoped for broader changes in behavior and lifestyle among their clients, but at any moment clients were relatively few in number. For others, CeaseFire promoted a risk management approach aimed at harm reduction, rather than personal redemption.<sup>2</sup>

## **High Risk Youth Focus**

A notable feature of the program is that it did not aim to directly involve a large number of individuals. Rather, CeaseFire focused on changing the behavior of a small number of carefully selected members of the community. Few outreach workers ever worked with more than ten or so clients at a time, so to maximize their impact on the community CeaseFire advanced a set of client selection criteria they considered predictive of being at high risk of either “being shot or being a shooter” in the immediate future. To be classed as high risk, and thus eligible for recruitment, individuals were supposed to meet at least four of a list of client criteria. Ideally, they were to be between the ages of 16 and 25, have a prior history of offending and arrests, be a member of a gang, have been in prison, have been the recent victim of a shooting, and involved in “high risk street activity,” which in practice meant involvement in street drug markets.

By academic standards this was a rough and ready list. Research on risk factors for youthful offending has identified a list of reliable predictors of getting into trouble. These include

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<sup>2</sup> Kemshall, Hazel and Jason Wood. 2007 “Beyond Public Protection: An Examination of Community Protection and Public Health Approaches to High-risk Offenders.” *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 7, 203–222.



low grades, a sense of marginality, believing that it is acceptable to steal, strong peer networks, negative life events, low parental supervision, and impulsivity.<sup>3</sup> However, street workers were not in a position to assess potential clients on many of these dimensions, at least until after they had recruited them and gained their confidence. They had to make do with what they could observe, extract during in a brief conversation, or gather through rumor networks.

As later chapters describe in detail, CeaseFire recruited on the street, not through institutions. A feature of the lives of young people who could meet the criteria listed above is that, in the main, they had already become marginalized from the rest of society. They found their friends, among whom they could find identity and respect, among others like themselves. They developed these fellowships on the street, as far from the constraints of adult supervision as they could put themselves. The program's high-risk focus explains why schools and many other local institutions were not found on the list of CeaseFire's key program partners. As one CeaseFire staff member bluntly put it, "Gangsters aren't in school." He was quick to add that gangsters are not found in church, either, but that the clergy could play important roles in mobilizing the community and might have influence over at least some gangster's families, so they were prominently featured in the plan.

## **Lever Pulling**

CeaseFire's program theory emphasized three causal factors: norms, decision and risks. Most CPVP staff members came from a public health background, but in a language common in criminal justice, these were three "levers" that could be "pulled" in order to bring a halt to shootings.<sup>4</sup> First, the program aimed at changing operative norms regarding violence, both in the wider community and among its clients. A second goal of CeaseFire was to provide on-the-spot alternatives to violence when gangs and individuals on the street were making behavior decisions. Finally, the program aimed at increasing the perceived risks and costs of involvement in violence among high-risk (largely) young people. The place of these three causal factors in CeaseFire's overall program theory is illustrated in Figure 1-1.

The "lever pullers" in this theory are described in Figure 1-1 as well. These were the individuals and organizations identified by CeaseFire as potentially having some influence on its short list of causal levers. In another terminology, their activities were the "inputs," or the components of the program that could effect causal mechanisms that influenced the outcomes that were to be reduced, shootings and killings. The lever pullers included outreach workers and violence interrupters, key members of the staff at each CeaseFire site. In the program model their principal levers were stimulating norm change among clients and street youths, and guiding them toward alternatives to shooting as a way of solving problems. Mobilizing two key groups in the


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<sup>3</sup> Malcolm Klein, 2007. *Chasing After Street Gangs: A Forty-Year journey*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

<sup>4</sup>The "lever pulling" metaphor was popularized in criminology by David Kennedy. See "Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence Right." *National Institute of Justice Journal* (July), 2-8.

community, the clergy and residents who could be stirred to direct action, was another key part of the program theory. The efforts of these two constituencies were primarily aimed at norm change, both in the community at large and among the outreach worker’s clients and other high-risk youths. Community involvement also targeted the perceived costs of violence. CeaseFire’s public education campaign was aimed at both changing norms about violence and enhancing the perceived risks of engaging in violence. Finally, actions by the police and prosecutors, and tougher anti-gun legislation, were seen as targeting the risks surrounding involvement in shootings.

Figure 1-1  
CeaseFire’s Program Theory



As Figure 1-1 suggests, CeaseFire’s program was built on a broader behavior change model than that underlying its better-known counterpart in Boston. The law enforcement component of Chicago’s program plan resembled the strategy behind Boston’s Ceasefire program. As David Kennedy described it, Boston’s approach was:

. . . [D]eterring violent behavior by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs, setting clear standards for their behavior, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when those standards were violated. The deceptively simple operation that resulted made use of a wide

variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in fundamentally new and different ways.<sup>5</sup>

CeaseFire-Boston also involved the clergy, their principal role being to help spread what the program dubbed a “retail deterrence” message emphasizing that crime would not pay. In contrast, Chicago’s strategy involved assembling a broader array of lever pullers, ranging from the clergy to social service providers, and they targeted a range of causal factors leading to violence, and not just the risk of incarceration.

## **Causal Factors**

The causal factors sketched in Figure 1-1 include community norms, awareness of the risks and costs associated with violence, and the availability of on-the-spot alternatives to resorting to violence when the situation arose. CeaseFire’s programmatic elements aimed at influencing these causal factors, which in turn were presumed to be among the major determinants of violence.

**Norm Change.** Social norms are the beliefs, attitudes and values that make up the culture of a community. They define the range of behavior that is normally acceptable, and draw some limits outside of which people are not supposed to stray. However, we know that norms relevant to CeaseFire vary from community to community, they are stronger in some places than in others, and their link to residents actually doing something when they are violated is problematic in too many areas. Residents of poor, high-crime neighborhoods frequently are estranged from society’s institutions, and especially the criminal justice system. There, even adults espousing conventional values can be resigned to violence, because they know that institutions have failed them. In surveys, African Americans and Latinos report less tolerance than others concerning violence and other crimes, but the actual impact of this is blunted by the fact that residents of poor neighborhoods have fewer mechanisms by which they can actually realize their values.<sup>6</sup>

Encouraging local debates over what people “will and won’t accept” was one of CeaseFire’s core strategies. Outreach workers were to carry the message that “the killing must stop” to their clients, while the clergy were to speak to their parishioners and CeaseFire staff to the broader community. Marches, rallies and prayer vigils, backstopped by the widespread distribution of promotional materials, focused on stirring concern among the public. If the program was successful in actuating normative resistance to violence, the payoff could be

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<sup>5</sup> Kennedy, David. 1998. "Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence Right." National Institute of Justice Journal (July), 2-8.

<sup>6</sup> Sampson, Robert J. and Dawn Jeglum-Bartusch. 1998. "Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences. Law and Society Review, 32, 777-804.

considerable. Research indicates that mobilization efforts that successfully encourage active intervention in defense of community norms should directly lead to a reduction in violence.<sup>7</sup>

**Risk and Cost Enhancement.** The second core concept in CeaseFire's theory of violence was risks and costs, both to the individual and the community. The risk component reflects a classic deterrence model of human behavior. Among the risks that are to be highlighted are those of incarceration, injury and death. Emphasizing these risks to high-risk young people was one important task of violence interrupters and outreach workers. As a program manager described one of his most successful operatives:

*J\_\_\_\_\_ has tried to help change men's mindsets. He tells them people leading this kind of lifestyle have "short life spans." If they tell J\_\_\_\_\_ that they are unique and can avoid these issues, he responds, "You aren't different. You aren't that special." He asks them to "look at the long-term."*

Another violence interrupter reported on the salutary effects of a recent police crackdown that he had been talking up:

*"Since they [police] did that raid, everything's been cool. The guys we've been talking to are kinda nervous. The young guys see the ones that are older getting locked up, so they're kinda nervous. We gotta keep them cool."*

In addition, staff members emphasized what might be called the "social risks" of involvement. This was the potential impact of violence on the families of clients and gang members: their parents, siblings and children. This included families' loss of a breadwinner if things went bad, as well as the emotional impact of the loss of a son or daughter.

The costs component of the model posits that shooting will be reduced through more widespread realization of the direct human costs of violence. In CeaseFire's view, "shooting first" had become a standard way of conducting oneself on the streets of Chicago. Young people on the street had become desensitized to the real consequences of what they were doing. A senior CPVP staffer described the strategy:

*The idea is to move the direction of the thinking of the shooter. One way they do this is by talking about the risks or negative impact of the shooting – how it would impact their family and loved ones, how they would pay the price of imprisonment, etc. The goal is to move the "have to" thinking to "this doesn't make sense." " We want a norm shift."*

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<sup>7</sup> Sampson, Robert J., Raudenbush, Stephen W. and Earls, Felton. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science*, 277: 918-924.

As one CPVP staff member put it, community responses – the marches, prayer vigils and other on-the-scene events organized by CeaseFire immediately following a killing – were a “teaching moment:

*During a response, "guys were hanging out watching this. They're seeing the mom crying, they don't usually see that." By observing the event, individuals inclined to be shooters may internalize the incident: "next time, it might be the shooter, his friends, the gang." Responses are a 'teaching moment.'" They are an opportunity to expose gang bangers to grieving mothers and crying siblings.*

**Decision Alternatives.** CeaseFire treated the young men and women they encountered as rational actors, capable of making choices. Their strategy was to promote their consideration of a broader array of responses to situations that too frequently elicited shootings and killings as a problem solving tactic. This reflected the often accurate view that a great deal of street violence is surprisingly casual in character. People shoot one another in response to perceived slights to their character or reputation, in disputes over women, or for driving through the wrong neighborhood. Competition between drug selling groups or over control of corners that were up for grabs is not conducted in a business-like manner. Worse, in the gang world, one shooting frequently leads to another, perpetuating a cycle of violence. Once initiated, retaliatory violence can send neighborhoods down a spiral of tit-for-tat killings. Violence spreads “like a disease” because it is copied (“modeled”), a learned response to situations, or the outcome of peer pressure. At a meeting we observed, one staff member:

*. . . [G]ave an example of an instance where a young man might feel pressure to shoot. His friends are saying to him, like, “He looked at your girl; what are you going to do about it?”*

CeaseFire strove to intervene in this by providing situation-specific, often negotiated alternatives to shooting it out. Working with clients and changing community norms were part of the process, but violence interrupters in particular worked to provide on-the-spot alternatives to the parties in a conflict. They disparaged the stupidity of resorting to gunplay in unthinking fashion or over trivial matters. They promoted truces during which alternatives short of warfare could be negotiated. They occasionally steered combatants into physical violence and away from shooting, and sometimes negotiated the payment of a fine in lieu of receiving a beating. Harm reduction, as well as harm prevention, was seen as a successful outcome.

## **Six Causal Levers**

Figure 1-1 also sketched the principal causal levers that CeaseFire attempted to pull in order to reduce violence. Some of these efforts were the responsibility of their own staff. However, CeaseFire itself was a small program, and could only hope to affect the causal factors lying behind violence by forming alliances that could coordinate and focus the resources of other community groups and agencies on violence prevention in general, and their clients in particular.

**Client Outreach.** The richest linkage in Ceasefire’s program model was that between their full-time outreach workers and the young men and women whom they recruited as clients. In public health, outreach staffers would be “lay health workers,” or indigenous people hired to reach sex workers or needle users. As chapters in this report on the program and on clients describe in detail, CeaseFire’s outreach workers were to provide counseling and mentoring for their clients. Their conversations ranged over topics including conflicts with their families, partners, peers and the police, and how to deal with them. Outreach workers were to develop an assessment of client’s personal needs, which ranged from family and health issues to education, employment and their emotional state, and connect them with appropriate services. They were to try to get them back in school or in GED programs, help prepare them for the job-finding process, and get them into drug treatment programs. On occasion they interceded with probation and parole officers, promising to take personal responsibility for straightening out clients’ lives. Pulling them out of gangs and away from the drug business was very much on the agenda. Outreach workers encouraged clients to participate in “Safe Haven” programs that brought them into gyms and game rooms where they could relax and interact with their peers in a secure setting, rather than on the street. OWs regularly visited client’s homes, to build personal relationships with family members and assess the many problems that could be found there.

**Street Intervention.** CeaseFire’s violence interrupters (VIs) had a more focused role, that of identifying impending violence and responding by providing the participants alternatives for resolving disputes and protecting their honor. As noted earlier, on Chicago’s streets disputes over honor and status too often have violent outcomes. One attack leads to another, for inter-gang shootings create collective responsibility for a quick retaliatory response. Killings lead to retaliatory killings, and violence ripples through the community, ricocheting between organizations and sometimes involving bystanders and others not involved in the underlying conflict at all. A senior CeaseFire staff member offered this example of how peer pressure and social norms encourages shooting behavior:

*Last year, a guy’s sister was shot in Austin. If the man failed to avenge his sister’s death, his peers and people within his community would say, “What kind of man would not protect his sister.”*

Within gangs, violence is exercised in order to impose discipline, collect street taxes, and maintain the standing of power-holders (as when former kingpins return from prison demanding their share). Between gangs, violence is a tool for settling disputes over drug markets and control of other illicit enterprises, and those too can escalate into retaliatory spirals. Describing one suburban site, a CeaseFire staff member noted:

*A lot of shooting violence continues to be gang-related. In [the site] the Mafias, Stones and Four Corner Hustlers are now shooting at one another after a Four Corner Hustler accidentally shot a Mafia, while attempting to shoot a Stone. CeaseFire violence interrupters are struggling to mediate this conflict.*

In CeaseFire's program model, violence interrupters were to work the streets at night, ferreting out situations that threatened violence and stepping between the parties. They capitalized on their status as former gang members themselves to monitor impending conflicts. They organized truces between gangs, negotiated solutions to specific issues that were in conflict, and suggested alternatives to shootings and killings (such as an organized beating) that would at least reduce the overall level of harm that came from the incident. As a newspaper reported described it, they were ". . . trained to parachute into conflicts and cool them down." Backstopping their personal skills was a continuous review of their experiences and constant training in conflict resolution at CeaseFire headquarters.

A violence interrupter described a conflict between gangs over street corners, and why violence was (at the moment) seemingly under control. He also illustrated the "gotta make a living" attitude of street workers toward the drug business.

*The [Black Peace} Stones are based on the South Side, whereas the Fours [four Corner Hustlers] and Vice Lords are based on the North Side. Last year, the Stones tried to "cross the street" to sell drugs. The conflict, then, was about territory between "pack workers" [men selling on corners]. So far, [the area] has been "fortunate." They have not had any retaliations. One reason K\_\_\_\_\_ and D\_\_\_\_\_ have been so successful in keeping conflicts down is that "they all work together. They all sell the same sized bags for the same amount of money. They got nickle [\$5 bags], mid-grade, saw bucks [\$10 bags]."*

**Clergy Involvement.** Local clergy were regarded as one of CeaseFire's most important local partners. In poor areas that are too often bereft of functioning local institutions, the city's many small churches are often one of the most vital elements of the community. Many of the program's collaborators (in our sample, 87 percent) had not-for-profit arms providing services that were paid for by foundation grants and contracts with the state. Clergy were seen as opinion leaders in the community, people who were strategically placed to help change norms regarding violence. A local minister observed:

*. . . [C]hurches in places like West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park are "oases." They represent and offer a "counter-culture." We value education and non-violence. We want to elevate people's way of thinking and way of life. Normal, civilized people don't have these kinds of problems.*

Clergy were also asked to take a role in many of the community mobilization events that are described in the chapters that follow. They led prayers and were asked to take a prominent place in the marches, vigils and shooting responses sponsored by CeaseFire. Clergy were also asked to open their churches as places for counseling and mentoring. If a church had a gymnasium, there would be interest in using it as a Safe Haven. Pastors representing a wide variety of denominations got involved in the program. In a study reported in Chapter 7, we found that 20 percent of the clergy connected to CeaseFire were Roman Catholic. The remainder were Protestants, principally Baptists, but 18 percent described themselves as "nondenominational."

**Community Mobilization.** Community mobilization is a common public health strategy for addressing maladies ranging from obesity to immunization. The targets of CeaseFire’s community mobilization efforts included residents, local business operators, other community groups, and elected officials. The centerpiece of this component of the program was the marches, rallies and prayer vigils that were held to help carry the “Stop the Shooting” message to the wider community. A priest active during CeaseFire’s early days recalled the visibility of their efforts:

*You could see CeaseFire’s presence in the area. They saturated the area with material. We declared the gymnasium a CeaseFire zone. We had marches and prayer vigils. We mobilized people whenever there were shots fired. Through organizers and outreach workers, we were able to mobilize people in a given area where the activity took place: we prayed and walked.*

At a more recent meeting reviewing the activities of various sites:

*Reporting for [his site], E\_\_\_\_\_ says they have had “quite a few marches” with “30 to 40 people minimum at each march.” This is taken as a sign that CeaseFire is “getting more popular in the neighborhood.” Adding more details on their organizing for the marches, E\_\_\_\_\_ shares that each of their staff people has to learn 5-6 chants. He declares, “our people love chants.”*

An important program strategy was to organize rapid community responses to shootings. Following an incident, outreach workers and other staff members were to conduct a door-to-door canvass in the vicinity of the event, distributing program literature and spreading word that a collective response by the community was being organized. These rallies and marches were to be held within 48 hours. Clergy were asked to lead prayers and march near the head of the procession, along with CeaseFire staff and other community leaders. Their goal was to spread word both about victims and the horror that violence had brought to their families. CeaseFire hoped that visible community outrage would impact the attitudes of high-risk youth. As a CPVP staff member described responses:

*Responses “have all kinds of benefits,” They assist in “signaling disapproval and changing the thinking of the shooter.” Shooters continue their behavior, because “their thinking is that the community doesn’t care.” Responses also deter future shootings, because shooters “don’t want attention drawn to them.”*

But it seems more likely that visible community responses could reinforce community norms against violence, and give individuals the sense that they can take positive, collective action against crime. In CPVP’s view, the goal was to get to, and over, some “tipping point,” so that the message and indigenous responses to violence could take off on their own.

*If you’ve read The Tipping Point, it is possible. Ninety percent of the community members have been tipped. They don’t want shooting, but they are afraid. It is a take back the street effort.*



**Public Education.** A feature of Ceasefire’s program was the emphasis on what they dubbed “public education.” This emphasis grew out of successes in public health in targeting smoking, seat belt use, condom use, and immunization. As indicated in Figure 1-1, CeaseFire’s public education campaign was aimed at both norm change and increasing awareness of the costs of violence to individuals, families and the community. Recognition of CeaseFire and its logos, and perhaps support for the program, might also be a fallout of the public education campaign. “Pub Ed” activities included distributing printed material: flyers, posters and bumper stickers. Outreach workers dropped off materials when they did door to door canvassing, often in the context of mobilizing community members to attend a shooting response. Participants at rallies carried signs, and stores in the program areas sported window posters. Clergy were asked to speak about the program on Sunday mornings. CeaseFire staff regularly appeared on the city’s cable channel, and they lobbied local sports teams in an attempt to secure endorsements from local heroes.

The message was always short. “Stop the Killing” or “No More Shooting.” An advertising firm working *pro bono* with CeaseFire developed a “Stop Killing People” campaign and associated signs and bumper stickers. CeaseFire managers frequently drew parallels between their efforts and campaigns to stop smoking and promote seat belt use, where the messages included “smoking kills” and “click it or ticket.” They cited public health research indicating that the volume of literature distributed is paramount in changing the way people think, rather than the details of the message. A senior program manager argued, “It’s not so important how perfect the message is, but the intensity of the messaging. The goal is ‘massive messaging’.” Almost all of this material was centrally produced and paid for, but distributed by the individual sites.

**Law Enforcement.** Police and prosecutors comes last on the list of program inputs. CeaseFire’s promotional material gave law enforcement agencies a prominent role. In the program’s widely distributed “Eight Point Plan to Stop Shooting,” two of the eight points featured law enforcement. This and other statements called for stricter enforcement of existing laws. They called for “serious prosecutions and sentences . . . for shooting or involvement in shooting,” and “community advocacy to ensure prosecutions.” The Eight Point Plan promised to distribute information on prosecutions and sentences to high risk persons, part of the strategy of using public education to raise awareness of the risks associated with being involved in violence. CeaseFire also called for stricter gun control laws. As Figure 1-1 illustrated, in CeaseFire’s model enforcement was aimed primarily at enhancing the risks that were associated with involvement in shootings and killings. As later sections of the report will document, the gap between program theory and reality was probably greatest in the case of law enforcement.

### “Culturally Appropriate Messengers”

A notable feature of CeaseFire’s staffing was their commitment to hiring what they dubbed “culturally appropriate messengers” to carry the word to the community. Who they hired was a strategic consideration. The program was not staffed by trained social workers. Outreach workers and violence interrupters did not, by-and-large, do their work in an office. They had to

fit in, they needed enough street savvy to maneuver through an often rough-and-tumble environment, and they had to pass muster with gang members and leaders.

The program was fielded almost exclusively in poor African American or Latino neighborhoods, but a racial fit between staffers and the communities they served was only one of the selection criteria. They gained legitimacy among potential clients and gang leaders because many had themselves “lived the life.” Many staff members had been active in an area gang, and most had gotten in trouble with the law. In our interviews and surveys we deliberately did not ask CeaseFire workers about their past. However, at program headquarters numbers like “70 percent” of violence interrupters having done time in prison were widely quoted. The archetypal CeaseFire staff member had been in trouble, had turned his life around, and now wanted to help others do the same.

A senior program manager explained the hiring strategy:

*We hire ex-cons, and it is not because we are nice people, we hire them because they are a technology. They are far more likely to get the attention of the potential shooters. Our message becomes more credible when we use a similar population to deliver the message.*

Their background help staff members navigate the dangerous world of street gangs within which they operated, because they were familiar with the players and they had an intimate understanding of gang culture – the rules and codes of behavior that they had to respect. Asked if he had problems negotiating the street, one worker replied,

*Naw! I just follow the rules, for all y'all in the job, you know there's a chain of command. I follow the rules, cause if you don't, they'll deal with you proper like.*

At a training session for new staff members, the same staffer observed that his background also built his legitimacy among potential clients:

*The young guys that came up under me, respect me. I'm thirty-six. They [“the young guys”] know what I did when I was involved in the mob, and they trust me. Many of them still call me OG [original gangster].*

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

For evaluators, one of the notable features of CeaseFire was their commitment to developing systematic indicators of program activity and outcomes. CPVP wanted to “manage by outcomes,” and their in-house evaluation unit maintained systematic data on beat-level trends in shootings and killings. At times they had the active cooperation of the police, and received listings of monthly crime statistics by beat. At other times, and when they needed data rapidly, they accessed the city’s publically available on-line crime mapping system and printed out the most recent numbers for their target areas.

These data were to be used to identify nonperforming programs, by which they meant sites with upward rather than downward trends in shootings and killings. In principle this could lead CPVP to intervene in site operations, in an attempt to fix the problem. In practice this was difficult, for the decentralized structure of the program (which will be detailed in sections of the report) gave them influence but not control over site-level operations. Presenting comparable trend lines across sites also enabled them to compare their successes – or lack thereof – with each other.

Especially after 2004, the evaluation unit also began to assemble systematic measures of program staffing and activity at the site level. The list of activity indicators was a long one. It included monthly staffing levels – the number of outreach workers and violence interrupters on duty. They counted the frequency of major activities on a monthly basis. These included the number of shooting responses and community events, the number of people who turned up for them, and the volume of public education materials that were distributed. They used site records to count the number of home visits conducted by outreach workers, and the number of times they accompanied their clients to court. CPVP asked violence interrupters to fill out elaborate forms whenever they mediated a conflict. The forms asked about reasons for the conflict, the number of people, and what the interrupters did to prevent an impending shooting. Gathering the data often involved hectoring the sites, for the detailed nature of the data that was being requested diverted them from “doing” to “pencil pushing,” and they had not signed up to be accountants. CPVP staff also made frequent visits to the sites, to glean for themselves what they could from client and activity records that were filed there.

Crime trend data and their association with activity counts was useful for dealing with two important constituencies of CPVP: the press and funding agencies. At a meeting with a group of foundations supporting the program, our observer noted:

*L\_\_\_\_\_ walked the group through each handout. The notes were divided into three groups. The first and second sections focused on the data on homicides, shootings and assaults. It also included both historic and recent data on each CeaseFire zone and their contiguous beats. Police data was also included in the area where each zone is situated. Some citywide data was presented as well. The major message in these data was that there has been a reduction of aggravated assaults and batteries with a firearm, shootings, and killings in the CeaseFire zones. Numbers varied by zone, but all were doing better in each category.. . [One foundation official] commented that she is pleased with the data provided by the CeaseFire staff today and realizes they are putting forth an enormous effort.*

CPVP produced analyses showing crime trends in selected program beats, and contrasted these to events in nearby areas. More sophisticated charts associated variations in staffing levels with shifts in crime, to illustrate the importance of securing enough funding to support a powerful-enough program “dosage.” In our experience, reporters were impressed by the data, and by the sheer fact that CPVP had data. In a typical comment, one reporter noted that, while many

community groups made bold claims about their effectiveness, CeaseFire was virtually alone in having “hard numbers” they could point to.

### **About the Evaluation**

The evaluation of CeaseFire had both process and outcome components. The process portion of the project involved documenting how the program actually looked in the field. This included issues involved in selecting target neighborhoods, choosing local host organizations, and staffing, training, and management issues. The outcome evaluation used statistical models, hot spot maps and gang network analyses to assess the program’s impact on shootings and killings.

The process evaluation began at project headquarters. There, we sat in on meetings, which ranged from gatherings of site directors to sessions of the project’s steering committee, and we participated in a host of internal planning and review sessions. In total we attended and took observation notes at 63 headquarters meetings of all types. We also attended a total of 52 weekly meetings of violence interrupters and gatherings of outreach workers. In addition, evaluation staff members attended 10 staff training workshops, five special events, and three sessions with the panels that oversaw the selection of site-level staff. We also conducted personal interviews with 10 headquarters staff members over the course of the evaluation, some multiple times.

In the field, we worked to independently document the nature and extent of program activity. We conducted multiple site visits and personal interviews, administered staff surveys, observed site meetings, and attended special events. Our goal was to describe the program in action and how it was being administered. In total we made visits (often several times) to 18 sites. While there, we conducted 79 personal interviews with staff at all levels, sat in on a half dozen staff meetings, attended 31 other events or activities and went on 15 neighborhood ride-alongs with local CeaseFire workers.

Based on what we heard and observed during the first round of site visits, we developed a systematic survey for program staff. The survey gathered information about how they spent their time – interacting with clients, canvassing the streets, attending meetings and completing paperwork. It examined their contacts with local partner organizations, including schools, churches, service agencies and the police, as well as their involvement in programmatic activities such as participating in shooting responses, visiting clients’ homes, and connecting clients with services. We also asked about their clients and client load, and their assessments of clients’ problems and prospects. The survey also gathered self-reports of respondents’ adherence to administrative rules and productivity standards. The survey included questions about their satisfaction with training, personnel policies and management practices. These surveys were gathered on site or during meetings, sometimes with a mail followup for staff members who were not there. In total, we surveyed 23 outreach worker supervisors, 78 outreach workers and 52 violence interrupters. In addition, we took an in-depth look at the work of violence interrupters to

better understand their activities. Much of what they did took place on the street, late at night, and there is a discussion in Chapter 5 of the problems involved in understanding their work.

To gauge the extent of CeaseFire's collaboration with local agencies and other stakeholders, we conducted telephone interviews with potential collaborators in 17 sites. We drew samples of organizations and interviewed their representatives in each of six community sectors: business, clergy, community organizations, police, schools and service agencies. The survey focused on their familiarity and contact with CeaseFire and clients; involvement with the program; the costs and benefits of collaborating with CeaseFire; and assessments of the agencies hosting the program locally. A total of 230 interviews were conducted, and in addition we sat in the back and observed 10 local meetings of coalition partners. Because of their importance to the program, we developed in-depth case studies of the involvement of church leaders and the police.

To learn more about CeaseFire's clients – the issues they were facing, the level of help they were receiving, their assessments of the program – we interviewed active clients. Personal interviews were conducted in the field with 297 clients from 13 CeaseFire sites. They were questioned about their problems, the help they received, and the impact of CeaseFire on their lives. We initially considered two alternatives to simply surveying clients. A randomized experiment assessing the impact of the program on their lives was impossible, for we could meet none of the requirements of an experiment. At the site level, we had no possibility of controlling the intervention. We could not control which areas received the program and which did not. This was determined largely by funding politics in the state legislature and the interest of legislators in having the program in their district. We also could not control the program's dosage level. Dosages were highly variable, both across sites and over time as program funding waxed and waned. What the program actually looked like varied from site to site, and this was ultimately in the hands of the local host organizations, which had their own agendas. At the individual level, we had no possibility of controlling who became a client. As later chapters will document, there were massive selection effects in the recruitment of CeaseFire's clients. Potential clients were approached on the street by outreach workers, who were constantly in search of suitable, high-risk young men to meet their caseload quota. Many likely-looking prospects refused to become involved at the outset, while others dropped out quickly. We had little prospect of knowing whom any of them were. In order to reassure their clients – and protect their records from subpoenas – outreach workers identified their clients in their records, and to their immediate supervisors, only by code numbers and nicknames. So closely held was information about clients that, if an outreach worker left the program, by-and-large his clients were lost as well. This also meant that we did not have access to the information required to track clients' arrest history using official records.

We also rejected comparing program clients with “matched” non-client comparison cases, again because of the massive selection processes involved. By-and-large, clients were very high risk: they were not in school, they had long arrest records, many worked in drug markets, many reputedly carried guns, and most were affiliated in some way with violent street gangs. We became convinced that measured and (worse) unmeasured differences between those who ended up as clients and individuals that we could run down and interview as “comparisons” would be

very large. This is a common problem in criminology; Spergel reports that in comparison-group evaluation studies of gang programs, the comparisons are rarely equivalent in terms of gang membership, gang identification, and prior arrest. He notes the tendency of gang research to end up with younger, less delinquent comparison group samples, since more equivalent individuals may not be known or accessible outside of the program context.<sup>8</sup> In evaluations outside of Chicago, Spergel himself used students attending nearby high schools as controls for program clients; for CeaseFire, being an active student was considered a disqualification for involvement. Matching designs always under-match, and in this instance discrepancies between CeaseFire's client load and non-client populations that we could practically identify and personally interview would have been so great that the effort would not have been worth the time and expense.

It is important to note the concerted cooperation that we experienced in conducting this evaluation, both at program headquarters and at the individual sites. At the sites, we were free to interview anyone, and we also sat in on staff and coalition meetings, attended special events, and observed hiring panels in operation. Site managers played an important role in helping us develop lists of the groups, organizations and agencies with whom they collaborated. When we turned up at their offices to sample and interview clients, they spent a great deal of time and energy in making that effort a success, including vouching for us with their clients. They helped us navigate the neighborhoods, and involved us in rallies, marches, and late-night barbeques. At program headquarters we were free to sit in on meetings and conduct interviews with staff members. Everyone there freely shared paperwork and internal reports, and kept us abreast of program events. We were in constant dialog with CeaseFire's own internal evaluation staff. Later in this chapter there is a discussion of the role they played in program management.

It is also important to note that we played no role in formulating or implementing the program. Based on a long-gestating theory, program development began in the 1990s, and the first CeaseFire sites were established in 1999. Our evaluation team was formed much later, in the Fall of 2005. We began the project in response to a request from NIJ for an evaluation of the initiative. When we completed a major piece of the evaluation we shared the findings with CPVP for their feedback, but by then the program was quite mature and running in many sites. We also occasionally appeared at CeaseFire event, taking advantage of the opportunity to describe who we were and what we were up to.

### **About the Report**

The next section of this chapter describes the program theory that drove CeaseFire. CeaseFire was built upon a coherent theory of behavior and managed – to the extent possible – on the basis of systematic measures of its outcome effectiveness. The remainder of Chapter 1 describes key elements of the theory and how they were operationalized, in the form of responsibilities for program employees, their community partners, and public agencies.

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<sup>8</sup> Spergel, Irving. 2006. *Reducing Youth Gang Violence: The Little Village Gang Project in Chicago*. AltaMira Press, p. 259.

Chapter 2 examines some of the complexities involved in selecting program sites and local partners for CeaseFire. The decentralized, “local host” model that CeaseFire headquarters adopted for delivering a neighborhood-based program in numerous sites in Chicago and around the region is a common approach to service delivery, and lessons learned from this experience may be applicable to a broad range of human service programs. This chapter describes the host model and processes for selecting sites and local organizations. It then sketches the organizational structure imposed on the hosts. There is a brief description of the sites and host organizations themselves. This is followed by discussion of a list of issues and difficulties CeaseFire confronted in making the local host model work.

Chapter 3 examines issues in staffing and funding the program. Implementing a program like CeaseFire presents complex managerial challenges. Hiring staff, providing staff training, maintaining control of operations, and identifying and securing funding streams that can support a long list of sites plus central office operations, are activities that must be carefully orchestrated. The first section of this chapter examines staff hiring, training and supervision. These were key problems because hiring was itself a strategic consideration. As the next section of Chapter 1 details, hiring “culturally appropriate messengers,” many of whom had themselves been “in the life,” set CeaseFire apart from many social service programs. Chapter 3 examines management issues ranging from background checks and drug testing to staff career development, and employee turnover. It also addresses some of the special issues raised by the involvement of faith-based local host organizations. Another section examines the realities of funding CeaseFire. From the late 1990s, CeaseFire spawned 30 or so sites in Illinois. The central office took the lead in identifying a diverse collection of funding streams to support their activities, including federal and state governments and private foundations. The arrangements they were able to secure were fragile, and Chapter 3 concludes with a description of the funding crisis of the summer of 2007, a crisis which led to a radical, and perhaps permanent, downsizing of the program.

Chapter 4 examines CeaseFire’s client outreach. Identifying and involving individual clients was one of the most important components of the program, and in practice client outreach may have been the most successful elements of CeaseFire. This chapter describes outreach workers and their clients. The first section describes the background, recruitment, training and supervision of outreach workers, and details some of the mechanics of their work. The second major section describes the client recruitment process, the background of clients, and the delivery of client services. This is based on personal interviews with almost 300 clients that we conducted in 17 site offices.

Observers of CeaseFire regard the role of violence interrupters as an original development in the violence prevention arena. As Chapter 5 documents, violence interrupters cruised the streets, striving to identify and intervene in gang-related conflicts before they escalated into killings, and to step in and halt retaliatory spirals of violence if the shooting had already begun. Themselves former gang members, and often graduates of the state’s prison system, violence interrupters capitalized on their former roles to gain access to street information and the parties to conflicts, and attempted to negotiate workable settlements to within- and between-gang rivalries.

This chapter explores the recruitment, training, activities, management, and impact of violence interrupters.

Chapter 6 describes the networks of collaborating organizations that arose in the sites. CeaseFire was a modest program, and the sites of necessity had to engage with a diverse set of local partners in order to leverage services and jobs for their clients, access their facilities, gain scale in the distribution of public education materials, and populate the marches and vigils that were held in response to homicide. Because many of the sites were funded by local politicians, having a broad base of support in the community was also an important aspect of partnership-building. This chapter describes typical members of the sites' coalitions of collaborators. The first section is based on survey interviews with 230 representatives of local collaborating organizations. The following sections present in-depth case studies of the roles played by two collaborating organizations: the police and churches.

Chapter 7 examines the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings. The first section utilizes statistical models to identify the effect of the introduction of the program on shootings and killings. These analyses use 192-months (16 years) of data on selected sites and matched comparison areas to examine trends in violence. The second section of Chapter 7 utilizes crime mapping technologies to examine the impact of the introduction of CeaseFire on short-term trends in the micro-level distribution of shootings. Each CeaseFire site featured initially at least one "hot spot" of violent crime. This section tracks what happened to those hot spots over time in the program and comparison areas, looking for possibly disruptive effects of the introduction of the program. The third section of this chapter focuses on gang homicide. It utilizes graph theory and social network analysis to examine the effect of CeaseFire on networks of within-gang and between-gang homicides, and the number of violent gangs active in the area. Like the mapping study, it probes for possibly disruptive effects of the program.

Chapter 8 summarizes the major findings of the evaluation.



## **Chapter 2**

### **Selecting Sites and Host Organizations**

This chapter describes some of the complexities involved in selecting program sites and local partners for CeaseFire. The decentralized, “local host” model that CeaseFire headquarters adopted for delivering their theory-driven, neighborhood-based program in numerous and diverse sites is a common approach to social service delivery, and the lessons learned from CeaseFire’s experience may be applicable to a broad range of human service programs.

This chapter describes the host model and processes for selecting sites and local organizations. It next sketches the organizational structure imposed on the hosts. The following section of this chapter then presents a brief description of the sites and host organizations themselves. This is followed by discussion of a list of issues and difficulties CeaseFire confronted in making the local host model work. These ranged from difficulties in identifying qualified sites and local organizations, to the sometimes conflicting demands of politicians, rivalries among area organizations contending for the program, and special issues raised by the involvement of faith-based groups. An overarching issue was the role played by CeaseFire headquarters vis. the sites: should – and could – the central office try to maintain tight control over operations, to ensure their adherence to the program’s theory, or should – and could – headquarters revert to providing technical assistance (such as training) to the sites, and let them find their own way.

The descriptions and conclusions presented here are based on personal interviews and observations of meetings. We made repeat visits to each of the sites and conducted personal interviews with most staff members of the moment. We also attended meetings between CeaseFire headquarters and its sites and community partners, and observed many local social, political and organizing activities.

#### **A “Host Organization” Model for Program Implementation**

CeaseFire is administered by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP). It is housed at the University of Illinois’ School of Public Health, which is located on the near west side of Chicago. CPVP was formed in 1995 with the mission of reducing violence by working with community, city, county, state and national partners in designing community violence prevention programs. Developing and implementing CeaseFire was but one of their roles, but it was a major one. One job of CPVP was to identify areas that could benefit from CeaseFire, and to select a community-based organization to administer and house the program locally. This report refers to these local organizations as “host” organizations or agencies. Once a site and partner host organization were selected, CPVP continued to be involved in the operation of the program. The central office provided technical assistance and training to the sites, helped them develop a comprehensive violence reduction plan, and prepared staff for their various roles within the program through an extensive training program. CPVP actively monitored the workload of the sites, and reviewed their files to ensure that suitable clients were being served. Additionally, CPVP facilitated a variety of weekly and monthly meetings for the sites’ steering

committees, violence prevention coordinators, and the CeaseFire outreach staff. CPVP also provided information, guidance and models of best practices for the CeaseFire staff through workshops. Program headquarters also produced printed materials, signs, bumper stickers and tee-shirts for the sites to distribute locally. Crucially, CPVP also played a major role in securing and maintaining funding for the sites, generally passing through state and federal monies to their local partners.

A number of factors determined where CeaseFire sites were situated and who served as the host organization. The major criterion for site selection was the level of violence in an area. As we shall see later in this chapter, most sites were located in high-crime communities. Another determining factor was whether there was sufficient community capacity to deliver a program in the area. Prior to site selection, the CPVP staff canvassed candidate areas to discern whether there were community-based organizations that could house and administer CeaseFire activities. A few sites and host organizations were selected after they took a proactive role, lobbying for CPVP's attention because they felt their community needed the program and they could deliver it. In the early phases of the campaign, CeaseFire was not just selecting sites; some sites were picking CeaseFire. In other areas, multiple organizations vied for the opportunity to host CeaseFire, offering choices for CPVP. However, in resource-poor locales there could be a dearth of qualified local organizations, and CPVP was sometimes hard pressed to find an effective local partner. In those cases, as a program could only be fielded if it was directed by CPVP itself, or perhaps by a local government. CeaseFire's governmental partners included a park district and a village department, and at one location a politician's office was used temporarily to house the program. Sometimes politicians pushed for a favored site, and at other times it was community leaders connected with a local nonprofit organization. Another important factor in site selection was the level of political support that existed for an area. In a few instances political leaders, notably state legislators, played a role in determining where sites were located, because their participation was key in securing continuing funding for the program. The host agencies needed to be well-positioned to understand local needs, and more able than CPVP headquarters to connect with other local groups to form partnerships that could deliver services to their clients and the community, so local connections of all kinds were an important in fielding an effective program. Most of the host agencies that were active during the evaluation period, and all of the newer sites, were selected competitively, based on a formal review of the evidence.

. This included occasions when outreach workers were not identifying and serving the required number or type of clients; and when serious complaints were lodged against the host agency itself. In these cases, CPVP staff reviewed the program and gave host agencies feedback. They were told they had to "clean up their act" if their contract was to be renewed for the next fiscal year.

The host agencies were responsible for delivering the program on a day-by-day basis, implementing the CeaseFire model locally using the organizational structure recommended by CPVP. The hosts were responsible for outreach, coalition building, and public education activities in their community. A formal contract was signed between CPVP and the host agency that included a description of the scope of work they were to conduct. The host designated a

violence prevention coordinator to be the full-time administrator of the program. The first task of the host was to develop a violence prevention plan. This plan was to take into account local problems, makeup of community, and resources within the community that could be leveraged on behalf of violence prevention. Then, hosts were to begin community outreach and, with CPVP's assistance, build a staff. Typically this included an outreach supervisor and four or so outreach workers. They were responsible for the outreach and public education efforts. In 2004, CPVP added a new component to the program, violence interrupters. They were centrally hired, trained and supervised, but they were to work locally and coordinate their efforts with the host agencies.

The hosts' outreach efforts included a broad range of activities, and these are described in detail in the next chapter. For many clients, the host agency's office served as a drop-in center where they could safely and privately meet with their outreach worker. Outreach workers often expedited getting their clients into alternative schools or helped them earn a GED credential. Outreach workers assisted clients in connecting to needed services, including housing, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and job readiness skills. They sought to provide clients with alternatives to using drugs and hanging out with street gang members. Some host agencies' facilities included computing, recreational and meeting areas. These provided clients with a physical space to work on their resumes, search the web for possible jobs, and interact with other clients in a safe environment.

Host agencies were also to have a strong relationship with area clergy and businesses. Their link to the education community was less structured, and varied by site, but many provided clients with support if they were trying to stay in school. Many schools welcomed having additional people assisting them with violence prevention, but schools were generally not home to CeaseFire's target population of high-risk youths, and many thought that devoting too many resources to school-based activities was diversionary. Host agencies tried to partner with local organizations havingh gymnasiums, so that their clients could have special opportunities to meet with CeaseFire staff and interact with other young people from the area in a safe and diverting manner. The public education component of the program model was to be carried out by outreach workers while they were canvassing the community for support. They were to distribute posters, pamphlets and buttons to local businesses, politicians offices, schools and residents. Often the outreach workers engaged their clients to help them with this task. This kept clients involved and allowed them to contribute to the community.

### **Organization Structure**

The basic structure for a CeaseFire site included an executive director of the host agency, a violence prevention coordinator who reported to the director, an outreach worker supervisor, outreach workers and, usually, at least one violence interrupter. The executive director's involvement varied from site to site. Some worked directly with their staff and were involved with CeaseFire; others were not. The host agency was responsible for hiring a violence prevention coordinator, whose primary job was to build and sustain community partnerships. The community partners most often involved with CeaseFire were local clergy, schools, police,

businesses, social service providers, community groups, and politicians. The violence prevention coordinators varied a great deal in terms of their level of involvement in the program. Ideally they were highly involved, created a violence prevention plan, and were actively working on developing partners within their community. However, this often did not occur. Perhaps the biggest reason for this was that most violence prevention coordinators originally worked for the host agency and were reassigned to work on CeaseFire, and allegiance lay with their primary employer. Even though CeaseFire had raised the money for their salaries, they viewed themselves as employees of the host agency. Many executive directors had them so busy writing grant proposals and doing support activities for the agency, that their CeaseFire work was secondary. They were asked to attend monthly meetings at CPVP, but many had schedule conflicts and did not have much direct contact with program developers or other violence prevention coordinators. One CPVP staff member felt that the violence prevention coordinators were not active in local coalition building because they were concerned that CeaseFire might want to make those other organizations their replacement host – “they are afraid of us contracting with other agencies.” However, we saw no evidence that they had ever done so. However, this sense of competition could impede coalition building. Some violence prevention coordinators created very thorough and comprehensive plans, and then followed through on them but they were in the minority. Toward the end of the evaluation period CPVP began to focus more on the role of violence prevention coordinators, and several proved to exemplify what the program was trying to accomplish.

Host agencies were also responsible for working with CPVP to hire the remaining staff – an outreach worker supervisor and outreach workers. This hiring process varied from site to site. Most of the outreach staff were hired through a panel composed of CPVP staff and a variety of local professionals including police, clergy, and other CeaseFire stakeholders. Often the outreach worker supervisor sat on these panels as well. The panels reviewed the qualifications and readiness of applicants. Because applicants were generally ex-offenders and former gang members, it was important to gauge their willingness to effectively participate in an anti-violence program. On the job, outreach staff were involved in neighborhood canvassing, distribution of public education and CeaseFire materials throughout the community, recruitment and case management of high-risk clients, and participation in shooting responses.

Supervisors were selected both from outside the CeaseFire program and from within. Many first served successfully as outreach workers and demonstrated leadership qualities. Their primary role was to guide and supervise the outreach staff. The supervisors were responsible for making sure that outreach workers recruited appropriate clients and documented their work in a manner that was both confidential and sufficiently specific to meet CPVP’s monitoring requirements. Additionally, they provided training in areas such as anger management and other life skills for their outreach staff.

The relationships that developed between the violence prevention coordinators, supervisors and outreach workers varied. In some sites the violence prevention coordinator took the lead, in other sites the outreach supervisor did more of the organizing. In sites where there was not a strong violence prevention coordinator, supervisors took on additional responsibilities,

such as organizing shooting responses and community events. In other sites we saw conflicts when outreach supervisors were promoted. Additionally, not all outreach supervisors were able to work with a staff that had a street background. One supervisor thought the outreach staff should put forth more “positive role models” for their clients, and he felt that the reputation of his staff reflected poorly on him. However, identifying staff members who could legitimately communicate the message that it is possible to turn one’s life around was a strategic consideration driving CeaseFire’s hiring policies, and this was not a common view.

The sites also were served by violence interrupters, whose jobs are described in detail in Chapter 5. They were selected, trained, and supervised by CPVP, but assigned to specific sites. The violence interrupters’ primary role was to intervene and prevent street violence. The host agencies were to facilitate the integration of the violence interrupters into their own staff via weekly staff meetings and continuous communication regarding violence in the neighborhood. Most violence interrupters were former “influentials” (held high ranking positions) in gangs and had a long relationship with many people they encountered on the street.

Most of the host agency staff was to be involved in responses to shootings and killings in the community. These responses included marches, rallies and prayer vigils, and often involved CeaseFire’s community partners and other organization impacted by violence. When a shooting occurred, CeaseFire staff were to go door-to-door, building community awareness of violence and asking for their participation in marches and other events. Everyone was encouraged to have a voice during the response, to help send the message that they would no longer tolerate violence as a method of problem-solving in their community. Changing the way a community thought about violence was a significant focus of the model underlying CeaseFire. Rather than accepting violence as a norm, residents had to learn that it was destructive to families and harmful to their community’s stability.

## **The Sites and Host Organizations**

### **Predominately African American Sites**

Table 2-1 provides brief profiles of conditions in the eleven predominately African American target areas. Except for the target neighborhood in the City of Rockford, a regional site, all were more than 80 percent African American in 2000. The Table also presents the percentage of persons living below the poverty line in 2000, and it is apparent that in most sites many residents were very poor. There are also reports of two measures of violence that will be revisited in Chapter 7, on the impact of CeaseFire: gun murders and shootings. The latter includes aggravated assaults and aggravated batteries in which a gun was used. Both figures are rates per 10,000 residents, and two years of data (for 2005 and 2006) were averaged in order to present a stable picture of the extent of violence in these areas.

Table 2-1  
African American CeaseFire Site Demography

Site	population 2000	percent black 2000	percent individuals in poverty	gun murder rate*	shooting rate*
Auburn Gresham	10,759	98.6	23.7	1.72	36.6
Austin	7,759	97.8	25.6	1.00	34.4
East Garfield Park	8,001	97.6	46.2	1.85	34.5
Englewood	5,879	98.5	30.6	6.41	54.0
Grand Boulevard	5,505	98.0	33.1	1.88	34.4
Maywood	13,762	96.5	11.8		24.6
Rockford	3,965	73.1	32.0		
West Garfield Park	3,107	98.1	39.6	4.43	48.8
West Humboldt Park	8,902	83.3	29.4	2.83	39.3
Roseland	11,882	98.3	20.4	3.46	48.7
Woodlawn	8,152	95.6	49.4	1.87	34.8
City of Chicago	2,896,000	36.9	19.3	1.18	16.7


\* rate per 10,000 residents, 2005 and 2006 average

When it came to violent crime, **Englewood** was in its own category. The homicide rate there was five times the city's figure, and not quite twice as high as Roseland, the second most deadly area on this list. Englewood's ranking was not a one-time problem – the gun homicide rate of 6.4 per 10,000 presented above was an average of two yearly figures that were both very high. In those two years, the homicide rate in Englewood was one third higher than in Jamaica, Venezuela, South Africa or Colombia, the nations which typically lead the world in violence. City-wide crime hot spot maps like those presented in Chapter 7 of this report often identify the Englewood police district as the "hottest" spot in the city.

White flight from this originally German, Irish and Italian community began in the late 1950s, for Englewood was not far from the traditionally African American Black Belt. The reaction by the community was a violent one. The Chicago Commission on Human Relations reported that, between 1945 and 1950 Englewood ranked second in the number of "racial incidents." These included arson, bombings, vandalism and the stoning of blacks seen on the street. But by 1970, greater Englewood was 97 percent African American. A low-rise neighborhood featuring many small single-family homes, much of Englewood's housing stock is in disrepair and of little value on the real estate market. Its previously booming commercial corridor likewise deteriorated. Until the 1960s, Englewood was home to the city's most vigorous retailing center outside of the central business district. But by the 1980s customers were scarce

and the area's large anchor department stores were shuttered.<sup>1</sup> After an unsuccessful start with another host agency, the Englewood site was adopted by the TARGET Area Development Corporation. TARGET successfully lobbied to conduct the program in their home neighborhood, Auburn Gresham (see below), but they took on Englewood as a satellite project. A skeletal operation, Englewood was funded at only 60 percent of the level of other sites.

Figure 2-1  
African American Sites



Three other African American sites were particularly poor: Woodlawn, East Garfield Park, and West Garfield Park. The location of these areas is depicted in Figure 2-1, on a map of Chicago's 77 official community areas. A middle-class white neighborhood until the 1950s, **Woodlawn** was the worst off. Almost half of all Woodlawn residents lived below the poverty line in 2000, and (not shown in Table 2-1) 52 percent of all households reported incomes of less than \$15,000 per year. Woodlawn's CeaseFire host organization, The Woodlawn Organization was founded in the early 1960s, in partnership with the legendary community organizer Saul Alinsky. TWO rapidly gained political power, serving as the widely-recognized the voice of the community. Over time the organization took on many economic and social development functions. The organization provides a broad spectrum of social services and runs an extensive real estate and housing development operation.

In **East Garfield Park** almost as many residents lived in poverty, and (not shown) nearly 30 percent of all households were made up of children with only a female family head, an important measure of family dissolution. Looting and arson attendant to riots in Chicago following the death of Martin Luther King destroyed the area's principal commercial corridor. The burned buildings were not rebuilt, and between 1960 and 2000 the population of the larger community area within which CeaseFire operates dropped by almost 70 percent. A 2006 study concluded that the East Garfield Park community area had the highest concentration of returning prisoners in the City of Chicago. The host in East Garfield Park was AGAPE, a faith-based and pastor-led organization primarily involved with youth development and services for young

<sup>1</sup>The brief community profiles presented here were drawn from a variety of local sources, particularly The Encyclopedia of Chicago History, the Chicago Local Community Fact Book, municipal web sites, and the Neighborhood History Research Collection of the Harold Washington Public Library.

people ranging from the 7th grade through high school. AGAPE also served youths through a juvenile court diversion program.

Conditions in **West Garfield Park** were almost as dire, and this was the second most dangerous CeaseFire site. Originally an Irish and Eastern European Jewish community, middle-class black families began to move into West Garfield Park in the late 1950s, as African Americans began to move out of the city's traditional Black Belt in large numbers. But by the end of the 1960s these families had in turn moved to the suburbs. The large apartment blocks in West Garfield Park, which were managed by absentee landlords, began to fill with a poorer clientele. Between 1960 and 2000, the area's population dropped by 50 percent, and real estate values plummeted in parallel. The host in West Garfield Park and West Humboldt park was Bethel New Life, Inc. Bethel is a large community-based development and social services organizations engaged in a broad range of activities in the area. CeaseFire clients most heavily relied on Bethel's employment center, computer facility, and financial counseling. In addition, Bethel provides daycare, a homeless shelter, and a prisoner reentry program.

CeaseFire's **West Humboldt Park** site lay immediately to the north and west of West Garfield Park, and the two shared Bethel New Life as their host agency. Once home to immigrant Poles, Russian Jews, Italians and Germans, the area includes a large derelict industrial site that was once a symbol of economic prosperity in the region. Today many sections are dotted with vacant lots where abandoned buildings that were beyond redemption or scarred by arson were demolished. The strength of the area's rental housing was undermined by the deferred maintenance practices of absentee landlords, and more recently the area has been targeted by predatory mortgage lending companies.

Three predominantly African American CeaseFire sites were in (relatively) better shape: Austin, Auburn-Gresham, and Roseland. "Only" 26 percent of **Austin** residents were living below the poverty line in 2000. In the 1960 Census the wider Austin community area was 99.8 percent white, and until the 1970s it remained a solidly middle-class German, Irish and Italian area organized around strong Roman Catholic parishes. By the 1980s Austin was also predominately African American, and housing disinvestment, abandonment and demolition scarred this neighborhood of brick two- and three-flats and courtyard apartment buildings. The host in Austin was Youth Outreach Services, a community-based and nationally accredited social service agency that works with communities, schools, local police, courts, other agencies, and community groups in providing a broad range of services to children, youth, and families. It is supported by contracts with many state agencies.

In **Auburn-Gresham**, 24 percent of the population lived below the poverty line in 2000. As in many other parts of Chicago's Southwest side, African Americans escaping the city's decaying Black Belt began to move into the area in large numbers during the 1970s. In contrast to many such neighborhoods, Auburn-Gresham's residents organized to respond to racial transition in an affirmative way. Churches and civic organizations attempted to educate residents and manage property values by confronting the "blockbusting" tactics of real estate companies. Unscrupulous realtors profited by frightening white residents into selling their homes to them for



below-market rates, homes which they then quickly resold at a mark-up to incoming, often middle-income, African Americans. For a half-decade, Auburn-Gresham persisted in this effort, but eventually classic forces – absentee ownership, redlining by mortgage and insurance companies, and commercial disinvestment – swamped their efforts. By the 1980s, many residential properties were in disrepair, stores were boarded up, and gangs and drugs swept the community. More recently a wave of community organizing and a resurgence of investment in businesses and housing has awakened segments of the community.

The TARGET Area Development Corporation that adopted Englewood was the founding host organization for CeaseFire in Auburn-Gresham. TARGET is a faith-based program that had an early focus on land use planning and commercial development in the community. They have since expanded to sponsor job development programs and to provide support for returning prisoners. TARGET had a staff of 25 full-time and 6 part-time employees, and during the evaluation it incubated a spin-off organization, Safe Cities Incorporated, to handle its criminal justice operations.

Table 2-2  
Host Organizations for African American Sites

Site	Host Organization	Type/Mission	Program Dates
Auburn-Gresham	TARGET Area Development Corporation	economic development; faith based	08/01 - 08/07
Austin	Youth Outreach Services	service provider	01/06 - 08/07
East Garfield Park	Agape Youth & Family Support Services	service provider; faith based	10/05 - 08/07
Englewood	TARGET Area Development Corporation	economic development; faith based	04/04 - 06/06
Grand Boulevard	Grand Boulevard Federation	community advocacy	12/05 - 08/07
Maywood	1-Vision of Restoration	1-faith based	03/04 - 01/05
	2-Village of Maywood	2-city government	02/05 - 08/07
Rockford	1-Let's Talk It Out	service provider and referral	05/04 - 08/03
	2-Hands That Help		05/03 - 08/07
Roseland	Genesis Urban Development	community development	08/06 - 08/07
Woodlawn	The Woodlawn Organization	service provider; faith based; political	12/05 - 08/07
West Garfield Park	1-Bethel New Life	community advocacy, organizing taken over by headquarters	02/00 - 09/06
	2-CPVP		
West Humboldt Park	1-W. Humboldt Pk. Development Council	community advocacy, organizing taken over by headquarters	03/00 - 09/06
	2-Bethel New Life		
	3-CPVP		

**Roseland** was the largest, and by some measures the best off, of CeaseFire's African American sites. Its poverty rate stood just above the city-wide average. Racial transition in this far-southside neighborhood began somewhat later than in other CeaseFire sites, but the closing of the Pullman Car Works and the collapse of the steel industry in the 1970s accelerated the area's population turnover. By the end of the 1980s, Roseland was plagued by housing abandonment and HUD repossessions. Its central Michigan Avenue commercial district, which had been home to branches of many of the city's largest and most well-known stores, stood shuttered. Genesis Urban Development, a very small faith-based organization, was the host organization in Roseland. The Roseland site was relatively large, with almost 12,000 residents in 2000, and this gave them a lot of work to do – there were more than 100 shootings in Roseland in both 2005 and 2006.

**Grand Boulevard's** shooting rate stood at twice the city average, and about a third of all residents were living below the poverty line in 2000. Close to the downtown and centered around a truly grand, tree-lined street – Grand Boulevard – the northern end of this community was originally home to many elegant mansions. By the 1920's African Americans made up more than one-third of the population, and in the 1930s Grand Boulevard was the hub of "Bronzeville," the city's thriving African American community. Bronzeville's central cultural institution, the Regal Theater, was located in what much later became CeaseFire's target area, one bounded on the west by a renamed Grand Boulevard – now known as Martin Luther King Drive. But by the 1960s the area had deteriorated physically. The disappearance of jobs in the nearby stockyards and the collapse of the steel industry brought unemployment, and massive public housing projects located to the west of CeaseFire's site brought concentrated poverty. The local host, the Grand Boulevard Federation, was originally set up in 1995, with funding through the State of Illinois from the Anne E. Casey Foundation. Its other programs focus on asthma education, and they work with community organizations, school staff, and parents on youth development projects.

Always a blue collar community, suburban **Maywood** has struggled economically since its principal industry, a can company, closed in the 1970s. The town's retail base then declined, and its anchor department stores closed. Maywood as a whole has a population of 27,000, and in 2000 was 85 percent African-American. CeaseFire's target neighborhood – which encompasses half the population of the town – was 96 percent black. Chicago's major gangs are active here, including the Four Corner Hustlers and the Black Mafia. After working unsuccessfully with a local non-profit, CPVP partnered with the Village of Maywood itself. Until offices could be found, the program was housed in the political office of the state representative who secured funding for CeaseFire-Maywood. At the time its funding ran out, Maywood had by far the largest client caseload of any CeaseFire site.

Founded at about the same time as Chicago, by the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century **Rockford** was a regional industrial city, a center for manufacturing machine tools, furniture and agricultural equipment. But by Century's end many of these establishments had disappeared, and others had downsized. Rockford's 2000 population of 150,000 was 17 percent African American. Rather ignominiously, in the 1990s Rockford was identified as one America's worst cities by Rand

McNally and Money magazine. Around the city center where the CeaseFire site was located there were few jobs and swaths of abandoned factories, mixed with extremely blighted residential areas. As indicated in Table 2-1, residents of the area were poorer than many of the African American sites located in Chicago. In 2000, 32 percent of residents were living below the poverty line, and 40 percent of households consisted of female-headed families. That year, the median household income in Rockford's CeaseFire's site was only \$21,000. The host in Rockford, Hands That Help, began the program with private donations, funding from the City of Rockford, and money from the state legislature. The organization was described as "a community based organization working within Rockford that is not faith-based, but is a church collaborative." Other than CeaseFire, its primary activity is to provide food, clothing, and housing services, tasks that are staffed by volunteers.

Two other predominately African American CeaseFire sites – Decatur and East St. Louis – were located far from Chicago, and will not be considered in any detail in this report. Another, located in another section of Chicago's Englewood neighborhood, was barely underway when CeaseFire lost most of its funding in mid-2007. At that point the West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park sites, which had been closed a year earlier, were merged and re-opened as a new "11<sup>th</sup> District" site, and operated by CPVP using federal funds. CPVP also managed a violence interrupter-only site in the West Lawndale community area. The 2005-2006 gun homicide rate in this very dangerous area almost equaled that of Englewood.

### **Predominately Latino Sites**

CeaseFire also sponsored programs in predominately Latino communities, including two in regional cities in the vicinity of Chicago. The Latino sites mainly fell near the Chicago average when it came to the proportion of residents living in poverty, and some were below that average when it came to violent crime. They were home to struggling, but working, families. More families than average had children living at home; in Little Village that figure was 65 percent, while it was only 30 percent in more diverse Rogers Park. Latino families were largely intact; the proportion of female-headed households was as low as 8 percent in Brighton Park, and 9 percent in Little Village, and the rate at which residents received public assistance in 2000 was also low, under 10 percent in every site.

Table 2-3 below presents summary indicators of the social composition and crime problems facing these communities.

The **Little Village** site was located in a formerly Czech, Polish and Irish neighborhood that now is the largest Latino community in the central United States. In 2000, 87 percent of residents reported that they spoke Spanish at home, and 41 percent of those responding to the Census were not citizens of the United States. Typical of the city's immigrant neighborhoods, only 36 percent of adult residents of Little Village had graduated from high school, the lowest of any CeaseFire site. But at the same time, "La Villita" is a dense, bustling neighborhood surrounding a vibrant central commercial corridor. The schools are full, and the area's Roman Catholic churches bustle with activity. Little Village's very low two-year average homicide rate

of 0.82 included both a higher (1.4) and a very low (0.27) year. This instability was typical of the area, for the homicide rate in Little Village is dependent upon the activities of one dominant gang, the Latin Kings. The local host, the Little Village Community Development Corporation, runs stay-in-school and back-to-school programs with schools and parents, does land use planning, conducts housing counseling, and is the local lead agency for a large housing and community development project supported by LISC and the MacArthur Foundation. CeaseFire is a sub-component of LVDC’s long-standing violence prevention initiative.


Table 2-3  
Latino CeaseFire Site Demography

Site	population 2000	percent Latino 2000	percent individuals in poverty	gun murder rate*	shooting rate*
Aurora	39,676	65.6	13.5		
Brighton Park	19,324	74.8	16.7	1.08	13.6
Cicero	85,616	77.4	15.5		
Humboldt Park	13,178	74.8	36.3	1.34	19.4
Little Village	20,376	93.4	22.5	0.82	13.5
Logan Square	13,728	78.0	20.0	1.05	9.3
City of Chicago	2,896,000	26.1	19.6	1.18	16.7

\* rate per 10,000 residents, 2005 and 2006 average

**Brighton Park** is located south of Little Village, separated from it by the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal and a string of commercial and industrial establishments and railroad lines running along the south bank of the canal. Originally a manufacturing stronghold, the area’s population declined following the de-industrialization of the 1970s. More recently, however, a steady stream of Latinos, many of them immigrants, have moved into the area, and its population has rebounded. In 2000, two-thirds of the residents of the target area in Brighton Park reported speaking Spanish at home, 45 percent of all residents were foreign born, and less than half of all adults had graduated from high school. The first host organization for the area, the Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, quickly fell into an adversarial relationship with area politicians and the police. After being closed for awhile, the site was re-opened under the auspices of the Peace and Education Coalition. Originally founded by a coalition of church and school activists, the group otherwise focuses on alternative schools and GED programs, and hosts youth summits on leadership. They also work with parents on domestic violence and gang issues.

Figure 2-2  
Latino Sites



CeaseFire’s **Logan Square** site is home to a diverse population of Latinos, some hailing from Mexico and Puerto Rico, and others from Cuba. Crisscrossed by wide boulevards, Logan Square’s relatively inexpensive but often large homes have since the 2000 Census attracted an influx of young artists and professionals, and the eastern end of the area has been gentrifying rapidly. Adapting, Logan Square’s host organization – the Alliance of Logan Square Organizations, or ALSO – expanded their program to encompass two beats to the south. This area was an appropriate target – the new **Humboldt Park** site, opened in March 2007, was the poorest of the predominately Latino sites. It was home to the most female-headed family households and was the highest recipient of public aid of any of the predominately Latino areas. It also recorded the highest shooting and homicide rates on this list. The local host, ALSO, is a large and professionally staffed community and youth services agency that coalesced from an alliance of community organizations, and it coordinates the

activities that those groups contribute.

Outside of Chicago, **Aurora** lies to the southwest, on the Fox River. Once a manufacturing powerhouse, a massive round of factory closings began in Aurora in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s the town’s unemployment rate reached 16 percent. The opening of a riverboat gambling casino in the late 1990s brought some life back to the downtown, but the old factories remain shuttered. Aurora’s CeaseFire program focused on the rapidly-growing Latino segment of the community, which clusters around the city center on both sides of the river. Almost two-thirds of the residents of the target area were Hispanic in origin, and 40 percent were born abroad. However, they were somewhat better off than residents of the predominately Latino sites located in Chicago. Fewer lived below the poverty line, more adults (48 percent) were high school graduates, and rates of public assistance were low, at under 4 percent. The local host was the Association for Individual Development. A very large organization, AID has numerous offices spread across the western end of the Chicagoland area. It offers more than twenty programs for individuals with developmental or physical disabilities and those in need of behavioral health services or crisis intervention. AID provides case management and home-based support, vocational training, counseling, alcohol and drug case management, homeless youth services, 24-hour crisis intervention units and victim services.

Table 2-4  
Host Organizations for Latino Sites

Site	Host Organization	Type/Mission	Program Dates
Aurora	Association for Individual Development	education, training, crisis intervention, counseling, alcohol & drug services	07/05 - 08/07
Brighton Park	1-Brighton Park Neighborhood Council 2-Peace and Education Coalition	2-education and housing services, counseling, parenting	1-04/04 - 06/06 2- 07/06 - 08-07
Cicero	Corazon Community Services	youth services, mentoring	04/07 - 08/07
Humboldt Park	ALSO, housed at La Capilla Del Barrio Ministry Center	umbrella group bringing together service providers	03/07 - 08-07
Little Village	Little Village Community Development Corporation	community & economic development	12/05 - 08/07
Logan Square	Alliance of Logan Square Organizations (ALSO)	local service providers	06/00 - 08/07

The **Cicero** program, in contrast to the others, targeted an entire city. In the 1920s, the gangster Al Capone had his headquarters in Cicero, a handy place that was close to Chicago but out of range of its police. During the 1960s, Cicero’s overwhelmingly white, predominately Eastern European residents successfully kept African Americans from moving into their community. Later, the city’s economic engine, a giant Western Electric manufacturing plant, closed, and the town began to decline. Latinos – including a significant number of Puerto Ricans – began moving into Cicero in large numbers in the 1980s, and by 2000 this town of 86,000 was more than 75 percent Hispanic. Their in-migration into an aging community drove a 25 percent increase in the city’s population following 1990, and has brought Cicero new residential and commercial vitality. Like residents of Aurora, a comparatively small fraction of town residents (16 percent) lived below the poverty line in 2000, but only 48 percent had graduated from high school. CeaseFire in Cicero enjoyed strong support from city government, the police, and local politicians. The local host, Corazon Community Services, also ran a small youth center and other community services, but CeaseFire constituted a large fraction of its overall budget.

### **Diverse Sites or Programs**

As noted earlier, CeaseFire’s program model emphasized the importance of recruiting “culturally appropriate” staff with roots in the immediate community and a connection to the area’s predominant gang. CeaseFire’s offices inevitably were situated within the confines of one or another gang’s turf, making them unsafe places for those with different affiliations to be seen. Given the realities of residential segregation in Chicago and the racial basis of gang recruitment, these operating rules added up to a strong bias toward programs serving only one racially homogeneous group or another in each site. In fact, of the whole list, only two CeaseFire sites served diverse target areas: Albany Park and Rogers Park, both located on the North Side of Chicago. But the clients that Albany Park served were 80 percent Latino, and 60 percent of

Rogers Park’s clients were African Americans, so these sites were not particularly diverse in day-to-day operation. Southwest and North Chicago/Waukegan sponsored programs in pairs of racially contrasting areas, running their daily operations separately using staff members recruited because of their background and experience within each area.

Table 2-5  
Diverse Sites and Programs Demography

Site	population 2000	percent Black 2000	percent Latino 2000	percent whites and others	percent individuals in poverty	gun murder rate*	shooting rate*
Albany Park	14,797	6.4	50.9	42.7	25.0	0.70	3.2
N. Chicago/Waukegan							
North Chicago	5,672	71.9	19.8	8.3	23.7		
Waukegan	38,752	18.6	59.8	21.6			
Rogers Park	15,403	31.3	28.5	40.2	4.8	0.49	6.6
Southwest							
African-American	10,116	76.4	19.1	4.5	17.2	3.39	28.5
Latino	20,198	20.3	61.5	18.2	19.8	1.45	23.3
City of Chicago	2,896,000	36.9	26.1	37.0	19.6	1.18	16.7

\* rate per 10,000 resident, 2005 and 2006 average


CeaseFire’s **Southwest** host, the Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP), managed programs in two adjacent beats, one predominately African American and the other Latino is composition. The predominately African American program began in the City’s Chicago Lawn community area in October 2002. African Americans began moving into this formerly Polish, Czech and Lithuanian neighborhood in the late 1960s, when the South Side of Chicago experienced a period of immense racial transition. by 2000 the targeted area was 76 percent African American, and suffered from a high gun murder rate.

In October 2006, SWOP hired Latino outreach workers and also began operations in a beat to the west, in Chicago’s West Lawn neighborhood. This target area lies in a part of the city currently undergoing another tremendous transition, as newcomers – primarily Mexican-Americans – move into the area in large numbers. In 2000, almost 60 percent of this target area’s residents reported speaking Spanish at home. They were at the city average in terms of poverty, and like other predominately Latino sites had relatively few female-headed families and low rates of public assistance. SWOP itself is an umbrella group supported by 30 community-based organizations active on Chicago's Southwest side. It is a multi-issue agency that coordinates diverse services and activities.

CeaseFire in **Rogers Park** was located in one of the most diverse areas of the city. In 2000 the program area was roughly equally divided among African Americans, Latinos and whites, at about 30 percent each, while Asians (7 percent) and others (3 percent) made up the

remainder. The 2000 poverty rate was quite low, only a fraction of the City average. The area is broadly diverse in terms of age and income, and is home to immigrants from many regions. Since 2000 the area has faced gentrification pressures, with rental housing being converted to condominiums at a steady pace. As Table 2-5 indicates, rates of shootings and killings were quite low in the Rogers Park target area; both measures fell far below the city average. A major impetus for establishing a site in the area was that a powerful state legislator wanted a visible crime prevention program in the most troubled part of his district, and he arranged state funding for CeaseFire’s Rogers Park site. CPVP selected the Organization of the Northeast (ONE) as the host organization, and the program began in April 2004. Except for CeaseFire, ONE does not itself provide services. It is an association of 80 different dues-paying institutions, including religious bodies (churches, temples, synagogues, churches), ethnic associations, businesses and non-profits (schools, universities, social service agencies, youth agencies). ONE includes organizations from and serves the neighborhoods of Rogers Park, Uptown, Edgewater, and West Ridge.

Figure 2-3  
Diverse Sites



**Albany Park** is a dense residential and commercial area that is growing in population. In 2000, about half of the site’s residents were Latinos, with whites and Asians (both at about 20 percent) making up most of the rest. In this mix are people from the Philippines, India, Korea, Cambodia, Serbia, Romania, Pakistan and the Middle East. Overall, 55 percent of the residents of the target area were foreign born in 2000, and 42 percent were not US citizens; by both measures, Albany Park was home to the highest concentration of immigrants in this report. The local host, the Albany Park Community Center, established the program in October 2005, and it operated until the funding crisis of summer of 2007. Although it enjoyed the support of its legislative representatives, Albany Park competed to be CeaseFire’s designated host in the area. A strength of the program was the broad range of services provided by the Community Center, ranging from Head Start and early childhood education through youth services, work force development, after

school programs, senior services, drug treatment and counseling, recycling, a food pantry, and English as a Second Language classes.



Table 2-6  
Host Organizations for Diverse Sites and Programs

Site	Host Organization	Type/Mission	Program Dates
Albany Park	Albany Park Community Center	broad range of human services	10/05 - 08/07
North Chicago/Waukegan			
North Chicago	1-North Chicago Park District	local government	1-10/05 - 06/06
Waukegan	2-Waukegan Township		2-10/06 - 08/07
Rogers Park	Organization of the Northeast (ONE)	economic development/advocacy	04/04 - 08/07
Southwest		community based leadership	
African-American	Southwest Organizing Project	development, issue advocacy and	10-02 - 08/07
Latino	(SWOP)	youth services	10/06 - 08/07

Outside of the City, CeaseFire was first implemented in a predominately African American section of the city of **North Chicago** in 2005. It closed in June 2006, following a dispute between program staff and its funding agency, and when it reopened with new funding in October 2006 the program expanded to include **Waukegan**, a community lying further north. One of the four political wards that lay in Waukegan's program area was primarily African American in composition, but the remaining three wards were largely Hispanic. However, while North Chicago/Waukegan is listed among the diverse programs, only one Latino outreach worker was in the field and the program had attracted very few Latino clients when, a short time later, CeaseFire lost its funding.


Historically, North Chicago was known for its large concentration of Eastern European immigrants. With the onset of the "Great Migration," large numbers of African Americans arrived in the city from states such as Arkansas and Alabama, and, toward the end of the 20th Century, became one of the city's largest demographic groups. Recent years have seen relentless de-industrialization and consequent loss of jobs in North Chicago. Though they live in what is one of the poorer towns on the North Shore, North Chicago citizens bear an unusually heavy residential tax burden. Much of North Chicago is a naval training base and is untaxable, and the tax burden on surrounding private residences is among the highest in Illinois. At the same time, of the 261 municipalities in the six counties surrounding Chicago, North Chicago ranked 253rd in per capita income in 2000. Although this city of 36,000 was 37 percent African American in 2000, the CeaseFire target area was 72 percent African American.

Though largely a residential community, Waukegan also is an industrial center, home to such companies as Abbott Laboratories, Fansteel, Anchor Glass, Baxter International, and National Gypsum. In the latter twentieth century, shopping districts and financial, governmental, and legal services were added to the mix. The population of Waukegan was 67,653 in 1980, and 87,901 by 2000. By 2000, the small African American population that existed in Waukegan since the 1870s had grown to 19 percent of the population, with Latinos – at 60 percent – making up the largest group in the city.

## Crime Rates and Site Locations

By-and-large, the sites selected for involvement in the program were poor and/or high-crime areas. Truly consistent crime data for small program areas are available only for sites in the City of Chicago. Figure 2-4 utilizes them to plot the relative location of all of the city's 279 police beats on two measures. The first is an index of concentrated poverty, the other is the homicide rate in 2006.<sup>2</sup> The two measures are ranked from low to high, because the homicide rate was so statistically skewed by high-rate beats that no comparable chart could be otherwise be created. The Figure also indicates the median rank for each of the two measures. The positions of CeaseFire's target beats on the two measures are indicated by name.

Figure 2-4  
Homicide, Poverty and CeaseFire Sites



Except for Rogers Park, all of CeaseFire's target beats lay above the median with regard to poverty, and two Rogers Park beats were above the median when it came to homicide. A large


<sup>2</sup>The poverty index is a factor score loading heavily on rates of household poverty, public aid, and female headed families. The homicide rate is per 100,000 residents.

majority of the program beats were at or above the median with regard to crime. The high-poverty but low-homicide beats in the lower-right quadrant are areas that are home to many immigrants and Spanish-speakers.

### Trends in Program Capacity

Figure 2-5 charts the growth of CeaseFire over time. It depicts the number of operational programs during each calendar quarter between 2000 and 2007. Because they began and were run separately, it counts North Chicago and Waukegan as distinct programs, and likewise double-counts the African-American and Latino sites directed by the Southwest Organizing Project. It also includes North Lawndale’s violence interrupter program, but excludes sites operating in downstate Illinois.

Figure 2-5  
Number of Operational Sites by Quarter



As Figure 2-5 illustrates, CeaseFire built slowly through the end of 2003, when just five sites were active. Then the program went through three periods of expansion, beginning in early 2004, and again at the end of 2005 and in 2006. At its peak, CeaseFire was active in 22 sites in Chicago and the greater metropolitan area.

## Issues in Site and Host Selection

We have described how sites were selected and hosts chosen and organized, and presented a brief profile of their responsibilities and activities. In this section we present some observations regarding the execution of CeaseFire's host model for program delivery. We discuss issues that relate to the ability of hosts to manage and administer the program, provide services, connect with the community, and interact with local law enforcement and political leaders. How well do faith-based hosts function? Are host agencies that themselves provide multiple services more likely to serve clients than those that must make referrals outside their agency, and what are the implications of this for their engagement with the community? Do large and bureaucratic agencies or smaller, grass-roots organizations do the best job of delivering the program? Does the host agency type predict who will become a client and stay a client? What has been the impact of politics on site selection and program operations? What about host organizations that served broad areas, and were not particularly rooted in their CeaseFire target areas? These questions demonstrate how complicated the host organization landscape proved to be.

**High Need Areas.** The most salient reason for selecting many sites was local need. These areas had high violence and poverty rates, abundant gang activity, and low levels of community activism. In many instances the host agencies had strong political support, which not only helped them be selected but also facilitated their yearly lobbying for continued funding. In some places, however, it was difficult to find a suitable host agency, due to the limited organizational infrastructure of the area. These were barren and disenfranchised places. In one area over 700 abandoned buildings had been torn down since the beginning of the community policing era in an effort to eradicate problems that were associated with them, including drug use and prostitution. However, the area has not experienced any significant new growth or investment; during a ride-along in the area we saw empty lot after empty lot. Because there was a weak community base, implementing the CeaseFire program in places such as this was often very challenging. It took a great deal of effort to get the "ear" of community residents in areas where crime and violence were commonplace. Many residents had experienced the failure of other initiatives, programs that were begun with great fanfare, but then the funds were cut and the programs subsequently disappeared. CeaseFire was initially met with cynicism and indifference in these areas, and they took more effort to gather support.

**Funding Politics.** In other neighborhoods we found sites where political factors predominated when target areas and even host organizations were selected. Some of these areas were contending with violence issues, but others were much less troubled. Politically influential places had some advantages. They often had strong community-based organizations and vocal political representatives. Their activists were able to bring CeaseFire to the community through their political clout. Politically savvy places typically has several potential host agencies with a long history of bringing resources to their community. They were also the most likely to be re-funded on a predictable basis because of their political support. Many organizations in the area were also able to bolster their budgets by getting additional support from local organizations; fund-raising was a built-in part of their operations. While some did not provide direct services for

clients, they were well-connected with agencies in the community that did. These places had well established resources and programs making CeaseFire an easy “fit.”

Strong political connections had their downside as well. A few sites were politically driven, but were not well organized. But the push for their selection came from politicians who had their own ideas about the location of sites, and host agencies as well. Some legislators who supported CeaseFire expected that the organization would hire individuals that they referred to the program. Some felt that, because of their support, they should have some form of control over the site management. All politicians apparently felt that, because they supported CeaseFire, they could use the program in their campaign materials, threatening to make support for CeaseFire a political issue. CPVP staff believed that the program would have much stronger roots if it was supported by broad coalitions of community groups, local businesses, and clergy, rather than just by individual political leaders. However, support from these political leaders was needed each year in order to retain funding from the Illinois legislature.

**Local Rivalries.** In some areas there was competition to host a CeaseFire site. This led to tension among the vying organizations. At one site an agency was selected from another area to run the CeaseFire program. Local groups were upset by this, and CPVP dealt with the resulting tension by bringing in an area church to help in the administration of the program. Even when there was not initial interest in becoming a host agency, tensions arose as CeaseFire was implemented in some areas. Existing groups believed that CeaseFire’s mission was similar to their own and that they could address gun and gang problems with their own programs. Some charged that CeaseFire was “superficial” in its work with clients and did not provide services with any continuity. Still others felt that CeaseFire’s partnership with the police was a “conflict of interest” because CeaseFire’s client base is composed of such high-risk individuals.

**Faith-Based Hosts.** Several CeaseFire sites were hosted by faith-based organizations. One of the more salient features of many faith-based organizations was their inclination to use religion, or “finding God,” as a means of helping clients move away from violence. This was an attractive message for many potential clients, but unattractive to others. Some clients complained to their outreach workers or CPVP staff about the apparent requirement to participate in church-based activities as part of receiving program services. Some even cut their ties with CeaseFire because of pressure imposed by faith-based hosts to become associated with their church or to participate in church-related activities. Some outreach workers shared this concern. In our personal interviews, however, many outreach workers emphasized the role of faith in turning their own lives around, and argued in favor of faith-based host-partners. Not all faith-based agencies actively included faith in their messaging. Some were not particularly pious and others only promoted church involvement among their staff.

We also observed a tendency for faith-based hosts to work with lower-risk clients, because their background and demeanor was less offensive to their congregations and active members. One former host agency discouraged the highest-risk clients from entering their premises by imposing a strict dress code that forbade gang “colors.” This agency, along with others, also had a policy that prohibited them from hiring ex-felons. This would have virtually

eliminated most outreach workers at other sites, for CPVP viewed hiring former offenders as a strategic move toward building credibility with potential clients. CeaseFire was conducted from a public university where proselytizing and ostracizing employees or clients because of their past record was not looked upon favorably. Faith-based proselytizing also tended to scare off potential community partners. In a number of our interviews with partnering agencies we heard complaints that faith-based hosts were more interested in their religious agenda than focusing on CeaseFire's message.

But promoting religion remained the explicit mission of the faith-based host agencies CeaseFire worked with, and it was woven into their message on a daily basis. CPVP called for a strong clergy partnership because pastors were to play a prominent role in shooting responses and other CeaseFire events, and because they play a very influential role in many Chicago neighborhoods. Churches are among the best organized groups in many poor communities, and the clergy are community leaders. The situation seemed to call for compromise and balance on the part of host agencies and CPVP.

**In-House Services.** Several host agencies were themselves service providers. The services included, but were not limited to, housing, drug treatment, GED preparation, job training, parenting skills and anger management classes. These agencies had many staff layers, plentiful resources, and connections with religious and political leaders outside of their organization. They were able to provide services directly to CeaseFire clients. The services varied by host agency, but one particularly large host was practically self-sufficient, and had very little need to make outside referrals for clients because of the comprehensiveness of its offerings. Larger service providers were also very familiar with the grant-writing process, program documentation, staff management, and day-to-day office functions. While proficiency in these activities may sound like a given, we found that in many smaller, single-focus host agencies, they were not. A downside to the larger more organized agencies was that they were less likely to develop extensive partnerships or work building on their community base, because they were so self-contained. A community partner survey described in Chapter 6 found they had developed fewer allies. A few agencies, because of their proximity to other service provider's offices, had easy access to certain services, such as the unemployment office.

The larger service providing agencies also had a solid financial base and regarded CeaseFire as an add-on, bringing additional capacity to their programs. Many larger agencies had established salary and benefit packages, as well as a full range of human resource policies that addressed matters such drug-testing and employee conflict resolution. In contrast, smaller hosts who would suffer financially if the CeaseFire program did not continue at their site were being asked to devise and adhere to personnel systems they had never before needed and conduct administrative tasks with which they were unfamiliar. Many of these sites had poorly paid hourly workers and offered no employee benefits. At the smaller single-focus sites, handling a problem employee often meant termination rather than attempts to resolve the problem in a positive way.

**Fallout of Activism.** In a few sites we found host agencies with strained relationships with the police, and this interfered with the implementation of CeaseFire. For example, one host

agency had been very active politically in the 1960s and 1970s, and had developed an anti-police stance. District officers recalled their conflicts with the organization, and there was reluctance on their part to get involved with an agency that had been so actively anti-police. In the end, they worked things out. A newly-arrived commander told officers “they were living in the 1960s. Get over it.” The commander observed that, “most radicals from the 1960s have since become corporate, and they’ve softened their positions.” He became an important supporter of the program.

In another area, the issue was not so easily resolved. The host agency had developed an oppositional stance toward both the mayor of Chicago and the superintendent of police. Years before, the host had organized a protest demonstration at the mayor’s family’s home, as part of a residential picketing initiative, and they had attempted to embarrass the police superintendent at a press conference. These incidents were not well received. When the organization was selected to be a host agency for CeaseFire, objections were raised by both parties. Indeed, the host agency’s sentiments had not changed much, and some of its staff members continued to have issues with the police. This led to very poor communication between them, and eventually to conflict and name-calling. In the end, many CeaseFire employees were let go, and the police commander in the area made a point to work with the new staff hired by a replacement host organization.

Other politically active host agencies did not have these problems, and we also observed some of the positive features of being known for passionate community commitment. In particular, other hosts with strong activist ties evidenced a strong capacity to build and participate in local coalitions, and they were able to surround themselves with organizations that could provide needed services for their clients. But an example of political entanglements that required CPVP action was provided when a host agency was reported to be supporting a particular political candidate in an aldermanic election, and the staff was doing political canvassing while wearing their CeaseFire jackets. Their involvement was no surprise; this host was a powerful and long-time player on the local political scene, and they wanted to oust the incumbent alderman. CPVP stepped in to halt this overt intervention, but the alderman lost anyway. On election night she complained bitterly on local television about the political involvement of CeaseFire against her.

**Location and Environment.** The physical location of the host agency proved to be problematic in some areas. We often observed that the geographic area designated as the CeaseFire site was controlled by a particular gang. However, CeaseFire was attempting to provide services to a range of clients, including those associated with other gangs. Finding neutral territory, so that high-risk individuals from diverse backgrounds could be served, was sometimes difficult. CPVP was on occasion confronted with whether to select the agency best suited to run CeaseFire locally, although they were anchored in one gang’s territory, or go with a different agency that was located in a more neutral location. One site recognized this issue, and to compensate, the host’s outreach workers met their clients off-site and out of the area. This became an issue for the evaluation, when we attempted to interview clients at the host’s office. According to site supervisors, clients associated with rival gangs did not, as a rule, enter the area where the host agency was housed because they feared for their safety. This issue was not easily

resolved, and it is important for program planners to be cognizant of gang dynamics selecting site boundaries and planning program activities.

Another issue with the physical location was whether it encouraged or discouraged clients from dropping in. Some sites could provide computers, games, comfortable furniture, and music to entertain drop-ins. Other sites were more sterile and business-like. Some had entrances that were hard to find, or which were locked and required that visitors be buzzed in from offices located on a higher floor, making them less accessible. When we made our site visits we often saw clients hanging around the places that offered a more youth-friendly environment. In some of the more business-like places, we never saw clients come by. At one time a site was located in a church where the nuns were terrified by the clients, who were primarily members of a local street gang, and there was absolutely no incentive for them to come on the premises. Churches were not necessarily bad host agency locations, but the comfort level of the clients had much to do with the attitude of churches' congregations and pastors.

One host agency was situated in a large building in which many questionable activities were also taking place. Because the CeaseFire program was housed in the same building, these activities risked being attributed to them. The staff talked to the building manager about dealing with the problem, hoping to shut down activities that were giving them a bad reputation. The building manager was responsive, and the problems quickly diminished.

**Competing Agendas.** A difficulty with the host agency model for delivering a program with a clearly articulated strategy was that active and experienced local organizations almost inevitably had their own agendas and interests, and their own programs. At one site, CPVP partnered with a host agency that provided teens with a place to come and socialize in a highly supervised after-school setting. Participating youths were required to participate in volunteer activities within the community, but in addition were constantly encouraged to join the organization's church. Because of the time and resources devoted to this ongoing initiative, very little effort was devoted to the highest-risk young people in the area, including those not in school, not interested in becoming associated with a church, and with no interest in participating in volunteer activities. The outreach staff found themselves assigned to this after-school facility, as opposed to canvassing the streets and recruiting high-risk clients. While the host agency's own program had merit, it was in conflict with CeaseFire's agenda.

Host agencies also sometimes simply did not agree with aspects of CeaseFire's program model. At another agency the director had a great deal of difficulty with the amount of time and effort that was supposed to go into the task of distributing printed public education material. The distribution of such materials was an integral part of the public-health oriented model at CPVP, and they monitored its execution. Instead, this executive director wanted just to focus on building personal relationships with neighborhood youths. As we observed elsewhere, when local priorities came in conflict with the program model, the former more frequently won out.

**Technical Assistance or Central Management?** As the program was conceived, CPVP's preferred role with the host agencies was that of providing technical assistance. In that



role, CPVP would assist in site selection, help with program documentation, provide training, hold regular meetings to assist with program implementation, and participate in securing future funding. But in practice there was uncertainty about CPVP's actual roles in relation to the local sites. This was obvious among CPVP staff and at the host agencies. While serving in a technical assistance role may be the ideal model, there were good reasons for CPVP to tailor their relationship to each host agency individually. Our observations suggested a list of characteristics of hosts that could benefit from a technical assistance role, as well as the characteristics of hosts that could benefit from a central management role, especially in the early stages. As the host agencies differed, there was not a "one size fits all" response in terms of program management. The types of agencies that could benefit from CPVP acting in a technical assistance capacity had:

- an organization with existing leadership
- an organization with a strong infrastructure
- the ability to quickly mount the program utilizing current resources
- independent ties to local politicians who could leverage state funding
- services they could provide to clients
- well-developed community partners who could open doors that outsiders could not
- the respect of other local partners
- good relations with the police

The types of host agencies that could benefit from CPVP taking a central management role had:

- adversaries and turf where they were not welcome
- a small organization with little administrative experience
- a bad relationship with the police, due to an incident or conflict with the administration
- an agenda that conflicted with CeaseFire's program model
- policies that excluded populations that CeaseFire hired and served
- a relationship with politicians who supported the host organization over CeaseFire, which could keep failing sites open

During the evaluation period we saw a tightening of policies and procedures on the part of CPVP that reflected the adoption of a more centralized management role. CPVP took a more active role in regulating program activities and reviewing site records. CPVP staff made an increasing number of site visits to ensure better program implementation, and new central office positions were created to handle program implementation and documentation issues. Sites were held more accountable to meeting standards regarding shooting responses, client caseload size, and other program activities. CPVP also became more assertive about the hours that sites were to be open, to parallel the hours when violent crime actually occurs. However, at the same time many sites became more self-sufficient, and CPVP was able to hand many of the responsibilities they previously bore. This included taking charge of organizing CeaseFire week, political lobbying for program support, and handling day-to-day crises in program administration.

**Other Management Issues.** We observed other, often generic issues that hampered program implementation. Many local CeaseFire staff were ex-felons and had their own history on

the street. This path had not allowed many of them to complete their education or gain marketable skills. Many had never held a job that required compliance, structure, documentation or accountability, and the host agencies were generally not prepared to take on the task of training them. In response, CPVP instituted hiring panels to better screen candidates, and they provided ongoing training and workshops to address these issues. Also, outreach workers often found themselves with no career ladder within the CeaseFire program, because only a limited number could become supervisors. This impacted salary and promotion opportunities for the CeaseFire employees.

Another problem that was prevalent throughout the program was that site staff were often fundamentally confused about lines of authority within the program. Each site operated differently in terms of their lines of supervision. Some sites had strong violence prevention coordinators, others had a strong outreach worker supervisors, and some relied on CPVP to resolve problems as they arose. Additionally, our interviews revealed that many outreach staff members did not understand the fundamentals of the CeaseFire model, and this had an impact on program implementation. Even some CPVP headquarters staff did not agree that the program's official model was the correct way to approach community violence prevention. Instead, they felt the root causes of violence – poverty, unemployment and delinquency – needed to be addressed first. This disagreement surfaced in meetings and in personal interactions, and CPVP did not speak with a united voice about their program's theoretical underpinnings. Rather, their voice was fragmented and often contradictory, leaving the sites to piece together a program as they could.

An important consideration to some was that CeaseFire's program theory did not seem to take into account variation among communities. For example, we found that some sites were not happy about organizing marches and vigils in response to shootings. A few were in the process of gentrifying, and shooting responses were not appealing to new property owners. Shooting responses, to them, signaled a problem and a threat to the value of their real estate. Residents of other areas felt that shooting responses brought shame to their families and their neighborhood. Shooting responses did not fit their expectations, and participation was slim in those neighborhoods. Our research on community policing has documented that in Latino areas where the primary spoken language is Spanish, the most effective mode of communication is relational in nature. No amount of public education material, even if printed in Spanish, will be as effective as one-on-one communication. Allowing individual communities the ability to tailor the program's model to their specific community needs would have been beneficial. Such local variations should be important considerations when managing a program across diverse areas.

As noted earlier, CPVP on occasion took oversight responsibility for managing individual sites. This occurred when no suitable host organization could be located in a high-need neighborhood. These sites provided a bit of a test of the local host model of program delivery, for we observed difficulties in this centralized management role. CPVP is located at the University of Illinois at Chicago and did not have the community-level ties that were needed to develop solid relationships with local partners. We saw this very clearly when we conducted our community partner study in some areas that CPVP managed. There was poor program

recognition among the potential local partners we contacted, and even weaker actual involvement in the program. Many who were believed to be CeaseFire partners by the staff at those sites, claimed that they had never heard of the program, or that they only knew of it by name and had never had any interaction with the program. Clearly, coalition building took a back seat in these areas due to a lack of local direction. But CeaseFire did directly provide services, and depended upon local service providers. Due to the lack of local connections, it was difficult to develop a solid and lasting referral base for clients in these areas. There was no replacement for not being intimately connected to a community, or with managers being present at a site on a day-to-day basis.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Staffing and Funding the Program**

Implementing a program like CeaseFire presents complex managerial issues. Staffing the program, providing training, maintaining control of operations, and identifying and securing funding streams that can support a long list of sites plus central office operations, are activities that must be carefully orchestrated. This chapter describes some of the complexities of the task. The first section examines staffing issues: hiring, training and supervision. Some of the issues that are raised stem from the decentralized nature of the program and the special place of faith-based local partners. Others stem from CeaseFire's commitment to hiring high-risk community members to staff the program. This section examines issues ranging from background checks and drug testing to staff career development and turnover.

The second section of this chapter examines the realities of funding CeaseFire. From the late 1990s, CeaseFire spawned 30 or so sites in Illinois. The central office took the lead in identifying a diverse collection of funding streams to support their activities, including federal and state governments and private foundations. The bulk of its operating funds were appropriated yearly by the Illinois State Assembly, which designated which sites would be supported. This proved to be a fragile and unstable relationship. The section begins with a discussion of how much it cost to operate the program, and concludes with a description of the funding crisis of the summer of 2007, which led to a radical down-sizing and refocusing of CPVP.

The descriptions and conclusions presented here are based on personal interviews, observations of meetings, and surveys of program employees. As noted in Chapter 1, we made repeat visits to each of the sites, conducted personal interviews with most staff members of the moment, and gathered systematic questionnaire data from outreach workers, supervisors, and violence interrupters. We also attended meetings between CeaseFire headquarters and its sites and community partners, and observed many local social, political and organizing activities. Appendices to this report describe the methodologies involved in all of the surveys, and presents the questionnaires that we developed for the study.

### **Staffing the Program**

For CeaseFire, staff hiring, training and supervision were key issues, because hiring was itself a strategic consideration. As part of their strategy of recruiting clients who were at the highest risk of being a victim or perpetrator of violence, and to facilitate access to the world of street gangs, CeaseFire aimed at hiring people who would be credible messengers among these groups. Violence interrupters and outreach workers normally did not have much experience in the traditional workplace, and many had themselves run afoul of the law. This set CeaseFire apart from many social service programs, although it is common for public health interventions around the world to hire and train indigenous people to handle their public interface. Observers outside of CeaseFire, including clergy and politicians, admired the program for hiring former felons and others who might otherwise have been unable to find legitimate work. One minister thought, "It's nice that they have jobs. That's the best part of the program. I would support it just for that."

CeaseFire’s executive director tried to appeal to like-minded individuals during a 2007 Public Safety Appropriations Hearing in Springfield, IL. He told state representatives, “We ourselves are directly employing 100 previously incarcerated people.” But critics of CeaseFire used this against the program. One state senator was quoted in a newspaper article as saying, “The over \$18.5 million given to Operation CeaseFire has done more to legitimize gang leaders’ portfolios than actually stopping violence.”<sup>1</sup> Responding to this comment and the larger problem of the governor’s eliminating CeaseFire from the State budget, some violence interrupters came together and organized a march to the senator’s office, chanting, “When will our wrongs end? [Now!] When will our rights begin? [Now!]”

Hiring high-risk individuals presented unique challenges, and CeaseFire implemented safeguards to ensure – to the extent possible – that their staff remained out of “the life.” These measures included drug testing and background checks, and eligibility requirements such as having a high school diploma and having successfully remained out of trouble following release from prison. When hiring violence interrupters and outreach workers, CeaseFire faced a challenge: the staff needed to be able to connect with potential shooters and victims, but to have successfully extracted themselves from the drug trade and gangs. CPVP struggled to find a violence interrupter for one neighborhood; they kept finding candidates who “wanna work, but at the same time, they wanna still be in the gang.” Indeed, CeaseFire occasionally and unknowingly hired individuals who were still involved with and may have still been active gang members, although all of its policies and procedures were aimed at preventing this. The instability of CeaseFire funding, the demands of the job, the high-risk backgrounds of most violence interrupters and outreach workers, and drug testing contributed to staff turnover. And, this came with a cost, most visibly in outreach worker-client relationships that could not be easily rebuilt with another staff member.

Responding to the relative inexperience of their staff in the workplace, as well as their criminal backgrounds, CPVP and site managers spoke about them and treated them in ways that were parallel to the street staffs’ relationships with clients and contacts. One CPVP staff member said in a meeting: “It’s clear that we have a lot of employees as well as clients who are high-need. If you take 15 to 20 years out of someone’s life, there are interactions with people that have been missed. They have a lot of baggage, and we need to help them.” During our fieldwork, CPVP thought a lot about and enforced surveillance policies among their street staff. Despite many efforts, they were less effective in providing professional development, and job security remained a hostage to the vagaries of program funding.

## **Hiring High-Risk Staff**

**Hiring Panels.** Each site hired outreach workers and outreach worker supervisors through a joint decision process. At an outreach worker training, a CPVP employee estimated the yield for an outreach worker panel. “We got 30 resumes, 10 people were called to the panel, and

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<sup>1</sup>“Auditor General’s report blasts Cease Fire” by Kathy Chaney (The Chicago Defender, 30 August 2007).

four were hired.” Other panels yielded no outreach workers, and some sites even struggled to find enough applicants to hold panels.

CeaseFire viewed the hiring panels as insurance. One CPVP staff member told host-agency executive directors that hiring panels for outreach workers “protect the program against so many abuses.” He used the example of an alderman wanting to give someone a position. In response, the local site could say, “It’s a panel decision. It’s not yours. It’s not mine.” At least two violence prevention coordinators, who did not undergo the panel process, were political hires. At one site, the local state representative appointed his former chief of staff to be a violence prevention coordinator. At another site, the executive director fired the violence prevention coordinator after he disappeared from his job for several days. The violence prevention coordinator was rehired after the state representative (who was responsible for funding CeaseFire in that neighborhood) asked him to take the recently fired coordinator back. According to one CPVP staff member, in this conversation, the state representative “talked about funds secured for CeaseFire.” The panel’s decision also cushioned the blow if outreach workers began participating in illegal activities again. One violence prevention coordinator told his colleagues, “The panel protects you. If you select individuals and one of them turns out bad, they can’t point the finger at you.” In that same meeting, an executive director suggested the panel placed pressure on workers to perform well and to stay crime-free: “The outreach workers feel like they have multiple bosses, so they’re on their toes.”

A panel ideally involved five or six members representing different local institutions. The idea behind the panel, according to a CPVP staff member, was that it shares the burden with multiple players at the table: the police, a representative from the host agency, clergy, and representatives from social service agencies.” The outreach worker panels that we attended were composed of violence prevention coordinators, outreach worker supervisors, CPVP staff members, law enforcement representatives (from a police officer to a deputy chief), pastors, and a representative from Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC). For CeaseFire, police officers were an especially important component of this team. Only two participants had veto power on the panel: CPVP staff and the police representative. The police vetoed candidates “a couple times,” according to a CPVP staff member. He wanted police on the panels, because “we can’t afford to make mistakes in hiring.” For him, if the police complained about an outreach worker, CeaseFire could remind them, “You guys were on the panel.”

There was a general protocol for hiring panels. Before each met, candidates submitted their resumes, and outreach supervisors and violence prevention coordinators pre-screened them. The panel interviewed each final candidate, with most members asking questions. One candidate was asked these questions by the panel:

- We have six people for only so many positions. Why should we consider you?
- What are your thoughts on street gangs?
- Have you ever mediated a conflict, and were you successful?
- On this job, you interact with gangs, and you interact with the police. How do you feel about that?

- How do you plan to reach gang members?
- Do you have a record?"

Panels also asked candidates whether they had a valid driver's license and car insurance. Both were requisites for outreach positions that involve patrolling the neighborhood, visiting clients, and taking clients to appointments. In addition to gathering information, members of the hiring panel tried to "get a feel for the individual," according to a CPVP staff member. One panel rejected an outreach worker candidate because, as the violence prevention coordinator said, "I have a problem with the way he presents himself. He comes on a little too strong." Panels found some candidates who did not have formal credentials that were a prerequisite for the job, but were willing to compromise on this if they believed the candidate would be able to connect to high-risk youths on the streets. In contrast, they rejected candidates who did not seem street-savvy. While deliberating on a female outreach worker candidate, the group had to double check that she could influence gang members. A CPVP employee thought, "She knows a bunch of girls, and that's a good thing in getting to these guys." The violence prevention coordinator said, "She's a solid person, but she does have her dark side," which, in this context, was a good thing.

Reflecting their role in managing violence interrupters, CPVP hired most of them on their own. According to the violence interrupter manual, "hiring decisions are made by the gang mediation coordinator after consultation with formal and informal networks to determine the applicant's qualifications." Unlike the outreach worker hiring process, the local sites had little input about whom CeaseFire assigned as an interrupter in their community. In contrast to site personnel, CPVP hired violence interrupters without using panels, because they believe panels would not necessarily hire the best candidates for this position. A CPVP staffer observed, "Some of them can't talk. Some of them can't write. All they can do is stop violence." He believed the panels would not be able to relate to the candidates. The supervisor said, "They're from a whole 'nother planet."

There were times, however, when a local site vetoed CPVP's violence interrupter selection. In one neighborhood, CPVP wanted to hire a former gang leader who previously ran for office against the incumbent alderman. The host agency's executive director thought he would be a liability. "We didn't need another issue with [that alderman]." Furthermore, the director knew that the man had been "active south of here," not in the community where the site was located. In another neighborhood, a violence prevention coordinator challenged CeaseFire's policy to largely exclude the sites from the interrupter hiring process: "I've hemmed and hawed about the violence interrupters. [CPVP] finally consented to us interviewing candidates." This request is understandable. The sites' marginal role in hiring could cause tensions later on, most commonly because violence interrupters did not report to local site administrators, or refused to work with them.

**Drug Testing.** CPVP believed that it was important to administer drug tests to its workers. The organization wanted drug-free employees working with clients, and they wanted to avert the potentially negative press interest that the arrest of a staff member might spark. For these reasons, the organization strongly encouraged host agencies to test outreach staff for drug

use. Historically, CPVP was not as committed to testing violence prevention coordinators because of their distance from the street. Their hesitation to test interrupters was initially based on a concern that many would not pass. When violence interrupters were finally tested, only a handful turned out to be “dirty.” CPVP performed drug tests on outreach workers on its payroll just as it did all of the violence interrupters. But drug testing policies elsewhere varied, as each host agency was responsible for testing its workers.

CeaseFire believed that drugs impair a person’s ability to do outreach work in a variety of ways. One CPVP staff member said in a meeting that a positive drug test “raises questions about fitness for duty.” A violence prevention coordinator thought it would be difficult for a drug user to work around drug dealers, who were many of CeaseFire’s clients, because he or she would be tempted all the time. CeaseFire also thought its employees should be drug-free, because outreach workers and violence interrupters were supposed to be “examples” for people on the street. A violence prevention coordinator said, “I set a high standard for the outreach workers. They are examples and mentors for high-risk individuals.”

CeaseFire also wanted to ensure that its employees were drug free in order to avoid bad publicity. One CPVP staff person said, “There’s too much exposure for us to be tolerant of someone abusing illegal substances and alcohol.” Suggesting that someone’s positive drug test could make everyone at CeaseFire vulnerable, another CPVP staff member said, “When I do drug testing, I’m just going to do it. I’m not going to announce it. A cat might have a cocaine or heroin problem they can’t work out. All of us have put too much work in to deal with that.” CPVP’s concern that CeaseFire staff could be using drugs was well-founded, for a few outreach workers did test positive. In late 2005, four of 16 outreach workers who were on CeaseFire’s central office payroll tested positive for using substances including cannabis, morphine, codeine, and cocaine. Several months before, two suburban outreach workers were fired because they tested positive for drug use.

To avoid employing active drug users, CeaseFire tested every candidate recommended by hiring panels. This policy made hiring challenging, and most sites had stories about finding the perfect outreach worker who failed a drug test. One violence prevention coordinator remembers, “It was a big struggle to find people who could pass the drug test. Thirty-five people could not pass.” He would say to candidates, “Keep it real. The next step is the drug test. Can you pass it?” Some would tell him up front that they could not. “One guy passed the panel with flying colors. He swore up and down that he could pass the drug test. It didn’t work.” Because of situations like this, sites suggested testing candidates before they reached the hiring-panel stage. The trouble with this, and regular testing in general, was the expense. The University of Illinois’s Health Services charged CeaseFire \$60 per test. CPVP budgeted \$5,000 for drug testing each year.

While most CeaseFire managers (including CPVP staff) agreed that being drug-free was important to their work, CeaseFire did not have an organization-wide drug testing policy. There could be confusion within the local site regarding who was to be tested and the consequences for a positive result. There was a hierarchical disparity in drug testing at CPVP. Some of the central administrative staff did not have to take drug tests and, as mentioned earlier, the violence



prevention coordinators also were not tested. After suspecting that a violence prevention coordinator was using drugs, one CPVP staff member believed the violence prevention coordinators should be tested as well. In a discussion about drug testing, the staffer noted, “We need to be talking about coordinators as well. These people are paid with CeaseFire funds.” Another CPVP staff member complained about the compulsory drug testing of outreach workers and violence interrupters, compared to the voluntary drug testing of other staff members. The staff member pointed out, “Academic professionals are not subject to drug tests. Why do we test [CeaseFire workers]? Because they sign a form saying they are drug free?”

Not only has CPVP struggled over whom to test, but also what to test for. One CPVP staff member told his colleagues, “marijuana is a heavy issue; you have to be careful with marijuana.” He was referring to its widespread use and acceptability in many social circles. Other staff members disagreed, saying “illegal is illegal.” A member of a hiring panel wondered if a promising young applicant would be able to pass a drug test. “I think his problem is weed. Folks in his generation don’t know weed is a drug.”

Within Chicago’s CeaseFire program there was a wide range in drug testing policies as well as a disparity in the consequences of positive tests. Because CPVP was affiliated with the University of Illinois at Chicago, a positive drug test for someone on CPVP’s payroll did not mean their termination. One CPVP staff member explained in a meeting, “If it [a positive drug test] happens when [CPVP staff members] are on probation, they are fired. If it happens when they are an established employee, it’s an Employee Assistance Program issue.” While enrolled in the Employee Assistance Program, the worker could go through rehabilitation and be cleared to begin working again. Alternately, it could be decided that the worker had a serious problem and should not return to the job. The host agencies had a variety of drug testing rules. One South Side host agency tested all of its employees for drug use, from janitors to the executive director, before they were hired and randomly thereafter. One year, the host agency budgeted \$30,000 for drug testing. The outreach workers at this host agency’s CeaseFire office followed an even more stringent regimen. The violence prevention coordinator there said, “We drug test before they’re hired. They are drug tested every month for 90 days and then periodically. They sign that they are willing to be drug tested throughout probation and at any time thereafter. We have a zero-tolerance rule.” Most host agencies had unique drug testing policies for CeaseFire staff. One host agency only tested the CeaseFire outreach workers, because “it’s too costly” to test everyone, as there are between 200 and 230 people who work there. Another host agency did not test its staff, although its CeaseFire employees were paid through University of Illinois School of Public Health, and they were tested. That agency’s executive director shared his philosophy about drug testing in a meeting: “It would be counter to the way we operate to test workers.” Another violence prevention coordinator told CPVP staff that she does not drug test, because their drug-free workplace was on an honor system.

**Background Checks.** While CeaseFire wanted its outreach workers and violence interrupters to be close to the streets, the organization did not want them still to be involved in illegal activities. In addition to drug testing, CeaseFire also used background checks to screen its workers. CeaseFire relied on police to determine whether or not candidates had committed any

crimes against women and children, and whether or not they had any cases pending against them. Some sites had even more stringent requirements regarding workers' rap sheets. These host organizations could not hire individuals with felony records, making it difficult for them to meet CPVP's program model. These sites often had contracts with government agencies, including the state's Department of Child and Family Services, that required this. One site sidestepped this agreement by employing an outreach worker with felonies, but having him paid through CPVP rather than carrying him on their books.

CPVP also ran background checks to make sure only rehabilitated employees were working with clients, and to protect the program from bad publicity. In a meeting, an executive director spoke about why it was critical to the outreach worker-client relationship for CeaseFire to do background checks. "It would be a mistake for outreach workers to have warrants, because clients wouldn't see the difference between themselves and the outreach workers, and they need to see that." One CPVP staff member highlighted the importance of keeping the program above-board. "The police have not asked for this. We asked for this. We don't want to have a front page or any page story of a CeaseFire worker selling drugs. We can't afford it. We're asking for their help to protect us." CeaseFire had an additional explicit policy of not hiring anyone who has been convicted of crimes against women or children, in order to protect staff and clients.

The background check requirement frustrated many sites, because they prolonged the outreach worker hiring process and raised suspicions – in most instances unwarranted – about existing outreach workers. In Spring 2006, two sites submitted names of candidates for the outreach worker position to the police, and they heard nothing for two or three weeks, preventing them from becoming fully-staffed in a timely manner. One outreach worker resented the idea of running background checks on his outreach workers. He refused to give CPVP his workers' social security numbers and dates of birth (required for the check), thinking, "You aren't going to humiliate me and my guys, because one or two assholes you hired did something. They're busting their asses and risking their lives."

In addition to the police background check, CeaseFire ran its own checks on potential hires to determine whether or not law enforcement's information was accurate and whether CeaseFire's job candidates had street connections. At times CeaseFire's intelligence contradicted that of law enforcement. "They flagged people who we thought were good workers," one CPVP staff member said. In some cases, the police admitted that their "information is old." CeaseFire intelligence goes beyond that of law enforcement, as sites try to figure out whether workers can really access the highest risk to shoot or be shot. One site refused to hire an outreach worker from another site because he had the reputation of "being a snitch and playing both sides" in prison. This same site had to fire an outreach worker who, according to the violence prevention coordinator, "was a wonderful worker, but the [gang] had a contract on him, and we couldn't take it off."

Even with background checks, outreach workers and violence interrupters have been arrested for illegal activity, including drug possession. Arguably these arrests were related to CeaseFire street staff's ambiguous relationship to the street. Outreach workers and violence

interrupters consorted with high-risk people who sometimes did illegal things (like selling or using drugs). From 2004 to summer 2007, only one violence interrupter was arrested. After 30 days of working, he was “locked up for narcotics.” CPVP fired another interrupter two months before he became the primary suspect in a shooting. This was a low number of arrests considering interrupters’ proximity to street activity. With street staff arrests, there were varying degrees of culpability and divergent outcomes. In one situation, the case against an outreach worker was dropped, but the site was wary of keeping him on until the case was resolved. The executive director described the situation, “We had a worker arrested outside of work and outside of hours for possession. We thought it was a bad arrest. But we need to protect ourselves – [the host agency], the workers, and CeaseFire. We suspended him without pay until the charges were dropped.”

**Credentials.** CeaseFire required that its outreach workers have a high school diploma or its equivalency. They rejected candidates who did not. A CPVP member said of an outreach worker candidate: “One of the guys didn’t have a diploma. I told him that we couldn’t hire him without that credential. He was an older guy, a businessman. I told him to work on it and check back in a few months to see if we have an opening.” Diplomas and GEDs were important requirements for CeaseFire positions, particularly for outreach workers. A CPVP staff member believed those credentials indicated whether a candidate would be able to do paperwork, saying, “We expect them to write stuff up. We expect it to be clear. We expect them to use more than two or three words.”

Although some already-hired CeaseFire staff lacked required educational credentials, the organization believed their street credentials trumped their educational ones. At the university there were minimum requirements for the “community affairs specialist” job category under which both violence interrupters and outreach workers were hired. In order to meet these requirements, CPVP staff had to reinterpret candidates’ life experiences so they were qualified for these positions. Hiring panels sometimes required candidates to complete a writing sample before going through the interview because otherwise they would have “. . . a real tough time with the documentation piece of the job.” A high school education is not only important for completing documentation. Outreach workers were also supposed to refer clients to GED programs and in some cases, high school and college, but perhaps this would be an uncomfortable task for someone who had not themselves completed school.

**Turnover.** CeaseFire had high employee turnover at the sites, leaving areas short-staffed and clients without outreach workers. There were multiple issues underlying this high turnover rate, beginning with the job’s evening. During a hiring panel, a CPVP staff member tried to convey to a job candidate how demanding the outreach worker position is: “This is not nine to five, Monday through Friday. It’s Tuesday through Saturday, four to twelve o’clock. As far as a personal or social life, it’s out the window if you take this job.” One site lost two outreach workers in the first few months of its existence. The job strained their personal relationships. One of them quit at the beginning of outreach worker training. The coordinator explained, “He interviewed well, but once he got in, he saw it took away from his family.” He didn’t want to “save the world while his family was going to hell.” That site’s only female outreach worker left

because her husband did not approve of her working late hours in an office full of men. “He thought improper things were going on,” according to the violence prevention coordinator, who advised her to leave. Another site continued to lose workers, some of whom were arrested for drug possession. Ten months after the site first opened, only one member of the original outreach team was left. One outreach worker quit and another was fired. But a third outreach worker “got caught up in a sting,” according to someone at the site. In the second year, after more outreach workers were hired, two others were arrested for drug possession.

Some sites were quick to fire workers and, in the opinion of some CPVP staff members, recklessly so. One site fired an outreach worker whom a CPVP staff member described as “a Mr. Know-It-All . . . a lone soldier . . . insolent. He’s not a team player.” Another CPVP staff member was concerned that the site had acted too quickly, wondering, “Did they give him an opportunity to correct his actions before letting him go?”

Staff turnover also was encouraged by layoffs of outreach workers and violence interrupters for budgetary reasons. Many CeaseFire employees had experienced at least one budgetary layoff. A violence interrupter remarked during a meeting that, “I’ve been laid off every year I’ve worked for CeaseFire [the past three and half years]. And once, it was for five months.” An outreach worker talked about the perennial layoffs: “Every year around June [towards the end of the fiscal year], there will be a month that people will be off.”

When the program lost outreach workers and violence interrupters, it risked losing relationships with high-risk men on the street. One outreach worker remembered how difficult it was to take on a departing outreach worker’s clients:

*They weren’t comfortable working with me. One hundred percent of the individuals I work with are not going to feel comfortable working with another person. We’ve built a trust level. I became privy to information that’s incriminating. You need to build a certain level of trust with these guys. You can’t turn it on and off.*

Perhaps feeling similarly, when one outreach worker left a site on bad terms, he refused to give others on the outreach team his clients’ names, claiming that his clients would not work with anyone else. When street staff left the program, CeaseFire not only lost clients, the program also lost street credibility. Disgruntled former employees told men and women on the street not to work with the campaign. As a result, CeaseFire has worried about firing some employees. One CPVP staff member said of a site and one of its outreach workers, “If they got rid of him without just cause, it might cause problems with those guys on [street].”

Having a smaller outreach staff could jeopardize the safety of the outreach workers at each site. One site lost all but one of its outreach workers, and CPVP worried about him. A CPVP staff member observed that “[The outreach worker] is basically out there by himself.” And, members of his former gang’s rival were “egging him on” as he canvassed. With a full staff, there might have been an outreach worker who could reach this other street organization. A larger problem this example highlights is that, in the harsh world of Chicago’s streets, association

with one gang is a disqualification for working with youths associated with other gangs. Sites had to try to balance the associations of their staff with the distribution of gangs in their area, adding to the complexity – and ramifications – of hiring.

Being short-staffed prevented the sites from realizing important aspects of the CeaseFire model, from working with the highest-risk to conducting shooting responses. One site was only able to hire and train a single outreach worker in its first four months of operation and his supervisor quit before he could be trained. At that point, the outreach worker felt alone in “unchartered waters [sic].” After being exposed to “fast-paced” sites during training, his initial weeks at his own site were disappointing.

### **Issues in Staffing**

Many have lauded CeaseFire for its commitment to employing high-risk individuals who might otherwise be unable to find regular and personally meaningful work. The terms of their employment, however, reflected their vulnerable positions. There was little job security and, as a cost-saving measure, many workers received no benefits.

With some exceptions, most host agencies payed their outreach staff directly. CPVP recommended salary amounts to each site, and the host agencies adjusted these figures to fit their institutions’ needs and resources, and the salaries of other employees. As a result, there was a range of salary and benefit packages among workers. At one site, whose host agency was a large social service agency, each member of the outreach staff received, according to the coordinator, “the full benefit package: health, dental, vacation, sick days, they meet with a financial advisor, and life insurance.” Receiving benefits “was huge for these guys,” he noted. “I wouldn’t feel right if they didn’t have it.” Some sites payed outreach workers more than CeaseFire recommends. In the Winter of 2005, another coordinator reported that CPVP suggested an annual salary of \$25,000 for outreach workers. Increasing this figure, her site paid each outreach worker \$28,000. Other sites pay less than headquarters recommended. At one, whose host is a government agency, everyone took a pay cut between \$2,500 and \$3,000 in order to add an additional outreach worker position to the staff. Even with the salary reduction, the coordinator fought for the outreach staff to get minimum benefits and workman’s compensation, which they did receive. But they did not have health insurance or life insurance. Outreach workers at another government host agency did not receive paid vacation, sick time, or any other benefits to speak of.

The University of Illinois at Chicago divides CPVP workers into three categories: academic staff, civil service staff and “extra help.” In early summer 2007, CPVP had 21 academic staff members, 20 civil service staff, and 37 staff members who were classified as “extra help.” Academic staff and civil service staff are eligible for benefits. Outreach workers employed by CPVP were civil service staff. Extra help – mostly violence interrupters – were not eligible for benefits. While all outreach workers were salaried, the majority of violence interrupters were classed as extra help. They signed 900 hour contracts, and worked part-time until their contracts expired. Fifteen were promoted to be civil service staff and became salaried

workers. They worked 37.5 hours per week and received University of Illinois benefits. The violence interrupter supervisor explained how he decided who would become salaried workers, “Some of the guys were with me for awhile, and they produced. It was just time.”

The violence interrupters on 900 hour contracts were perhaps in the most precarious position. When their contractual hours ran out, they had to be laid off for 30 days before they could receive a new contract. Some of the 900 hour contracts were supposed to last six months, while others were designed to span an entire year. These layoffs led to gaps in mediation work, and sometimes, their contracts were not renewed. When the interrupter program first began, the 900-hour contracts were seen as appropriate for an experimental program, and because CPVP envisioned the job as part-time. However, although headquarters did not expect them to work longer than their contracted hours, most interrupters reported that they did. One violence interrupter felt his was officially a “five-day a week job . . . [but] sometimes it’s an every day for life type thing.” He estimated that he worked 75 to 100 hours every two weeks. Given the discrepancy between the number of hours some violence interrupters worked and the contracts they had, one would imagine that more would have been dissatisfied with this arrangement. But in the staff survey, 41 percent of interrupters said that they were very satisfied with their 900-hour contract, while 39 percent were not satisfied.

Feeling their CeaseFire compensation was inadequate, many violence interrupters had other jobs. Their second jobs could distract them from their work with CeaseFire. In a meeting, one of the most respected violence interrupters told his colleagues that he was successful because his position was salaried and full-time. Some interrupters, though, had outside jobs that overlapped with their CeaseFire work. One worked with high-risk youth in a community that abutted his CeaseFire zones through Catholic Charities; another prepared tax returns for men who help him mediate conflicts on the street; a third was in real estate, specifically the foreclosure business, and he had mediated between people whose homes he had tried to buy.

## **Training**

Both outreach workers and violence interrupters received training for their jobs, although for outreach workers it was more structured and consistent.

**Outreach Worker Training.** Outreach worker training consisted of an initial six-day, 48-hour session with other new hires, and then subsequent two-hour monthly sessions that were to be attended by all outreach workers. The initial training introduced men and women to the program. Outreach worker supervisors and violence prevention coordinators also attended these sessions. The monthly training was more focused, targeting dilemmas that emerged at the sites. CPVP advised the sites to not allow outreach workers to start working until they had completed the training course. If outreach workers failed to finish the course, they did not receive their CeaseFire jackets or IDs. Outreach worker training consisted of classroom instruction as well as visits to existing CeaseFire sites. While at the sites, outreach workers learned by doing: they canvassed, documented client contact, visited homes and, if there had been a shooting in a CeaseFire zone, they attended a shooting response. One outreach worker appreciated visiting an

active site during training, saying, “I like the way they took us to an actual site. What better battleground to do training?”

Because staff were hired on an irregular schedule and training was sporadic, some outreach workers spent their first weeks on the job without training. At a meeting, one violence prevention coordinator said of a new outreach worker, “he is being trained by our current outreach staff.” Some outreach workers think this is actually more effective than CeaseFire training. An outreach worker supervisor said, “Training would be more effective if we trained the outreach workers ourselves.”

As part of the training, CPVP staff introduced the group to CeaseFire and the philosophy behind the program, particularly the public health model and its foundations in behavior change theory. Outreach workers also learned their place in this model. One outreach worker said of training, “It was very informative. It gave us an understanding about CeaseFire’s approach, an idea of what we are trying to do, a mission.” CeaseFire’s model resonated with his personal experiences: “Once I was able to change my thinking, I was able to begin my process of change. I know what it was like to be stuck in the street mentality.” Outreach workers were one of the “interveners” in CeaseFire’s model. During an introductory training session, a CPVP employee told outreach workers how they intervene: “As outreach workers, you take knowledge to them and say what’s available to them. People are going to be less likely to shoot if they are taking advantage of alternatives.” Later in that training, the same CPVP staff member continued to describe outreach workers’ roles in the intervention: “It’s not rocket science. Get out there and walk the neighborhood. You can’t do this work without being on the street. If you’re in the office, you ain’t doing the job. Just walk up to the corner, and say, ‘Hey man.’ Be visible. Be out there. Get into conversations.”

The initial training was also a time to discuss difficult issues in outreach work. Outreach workers wondered whether or not they should attend roll calls and beat meetings, and what their roles at those venues might have been. One outreach worker expressed his hesitation to work with the police, “I ain’t going to no roll call. I’m not trying to get them to like me. I seen how they treat guys.” A CPVP staff member encouraged him to meet the police, because he might have been able to help men on the street through his connections. Sometimes when the police saw CeaseFire jackets, they drove by and left clients or potential clients alone. The training group also discussed whether or not their work should be limited to CeaseFire zones. An outreach worker wondered if he could help men in another South Side neighborhood when his client caseload was complete. A CPVP staff member told him, “No. We got numbers to go on, funders to respond to. We have to show results. Don’t get into a situation where you have 15 guys from Englewood and two guys from Grand Boulevard (the neighborhood where he was supposed to work).” Outreach workers also wanted to know to what extent CeaseFire would protect them from the police. An outreach worker was worried that CeaseFire might not vouch for him if the police catch him with a client who has either a weapon or drugs. A CPVP staff member told him, “We can’t be your mother hen. If Johnny Martinez (a hypothetical client) got a gun on him, it’s your decision whether or not to take him somewhere. Usually when one of my guys gets busted, it’s cause he’s doing something he shouldn’t.” But, this CPVP staff person allowed, “We’ll try

our best to get to the situation before it's processed, before you get from City Jail to County Jail." This dialog illustrated how vulnerable outreach workers could feel on the street.

After the initial training, the outreach workers convened once a month for two hours to be trained in special sessions. CPVP staff estimated that they conducted 95 percent of these training sessions in-house, with outside facilitators doing the rest. Training topics grew from issues at the sites. One outreach worker went to court with one of his clients and found it difficult. He wanted a training on what outreach workers should and should not do while in court with a client. He wondered, "Do I show the judge my files?" One of his clients was "arrested for mob action; he was doing nothing." The outreach worker pondered, "How can I prove that to a judge?" Since CeaseFire's outreach initiative began, training sessions have addressed a variety of topics, including court advocacy and the justice system, substance abuse, mental illness, listening skills, dealing with difficult clients, working with family and mates, housing assistance, suicide, working with gangs, terminating relationships with clients, home visits, death and grief, manhood development, documentation, and staff burnout. Outreach workers applied what they learned in training to their own work. For instance, one outreach worker recalled, "they gave us steps on how to deal with suicide." She put this lesson to use when one of her clients called her to say, "I'm thinking about killing myself." She gave him "spiritual guidance" and checked on him regularly for three days. In responding to this cry for help, she found herself going beyond the training. "There are some things they can't teach you. You have to go through it."

These monthly sessions were not cure-alls, and they had structural problems. One CPVP staff member thought training "helps to some extent," but issues never completely disappeared. "Repetition is never a problem. People forget or don't listen in the first place." Leading the training sessions was challenging for CPVP. As the number of sites grew, so did the number of outreach workers. Meanwhile, the size of the CPVP staff stayed the same. During one period of expansion attendance at the monthly sessions became too large, with one person attempting to instruct 75 outreach workers each time.

However, the staff survey indicated that most were fairly satisfied with their training. Table 3-1 summarizes their replies when asked how satisfied they were with its content and frequency. Almost two-thirds of outreach workers felt they were adequately prepared before they first went out on the job, and over 90 percent of them felt prepared at the time we questioned them. Violence interrupters felt less well prepared than outreach workers. Overall, staff members were least satisfied with the frequency of training and its utility in "the real world," a typical lament regarding classroom instruction.



Table 3-1  
Staff Satisfaction with Training and Policies

How satisfied are you with . . . ?	Outreach Workers			Supervisors			Violence Interrupters		
	very satisfied	fairly satisfied	not satisfied	very satisfied	fairly satisfied	not satisfied	very satisfied	fairly satisfied	not satisfied
how prepared I was before I first went out on the job	64	32	4	42	42	17	59	41	0
how prepared I am for my job now	91	9	0	75	25	0	77	23	0
how frequently we have training sessions	45	51	4	50	42	8	50	46	4
how useful our training is in the real world	55	42	4	75	17	8	50	36	14
Taylor Street's drug testing policy	72	24	4	73	27	0	100	0	0

Note: 78 outreach workers; 23 outreach supervisors; 53 violence interrupters

**Violence Interrupter Training.** Unlike outreach workers, violence interrupters did not have an regularly scheduled training sessions. However, interrupters met weekly with their supervisor and other CPVP staff, in sessions that featured exchanges about problems they were facing and the strategies they adopted to address them, and this kind of frequent, supervised feedback could be a reasonable substitute for classroom-like presentations. In the survey, 91 percent reported they attended meetings at CPVP “once a week” and the other 9 percent fell in the next, “several times a month” category. Almost half of the group also reported that they attended training sessions with the same frequency, indicating that they saw the meetings working that way for them. According to our survey, violence interrupters were satisfied with their CPVP training. More than 85 percent were very satisfied with those meetings, and 83 percent reported that they were “very satisfied” with their level of preparation for the job. Some interrupters had experience mediating conflicts on the street before coming to CeaseFire. One said, “I’d been doing similar work in the neighborhood. People knew if there’s a problem, I can squash it before it gets to gun play.” Sixty percent stated they were very satisfied with the frequency of their training sessions, and 59 percent were very satisfied with how useful their training was “in the real world.”

CeaseFire training addressed a variety of topics: stress management, legal aid for clients, substance abuse awareness, and conflict resolution. Violence interrupters were dubious about receiving training for their jobs. They believed their experiences on the street best prepared them for their work. One interrupter shared, “I came from the street. What kind of training can I receive from someone who hasn’t been in the streets? Just like some teacher trying to tell me something about crack without smoking crack. The best person to teach you how to steal is a crook.”

Responding to this argument, CeaseFire used other former gang leaders involved in violence prevention work to facilitate training sessions. They encouraged violence interrupters to be sensitive to the diversity of the situations they confronted, and to carefully collect information about each conflict. One, who worked in violence prevention before joining CeaseFire, listed what he covered in one session: “approaches,” “being up front,” “certain things you can’t ask a person,” and “how you network.” An advisor to CeaseFire and a former gang leader told interrupters in training: “You have to know, how do [the disputants] see it, not how you assume it. Listen for their assumptions and hearsay. You are gathering data for the mediation.” After this information is collected, the facilitator recommended bringing the disputants together for the “confrontation process.” In a handout for the training, he wrote, “There must be a confrontation to begin the conflict resolution process. (Confrontation is simply being honest with another person as to how you see them or how they make you feel) This is accomplished by first having both parties agree that they are willing to talk to each other. A neutral place is the key for safety purposes. (Cease-fire office is suggested).” Many mediations did not reach the confrontation process, because violence interrupters were familiar with only one side of the conflict or it was too dangerous and impractical to bring both sides together. But they seemed adept at collecting intelligence about each conflict and treating it uniquely.

For other special training, CPVP did not bring in facilitators with street experience. In one session about professional burnout, the extent to which the facilitator’s recommendations and the violence interrupters’ experiences were disconnected was obvious. Violence interruption is a unique job, in that almost all of it took place in the field with high-risk individuals. This trainer’s

session was geared toward office workers with a reasonable number of resources. Some interrupters disengaged from the session by falling asleep and regularly leaving the room. After describing professional burnout, the trainer tried to give tips on how to prevent it. He told them not to take issues from work home with them. One interrupter wondered, “How do I do that?” The men he involved in mediation hung out “with my kids.” The facilitator also encouraged them to take vacations. One said this wasn’t feasible. “If I’m not working, I’m afraid my money isn’t going to be right. I have to work. I have to collect rent. I have to get things done.” The facilitator suggested that he ask other people to assume some of his responsibilities while he’s away. The violence interrupter did not think this was feasible. The facilitator asked, “Do you trust people?” The interrupter informed him, “trust isn’t a good thing where I come from.”

**Staff Development.** Along with formal training sessions, CeaseFire provided its street staff with support and guidance. A CPVP staff member said of the violence interrupters, “This is about change. I’m working on changing them, while I’m employing them.” He began a meeting with a question, “What are you going to do if someone calls you a bitch?” He wanted them to explore their capacity for violence. One violence prevention coordinator also sought to help his outreach staff change. He said, “We provide a service, but the staff is also provided a service. As we help clients, we have to help our staff.” With some of their histories, it was “only by the grace of God that they’re living.” This Violence prevention coordinator found himself “reeducating them” on a variety of situations, from “this is how you talk to your supervisors,” to “the whole nine yards.” CPVP and site management’s visions of staff development could seem patronizing. But, outreach workers and violence interrupters expressed appreciation for some of the support they received. One outreach worker enjoyed his site because he was “working with a lot of people who are there for you.” Staff members appreciated the camaraderie of the job, especially since they might not have experienced it elsewhere. Since one outreach worker left the street, a lot of men in his neighborhood “say stuff behind my back.” Sometimes he felt isolated; he spoke to his outreach worker supervisor “a lot to keep myself focused.”

CPVP considered doing more professional development with its street staff, but found itself too under-resourced to do so. At one meeting, CPVP staff discussed offering personalized career development to CeaseFire employees. One CPVP staff member pointed out, “it’s not going to happen time-wise.” Instead, he wanted to put together a “package” with information on various educational and occupational opportunities. CeaseFire had long planned doing the relatively easy thing of providing certificates to its outreach workers and violence interrupters. These legitimized their work and strengthened their future job applications. A CPVP staff member envisioned an outreach worker certificate that would acknowledge twenty four hours of specialized training earned over the course of 12 months. By the end of August 2007, when CeaseFire lost most of its state funding and outreach workers were laid off, CPVP had still not created these documents. They did, however, make certificates for the violence interrupters, who were not immediately terminated because they were supported by a separate funding stream. Each read, “Violence Interrupter Conflict Resolution Certificate,” and both the director of Gang Mediation Services and the chief financial officer signed them. When most outreach workers were laid off at the end of August 2007, CPVP staff (who normally provided technical assistance to the sites) offered

help with writing resumes and completing unemployment assistance applications to former street staff.

## **Employment Alternatives**

Even though outreach and violence interrupter positions were not ideal, they offered personally meaningful work to men and women who otherwise struggled to find such opportunities. With the loss of CeaseFire's state funding, one wonders what the laid-off workers will do. Some might return to the street. Some might find other anti-violence work, as a few violence interrupters already had in schools and faith-based organizations. Others hoped to use their experience as outreach workers to find other case management positions.

One can anticipate their labor market options by examining where street staff worked before coming to CeaseFire, and how they made do during past layoffs. Before CeaseFire, one outreach worker was a bellman at a downtown hotel, and during one layoff, he applied for other hotel jobs. He also enrolled in forklift operator training, but did not pass the final test. Another outreach worker listed his occupations before coming to CeaseFire: "machine operator, forklift driver, worked security at a car dealer, answered phones—all kinds of stuff." He was doing these things and "selling drugs at the same time." Some staffers reported long stretches of unemployment. One outreach worker, who later became an outreach worker supervisor, had been unemployed for three and a half years prior to working for CeaseFire. People would not hire him, "because I developed a background, as unfair as that is." This person had worked in factories, but disliked it, saying, "It's not really my forte. I always thought of myself as being a little more intelligent than the average industrial worker." Another outreach worker was employed in a factory before CeaseFire hired him. He likened the environment to a "sweatshop." Other CeaseFire employees worked in construction, security, and food services. One female outreach worker had several jobs before CeaseFire, but "nothing as significant as this."

Near the end of our evaluation, and shortly after it became clear that CeaseFire's budget was at risk in the state capital, something the campaign long feared would happen became a reality. The Chicago Tribune published a story about the arrest of a 23-year-old outreach worker. In an article titled "Anti-gang worker had guns, drugs, cops say," (August 28, 2007), the newspaper reported,

*V\_\_\_\_\_ was alone in the home when he was arrested about 10 p.m. Saturday and charged with cannabis production, owning a firearm and ammunition without a valid firearm owner's identification card, police said. Police said he had boxes of ammunition, sun lamps, a loaded .38-caliber revolver and gang paraphernalia, in addition to CeaseFire pamphlets and T-shirts.*

Concern that staff members might be arrested, and the related fear that the press would learn of the event, motivated in part CeaseFire's approach to outreach workers and violence interrupter recruitment, training and management. Events like this demonstrated the necessity of hiring panels, drug testing, and background checks necessary. Another salient issue that this event

brought forth was the instability of CeaseFire positions and the difficulty staff members can have in finding employment after losing a position with CeaseFire. Former staffers struggle to find work that is as meaningful as being an outreach worker or violence interrupter. But at the same time, because of their work with CeaseFire, their connections to the street and its moneymaking opportunities never really go away. The arrested outreach worker had known for most of the summer that his job with CeaseFire was precarious.

Despite these flaws, CeaseFire provided an important opportunity for its street staff: redemption in communities where they were active as drug dealers, gunners, gang members, and street leaders. A violence interrupter explained why he stuck with CeaseFire in spite of the always-looming possibility of a layoff: “We are being more real to our community now than we have ever been.”

### **Funding the Program**

Four offices within CPVP participated in the planning, development, execution and evaluation of CeaseFire. The Office of the Director spearheaded the initiative, and included a few additional support staff. This office was responsible for program development, media relations and fund-raising. The Management and Administration office at CPVP managed the budget and served as a human resource department for CeaseFire employees. The Evaluation staff’s primary responsibilities included monitoring program implementation, conducting field checks of local records on clients, and conducting analyses of crime and program data that could document the impact of the program at the various CeaseFire sites. Together these central-office operations were primarily supported by foundation grants and state funds.

However, a majority of staff at CPVP worked in the Community Development office, supporting CeaseFire’s site operations. Community Development personnel were involved in site selection, host agency selection, hiring and training outreach staff, insuring quality control measures at the site level, and providing ongoing technical assistance to site staff through regular meetings, training and site-visits. This office also oversaw the hiring, training and management of the violence interrupters. The staff in this office provided ongoing education and training to site staff including violence prevention coordinators, outreach workers and their supervisors, and the violence interrupters. The Community Development group also had a budget for promotional materials. As noted earlier, one goal of CeaseFire’s campaign was to raise public awareness and change people’s attitudes about violence. As a result, the program’s public education budget was significant. The public education component of the program was primarily supported by foundations, federal grants and some state monies.

The 2007 CPVP budget, which includes its national, Chicago, and other Illinois projects, illustrates the scale of this operation. The management office received \$1,913,635 to support its combined national, Chicago and Illinois site projects, including support for staff, consultants, workshops, conferences and out of state work. The evaluation office received \$312,453 for staff and survey support. The community development office received \$636,709 for technical assistance in Illinois, \$725,183 for outreach staff work in Illinois not managed by contracts with

sites, and for violence interrupters, community support, client youth activities, and \$51,600 for public education materials. Thus, the total CPVP budget for 2007 was \$3,639,580.

While they varied a bit, the individual sites ran CeaseFire on budgets of about \$250,000 per year. This enabled them to pay the salaries of their violence prevention coordinator, outreach worker supervisor, and the outreach staff. The host agencies also received some funding to support local activities such as barbeques or taking clients to see a movie. Almost all of the sites were funded by the State of Illinois, which channeled the money through the budget of the State Department of Corrections. A few sites were able to secure some additional support from local organizations to augment their state funding.

By contrast, the violence interrupters working in and around each site were funded by a federal grant, and they were paid directly by the University of Illinois-Chicago. Because they were university employees, benefits were part of their compensation package. The violence interrupter's appointments, however, took the form of an 900-hour contract, which was not always sufficient to retain them on a regular basis. As a result, violence interrupters frequently had to stop working and wait for their next contract to become effective, a situation which was extremely disruptive. The 2007 budget for violence interrupters was \$189,050.

To summarize the discussion that follows, the evaluation concluded that CeaseFire's funding mechanism was fundamentally flawed. The short, one-year funding cycle for most sites created job uncertainty and service interruptions, and drew staff time from operations to working on perennial funding crises. Start-up sites were especially impacted, due to the time it took to become operational in the first place, including recruiting and training staff, and developing a client base. The political nature of CeaseFire's funding led to needy sites being passed over, while sites with more political clout but less violence received funding. In some sites, politicians also demanded too large a hand in the operations.


## **Funding Sources**

In 2005, state and federal governments provided nearly \$5.6 million to CeaseFire. Local foundations contributed another half million that year, and corporations provided almost \$25,000. Of the \$6.2 million in the 2005 budget, more than half went into direct contracts to sites. The remainder of money was used to support the sites through other mechanisms, such as direct site support, violence interrupters, outreach supported by the project on behalf of sites, and to central management and national level work.

In 2006, state and federal sources provided \$7.5 million to the CeaseFire program. Local foundations provided \$1.7 that year, and corporations contributed more than \$130,00. Of the nearly \$9.4 million provided in 2006, two-thirds – \$6.25 million – went to support the individual CeaseFire sites. In 2007, CeaseFire's budget dropped to a little more than \$3.6 million, with state and federal sources providing \$1.65 million. Foundations provided close to \$2 million, and corporations provided \$45,443. Of the \$3,639,579 in the 2007 budget, federal funding supported one CeaseFire site, in the 11<sup>th</sup> police district in Chicago. Figure 3-1 illustrates trends in funding,

including the dramatic drop in 2007 that came as a result of the governor’s decision to discontinue funding the initiative.

Figure 3-1  
Yearly CeaseFire Funding



**Funding Stability**

The role played by CPVP staff was stable throughout the 2000s, because their funding primarily came from local foundations and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, an agency that primarily manages federal passthrough money to the State. They responded to proposals from CPVP that outlined their proposed scope of work. Their support could be spread over several years, leading to a stable and predictable flow of funds to support central office operations. Funding of the individual CeaseFire sites was quite another story. Almost all site operations were supported through yearly appropriations by the state legislature. In some years this brought prosperity to CeaseFire, when politicians were supportive and gave CeaseFire a “voice” in Springfield. Then, old and new sites were selected and funded by the State. But there were lean years as well, as funding ebbed and flowed in response to legislative politics and election cycles. Needy places sometimes had to be dropped because they failed to maintain support in the legislature, while others were created because their champions spoke up during the budgetary process.

Another negative consequence of this funding arrangement is that CeaseFire evolved into a large number of small and arguably underfunded and understaffed projects that targeted small areas, because each member initiative was capped. Everyone involved knew that this was not a

desirable situation. To mount a sustained campaign the program needed to be a regular budget item that was monitored and assessed by administrative officials. CPVP believed that, to be more effective, there should have been fewer and more well-staffed sites that could focus on larger and more naturally-defined target areas that might span legislative district lines. But they were unable to break out of a funding trap that eventually snapped closed.

So although CeaseFire expanded over time, there were downsides to being a politically-driven program with a yearly budget cycle. Each year CeaseFire staff needed to gear up to fight a new budgetary battle. Both the central CPVP office and local sites had to remain in contact with their legislative representatives, to make sure that CeaseFire was included in the budget. This process began early each spring, and continued through June 30<sup>th</sup>, the last day of the State's fiscal year. It was labor intensive and diverted the staff from doing the jobs they were hired for. During years when the legislature was unable to agree on a budget by the end of the fiscal year, CeaseFire offices were forced to close temporarily, work with a skeleton staff, or let staff members work on a voluntary basis until a budget was finally approved. Once the state budget was finalized, some sites would learn that they had been dropped, and had to let their staff go on short notice. In some areas the program came and went several times, each cycle forcing CeaseFire to shut down, leaving the staff unemployed and clients unserved.

There were many other implications of this funding structure. It inhibited the proactive selection of CeaseFire sites. An alternative model, one in which levels of crime and the readiness of local organizations to step forward in support of CeaseFire determined where the program was sited, probably would have been more effective. Instead, some CeaseFire sites opened where state legislators wanted them, or where they could be convinced to support siting them. In addition, the budgetary process which evolved ensured that each site, regardless of size or need, was awarded the same amount of money. Sites with much lower levels of violence received the same level of support as those with extremely high levels of violence. Another downside to the politically driven nature of the funding was that some of the politicians who were involved thought they should have a say in who was hired and how the program was run, although CPVP stoutly resisted this. Additionally, CeaseFire risked being the pet project of individual legislators, rather than a state program. Efforts were made by CeaseFire not to support one political faction or another, and at times this created conflict. At one site the outreach staff became involved in an effort to defeat the incumbent alderman. They worked the district while wearing their CeaseFire staff tee-shirts and jackets, forcing CPVP to intervene and try to make clear to them the difference between personal campaigning and campaigning in a manner that looked as though they represented the CeaseFire program. However, support for the program from legislators often came with one price tag or another. The politically driven nature of CeaseFire also did not allow the program to grow in deliberate fashion. In some years sites were cut unexpectedly, while in others perhaps too many sites had to be opened too quickly. Trying to recruit, hire, train and provide technical assistance to as many as a half a dozen new sites all at once was difficult, particularly when there was only a one-year commitment to funding them.

To understand the implications of year-to-year-funding, it is helpful to review what it took to get a site formed and operational once funded. Once an area was selected as a CeaseFire site



(July 1<sup>st</sup> in calm budget year), a host agency had to be selected to conduct the program. This could be a long and complicated process in areas with multiple, competing potential hosts that needed to be evaluated in order to find the most appropriate home for the program. It was no easier in areas where there was a dearth of technically qualified agencies with sufficient programming experience, for there simply finding a place to house the program was difficult. In several instances the central CPVP office ran programs directly in areas where they could not find suitable hosts. In others they turned the program over to a city department, as in North Chicago and Maywood. After selecting the host agency, a contract had to be drawn up and signed by both CPVP and the host agency, and this could take several months. By fall, recruitment could begin for the outreach staff. Once recruited and hired, they had to attend several weeks of formal training and then they accompanied experienced outreach workers as they pounded the street. This process often extended deep into the fall. Once the outreach staff was in place, they began the process of finding appropriate clients for the program. Building a client base of 15 (their target figure) usually could not happen until the spring, and most outreach workers were just beginning to make some inroads with clients by that time. This was also the time, unfortunately, that lobbying had to begin to keep the program alive. If the site was successful, and the political currents favorable, they could enjoy a year-long window to actually do their job.

Because the funding structure did not allow for the hiring of field staff for any more than a year, it was difficult to build site stability, depth and loyalty. It was also impossible to consider developing a career development process within the organization. Each year the outreach staff would need to wait to hear the outcome of the state's budgetary process. If their site wasn't included, they had to immediately shut down. This undermined staff morale in threatened sites. Often they blamed the CPVP staff for the problem, thinking they had not supported them effectively. When a site closed, CPVP would attempt to transfer the staff to other sites where there were openings, but, year after year, many outreach workers lost their jobs completely. Clients as a result were not being served with any regularity. Worse, the period of the most uncertainty, when staff were most focused on the political process, was during the summer. Then, school is out, much of the school-aged population is unemployed, more people are hanging out in the streets, and gang violence heats up. This combination of factors makes the summers the most vulnerable time to pull a program from a neighborhood. Just as those who are most likely to be the victim or perpetrator of violence have more time on their hands, the program risked disappearing.

And disappear it largely did. In 2007, lobbying for the inclusion of CeaseFire in the state budget proceeded as usual. Staffers were calling their representatives, busloads of CeaseFire supporters made trips to Springfield, and the media featured some well-placed descriptions of CeaseFire events. However, the legislature missed its July deadline for passing a budget because of a stand-off, seemingly to the death, between the governor and the General Assembly. A temporary budget was put in place that continued many state activities at their previous budgetary level. CeaseFire was supported in this stop-gap fashion for a month, but the governor's staff systematically axed the program from the final budget. Stalled budgets were not new to Illinois or CeaseFire, but as the summer dragged on, many site workers were having to work fewer hours or on a voluntary basis, due to dwindling funds. The staffers at CPVP were bracing for a cut in their

program and they were immersed in the very difficult task trying to hold a program together that was shrinking before their eyes. But using his constitutional amendatory power, the governor punished the legislature for failing to agree with his taxing and spending priorities by cutting out all programs that were included in the budget in the “special initiatives” category. Legislators’ requests to fund specific CeaseFire sites were among the many initiatives listed under this title, a list which the governor dismissed as “pork.”

To further complicate matters, a day after this budget announcement was made, the state released the findings of an audit of CeaseFire’s activities. The audit provided its own evaluative measures, and argued that the program had no impact on crime. According to the audit, CeaseFire had not been able to demonstrate its effectiveness in any significant way. Most of the remaining criticisms in the document focused on run-of-the-mill accounting errors that easily could have been made while trying to manage more than 20 active sites. The audit had been initiated by longtime critic of CeaseFire, a powerful state senator representing the city’s South Side and a prominent leader of the Illinois Legislative Black Caucus. One particular complaint of the Caucus was that CeaseFire was directed by a white epidemiologist. It did not matter that the CPVP staff was primarily Latino and African-American, and that the sites were located in almost completely Latino and African American neighborhoods. Their opposition explained why CeaseFire was a project of individual members of the state House of Representatives, and was never able to secure a permanent budget line debated by both houses of the General Assembly. Many observers wondered whether the audit was unbiased, and certainly the exquisite timing of its release was quite damaging to CeaseFire: the media focused as much on the audit as the budget cut.

In this process our evaluation team had a modest opportunity to speak about its preliminary findings, but so did representatives of another evaluation group that doubted the efficacy of CeaseFire. They claimed to reflect “the voice of the community,” which they heard as criticizing the program. They concluded that other, more grass-roots neighborhood organizations should have gotten the money. Their appearance during the budgetary struggle meant there were contending evaluation “findings” regarding the program. We note that this group was closely affiliated with a political faction known for its dislike of CeaseFire and the origins of its director.

So, dependence on yearly state funding via legislators’ personal initiatives proved near-fatal for CeaseFire. At a meeting we attended, local foundation officials suggested that CeaseFire look for support beyond the legislature, to build a more diverse and resilient funding stream. They were warned at the same time not to become dependent on foundations for continuing support, for they prefer to provide funding for start-up ventures rather than continuing programs. It is noteworthy that the City of Chicago never contributed to CeaseFire’s funding, although the mayor often spoke of the program and participated in its marches. For a brief period the federal government showed interest in the program, and First Lady Laura Bush gave it high praise. However, none of these efforts succeeded in expanding the program’s budget base enough to weather downturns in state support.

By the end of September 2007, all but two CeaseFire Chicago sites had closed. Shortly after, the Alliance of Logan Square Organizations raised enough money to reopen the two sites it

had been hosting, and Woodlawn followed suit. Neither continued to operate under the CPVP umbrella, however. CPVP turned its focus to developing its CeaseFire program model and expanding to other cities. They also managed a federally-funded site on Chicago's West Side that served as CeaseFire's demonstration and training program. Twenty or so violence interrupters continued to do mediation work in the field. CPVP continues to work on restoring state funding.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Client Outreach**

Outreach work to identify and involve individual clients in the program was one of the five components comprising the CeaseFire model, and it was one of the most vital. Other elements of the program – community mobilization, public education, clergy involvement and criminal justice participation – were all heavily influenced by client outreach efforts, and in practice client outreach may have been the most consistent component of the program. This chapter describes outreach workers and their clients. The first section describes the background, recruitment, training and supervision of outreach workers (outreach workers), and details some of the mechanics of outreach work. The second major section describes the client recruitment process, clients' background and the delivery of client services.

Initially, CeaseFire did not have a client outreach component. From 1997 until 2001, the focus was on fostering clergy partnerships and community involvement, organizing collective responses to shootings, and public education. Between 2001 and 2005 the outreach program went through a period of steady growth, with new sites being added nearly every year. The most dramatic growth in the outreach program was between 2004 and 2005, when the number of outreach workers grew from 20 to 70. In 2005, the outreach program shrank in an equally dramatic fashion due to a temporary loss in funding, showing that the earlier growth was not sustainable. While the number of outreach workers fluctuated, in early 2007 they numbered approximately four per site.

CeaseFire's outreach workers were individuals with street experience and, quite often, experience with the justice system. Having strong local ties, they were usually hired to work in their home neighborhoods. From the perspective of the CPVP, outreach workers who fit this description were hired because doing so helped deliver a "credible message" to clients and the community. In the words of a staff member, that message ". . . becomes more credible when we use a similar population to deliver [it]." But outreach workers were not simply messengers. They were also case managers, conflict mediators and client mentors. All of these roles were premised on their ability to build trust with the target population. Outreach workers had to navigate the dangers of the streets as well as manage complex client relationships.

The outreach worker role was a hybrid; often they served as both social worker and violence intervener. Hired for their personal experience rather than professional backgrounds, outreach workers often had little to no formal training other than that provided by CPVP and the host agencies. More often than not, this training consisted of monthly sessions at CPVP. Describing the role of the outreach worker during a staff orientation, one CPVP staffer explained, "as outreach workers, you take knowledge to [clients] and say what's available to them. People are going to be less likely to shoot if they're taking advantage of alternatives." However, presenting information about alternatives and convincing clients to take advantage of them are different matters. For example, many outreach workers maintained that their clients were "just not ready" to step into a steady job. Their role was instead to first prepare their clients for seeking a job and encountering the requirements of the world of work.

While outreach workers at many sites also ended up taking responsibility for carrying out CeaseFire's "public education" campaign (which chiefly meant door-to-door canvassing and distributing printed material), their success in delivering CeaseFire's message required that their clients were receptive, making individual trust-building critical. A key component of CeaseFire's messaging was the one-on-one personal connections that outreach workers established with the community. They were to develop relationships with high-risk young people who, if they stayed on course, were often positioned to become victims of violence in the short run, and in the next generation of active gang members and leaders.

This discussion of outreach workers and their supervisors is based on personal interviews with several outreach workers at each active CeaseFire site. Based on those interviews, we constructed an outreach worker survey, which was administered twice over the course of the evaluation. The first survey was conducted May and June 2006, and the response rate was 100 percent. In July and August 2007 we re-surveyed the staff to include those hired since the first round of questioning, both in the original sites and in new CeaseFire areas. In total, 23 outreach supervisors and 78 outreach workers were surveyed. Details of the survey are presented in an appendix to this report. We also attended training and staff meetings involving outreach workers and supervisors.

### **Outreach Work**

In interviews with outreach workers, a recurring theme was their past gang involvement and their current determination to work with young people who were going through the same struggles. Case workers viewed their personal experiences on the street as a significant resource. One pointed out, "I was there once. The whole social, economic, single-parent things. All these played a part in me making mistakes in my life." Later in the interview he noted, "I have not faced anything so far [on this job] that I haven't dealt with in the past; nothing surprises me when it comes to this job." Another outreach worker, who later became a supervisor, identified as an "ex-gang member, ex-gang leader, ex-drug dealer, ex-drug user." Since being released after a dozen years "in the joint," he has spent 15 years in gang intervention. Describing his qualifications to do outreach work, another outreach worker thought that his experiences gave him "insight" into the experiences of men and women gangs. He believed that his life was evidence that it is "possible to survive."

When asked about their motivations for anti-gang outreach, outreach workers often alluded to correcting for their own past mistakes. When this question was asked at a CPVP orientation for new employees, responses ranged from "to give back, to be a blessing," to "I want to make penitentiaries go bankrupt," to "I'd like to stop the self-inflicted genocide." They commonly felt an obligation to atone for their wrongdoings. One violence prevention coordinator stressed that the way in which outreach workers relate to their past is a major factor in hiring decisions. He observed:

*They have to regret what they did when they were youngsters. They have to feel a moral obligation to make amends with the community. They have to express themselves eloquently. Those are the qualities we're looking for.*

From this perspective, a person's attitude about past wrongs shapes how he or she relates to the community and clients. A sense of penance seemingly creates extra drive to do the difficult work of building relationships with active gang members.

In addition, many within CeaseFire believed it important that outreach workers come from the neighborhood where they eventually work. Outreach workers argued that their debt to the community could best be paid off in the area where they grew up. An outreach worker noted that he knew many business owners where he worked, "because I grew up around here. They know me; they know what I used to be." They were pleased to see him working for CeaseFire, because he "made a change" in his life and was "trying to assist young guys to do positive things." Due, at least in part, to their having witnessed his transformation, these business owners willingly hung CeaseFire posters in their windows. In this instance we see how hiring from the area increased both the credibility and the connections that an outreach worker could then turn into resources for their clients. Whether aiding in coalition building or in forging connections with the target population, a personal history in the neighborhood can serve as an invaluable resource.

Another advantage of hiring people from the neighborhood to do outreach work was that this practice could help neutralize potential resistance that the program might receive from both "community groups and brothers on the street." In the outreach workers survey, a full 60 percent agreed that they knew some of their clients before they became outreach workers. The central component of CeaseFire outreach work – building ties with people who are likely to shoot or be shot – was facilitated by past affiliation with local gangs. While CeaseFire was not always able to find qualified candidates from their target area, they almost never hired individuals who did not previously have any influence on the street. In our survey of CeaseFire clients, the majority reported that their outreach worker was "very connected to the streets." This familiarity with gang life clearly exposed the program to potential liabilities, and CeaseFire employees were arrested on a number of occasions. However, their prior street experience and local connections enabled outreach workers to make contact with the toughest-to-reach people.

Having been through many of the stresses faced by their clients, outreach workers had a unique understanding of what attracts young people to negative choices. Citing the absence of loving or nurturing influences in his own upbringing, one outreach-worker-turned-supervisor noted that he focused on showing love to his clients. His decision to join a gang was as simple as deciding to spend his time where he felt loved. He notes, "When I went out on the streets, I had guys on the block telling me that they loved me and would kill for me. I got more love on the streets than from my brothers, so gang life appealed to me."

Another outreach worker emphasized that past affiliations mattered a great deal when doing outreach work and violence interruption. He stated, "We know all the guys in the

neighborhood. That's why we're an effective team." For him these connections keep the staff from being "intimidated" by outreach work and violence interruption. The same employee was working for peace on the streets even before joining the CeaseFire staff. He shared, "since we used to be active, when things happened, we'd do mediation. Through contacts with the different mobs (gangs), we'd find resolutions. We were keeping things at a minimum with the mobs." He thought that CeaseFire made his work more effective, though he sees his pre-existing connections as a resource that enabled him to do outreach even without the support of an organization.

For many outreach workers, although working with high-risk young people exposed them to dangers on the streets, it also allowed them to move beyond their past experiences through a positive outlet. This positive behavior amid continued temptation enabled outreach workers to demonstrate to their clients that it was possible to remain in their familiar environment and still act as a force for good. When done well and consistently, this behavior modeling may be one of their greatest contributions to their clients' lives. At the same time, using the wisdom gleaned from past life experiences may have helped outreach workers make sense of their own lives and stay out of prison.

Recidivism rates are high in Illinois, and it is more likely that someone will return to prison than it is they will stay out. Much of the criminological literature on desistance indicates that creating an alternative identity is a necessary component to forging a new life path. As Farall and Maruna<sup>1</sup> posit, "[d]esisting from crime may, in part, not only be about giving up one way of life, but also about adopting another, more socially-aware approach to oneself and one's behavior." Because desistance is a maintenance process and there is rarely, if ever, a single baptismal moment where one becomes automatically crime-free for life, it is vital to look at the adoption of a more socially-aware approach to life over the long-term. CeaseFire offered a unique and challenging opportunity for former offenders to adopt such a lifestyle. In the words of one outreach worker, "I know that change doesn't come overnight. You have to give yourself a chance to change." This was a message that he brought to his clients, and through sharing it he reaffirmed his understanding of his own process of change.

By providing a means for a meaningful and exciting alternative identity, being employed as an outreach worker helped keep former offenders out of potential trouble. While CeaseFire offered a legitimate income source and an opportunity to give something back to the community, outreach workers often expressed a commitment to the people they worked with that extended beyond their jobs. One outreach worker remembers wanting to do something for his community when he got out of prison. He recounted, "I said, let me go out there and relate to society. Let me go out there and show these guys they can change. Don't hang around the four corners (the block) all your life. These guys don't know about downtown. They don't know about the outside. I said, 'Let me give back to the community I've done so much wrong to.'"

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<sup>1</sup> Farall, Steven and Maruna, Shadd. Desistance-Focused Criminal Justice: Introduction to a Special Issue on Desistance from Crime and Policy. *The Howard Journal*, Vol 43 No 4. September 2004.

CeaseFire mostly hired men to address violence that was almost exclusively male-on-male, reflecting the program's focus on street-level, often gang-related conflict. Resistance to hiring women for outreach positions occurred at individual sites as well as at the central office. On occasion CPVP wanted a site to hire a proven outreach worker from a site that had closed, but it became clear that the proposed new site "[didn't] want women." A female violence prevention coordinator was told that there were so few female outreach workers because gang violence is a male phenomenon. She argued in turn that the number of female gang members was growing, and another outreach worker supervisor said he had asked site administrators if they could hire a female outreach worker because "ladies are in dire need of direction." According to many, there is growing female involvement in the street economy, for reasons ranging from declining family cohesion in high-incarceration areas to shrinking economic opportunities for young women in poor communities.

CeaseFire's general policy was for male outreach workers to not work with female clients. Explaining one rationale behind this decision, a CPVP employee announced to a group of new outreach workers, "You don't want to put yourself in any situation you don't want to be in. You could be accused [of sexual harassment, sexual violence]. We deal with a promiscuous population. You can say, 'I'm not going to go there,' but the accusation can be damaging." While the policy averts potential liability issues, it likewise limits outreach to young women on the streets.

## **Supervisors**

Providing accountability and guidance are important components of the outreach worker supervisor position. The role of the supervisor is to make sure that outreach workers are doing their job, and to provide insights and support. This role is particularly important given the instability faced by many CeaseFire employees who are former offenders, the liabilities that many outreach workers bring with them as ex-offenders, and their relatively short professional resumes. Supervisors can themselves be held accountable for knowing if their outreach workers are involving themselves in illegal activities on the street, particularly activities that impact their capacity to do effective outreach (e.g., selling drugs).

Several sites have terminated outreach workers who were "straddling both sides of the fence" and who still "wanted to be in the life, on the streets." One supervisor emphasized, "We can't have that. We sent the message, 'We're not going to let you take down something we built.'" Meanwhile, accountability on the job can have many different faces. Depending on the site and the time, an outreach worker may be held accountable to the CPVP model, to their site's strategic goals, to their own personal standards, to their paperwork, or to all of the above.

The supervisor is primarily responsible for steering the development of the site's outreach program. At their best, they act as both supportive guides and well-informed generals. At least one outreach supervisor has taken on responsibility for facilitating a gathering with clients from each outreach worker. This group mentoring session is called "Reflections," and it was started so that the site's outreach workers could improve the strength of their client relationships by



bringing them to a weekly group session with young people from different street organizations. Another key role for the supervisor is to guide their sites in strategically planning their outreach efforts. While this strategic-planning function is clearly present systemwide, it is one of the least consistent supervisor duties across sites. Ever-present is the daily task of outreach and the goal of stopping shootings, but frequently there is no step-by-step plan on how to get from one to the other. Where and when these plans do exist, they tend to be developed on a site-by-site basis, and there is no coordination across parts of the city or region.

Beyond developing strategic plans and creative in-house programs for clients, supervisors are also responsible for outreach worker safety in the field. One violence prevention coordinator said about putting together his staff, “the hardest part was finding [the supervisor].” For him, supervisors are obligated to know the types of situations they are asking their workers to enter. The coordinator explains that “he can put people in harm’s way or he can be wise.” This is critical given how vulnerable the outreach workers are: “unlike a Chicago police officer, they don’t have a weapon or a bulletproof vest.” He feels the supervisor must “ assess the battlefield, and [he] does a very good job assessing the battlefield with them.” Almost all supervisors recognize that there are critical moments when their workers need to be taken off the street.

CeaseFire’s outreach worker supervisors had diverse backgrounds, ranging from the professional world to the underworld. The demands of the job included the ability to supervise ex-offenders, relate to the targeted population directly, mediate conflicts, manage effectively, guide outreach workers through often dangerous terrain, and provide key support for the program’s front-line staff. Several sites were supervised by individuals who previously served as outreach workers and knew the demands of that job. While not every outreach worker was able to make that transition, there was some incentive for CPVP to hire supervisors from its own ranks if a position opened up. Except for a promotion to team leader – a position that existed at a few sites – it was the one vertical career move available to outreach workers.

Compared to those of outreach workers, there were less clear expectations regarding the personal histories and qualifications of supervisors. Some violence prevention coordinators insisted that it was better that supervisors did not come from the streets, but at the same time outreach workers complained about professionally minded supervisors who were unable to connect to their target population or even understand what was needed to do so effectively. Consider the following two perspectives on the same supervisor. The site’s violence prevention coordinator said, “I got lucky. He’s a real smart guy. He’s not really from the streets... You don’t want someone from the streets to be a supervisor, because he needs to be disciplined.” In a separate interview an outreach worker from the same site said, “You have to have people that are familiar with what is required to deal with this [outreach worker] population. A lot of people doing the work are ex-offenders. You need someone who can deal with this type of person... We need different kinds of supervisors.” The tension surrounding who to hire in the outreach worker supervisor position may have had a lot to do with the supervisor’s role as intermediary between the field staff and CPVP, and between the field staff and the host organization.

As intermediary between the street and CPVP staff, supervisors were also charged with negotiating policy differences between their sites and CPVP. There were frequent conflicts between CPVP and the outreach staff at sites, in addition to conflicts between the outreach workers and the host agencies. One CPVP staff member feared that supervisors did not trust CPVP management, and consequently they had become less trustworthy themselves. According to him, this had serious implications for implementation of the CPVP model. Taking an extreme position, he suggested that the program was out of control, saying, “The outreach workers are burned out, so they make up stuff on their forms.” Pointing to a relationship between the absence of trust and the organization’s management style, one CPVP staff person argued:

*I think it’s fine to hold [outreach worker supervisors] accountable. But we have to take the opportunity to be more collaborative. Our style is to tell people, not to engage in discussion. That’s organization-wide. We are more like the police than a democratic organization. It’s top-down. [The executive director’s] style is a bit more autocratic. That’s an acceptable leadership style, but people get more interested in organizations if they have roles in making decisions.*

## **Outreach Workers and Clients**

CeaseFire outreach workers were expected to build and maintain a minimum caseload of 15 high-risk clients, within four months of starting the job. As we detail later in this chapter, the requirement that clients be high-risk was to encourage a focus on individuals who were most likely to be the perpetrators or targets of gun violence. Outreach workers are hired in large part for their ability to build relationships with high-risk individuals, and this ability often trumped other organizational concerns.

As an outreach program focused almost exclusively on intervention and mediation, it was essential that CeaseFire’s field employees were engaging those with the greatest propensity for violent and aggressive behavior on the streets. Working primarily, if not exclusively, with that target population and having a full 15-client caseload was challenging for many outreach workers. For most, the risk level of their clients mattered more than their total client numbers. Even though outreach workers believed that carrying 15 clients was important, in reality most had smaller caseloads. In the staff survey, more than half (52 percent) of outreach workers reported working with fewer than 15 clients, and only 10 percent had more than that number. As the discussion below on clients indicates, the sites differed in the percentage of clients who qualified as “high-risk” according to CPVP standards. Accordingly, successes and challenges with identifying the targeted client base vary across sites, as some communities had significantly greater numbers of young people, active gangs, returnees from prison and shooting survivors.

An outreach worker’s ability to build his or her caseload was also impacted by factors that were more difficult to measure, such as the intensity of peer pressure and the entrenchment of community (sub)cultural norms in the area. The strength of the gang culture in an area could have profound implications for an outsider trying to make inroads there. Oftentimes a young

person's receptiveness to an outreach worker's approach on the street hinged on who was around at the time and which acquaintances were watching.

The passion and experiential wisdom that CeaseFire workers brought to the job was the foundation upon which CeaseFire's work with clients was built. It was not uncommon for CeaseFire hires already to be informally involved in conflict mediation, and CeaseFire was a beneficiary of this. Moreover, the front-line staff's capacity to draw from their own pasts and share how they had moved from where they were was an essential part of their work. As many outreach workers attested, it was not enough to simply establish a line of communication with 15 people who meet the CPVP risk requirements. The challenge was keeping them as clients while helping them transition to a safer lifestyle.

Outreach workers shared a belief that most young people living the street life were not content with their lives. After decades of street work, one outreach worker concluded that "90 percent of guys don't want to be who they are." Helping people direct themselves toward a new path was an important part of outreach and case management. Yet effective client identification required recognizing the difference between dissatisfaction with one's life position and a willingness to take action to change it. Importantly, outreach workers were individuals who had experienced some degree of transformation in their own lives.

**Keeping in Contact.** Walking and hanging out in the neighborhood was the backbone of outreach work. Beyond that, outreach worker interactions with clients revolved largely around phone calls, home visits and visits in the local CeaseFire office. CeaseFire outreach workers were expected to spend approximately 80 percent of their time on the street or in the neighborhood, and 20 percent of their time in the office. In our staff survey, outreach workers reported their most frequent activities as "talking to current or potential clients on the streets" and "walking or hanging out in the neighborhood." Approximately 94 percent of CeaseFire outreach workers report that they do both of these activities multiple times a week, with the large majority saying that they do these activities on a daily basis. These and other self-reports of their activities are described in Table 4-1.

This focus on providing a visible street presence helped them remain in contact with their clients, as well as identify new ones. Many CeaseFire clients were not very mobile; one outreach worker described his clients as "two-block gangsters." Because of gang rivalries, clients had a very geographically limited comfort zone. As a result of clients' unwillingness to travel far, outreach workers generally knew where to look for them. And one contribution that outreach workers could make to their clients' lives was getting them out of the neighborhood; outreach workers reported spending time taking clients to events (averaging about once a month), and some sites had dedicated travel budgets for their clients.

When not meeting with their clients on the street, cell phones were their most important resource. Client contact happened most frequently on the phone, with 33 percent of outreach workers reporting that they talked to clients on the phone daily, and 50 percent that they talked to clients several times a week.

Table 4-1  
Spending Time With Clients

How frequently do you . . . ?	every day	several days a week	several times a month	about once a month	I do this, but not often	not at all
talk to clients in the office	6	41	33	13	7	0
talk to clients on the phone	33	50	0	15	2	0
take clients to lunch, dinner or coffee	0	9	35	18	30	7
make a home visit	15	49	30	4	2	0
take clients to an event (bowling, sports game, etc.)	0	4	32	28	22	15
participate in sports with clients, or play cards or games with clients	2	23	24	19	21	11
prepare clients for job interviews	9	23	51	8	8	2
take clients to job referrals or help clients fill out job applications	7	30	39	11	13	0
take clients to court or talk with their lawyers	4	2	31	10	45	8
talk with their probation or parole officers	4	8	24	13	42	9
take clients to church events	0	2	19	9	34	36
just hang out with clients on the street	19	38	21	2	14	6

Note: N=78 outreach workers

However, phone conversations were not always the best way for an outreach worker to find out what was really going on in a client's life. CeaseFire's outreach workers were required to have four in-person contacts with each client a month. While meeting clients on the street and out in the neighborhood enabled outreach workers to meet this requirement, home visits were often outreach workers' time to get a real understanding of what their clients faced. As Table 4-1 documents, 64 percent, of outreach workers reported making home visits at least several times a week.

Substance abuse, incarcerated or missing parents, domestic violence, and family-based gang affiliations were among the issues commonly revealed by home visits. Speaking about the issues that his clients faced at home, one outreach worker talked about a household with a drug-dependent single mother whose son would give her drugs so he would have free reign of the

house while she got high. Nearly 85 percent of outreach workers report that their clients were targets of abuse at home, and 32 percent agreed that a major client issue was drug-dependent parents. Home visits allowed outreach workers to understand the entirety of challenges faced by clients. One outreach worker, who was raised in a challenging home environment herself, said of her clients, “it’s a bumpy road, and some are still one fall away from needing to be picked up. I help them.” Many clients were walking this bumpy road while living with their parents and siblings.

Outreach workers were also able to spend focused time with clients in the local CeaseFire office. This was especially important when clients were facing serious obstacles at home and needed a safe space for reflecting on their life. For many outreach workers, the office was a central resource for drawing clients off the streets and for listening to what was going on in their lives. Forty-seven percent of outreach workers reported having office visits with clients several times a week, and 80 percent reported engaging in office visits at least several times a month. There is a wide range of accommodation among CeaseFire offices, ranging from very welcoming to cramped and poorly lit. Nonetheless, in neighborhoods where street and domestic life can be overwhelming, the office provided a reliable space for escape. Clients could work with outreach workers and call potential employers, schools or service agencies. The office provided a place for clients to cool off in summer and warm up in winter.

Outreach workers also reported taking clients to court, talking with their lawyers, and meeting with their probation or parole officers. In total, 37 percent of outreach workers report accompanying their clients to court or talking with their lawyers more than once a month. Outreach workers believed they could help by appearing in CeaseFire attire, by describing their clients’ programmatic activities, and by showing judges paperwork documenting their client’s CeaseFire involvement. Other outreach workers hesitated to go to court with clients. They were unsure it was appropriate for them to do so. Moreover, with newer clients or those with whom they had a somewhat tenuous relationship, outreach workers ran the risk of backing clients without having full knowledge of the charges against them. Some outreach workers were wary of helping new clients, who they believed might have been using their CeaseFire connection to avoid conviction.

As Table 4-1 documented, about one-third of outreach workers reported that they talked with their clients’ probation or parole officers more than once a month. This activity was potentially valuable because of its impact on the re-entry dynamics for men and women leaving prison. Over time, a growing number of sites used information on who was re-entering their community from prison to identify potential clients. At some sites probation and parole officers give direct referrals to CeaseFire, while other sites received a re-entry list from the Department of Corrections. Outreach workers had a great deal of legitimacy when contacting these ex-offenders, because so many had themselves made the journey from prison.

**Providing Services.** A common refrain among outreach workers was that they were not on the streets to tell people to get out of gangs; rather they were there to provide them with alternatives to that way of life. Providing clients with alternatives to a street-dependent life often

meant helping them find a job. However, providing alternatives could extend from identifying education-completion options for clients, to helping them create a more positive self-identity, to exposing them to non-violent problem-solving approaches. There were several layers of client services provided by outreach workers, some addressed material needs while others addressed personal and interpersonal issues, such building self-esteem and creating healthier relationships with others. These layers were clearly interconnected and, to some degree, mutually constitutive.

Service provision was not simply about available local resources area and client needs. In general, services were provided according to perceived client needs, what was available for them, what issues the outreach workers knew how to address, and even what issues they had themselves dealt with personally. Another important factor was the outreach workers' ability to connect their clients to outside resources, which was influenced by clients' mistrust of official agencies and agencies' insensitivity to gang culture. As a guide in these processes, outreach workers could draw from their personal history of dealing with employment, education, and other key issues.

As one outreach worker illustrated, such guidance could be extremely hands-on:

*I help them get ID cards and driver's licenses. I'll take them to their first driver's test. If they don't have a car, I even let them use mine. If a guy is living with his friends, he's probably sleeping on a couch or on the floor. He's not gonna be doing nothing. I'll take [clients] down to Fullerton, where all the factories are, and fill out like 100 applications, like a mad man. I call that behavior-modification.*

Outreach workers like the one quoted above, who provide direction in their clients' lives, could play a critical role in helping their clients initiate changes in their lives. For these young people, an energetic outreach worker was often one of very few positive mobilizing forces in their lives. Importantly, the internal difficulties faced by clients were often shaped and reinforced by difficulties establishing a constructive role for themselves in society.

When asked about the challenges faced by their clients, 95 percent of outreach workers reported that their clients struggled with having a felony record, with having no high school diploma, with anger management, and with child support. As Table 4-2 documents, 85 percent of outreach workers report that their clients had issues with drugs, job readiness, being the target of abuse at home, and being a formal gang member. While 77 percent of outreach workers attested to having clients who survived shootings, 75 percent indicated they had clients who themselves had been shooters as well. Nearly two-thirds thought their clients included leaders in a gang, and 26 percent even reported having clients who were "gang hit men." These were all quite serious issues, and they were often the focal points of outreach workers' efforts. In addition, 40 percent of outreach workers indicated their clients faced being homeless, 23 percent agreed that their clients suffered from mental illness, and 14 percent that their clients suffered from physical disabilities.

Table 4-2  
Outreach Worker Assessments of Clients' Problems

percent	problem	percent	problem
95	have a felony record	74	no high school degree
95	anger management	68	hangs with a gang; not a member
92	have children to support	65	have no GED
86	member of a gang	63	has been a gang leader
85	drug use	60	lost their job
85	job readiness	40	homeless
85	target of abuse at home	32	parents on drugs
81	never had a job	26	was a gang hit man
77	have been a shooting victim	23	mental illness
76	alcohol abuse	14	physical disability
75	has been a shooter	1	HIV/AIDS

Note: N=78 outreach workers

Amid a sea of client issues that needed addressing, many outreach workers indicated in interviews that finding their clients a job was their biggest challenge. Eight-five percent of outreach workers cited a lack of “job readiness” as a major issue for clients. This stemmed, in no small part, from the fact that many clients (82 percent; see the self-reports of clients below) had been arrested or had been in even deeper trouble with the law. As Table 4-3 documents, in the survey 72 percent of outreach workers reported successfully connecting a client to job training or job readiness programs at least once a month, and 64 percent of outreach workers said they connected clients to job interviews at least once a month. (These figures also match client’s reports; see below). Though job training programs and job interviews did not always translate into jobs, they were a necessary steps in that direction. The process was not without frustrations. It proved counterproductive to enroll clients in job readiness programs when there were no jobs waiting at the other end, or when clients accepted a job before they were actually ready. These situations were demoralizing for client and outreach worker alike. Today’s labor market is not a welcoming place for low-income men and women of color with little or no employment history. This reality was underscored by the fact that 81 percent of outreach workers reported that a major issue for their clients is that they have “never held a job.”

After job-related services, outreach workers invested the most energy in working with clients to improve their educational credentials, through enrolling them in GED programs or alternative schools. Many outreach workers (74 percent) reported that a major issue for their clients was not having a high school diploma, and 65 percent said the same about clients not

having a GED. Beyond improving clients’ credentials for getting a job searches, enrollment in school offered clients an avenue for making positive investments in themselves and to experience a sense of personal progress. Well over half of outreach workers (61 percent) reported getting a

Table 4-3  
Referral of Clients to Programs and Services

How frequently are you able to refer or connect your clients to these services or opportunities?	More than once a month	once a month	less than once a month	not at all
a GED program	61	28	9	2
an alternative school	42	15	34	9
college	12	14	32	42
drug rehabilitation	27	15	31	27
alcohol /rehabilitation	29	14	28	29
anger management programs	38	24	24	13
mental health services	14	12	18	57
job training or job readiness program	72	13	7	7
a job interview	64	15	19	2
HIV/AIDS testing	4	0	32	64
pregnancy & parenthood services	10	2	20	69
housing assistance	10	22	32	36
food assistance or WIC	10	16	32	42
places to get driver’s licenses, social security cards or state IDs	43	20	26	11
daycare for clients’ children	12	6	14	69

Note: N=78 outreach workers

client into a GED program more than once a month, and 89 percent reported doing so at least once a month. Alternative schools offered clients a positive social environment where they could interact with other young people away from many of the pressures of the street. Overall, 42 percent of outreach workers reported enrolling clients in alternative schools several times a month and 57 percent claimed to do this at least once a month. The role that alternative schools played in the program varied greatly, depending on the available options in the area and each outreach worker’s personal connection to those options. Outreach staff at one CeaseFire site helped start a local alternative school and leveraged their connection to the school as a resource for enriching their clients’ lives. At another site, CeaseFire’s local partners helped establish two alternative schools in the area that were available to CeaseFire clients.



Another basic service commonly provided to clients – one that all outreach workers have had to address in their own lives – was obtaining official forms of identification. Forty-three percent of outreach workers report helping get clients drivers licenses, social security cards, or state IDs more than once a month, and 63 percent of outreach workers did so at least once a month. Proper IDs were essential for clients as they pursued job possibilities and navigated life outside of their home turf.

For sites operating in immigrant communities (in this instance, predominately Latino neighborhoods), the documentation issue was especially tricky. Describing this reality, one outreach worker supervisor said, “They came to the U.S. for better opportunities, and they got caught gangbanging. Finding legitimate work is difficult for them. Everyone closes the door, because they’re undocumented.” Workers at these sites had to grapple with language barriers and legal issues ranging from citizenship to felonies. Staff members at several sites spoke of the impact of deportation, both the fear and the reality, on gang structures in their zones. On at least one occasion federal raids targeted active gang members in CeaseFire areas, with the result being that the rapid removal of leaders weakened the level of informal social control operating within the targeted gangs.

Not surprisingly, addressing clients’ anger-management issues was a major focus for many outreach workers and their interactions with clients. Ninety-five percent of outreach workers reported that their clients had anger-management needs, and 62 percent report getting clients into anger-management programs at least once a month. Anger has an obvious and powerful relationship to aggressive behavior, and is a root emotional cause behind much of the destructive behavior occurring in CeaseFire communities. The saying “hurt people hurt people” does much to explain the interplay between the pain that gang-involved young people experience and the pain they cause.

### **Clients and Their Problems**

Their individual clients were among the primary beneficiaries of CeaseFire’s efforts. In the program model, clients were to be drawn from among the highest-risk residents of the area: young adults with long arrest record, who were involved in gangs and street drug markets, and who seemed likely to be perpetrators or victims of a shooting or killing in the near future. They all needed assistance. Clients needed not just jobs, but pre-employment preparation to ensure that their first job was not a negative experience for them or their employer. They often needed help addressing mental health issues, including anger management, and some faced re-entry problems because they had recently been released from prison. We found that clients usually learned about CeaseFire through a friend, by dropping in at the local CeaseFire office, or through a direct approach by an outreach worker. Outreach workers reported spending a great deal of time talking with potential clients, in order to evaluate their appropriateness as a client and to earn their trust. But information flowed slowly from potential clients; they often had faced unfulfilled promises from other social service programs, and they had seen government-funded programs come and go. Further, many initially believed CeaseFire was somehow connected to the police department, and gaining their trust took time. During this get-acquainted period, outreach workers assessed

whether individuals were appropriate candidates for CeaseFire, and whether they appeared to have sufficient motivation to change.

As of July 2007, CeaseFire was monitoring the status of 659 active clients at 15 program sites. Some new sites were just beginning to establish themselves, and client information was not yet available for the few individuals with whom they begun working. Across the 15 active sites, the smallest client caseload was 20, and the largest was 83. A typical site carried a caseload of 33 to 59 clients.

Our data on CeaseFire's clients is drawn from several sources. First, we had access to intake forms that outreach workers completed during their initial meetings with clients. In this study the clients remained anonymous and, in fact, their identities were unknown even at CeaseFire headquarters. Clients' names never appeared in their files; instead an identifying number was assigned to each at the site office. In order to protect their clients' identities, only outreach workers and their immediate supervisor know the corresponding names. This procedure was followed because sensitive personal information was sometimes documented in client files. Outreach workers feared investigations by the police and subpoenas from prosecutor, and wanted to protect client confidentiality. Information from these forms was entered – with ID numbers only – into a database, and the completeness of the files was continually monitored by CPVP staff, who made regular site visits to review the completeness of the client paperwork.

The second source of information on clients was a 297-respondent survey conducted in spring and summer 2007. The survey focused on who CeaseFire clients were, the personal and family issues they faced, and the extent of assistance that CeaseFire provided in response to these problems. The client survey also provided an assessment of CeaseFire from the clients' perspective. This included their assessments of whether outreach workers had been able to help them access the services they needed, whether outreach workers were knowledgeable about the realities clients face on the street, and the overall impact of CeaseFire on their lives. We wanted to know whether CeaseFire was providing them with opportunities that they deemed valuable. The client survey involved structured in-person interviews. Respondents were randomly selected from lists of active clients. The number of respondents from each site was determined by their caseload; larger sites were represented by more survey respondents, and as a group the final sample provided a portrait of CeaseFire's clients as a whole. Respondents were selected from 13 sites that had been in operation long enough to involve clients with a wide range of experiences with the program. Overall, the response rate for the survey was 82 percent. The 18 percent who could not be found and interviewed were replaced by random selection from among those not selected for the main sample. A detailed description of this survey is included as an Appendix to this report.

In addition to the client survey, we also conducted eight in-depth personal interviews with clients to glean more information about their experience with CeaseFire. We used these interviews to explore, in greater detail, issues raised in the larger, fixed-response survey. The sessions were conducted at four different sites whose clients included both African-Americans and Latinos. For the most part these in-depth personal interviews confirmed that the responses

we were getting in our larger survey were “on target” and that the survey adequately represented clients’ perspectives. Many responses in the longer interviews were very similar to replies in the survey data.

Finally, our surveys of CeaseFire’s staff gathered reports of the extent of their involvement with clients. The survey asked about the frequency of home and office contacts, how they spent their time with clients, their efforts to connect clients with services; and assessments of their clients’ problems and prospects.

As noted in detail in Chapter 1, the evaluation did not attempt a randomized study of the impact of outreach work on clients. This decision revolved around two key aspects of any randomized experiment: control of the intervention and the random selection of treatment and control groups. We could not control which areas received the program and which did not, and we could not control the outreach “dosage level.” Most important, we had no possibility of influencing whether individuals became clients or not, and there were massive selection effects in the recruitment of CeaseFire’s clients. In most sites outreach workers did not have enough clients to meet the program’s quotas, and they would have been unwilling to surrender qualified clients to make up an evaluation control group. We also could not identify suitably “matched” non-client comparison cases, a strategy that already would have abandoned the experimental model. By-and-large, clients were very high risk: they had long arrest records, they were not in school, they worked in drug markets, they carried guns, and they belonged to violent street gangs. The measured and (worse) unmeasured differences between those who ended up as clients and neighborhood residents we could run down and interview as comparisons would be very large, a common problem in gang research.<sup>2</sup>

## **Client Selection**

Client selection was a courting process. Outreach workers often initially encountered prospective clients standing on corners or hanging out in the CeaseFire area. They engaged likely-looking candidates on a one-to-one basis in order to gauge their situation, and asked around to find out what was known about them. Outreach workers provided potential clients with their own contact information, and tried to gather enough information to arrange follow-up meetings. Their goal was to assess whether potential candidates were appropriate for the program. CeaseFire tried to focus on candidates that rated as “high risk” using seven criteria. To be classed as high risk, an individual had to match at least four of seven program requirements:

- gang involvement
- key role in a gang
- prior criminal history

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<sup>2</sup> Spengel, Irving. A. 2007. Reducing youth gang violence: The Little Village Gang Project in Chicago. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

- involved in high-risk street activity (e.g., drug markets)
- recent victim of a shooting
- between the ages of 16 and 25
- recently released from prison

These rough-and-ready criteria established priorities for client selection. They were employed in order to focus the program’s efforts on individuals who were most likely to be perpetrators or targets of gun violence in the immediate future. Others could be enrolled: following CeaseFire guidelines, a “medium-risk” individual would meet three of the seven criteria, and “low-risk” candidates might match two or fewer of the seven criteria. However, sites were allowed to enroll low-risk individuals only through petitioning CPVP, with an explanatory memo explaining why they should be in the program.

Table 4-4  
Frequency of Client Risk Factors

selection criteria	percent of clients	low-high range across sites
age 16-25	82	33 - 100
involved in a gang	92	75 - 100
key member of a gang	51	14 - 80
victim of a shooting	8	3 - 21
risky street behavior	91	73 - 98
arrest record	60	31 - 95
probation or parole	44	19 - 73
served in prison	22	3 - 46
classed “high risk” on 4/7 criteria	84	58 - 94

Note: 593 active clients in 12 CeaseFire sites.

Table 4-4 summarizes CeaseFire records on the 593 clients active in 13 sites where we conducted client interviews. It presents the overall percentage of clients who met each of the selection criteria listed above (we added having been on probation or parole to the table, but this was not one of the seven criteria). The table indicates that, by their standards, CeaseFire generally was enrolling higher-risk clients. More than 90 percent were involved in gangs and in street drug markets. In their data, CeaseFire classified just over half of clients (51 percent) as a “key” member of a gang, while 44 percent were rank-and-file members and 4 percent claimed no gang affiliation at all. Overall, more than 80 percent of clients fell in the highest-risk age category. Few had been victims of a recent shooting, but many had served either probation or parole sentences, or had been in prison. Six in 10 CeaseFire clients had an arrest record, by their

accounting, and about half were somewhere up the hierarchy in a street gang. Overall, 84 percent met the program's "four of seven" criteria. Among the sites, Englewood, Auburn-Gresham, Southwest, Maywood and Logan Square classed 90 percent or more of their clients in the highest risk category. East Garfield Park (58 percent) selected the fewest high-risk clients, followed (in the 70 percent range) by North Chicago, Rogers Park and Grand Boulevard.

Another criteria for client recruitment was that they should live or "hang out" in the program's targeted beats. As noted earlier, this criteria was based on CeaseFire's need to focus its scarce resources, and on its desire to demonstrate its impact to funders and the media using beat-level crime trend data from the Chicago Police. To evaluate this geographical targeting, interviewers presented clients with maps and asked them to identify the areas in which they lived and hung out. During this identification process, 28 percent of the clients reported living in a targeted beat and 40 percent reported hanging out in an officially targeted area. Most hung out close to where they lived, so together 47 percent of those we interviewed met the targeting criteria. Across the sites, client geographical targeting was most effective in Rogers Park (80 percent), which served a fairly large area. Two-thirds or more of clients were properly targeted in Little Village, Southwest, Woodlawn and Maywood. In Albany Park, Auburn Gresham, and Englewood, on the other hand, based on their own reports virtually no clients were associated with the site's targeted beats.

The data presented in Table 4-4 was drawn from information gleaned from recruits who developed enough trust and rapport with an outreach worker to agree to become a client. This involved completing an intake process which further clarified the client's needs and goals. Outreach workers and clients developed a treatment plan during this phase as well. Following this, outreach workers met with clients on a regular basis, in the client's home, on the street, or at the CeaseFire office, typically about four times per month. The treatment plan was further refined during this phase and outreach workers worked to help clients begin to make changes in their way of thinking and behaving in regard to violence. Outreach workers also assisted their clients in connecting with other services, such as getting them back in school or enrolled in a GED program, or prepared for the workplace. Outreach workers reviewed their treatment plans periodically to assess whether their clients were on track.

Table 4-5  
Client Background

	percent	arrested	percent	among those arrested	percent
gender				age of first arrest	
male	84	no	18	under 14	23
female	16	yes	82	14	18
age		employment		15	17
15-19	40	full-time	25	16	12
20-24	32	part-time	25	17	13
25-29	14	looking	38	18	10
30 plus	14	unemployed	12	19 and older	7
education		year enrolled		number of times arrested	
grade school	57	2004 or before	11	1-2	35
high school	35	2005	17	3-4	21
trade/college	8	2006	44	5-9	26
		2007	28	10 or more	19
race		gang affiliation		spent time in jail	
Black	72	not a member	4	no	44
Latino	26	member	44	yes	56
Other	3	key member	52		

Source: survey and CeaseFire administrative data on 297 clients

Table 4-5 presents a demographic and social profile of these clients, based on 297 survey interviews at 12 CeaseFire sites, and on CeaseFire administrative data for the same individuals. Most of the clients interviewed were involved with CeaseFire for between one and three years. As Table 4-5 indicates, the largest group (44 percent) became clients in 2006. The next largest (28 percent) became CeaseFire clients in 2007, and another 17 percent became clients in 2005. In the 2007 survey we encountered clients whose participation began at the end of the 1990s, but most had enrolled after 2004 or later. Clients reported hearing about CeaseFire in a variety of ways. Thirty-two percent recalled hearing about CeaseFire from a friend, and 36 percent heard about the program through an outreach worker. The remainder recalled hearing about the program through relatives (9 percent), via a sign or poster (6 percent), on the street (5 percent), from their probation or parole officer (4 percent), through school (3 percent), and at church (1 percent). In terms of actual referrals to the CeaseFire program, more than 60 percent of clients reported that they were referred by an outreach worker, another 22 percent by a friend, 9 percent by a relative, and 3 percent by a probation or parole officer.

As Table 4-5 also indicates, 72 percent of the clients interviewed were African American and 26 percent Hispanic, while 3 percent were white or categorized as “some other race.” These percentages very closely mirrored CeaseFire’s overall client profile. Eighty-four percent of those we interviewed were male, and 16 percent female. Not all of the sites had female clients, and we

interviewed females in nine of the 12 study sites. Females generally made up 4 to 8 percent of the client population at any site, but at one suburban site, 38 percent of the clients were women. Most clients were young; 72 percent were under the age of 25, and another 14 percent fell in the 25 to 29 age range. The oldest client we interviewed was 55. We asked clients their highest level of education, and the majority (57 percent) had only completed grade school. Another 35 percent had high school diplomas, and 8 percent were taking courses in a trade school or at the college level. Of clients interviewed, 37 percent were still in school or pursuing a GED diploma. In terms of employment, 25 percent reported holding down a full-time job; another 25 percent were working part-time; 38 percent reported they are “looking for work,” and another 12 percent listed themselves as unemployed.

### **Contact with CeaseFire**

Clients were asked how frequently they saw their outreach workers. The majority (63 percent) reported seeing their outreach worker several times a week; another 20 percent reported seeing them once weekly, and only 16 percent reporting seeing them just a few times a month. The time that outreach workers spent with their clients during these visits was rather substantial. Fifteen percent of clients reported meeting with their outreach worker more than two hours, on average, per visit and another 58 percent of the clients reported spending between one and two hours visiting with their outreach worker. Another 24 percent said the visit was shorter than an hour and only 3 percent said the visit was less than 15 minutes in duration. We also asked if clients knew the violence interrupters in the area, and 32 percent did. Some (36 percent) clients had worked with other outreach workers, most (90 percent) of whom were from the same CeaseFire site. We also sought to find out where clients met with their outreach workers; 92 percent reported meeting with their outreach worker at the local CeaseFire office, and for 79 percent of them this happened at least several times a month. The remainder (13 percent) met less frequently in an office setting. Seventy-nine percent of clients also reported that they met with their outreach worker outside of the office – “in the neighborhood, on the streets, parks or in restaurants.” A large majority (81 percent) of those meeting on the streets did so several times a month. Home visits were another of CeaseFire’s client-contact strategies. During home visits outreach workers were to make an assessment of clients’ domestic environments and identify others in the household who might need help. A full 87 percent of clients reported that their outreach worker visited them at home, and 53 percent reported that CeaseFire provided assistance to their parents or other family members.

### **Involvement in Activities**

We asked a series of questions about client involvement in CeaseFire-related events. This included outdoor community events such as barbecues, hot chocolate or chili nights, and fish fries. When clients volunteered to pass out public education materials, they were directly involved in promulgating CeaseFire’s “no shooting” message. When participating in marches, vigils and funerals after a shooting, they were exposed to the impact and consequences of a shooting, and they came in contact with the friends and relatives of those lost to violence. Seventy-eight percent of the clients interviewed acknowledged participation in outdoor events.

The same percentage also helped distribute CeaseFire materials, such as posters and signs, to local stores and offices in their community. A little more than half (55 percent) reported they attended a CeaseFire prayer vigil following a shooting, and about a quarter (26 percent) of the clients indicated that they attended a funeral with their outreach worker following a shooting. The most frequent activity that clients reported was assisting in distributing posters and signs; 43 percent reported they did this “about once a month,” while those who attended funerals reported that it “didn’t happen that often” (63 percent).

Based on four measures of involvement – attending barbeques, handing out public education materials, attending vigils and marches, and attending funerals – we found that clients engaged in an average of 2.4 activities, which is high. Only 5 percent reported no involvement at all, and nearly half (48 percent) were involved in three or four of the activities. The top four sites in terms of involving the clients in activities were Auburn Gresham, Woodlawn, Little Village and Rogers Park. Sites at the low end of involvement, as reported by clients, included Logan Square, Grand Boulevard and Southwest.

CeaseFire saw to it that these public activities were safe as well as productive. Sometimes this involved a discrete police presence, but more often the safety of events was negotiated by site staff. As clients noted:

*At a CeaseFire event you’ll be cool, and nothing will happen because it is a CeaseFire event.*

*When CeaseFire marches down a block or holds a vigil at a particular site, kids can come out and play; there are no drug dealers.*


*I enjoy the CeaseFire BBQs. There are a lot of people there. I play sports, chill, talk. I never feel unsafe.”*

## **Client Needs and Services**

One segment of the questionnaire asked clients about a range of problems and whether CeaseFire had been able to help them with these problems. Figure 4-1 illustrates the overall extent of each reported problem (the total length of each horizontal bar) and the percentage of those with a problem who reported that they received assistance from CeaseFire (the dark portion of each bar). As it indicates, the most common problem facing clients was joblessness – 76 percent reported needing work. Among that group, 87 percent recalled that program staff helped them get ready for a job interview, 86 percent reported that CeaseFire helped them find a job opening, 82 percent got help preparing a resume, and 54 percent were taken by their outreach worker to a job interview.



Figure 4-1:  
Client Problems and CeaseFire Assistance



The survey also asked about clients’ problems in dealing with their emotions, locating a rehabilitation program for drug or alcohol problems, getting tested and treated for sexually transmitted diseases, finding a place to live, needing pregnancy or parenting services, food assistance, leaving a gang, resolving family conflict and getting an education. Again, we first asked if they needed help with each of these problems, and if they answered “yes” we asked if CeaseFire was able to help them with the problem. After needing a job, the next four problems mentioned were “needing to get into school” (37 percent), “needing to leave a street organization (gang)” (34 percent), “needing help to resolve a family conflict” (27 percent) and “needing a program to help deal with their emotions” (20 percent).

As Figure 4-1 illustrates, almost everyone (89 to 99 percent) who reported the listed problems indicated that CeaseFire was able to help them. Overall, clients reported an average of 2.6 problems, and receiving help for an average of 2.3 problems. In total, clients obtained assistance for 88 percent of the problems they reported facing. As one client said, “I just got out. I found myself getting angry all over again, until I was in the [anger management] program. I thought things would be better when I got home [from prison] but they were the same. I was flying off the handle. I was drinking. I knew I needed some type of help. I didn’t know who to ask for help. That’s where [CeaseFire outreach worker] came in.” The outreach worker also connected this client to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and a food assistance program.

To standardize for variations in how many problems they had, both personally and across neighborhoods, we examine here the percentage of problems that clients received assistance with. So, a client reporting two problems and receiving assistance with one of them would receive the same ranking as a client with four problems who received help on two of them. Note that 25 clients reported that they had none of the problems on our list, and they are excluded in this analysis. Clients varied in the extent of their personal problems. The small number of female clients in particular described a broader range of problems than did their male counterparts. Clients age 20 to 30 years old reported more problems as well. There was no clear relationship between client characteristics and who received assistance. In the main, groups with more problems (which, in particular, included females, and also clients ages 20 to 30) also reported receiving more help.

Did this assistance make any difference in their lives? The client survey enables us to address this question for a few specific issues: jobs, education and leaving a gang. In the case of needing a job, we can compare whether clients who reported having needed assistance finding employment with their later job status, at the time of the interview. For education, we can compare whether clients wanting to further their education were in school, and with their overall educational attainment, depending on whether or not they received help. In the case of clients who wanted to leave a gang, we can compare the assistance they received with whether or not they reported still being a gang member at the time of the interview. For jobs and education, we can also examine responses to a later battery of life satisfaction questions that included satisfaction with their “job situation” and their “educational situation,” to see whether satisfaction was related to having received assistance.

As shown in Figure 4-1, jobs were the number one concern of CeaseFire clients, and many reported receiving assistance in finding one. However, this does not mean that they were hugely successful in actually securing a position. At the time of the interview, 25 percent of clients were working full-time; another 25 percent were working part-time, 38 percent were looking for work, and 12 percent indicated they were unemployed. The employment gap between job seekers who received assistance and those who did not was still considerable, however. Among clients who recalled receiving assistance, 52 percent later were working full or part time, and 48 percent were unemployed and looking for work. In contrast, among those who did not receive assistance, full or part-time employment stood at only 32 percent, and 68 percent were out of work. These differences were mirrored in their satisfaction. Among those who received assistance, 58 percent were “very satisfied” with their job situation, and another 31 percent were “somewhat satisfied.” In contrast, those who did not receive assistance were “not satisfied” 43 percent of the time, and only 36 percent were very satisfied. One satisfied client tells us, “Last summer I was selling dummy bags out there, I was bogus. I joined CeaseFire to get a job. CeaseFire hooked me up with it [the job].”

Educational attainment changes more slowly than job status, even among young people, but the same pattern emerged. The survey asked clients if they had needed to return to school or enroll in a GED program. In the survey, among those who reported receiving assistance from CeaseFire in this matter, 30 percent later had completed high school or even had some college or

trade school training. In contrast, only 8 percent of those who needed help but did not report receiving any graduated from high school. Those receiving assistance were also much more satisfied with their educational situation: 86 percent were “very” or “somewhat satisfied,” contrasted with the 42 percent of those who did not receive any assistance who were “not satisfied at all.” One of the clients we interviewed had recently enrolled in a plumbing program. “Over the winter [outreach worker] asked me what profession I wanted to do and I decided on plumbing or carpentry. [The outreach worker] hooked me up with the apprentice program at [local college skills center]. I like the program very much, especially the hands-on training they give you.”

Finally, the survey identified clients who indicated that they had needed help leaving a gang (34 percent of the total). Fully 94 of 95 (99 percent) clients who reported this concern indicated that they had received assistance from the program. Among this group, 70 percent were still in a gang at the time of the interview. This is far from a high success rate, but it is movement in the right direction. After one client returned home from prison he shared with us that “I was tempted to return to my street organization and drug dealing. [The outreach worker] told me that ‘I’d spent enough time on the street; it’s time to move on.’ I thought about it for awhile, if I wanted to go all the way.” Upon deciding to leave the organization permanently, he said, “I didn’t want to be around the same people doing the same things. [The gang] didn’t want me to go, but I told them I had put my time in and that I was ready to retire. I wanted to help people instead of hurt people.” This particular gang gave the client its “blessing” to leave.

Our in-depth interviews mirrored much of what we learned in the client survey. By far the most common need for clients that emerged across the in-depth interviews was anger management. Completing their education and finding suitable employment were the next most common issues they confronted. Clients reported that the outreach staff addressed those needs by getting them into anger management classes and drug rehabilitation programs; helping them prepare for employment opportunities and by assisting them in enrolling in GED-completion programs. Another thing that many clients find helpful is being kept busy or focused by their outreach worker. This is accomplished at many sites by having the clients participate in activities such as distributing materials or participating in neighborhood clean-ups. Many of these clients report the importance of being able to reach their outreach worker at critical moments in their lives – times when they were tempted to resume taking drugs, were involved in illegal activities, or when they felt that violence was imminent, either on their part or someone else’s.

**Safe Havens.** As part of the program, CeaseFire sought to provide places where clients would be able to hang out with their peers and enjoy themselves in safety. Many of the host agencies provided neighborhood “safe havens” that were separate from their offices. Safe havens were places where clients could get together with others from the area to play cards, participate in sports, work on computers, or just hang out in a violence-free zone. Safe havens were located in churches, community centers or other social services agencies. We asked clients if they had ever visited a CeaseFire safe haven; 50 percent indicated that they had. The clients were evenly split on how often they visited the safe havens, ranging from several times a week to once a month or less. More males (52 percent) than females (40 percent) spent time at safe havens. Also, more

Latino clients (59 percent) indicated that they spent time at a safe haven than did Black clients (46 percent). When asked what they did at the safe havens, 95 percent of the clients reported that they “hung out with other young people.” Other activities mentioned were playing games or sports (91 percent), visiting with friends or family members (83 percent), having discussions about violence (97 percent), and using a computer (68 percent). (Because we allowed clients to select all categories which were appropriate, percentages sum to more than 100.) As one respondent noted,

*There is no park in [gang] territory, CeaseFire got a gym opened and gave a space to the [gang] to get off the street. CeaseFire gets people to not rely on the streets all the time.*

We also asked clients if they ever went to a safe haven to specifically avoid danger, and 41 percent reported doing so. When asked if they felt protected from violence or physical attack at a safe haven, almost all (95 percent) of the clients said that they did. There was a great deal of variation across sites in the extent of client involvement in safe havens. In Albany Park, 88 percent of the clients reported going to a safe haven, whereas in Englewood only 7 percent made this claim. Visiting safe havens in East Garfield was also quite high (75 percent). In terms of the age of clients who visit safe havens, the under-25 age group was the most frequent visitor.

In our in-depth interviews, clients also reported feeling quite safe at CeaseFire facilities, as well as when they attended street events and shooting responses. Only one client was interviewed away from the CeaseFire site, due to his concern about personal safety. This client was worried about crossing opposing gang territory en route to the CeaseFire office.

**Site-Level Variation in Client Assistance.** Because of the high frequency with which clients reported receiving assistance, there was limited variation between sites in the extent to which they got help. Table 4-6 below describes the average extent of assistance across sites. It also describes another measure of program effectiveness, the percentage of clients reporting getting help with more than 80 percent of their problems. This can differ a bit from the average, which is heavily affected by clients receiving “100 percent” assistance. Based on this measure, Maywood was the most successful site: there the average client reported receiving assistance with 99 percent of their problems. Statistically, the sites with lower than average scores were Logan Square, Englewood, Auburn Gresham, East Garfield Park and Southwest. The others were indistinguishable from Maywood, given the size of the samples for each site.

### **Criminal Justice System Involvement**

In the survey, 82 percent of clients reported having been arrested. As Table 4-5 above detailed, most were first arrested at an early age. Almost one-quarter were arrested before the age of 14, and 70 percent had been arrested before they were 17 years old. As this indicates, 41 percent of these clients were at middle school age when they were first arrested, and 52 percent were of high school age. Overall, 45 percent reported having been arrested five times or more, and 56 percent had spent “more than a day or two” in jail at least once. Not shown in Table 4-5 is

that 21 percent of those who had gone to court had spent time in prison. Males and Hispanic clients were most likely to report having been arrested, as well as those who were affiliated with a gang. Across the sites, East Garfield Park, Logan Square and Southwest had the largest proportion of self-reported arrestees as clients, while Grand Boulevard and Maywood had the fewest.

Table 4-6  
Client Assistance With Problems, by Site

percentage receiving help ranked by average score	Average Assisted	Percent Assisted		(N)
		0-80 percent	81-100 percent	
Logan Square	64	46	54	(11)
Englewood	81	23	77	(13)
Auburn Gresham	82	29	71	(21)
East Garfield Park	82	41	59	(22)
Southwest	83	27	73	(33)
Grand Boulevard	87	26	74	(19)
Little Village	87	28	72	(18)
Rogers Park	88	33	67	(15)
Roseland	90	10	90	(10)
Woodlawn	90	12	88	(26)
North Chicago	92	12	88	(33)
Albany Park	94	18	82	(17)
Maywood	99	2	98	(44)
Total	88	21	79	(272)

Note: excludes 25 clients reporting they had none of the problems on the list.

### Gangs, Guns and Shooting

Overall, 51 percent of clients indicated during our personal interview that they were involved in a gang. This is lower than CeaseFire’s client intake records would suggest, but many respondents had been active clients of the program for more than a year. Gang membership was also undoubtedly under-reported in our survey as well. The most frequently mentioned gang affiliations were with the various “sets” and “cliques” that make up two powerful African American street gangs, the Black Gangster Disciples (36 percent of all clients) and the Almighty Vice Lords (20 percent). The Latin Kings, a Latino gang, were mentioned by 21 percent of gang affiliated clients, with the remainder scattered among many other small- and medium-sized

Latino street organizations, including the Two-Sixers and the Satan Disciples. Hispanic and male clients were more likely to report being a gang member, while those who were in school or had more than a high school education were less likely than others to report gang involvement. The sites with large proportions of gang members included Southwest (76 percent), Little Village (71 percent), and Englewood (69 percent). Membership was least common in Rogers Park (15 percent) and Grand Boulevard (19 percent). In our in-depth interviews, most clients report having some affiliation with a gang, and two reported successfully separating from their former gang.

In many CeaseFire sites it was routine for many to carry guns “in order to feel safe.” Clients and program staff reported that when conflict arises, “everyone reaches for their gun;” and that when people felt “a threat to their life,” they shot back. In our in-depth interviews, some clients carried guns but reported that they “know it’s not right.” They described feeling that they need the gun for the “what if” situation; carrying a gun represented security to them. One of CeaseFire’s key aims was to change the way clients and area residents thought about gun violence as a means of solving problems. This was a key target of the program’s public education effort, and of individual case workers. Clients were to be taught to resolve conflicts through discussion or by walking away from situations rather than “defaulting” to gun violence.

Most clients (79 percent) reported that they did not feel the need to carry a gun. Those who did cited the need to defend themselves. Three respondents noted:

*I carry a gun for protection.*

*There are times I need a gun. It is better to be safe than sorry. (Ironic comment)*

*I don’t think it’s possible to be in a gang or to sell drugs without being violent.*

Gun-carrying clients were predominately male, more often Latino, aged 25 to 29 years old and unemployed. In open-ended questions on our client survey we asked interviewees why they carried guns, along with the top three reasons why others carried guns. When it came to *themselves*, clients always listed safety and protection as the reason they carried guns. However, when listing why *others* carried guns, their responses were more diverse. While they still mentioned protection and safety (46 percent) as the main reason why other people carried guns, they also listed other responses, such as a requirement of the drug trade (23 percent), to commit robbery (22 percent), acting cool, fronting, or being hard (21 percent), part of being in or responding to gangs (20 percent), and feeling fear and helplessness in their neighborhood (16 percent).<sup>3</sup>

When asked whether CeaseFire could change people’s minds about shooting, 82 percent of the clients “strongly agreed,” and another 18 percent “somewhat agreed” that this was possible. But one respondent described how life’s contingencies still mitigated against disarming completely; as he noted, “Sometimes I carry a gun, but I know it’s wrong.”

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<sup>3</sup>Because each client was asked to list the top three reasons why people carried guns, the total exceeds 100 percent.

Table 4-7  
Attitudes Toward Weapon Use

“Is it OK to shoot someone if . . .”	Percent	
	Yes	“Depends”
There is a direct threat to life with a weapon?	52%	9%
There’s just a verbal threat of violence?	3	1
A loved one has been shot?	26	13
There’s just a verbal threat of violence to a loved one?	5	4
Business is taken or interrupted?	7	4
A debt is unpaid?	4	4
Property or money is stolen?	11	6
It’s in the best interest of the street organization?	6	4

Note: “depends” was a volunteered response not read to respondents

In the survey we also presented clients with a variety of “shoot-no shoot” scenarios, and asked whether, under each circumstances, it was “OK to shoot someone.” Table 4-7 summarizes the results of this inquiry. More than half (52 percent) of clients indicated that shooting a gun was “OK” if they thought their life was being threatened. The percentages for the other categories were lower, with the exception of the case where “a loved one has been shot”: 26 percent felt that retaliation was appropriate in that case, with another 13 percent volunteering that it was appropriate under “certain circumstances.” Considering it acceptable to shoot when personally threatened and after a loved one has been shot were particularly difficult scenarios to address.

Mediating conflicts and coaching clients themselves to become active conflict mediators was a significant goal of the program. When we asked clients if someone from CeaseFire had ever stepped in to settle a conflict, 44 percent answered affirmatively. Eighteen percent of those involved in a conflict reported that a gun was involved. Eighty-two percent of interviewed clients report that they have received conflict mediation training, and 59 percent claim that they have stepped in to mediate conflict on the streets. Of the conflicts mediated by clients, a gun was reportedly involved in 21 percent of incidents. We also asked clients whether they have ever spoken to someone else about not using a gun; 60 percent said they had done so.

The clients who participated in our in-depth interviews were able to articulate many of the messages that outreach workers try to convey. In particular, outreach workers seem to have driven home a message about the consequences of shooting or killing another person. The common messages that CeaseFire seems to send out across sites are “stay away from others in trouble,” “don’t hang out with known gang members,” and “fighting, especially with a gun, is not

worth the jail time.” There are surely many other messages, but these stood out in this set of interviews. A common thread in these interviews was that clients believe that it is impossible to be nonviolent while still in a gang dealing drugs. While they reported that outreach workers did not focus on getting them out of a gang (unless it was an explicit goal of the client) or stopping them from drug dealing, this was clearly the implicit message that comes with the push for non-violent problem-solving and becoming part of a legitimate employment market. As one South Side outreach worker described,

*When [clients] hold out their hand and we take [shooting] away, we have to replace it with something. I can't just take something away, I have to replace the take-away with something else or they won't listen. That something is jobs, school or counseling. My hope is that when they get some of these things they will feel better about themselves and will get out of the drug business on their own and see we didn't tell them to do that directly.*

### **Personal Mentoring**

One striking finding of the client survey was the important personal role that outreach workers played in the lives of their clients. We asked clients whether there was an adult in their life whom they trusted and on whom they could rely. Ninety-seven percent answered that there was, and outreach workers were identified as that person by 52 percent of them. This was second only to their parents, who were listed by 66 percent of the clients. Well below outreach workers came their brothers and sisters (28 percent), grandparents (18 percent), and other family members (22 percent). Spouses, coaches, teachers, counselors and, in last place, clergy, came after, at below 10 percent. (Because clients could mention multiple trusted adults, the total exceeds 100 percent.)

The importance of the relationship between clients and their outreach workers was also captured in our lengthier interviews. Many clients report that they served as role models, father figures or key mentors in their lives. Each was able to list ways in which the CeaseFire program had been able to help them. Many of these clients emphasized the importance of being able to reach their outreach worker at critical moments in their lives – times when they are tempted to go back on drugs, get involved in illegal forms of employment, or when they felt that violence is imminent, either on their part or someone else's. The following comments captured some of the flavor of client-outreach worker relationships among this group.

*He's cool, he talk about his life, he's helpful.*

*I give him mad respect.*

*He keeps a brother busy and out of trouble.*

*He just understood everything I talked about. I could talk to him about anything.*

*He's there when ever I call and need him. He's just a call away. He steers me in the right direction.*



The client survey revealed the extent of these relationships. We asked about a number of possible problems that clients might have, and whether they were able to talk to their outreach workers about them. We asked about issues with drinking, drugs, anger management, abuse by the police and at home, having a felony record, pressure to join or get out of a gang, and concern about being a better parent (asked only of those who had children). Sixty-one percent indicated that they would like to become better parents, and 80 percent had expressed this concern to their outreach workers. The second largest problem reported was dealing with anger, with 39 percent saying it was an issue for them; 92 percent of them talked to their outreach workers about anger issues. The third listed was having a felony record. Thirty-seven percent of clients nominated this as a problem, and 98 percent of them reported discussing this with their outreach worker. Twenty percent of the clients admitted to having problems leaving a gang or being pressured into joining a gang, and 95 percent of this group talked to their outreach workers about it. Sixteen percent of clients interviewed reported that they had issues with drinking, and 81 percent of these clients talked to their outreach worker about it. The same percentage (16) of clients reported having a problem with drugs, and a full 92 percent had spoken to their outreach worker about the problem. Very few (4 percent) clients expressed being abused at home; however, 42 percent reported being abused by the police. Of those who experienced police abuse, 68 percent had discussed the issue with their outreach worker. It is interesting to note that for most problems listed, 77 to 90 percent of the clients felt comfortable talking to their outreach workers about the problem. As noted above, police abuse was the problem shared the *least* with outreach workers. We do not have quantitative reasons to explain this, but when asked if he shared the police abuse situation with his outreach worker, one Latino client replied, “No, I was too mad to talk about it.”

Outreach workers also helped in other ways. When clients were asked if their outreach workers had ever gone to court with them or talked with a lawyer on their behalf, 72 percent answered in the affirmative. Another 24 percent indicated that their outreach worker talked to their probation or parole officer with them.

We also asked clients to rate their level of satisfaction with the skills and abilities of their outreach workers. For each question the clients were to tell us whether they were “very satisfied,” “somewhat satisfied,” or “not satisfied” with their outreach worker. The highest ratings went to outreach workers’ ability to listen (91 percent of clients being “very satisfied”) and to share information about violence in the area (94 percent of clients being “very satisfied”). Also quite high was their ability to listen to client suggestions and their ability to mediate conflict, with 87 percent and 93 percent of clients mentioning that they were “very satisfied” on these dimensions, respectively. Clients reported they were “very satisfied” with outreach workers’ ability to deal with difficult personal issues (85 percent), their ability to find needed services (85 percent), and their ability to help them find a job (79 percent). When asked how connected outreach workers were to the street, 82 percent reported “very connected” with another 17 percent reporting “somewhat connected.” Clients were also asked whether CeaseFire has had a “positive impact,” “negative impact,” or “no impact” on their lives. Ninety-nine percent of clients reported that CeaseFire has had a positive impact on their lives.

## Issues in Serving Clients

Our observations and client interviews uncovered a great deal that was positive about CeaseFire's client outreach efforts. In personal interviews, 99 percent of clients reported that the program had a positive impact on their lives. Outreach workers seem to have earned their status as mentor; they were named only second to clients' parents as the most important person in their lives. Outreach workers were described as role models, father figures and mentors by clients. Clients who came to their outreach workers in need of education credentials, getting out of a gang, and getting help with finding a job, were very likely to receive help on these important life issues. Two-thirds of the clients we interviewed reported needing a job, and 87 percent of them got job-seeking help from their outreach worker. Thirty-seven percent of clients reported needing education credentials; 85 percent of those received help in identifying educational options. Of the 34 percent reporting the need to get out of a gang, virtually all reported that they received help from their outreach worker in that process. Overall, clients reported getting assistance with 88 percent of the problems they faced, and 85 percent were very satisfied with their outreach workers' ability to find them needed services.

The benefits of CeaseFire hiring ex-offenders cannot be overstated. During the evaluation the program employed more than 150 outreach workers and violence interrupters, most of who at one time or another had been active gang members and many of whom had served time in prison. CeaseFire offered them a chance for employment in an environment where ex-offenders have limited employment opportunities. Working for CeaseFire also offered them an opportunity for personal redemption, and a positive role to play in the communities where many had once been active in gangs and their illicit enterprises. There is also no question that their local roots, life experiences and "culturally appropriate background" opened channels of communication and increased the legitimacy of their message in the target population.

However, a great obstacle to building trust and remaining in contact with clients was CeaseFire's staff turnover. There was an absence of consistent staff retention policies and practices across sites. While there was some potential for career advancement within the organization, it was quite limited. Vertical moves were contingent upon someone leaving. Moreover, there were generally no clear financial or professional incentives for outreach workers to develop skills within their current position. For most outreach workers, the job was one of high risks, limited benefits and low wages. One violence prevention coordinator addressed this directly, saying, "[Outreach workers'] biggest fear is that they will lose their job and no one else will hire them. They just want a chance to do right." It was common for outreach workers to maintain other income sources, from their running own small businesses to additional forms of community work, to supplement their pay. The program's perennial funding instability also had a demoralizing impact on every level of the program, and periodically left staff in precarious financial circumstances.

Other explanations for outreach worker turnover included: drug use, returning to the illegal economy, inability to do the job and personality conflicts. There is no question that the

lives of outreach workers were highly volatile, both personally and professionally, a fact that underscores the need for meaningful support and compensation, as well as on-the-job training.

Staff turnover had serious programmatic costs, with negative implications for how the program was perceived by clients and the communities in which it operated. Outreach workers were supposed to be a dependable, positive presence in the lives of high-risk young adults. When their case worker left the program, they joined a long list of adults who had disappeared from their clients' lives. Moreover, outreach workers were hired, to some degree, based on their connections to the street. In cases in which fired outreach workers still had influence in their past organization, the resulting ill-will impacted the organization's ability to reach out to those gangs with whom the former outreach worker had ties. While in some cases CeaseFire sites were able to transfer some outreach workers' caseload to another staff member, it was not guaranteed that this would work. Often, clients of former outreach workers simply had to be dropped.

Like outreach workers themselves, when program sites came and went due to shifts in funding, a vacuum was created in these communities. Clients were closely tied to their outreach workers by bonds of trust and confidentiality, and could not be shifted from worker to worker. While working on this study we had numerous opportunities to observe staff turnover. Not only did this leave a void in the individual support system, but it left communities ripe for uninterrupted violence. A dramatic example of this emerged after the funding cuts of 2007, leaving more than 600 clients without an outreach worker almost over night.

Outreach workers functioned as peers, mentors, and a combination of the two. The varying roles that outreach workers took on with clients was tied to a tension in the program between accepting clients as they were and pushing them to become someone else. During one outreach worker orientation, a CPVP employee introduced the professional standards for the program. He said, "We want you guys to remain professional with these people. You are going to become their surrogate role models." At the other end of the spectrum, one outreach worker said he uses the "homeboy" approach, in which the outreach worker behaves like a peer from the street when interacting with clients. He argued, "We can't act like we're lifesavers. We have to interact at their level." This assumption, that outreach workers must help their clients without triggering their clients' defenses, was common and it changed the ground rules for how outreach workers were to be held accountable. Moreover, it complicated the notion that outreach workers could go into an area and quickly begin changing (sub)cultural norms.

Gang norms were a force that outreach workers had to be aware of and acknowledge if they were to have any chance of changing them. There was a clear need to be sensitive to gang culture in order to effectively reach the target population. Part of what qualified the people CeaseFire hired for outreach work was their ability to not judge the young people they worked with, in large part because they were once in the same position. Changing behavior without judging it is a complicated process. Working with clients who were still tied to gangs could be difficult because clients also felt they had to continue to listen to the voice of their gang, and that sometimes this drowned out the voice of their outreach worker.

Clients ties to gangs set constraints on program staffing. It was difficult for the sites to recruit clients in areas where there were multiple competing gangs, unless the outreach staff included members with ties to each. The location of site offices encouraged or discouraged client participation because of the salience of gang turf boundaries. Race played a role as well. In diverse areas, sites had to have staff members from different backgrounds. In several areas the Latino population was under-served because CeaseFire had difficulty hiring enough Latino outreach workers.

Clients, because they were at such high risk, could easily get themselves into trouble and disappear for periods of time, making it difficult for their outreach workers to maintain a relationship with them. Despite efforts by outreach workers to steer their clients into job readiness programs or an actual job, some clients were just not capable of the follow-through necessary to do so. Some outreach workers perceived that their clients were not motivated to work, and that others came from home environments that were both disorganized and dysfunctional in terms of supporting them in their efforts to hold down a job.

An issue inherent to the work itself was the inability of outreach workers to protect clients from danger even as they were making major personal gains. Personal changes that clients accomplished did not shield them from threats such drugs, prison, the police, rivals and perils in their own households. The process of changing one's life and moving out of a high-risk lifestyle is necessarily gradual. Outreach workers could provide only limited protection for their clients as they made adjustments to their lives. Because CeaseFire worked in neighborhoods where even individuals with no involvement in crime were routinely victims of violence, a client's process of gradual change was not free from exposure to violence and risk. One Friday afternoon we interviewed a client who credited his partner, child, and outreach worker for motivating him to change his lifestyle. Before dawn the following Monday he was dead, shot in a car chase while passing through a rival gang's territory with some friends and family.

Some issues in client services stemmed from the geographic targeting of the outreach program. In theory, outreach workers operate in distinct police beats. This geographic focus was meant to offer parameters for outreach workers operating in neighborhoods with overwhelming levels of conflict. But in practice, beat-based outreach was perhaps the most routinely de-prioritized aspect of the official CPVP program. Beats are ways in which Chicago police divide up workloads and assignments, and CPVP chose to mirror this focus largely for data reasons – they needed reports from the districts to inform the program and data from police headquarters to evaluate their own effectiveness. Yet beats have little to do with the distribution of violent activity. Hot spots regularly change, gang boundaries differ from police territories, and violence occurring inside a beat is often directly connected to violence outside the beat. As documented in the section of this chapter on clients, at best half of them reported living or hanging out in target beats. In the words of a supervisor, “even though we're paid to work in specific beats, it's impossible to do... even though we're contracted to work in beats, we go by the community [scale].”

Supervisors' willingness to ignore or downplay the importance of the beat focus was due in part to the mixed messages they received from CPVP. An even bigger factor may have been how clearly the activities happening in different beats impacted one another, especially in the case of retaliations after a shooting or series of shootings. According to one supervisor, "you have to work outside your beat, because a Cobra over here will retaliate for a murder in another area. You gotta address everything as if it can lead to an epidemic – a ripple effect." Yet beats did play a real organizing role in how sites made decisions about their outreach work. According to our staff survey, the majority of outreach workers and supervisors supported focusing their work in their site's target beats. They were more ambivalent about confining themselves to clients from those areas.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Violence Intervention**

Observers of CeaseFire regard violence interrupters as an original and important development in the violence prevention arena. One clergy member was excited by violence interrupters' (VIs) ability to "interrupt and change trends of violence." A CPVP staff member who worked closely with CeaseFire's outreach program believed, "we get more bang for our buck from the violence interrupters." A Chicago Tribune columnist wrote in July 2007: "I was more fascinated with the workers CeaseFire calls violence interrupters [than the outreach workers]. They are trained to parachute into conflicts and cool them down. They make the more long-term intervention work possible." While CeaseFire's outreach work represented a variation on a common theme in human services delivery, violence interrupters constituted a unique contribution to violence prevention. This chapter explores the characteristics, activities, management, and impact of violence interrupters.

Like outreach workers, violence interrupters (with some exceptions) were assigned to work in certain communities. These were often the neighborhoods where they grew up or were active as drug dealers and gang members. Unlike outreach workers, they were centrally directed by CPVP, and they did not carry individual client caseloads. On the whole, violence interrupters formerly had more rank in gangs and more power in the drug market than did outreach workers. This was not always true, and interrupters sometimes became outreach workers as they sought greater job stability and higher pay. Many of them worked for CeaseFire part-time on 900-hour contracts, whereas outreach workers worked full-time as salaried employees.

CeaseFire expected violence interrupters to intervene in arguments before they escalated into shootings. In order to learn about and even witness brewing conflicts, violence interrupters hung out with high-risk people. While socializing, interrupters also developed relationships with people on the street in the hopes that they would, at some point, provide street intelligence and be receptive to their appeals not to be a shooter. Violence interrupters also capitalized on their former leadership roles to hear about and mediate conflicts. They walked a fine line between their past and present, and between legal and illegal realms. To mediate conflicts, violence interrupters did not attempt to dismantle the drug trade or gang power structures. Instead, they employed street rules and logics when mediating property, gang, and personal conflicts. By working within rather than against informal economies and illicit sovereignties, violence interrupters provided an important alternative to mainstream law enforcement. When violence interrupters mediated conflicts, CeaseFire expected them to turn in a conflict mediation form that captured approximately where the conflict took place, how many people were involved, how high risk they were with regard to both becoming shooters and victims, whether or not the conflict had been temporarily or permanently resolved, and brief account of the conflict and the interrupter's mediation strategies.

CPVP grafted interrupters to the CeaseFire model in winter 2004. At that time, a CPVP staff member sensed that outreach workers were not able to influence the highest-risk population. He described outreach workers as "social worker-type people who knew how to do case

management. Outreach workers could not penetrate the high-risk people. Everyone is not going to become a client.” CPVP was also concerned about CeaseFire’s broader credibility on the street and believed that adding violence interrupters would not only influence the highest-risk, but also enhance program appeal to simply high-risk people, too. A CPVP staff member said of the interrupters, “They did a lot for our credibility. They helped people understand we’re not an extension of the police.” In early 2004, CeaseFire added one interrupter to each active site. At first, there were ten; by the summer of 2007 there were roughly 50. This component of the program grew with CeaseFire, as a new violence interrupter was added with each new CeaseFire site. Many sites had at least two interrupters, and in addition a “violence interrupter only” site opened in North Lawndale. Demonstrating CPVP’s commitment to violence interruption, in early 2007, the West Garfield and West Humboldt sites evolved into program in the 11<sup>th</sup> police district, consisting of a violence prevention coordinator, two case managers and seven violence interrupters, but no outreach workers.

### **Methodology**

Both supervising and evaluating the work of violence interruptions was challenging. They worked alone or in pairs, almost always at night, frequently in dangerous areas and under threatening circumstances, and on an irregular schedule driven by events. Many of the people they dealt with were dangerous and prone to violence, immersed in activities that they did not want to become widely known, and highly suspicious of outsiders. The interrupter’s job was to keep things from happening in the first place, making the assessment task even more difficult.

We approached the violence interrupters’ role in CeaseFire in a number of ways. First, over an 18-month period we regularly attended the weekly violence interruption meetings held at CPVP. These brought together all of the violence interrupters, their immediate supervisor, and occasional observers. As detailed below (under “Managing Violence Interrupters”) these sessions involved discussion of how they had spent their week, with their supervisor asking hard followup questions to ensure that they remained focused on their core tasks. Their supervisor tried to ensure that violence interrupters were successfully resolving conflicts by periodically asking them to “produce” the people whose conflicts they mediated. He also challenged interrupters to “present the people who are shooting.” He told his staff, “If you say you know these guys, I’m challenging you to meet with me and them.” The supervisor also encouraged them to follow up on conflicts they mediated to be certain the disputes remained peaceful. (In our staff survey, 57 percent of interrupters reported following up on previous conflicts at least several times a week.) Our notes from those meetings were carefully secured. Also, on two occasions an evaluation staff member walked their site with a violence interrupter, once on the West Side and once on the South Side. We also attended violence interrupter events, from community barbecues to special training at CPVP.

In addition, in winter 2006, we conducted five personal interviews with violence interrupters about their daily activities. We used information gathered in these interviews and by observing the weekly meetings to create a systematic survey instrument, which was administered twice: once in spring 2006, and again in spring 2007, when we approached newly-hired violence

interrupters with the questionnaire. The first-round survey included all 22 violence interrupters on the payroll; at Time 2, there were 31 additional respondents, and two refusals. Both times, we primarily administered the survey during the weekly violence interrupter meetings at CPVP. People who could not complete the questionnaire at the meeting either mailed it to the evaluation office or handed it to the evaluation staff at an ensuing meeting. The survey covered a variety of topics, including canvassing, responding to shootings, collecting street information, interacting with community partners, and CPVP meetings. A detailed methodology report and a copy of the violence interrupter survey instrument is included as an appendix to this report.

Like us, CPVP struggled to assess how frequently and effectively violence interrupters mediated conflicts. Their approach included introducing a paper conflict mediation form and creating a database of those which were completed. These forms were to be used by violence interrupters to document their activities. CPVP shared this information with us. However, like us, they were uncertain about the degree to which violence interrupters were completing their paperwork. In interviews, we asked interrupters about their record keeping, and it was apparent that the conflict mediation forms were not an entirely reliable means by which to determine how many or how effectively violence interrupters mediated conflicts. For some, it was awkward to begin documenting things they had been doing for years. One violence interrupter thought, "A lot of stuff I do, y'all consider conflict mediation. It's just everyday shit to me." Another violence interrupter hesitated to fill out forms because he did not want special recognition. "There are a lot of conflicts I resolve, but I don't fill out the forms. I'm not trying to get credit for it. I just want to get it done." Rather than fill out paperwork, this interrupter simply told his supervisor, "I squashed it." One violence interrupter was dubious of the mediation events that others reported, because he suspected most of them would not have led to shootings: "Kids fighting at high schools—that's some other shit. That's nothing. Kids fighting at bus stops ain't trying to kill each other. When this first started, conflicts were based on real shit. Now it's gotten so statistics-driven that people just create shit." Some violence interrupters were quite reluctant to fill out these forms, because they were not sure that a given conflict had been mediated permanently. One observed, "It could be smooth today, and people get shot tomorrow."

Violence interrupters also disliked filling out these forms, because they feared this documentation would incriminate people on the street. One violence interrupter's policy was: "Trust no one. Suspect everyone. If the police don't know, I won't tell you. I have to protect me. I'm in these streets." On most conflict mediation forms, violence interrupters offered only vague outlines of disputes and the ways they settled them, in case the court system ever subpoenaed them. In a meeting, one violence interrupter advised the others to "use discretion when filling the stuff out." Another told them not to write the cross-streets of the incident on the form: "Only put down the neighborhood," he advised. One violence interrupter thought that generalizing the location did not ensure confidentiality. "If you put [beat] 2525, they'll just look at the date and see if you put enough info to pop the brother's ass. You sold him out. The police can come and get it when they want to get it." It is certainly not true that police even attempted to access CeaseFire's records, but distrust of the police ran deep among interrupters.



CeaseFire took these concerns into consideration. The first mediation document, the Conflict Resolution Form, asked the violence interrupters to list gangs that were involved in each conflict. Subsequent versions did not. But even when filled out completely, conflict mediation forms did not capture the breadth of the violence interrupters' work. Intervening in an impending inter-gang conflict might in the long run save ten lives. One CPVP staff person said, "It's hard to quantify that shift – when we keep groups of guys cool . . . The hardest things to count are things that don't happen." Even violence interrupters were not always certain that their mediation efforts prevented a shooting. "How do I know that because I got here and talked to you, I stopped the shooting? I don't know that. We don't see the harvest of our seeds."

The conflict mediation database also did not cohere with the findings of our staff survey. On average, violence interrupter each submitted one or two forms every month. One CPVP staff member expected interrupters to mediate a low number of incidents. He anticipated that most had "one or two mediations a month. If they do 15 a month, they're not telling the truth." And this corresponded to the number of forms the average violence interrupter turned in. However, according to our violence interrupter survey, 56 percent mediated conflicts between gang members at least "several times a week," and another 24 percent of violence interrupters reported mediating conflicts "several times a month." These numbers greatly exceeded the number of conflict mediation forms that IVs were required to turn in, when we did the math.

To penetrate the mediation process itself, we considered randomly selecting conflict mediations using the forms that were completed. Then we would interview both violence interrupters and the disputants in the incident, in order to learn more about the process. We experimented with part of this plan, interviewing selected violence interrupters and asking them to describe recent incidents that we had already identified in CPVP's mediation database. After some consideration, however, we decided not to continue along this line and interview other participants in the conflict, mainly for the violence interrupters' protection. Some were concerned that these interviews would further compromise their credibility on the street, where some people were suspicious that CPVP workers were affiliated with the police, or worse, the FBI. As one violence interrupter put it, "There's a lot of federal talk. People are telling on each other. Not everyone is trusting each other, even amongst themselves. Trust is gone from the highest-ranking member to the simplest soldier. It makes everything difficult." In our interviews with the violence interrupters about events summarized in mediation forms, they shared the stories of conflicts they had successfully resolved, as well as those that were too hard to mediate.

### **Where They Came From**

Violence interrupters had unique backgrounds and experiences that helped, but sometimes hindered, their efforts to convince high-risk people on the street not to use guns.

### **Street History**

One CPVP staff member believed, "It's impossible to stop killers if you don't know killers. You have to walk the walk, talk the talk." For him, CeaseFire needed staff members who

could say, “I was out there, just like you.” As one violence interrupter put it, “A lot of guys I don’t know. But I still know how to approach them. I talk to them in my language – a language they understand.” Violence interrupters had all participated in high-risk and illegal activity and/or were related to people who were involved in such dealings during the time they worked for CeaseFire. Some interrupters were high-ranking members in street organizations. Others were instrumental in the Chicago-area drug trade. And some were even “gunners” – gang members whose central duty was to shoot people. Several violence interrupters had such significant criminal backgrounds that CPVP staff hesitated to hire them. In a few cases, CPVP blocked candidates altogether, because they feared hiring these men would further jeopardize the campaign’s relationship with law enforcement. The Chicago Police Department included at least two violence interrupters (who were working for CeaseFire at the time) on their weekly list of “persons of extreme interest,” although probably mistakenly so. The disconnect between violence interrupters’ past and present even confused the men they were trying to help. In one instance, a violence interrupter was trying to convince men in his neighborhood not to shoot. They turned to him and said, “You taught us all this shit. Why are you stopping us?” But in this instance the interrupter’s efforts appeared to have prevented a shooting.

Some violence interrupters struggled to adjust to a nonviolent lifestyle. Their supervisor would tell them, “If you’re going to slip back up, let me know,” to avoid a painful termination process or CeaseFire’s reputation being tarnished. In one meeting, a violence interrupter told his peers about a fight he almost had. “There were cars sitting in the middle of the street. They ain’t moving, just steady sitting there. I drove up on the bumper [of one of the cars], and I hoped the person would get out, so I could bust his head.” This interrupter was in the car with his wife, who he remembers having said, “‘But you work for CeaseFire now.’ That clicked for me.” As CeaseFire aimed to change people’s minds about violence, specifically shooting, it was clear how difficult it was for some violence interrupters to fully change. In this same meeting, one shared stories about instances in which they were tempted to commit violent acts, just as they had previously. A former gang leader and advisor to the violence interrupters captured their dilemma: “Each brother has to question himself: have you made a lifestyle change? A lot of people talk about resorting to who they used to be. This ain’t who you used to be. It’s who you are.”

## **Prison Experience**

Most violence interrupters had served time in prison. Incarceration successfully disconnected them from the street, because while in prison, most decided not to return to the drug trade or to gangs. One violence interrupter talked about his decision to leave the street: “I did six years in federal prison. It’s more sophisticated there [than it is in state jails]. I was on the phone a lot, and I seen the change from the inside. I knew I couldn’t go out and go back to the streets. Them guys would have killed me.” When he returned to his neighborhood, “I renounced my throne. Guys wanted me to do this and that. They were calling me chief. I told them ‘it’s all on y’all. I’m gonna go to work.’”

In prison, even as violence interrupters foreswore their pasts, they also built and solidified relationships with men from other street organizations and other parts of the city. These

connections assisted them in their work for CeaseFire. One violence interrupter said of Joliet's Stateville Prison, "Anyone with rank or authority was there. After you do two or three or four years with someone, you got a bond that will never be broken. I can call someone I ain't seen in 15 years if I got a problem." Violence interrupters usually knew at least one other before joining CeaseFire, through their previous street experience or through time served together. CeaseFire recruited some violence interrupters from prison, after learning that they were about to be released. One remembered first learning about CeaseFire through an outreach worker. This CeaseFire employee wrote him a letter, saying, "I heard you're preaching. You'd be a prime candidate [for a position in the organization]." One CPVP staff member remarked, "everyone's talking about CeaseFire" in prison. He had received letters from men in jail offering help.

## **Race and Gender**

Violence interrupters mostly settled disputes between people of the same gender and race. The vast majority of violence interrupters were male; only 8 percent were female. One CPVP staff member thought CeaseFire was lucky to have any female interrupters, because of the historically peripheral role played by women in gangs. The women they hired were relatives (daughters or girlfriends) of high-ranking men on the street, including founding members of street organizations. CeaseFire wanted to hire more women with influence, in part because they, according to one CPVP staff member, had a "smoother approach" in mediation. Violence interrupters also believed women were the most appropriate mediators of conflicts involving females. Male violence interrupters called their female counterparts when a woman or girl was a part of a situation they wished to resolve. Males hesitated to work with women, because they were concerned that their boyfriends or male relatives would misinterpret their intentions. When one interrupter intervened in altercations between women, he was scared their boyfriends would "swing" on him. When another considered breaking up a fight between women, he stopped, because he imagined their male relatives would be suspicious. "It might turn into a messed up situation."

CeaseFire's violence interruption mirrored the segregation of the street. Like gender, race defined who could and could not mediate conflicts. A large majority of violence interrupters (78 percent) were African-American; consistent with program-wide staffing problems, CeaseFire had trouble recruiting Puerto Rican and Mexican-American violence interrupters. This changed during the course of the evaluation, and by the summer of 2007, 19 percent of the violence interrupters were Latinos. It was crucial to have a racially diverse staff, because black violence interrupters mediated between black disputants. Mexican-Americans did the same for Mexican-American disputants, and Puerto Ricans for Puerto Ricans. Violence interruption was rarely an inter-communal effort, in part because shooting violence in Chicago's tightly segregated neighborhoods most frequently did not cross racial lines. Most CeaseFire violence interrupters agreed that the causes of shootings were racially and ethnically bound. The violence interrupter supervisor believed the "reasons Latino guys fight are broader, deeper, cultural." Reflecting this opinion, CeaseFire arranged for Latino violence interrupters to meet separately from the rest.

## Age

Most violence interrupters were a full generation older than CeaseFire's target group – men between the ages of 16 and 25. None of the violence interrupters were teenagers. Eleven percent were in their 20s; 61 percent were over 40 years of age. The violence interrupter supervisor wanted to hire younger staff members, but “a lot of young guys are still in play.” Circumventing this issue, CPVP tried to hire violence interrupters who appeared younger than they were and could appeal to young high-risk people. The interrupter supervisor thought one of the best respected violence interrupters “blends right in. He's 46 or 47, but he looks like he's 24.” And young people “know his past.”

Although some violence interrupters seemed to effortlessly relate to youth, many violence interrupters had to make a conscious effort to transcend generational differences. This often meant referencing their own street past. The violence interrupter supervisor envisioned how a typical staffer would approach younger people: “I started this stuff. Now I want to dialogue with you.” Interrupters were careful not to patronize men on the street. One told us, “I can't come at them like, ‘Look youngster.’ You have to treat them like they're your people.” Even with these strategies, older violence interrupters could find working with young men challenging. One violence interrupter said, “People have to do time before they get tired. Younger guys think they're indestructible. When I was younger, I was stupid. Now I'm not out there acting like a gorilla. I can be cool. I did time. I just changed. I try to change them, but it takes time.”

## Geography

Most violence interrupters grew up in the neighborhoods where they were assigned. This meant they had connections not only to street organizations, but also to residents, who might provide them with street intelligence. Others grew up elsewhere, but participated in gang activity and drug dealing in the neighborhood or were connected to those who did. A few interrupters were assigned to communities where they neither lived nor were active. In one case, a violence interrupter lived in and knew a lot of high-risk people in one South Side neighborhood, but was assigned to another, 50 blocks north. He had very little experience in the second community and needed to do a lot of work to build his street credibility. “Not being from [the neighborhood],” he said, “I did not necessarily have the ear of those who make the difference – the leadership of the different street organizations.” This violence interrupter turned to other people for help: “I reached back to former contacts and some of my friends, and they were able to give me referrals.” While violence interrupters often once lived in the neighborhoods where CeaseFire assigned them, many did not live in those communities as CeaseFire employees. They commuted to work.

Only two of CeaseFire's seven sites outside Chicago had violence interrupters: Maywood and North Chicago/Waukegan. Since street gangs arrived in Maywood fairly recently (in the late 1980s), CeaseFire was not able to staff that community with violence interrupters who had been active there. Instead, those serving in the suburb were influential on the West Side of the City of Chicago, from where many Maywood families (and street organizations) had migrated. Along the

Chicago/Milwaukee corridor, North Chicago/Waukegan has violence interrupters who grew up in those cities, which have long been homes to street gangs. They attended South Side meetings, because their suburbs have the same street organizations as that region of the city.

## **Relatives**

Along with their first-hand knowledge of the local community, blood ties helped violence interrupters relate to high-risk people. violence interrupters were their uncles, aunts, parents, cousins and partners. Sometimes their relatives, nieces for example, were dating high-risk men. A few were even hired because of specific relationships with powerful gang leaders.

Violence interrupters also had kin, who were not blood relatives, since gangs provided a sense of family. In Chicago, one often hears young men greeting each other with, “what’s up, family?” Those bonds did not necessarily break once someone stopped participating in street organizations, and violence interrupters relied on lingering loyalty when mediating conflicts. In one situation, an interrupter resolved a conflict between members of the organization he led and a young man who served time with him. He was a father figure to them both. Another explained his relationships to high-risk youth in this way: “I raised them,” which probably referenced street mentoring. As an older relative might, one violence interrupter said he had known men who were active in his community, “since they were shorties.”

## **Managing Violence Interrupters**

Supervising violence interrupters epitomized the management dilemmas CeaseFire faced, including whether or not CPVP provided central management or technical support to the sites. Unlike outreach workers, who reported to their local site, violence interrupters were managed by CPVP’s gang mediation coordinator. They also had close contact with the director of evaluation, who notified them about shootings that the police and the hospitals responded to. Interrupters communicated individually with both of these staff members. They also met in groups once a week at CPVP.

## **Violence Interrupter Meetings**

Violence interrupter meetings featured community-by-community updates. Each staff member summarized the violence that had taken place in their area during the week and talked about things they had done to address it. They also discussed potentially violent situations as they updated the group on the status of previous conflicts. Below is an example of an update for a multiple-interrupter site:

*VII reports that a 16-year-old was killed on Friday and the victim went to the ER. ‘He was pronounced dead when he got there.’ The shooting occurred on [street] and [street]. VII says the shooter “came from nowhere and gave it to him.” In another part of this neighborhood, someone shot a girl in the face with a paint gun. She got her brothers. VI2 intervened and told them to calm down. VI2*

*suggested the arguing parties have a fist fight and then walk away. VII has been in phone communication with the host agency. The coordinator for gang mediation services wants to know about an old conflict. VI3 says it's been 'pretty quiet,' and the majority of people who were involved are 'dealing with other affairs.'*

When there had not been any violence in a neighborhood, the violence interrupter responsible for that area simply said, "Things have been quiet." The supervisor then asked, "Did we have anything to do with that?" A violence interrupter would typically respond that he indeed had been traveling around the neighborhood "talking to the guys."

One violence interrupter characterized their weekly meetings as "rituals." Similar to rituals, the meetings were governed by a set of rules. If an employee was more than 15 minutes late, he or she was locked out of the meeting. And there were consequences for missing meetings. A CPVP staff member warned: "If you miss this meeting, it'll be two hours off your pay." This person believed that CPVP must be strict with the violence interrupters, because, as he puts it, "this isn't the Brady Bunch. I got the Dirty Dozen here." Interrupters were also prohibited from using the actual names of gangs or individuals, when they were describing conflicts. Meetings were peppered with references to "Group A," "Group B," and sometimes, "Group C." This rule reflected the violence interrupter's distrust of one another. They were concerned that one of their colleagues would go to a person or to a gang, and tell them that their name was brought up in a meeting. With the anonymity system, CPVP and the violence interrupters could honestly say that no disputants' names were uttered during the gathering; this worked because their supervisor knew what they were talking about. Interrupters' meetings also served as weekly reunions: they often came early and stayed late, catching up with one another. They were able to gather in this fashion because they had extricated themselves from their past, so individual interrupters from opposing gangs in prison or on the street were able to joke and strategize together at CeaseFire meetings.

Motivated by the desire to make violence interrupter meetings less ritualistic, CPVP staff restructured them in the hope that interrupters would have more strategic conversations. The supervisor eventually began the meetings by asking, "anything prevented on the front-end?" to show that CPVP valued prevention as much as responding to shootings to halt retaliations. Once a month, the interrupters reviewed their conflict mediation forms with CPVP staff, so the latter could determine whether each form actually represented both a conflict and a mediation.

To allow more time for reporting and strategizing, CPVP eventually split staff meetings in two: the South Side and the West Side, and later added a separate meeting for the Latino staff members. In some ways, the meetings remained simple reporting sessions; in others, they evolved. The West Side violence interrupters planned strategic canvassing and group walks together. Multiple interrupters often contributed to discussions about a single shooting. This was also true of the South Side violence interrupters. They were able to confer about shootings with hospital response violence interrupters. Latino violence interrupters focused on strategies to mediate conflicts based in gang rivalry and territory, which was most pronounced in their

neighborhoods. And, they had their own hospital response team, with whom they discussed shootings.

Table 5-1  
Frequency of Violence Interrupter Meetings, Supervision and Coordination

How frequently do you . . . ?	at least once a week	several times a month	about once a month	I do this, but not often	not at all
<b>Attend Meetings</b>					
staff meetings at my site	81	6	4	10	-
violence interrupter meetings at Taylor	91	9	-	-	-
training at Taylor	24	20	37	12	8
<b>Fill Out Paperwork</b>					
fill out paper work for Taylor	64	19	11	4	2
keep my own records of activities	72	11	4	8	6
<b>Work on the Phone</b>					
talk to Taylor Street	39	22	12	10	18
talk to an outreach worker or supervisor from my site	77	17	2	-	4
talk to people to get street information	86	14	-	-	-

Note: N=53 violence interrupters

There were often “guests” at violence interrupter meetings. These were either individual that CeaseFire wanted to hire, or people enmeshed in conflict. Violence interrupters invited the latter to the meetings in order to do some conflict mediation on the spot. Meeting guests included gang leaders. At one session there were three men who “run the West Side,” according to a CPVP staff member. One of them “was about to unleash his crew on another crew.” At that same gathering, there was a man from North Lawndale who “has influence on all the young guys.” In another meeting, one violence interrupter introduced his guest by emphasizing his reach, “he can get with guys in Group A; he has a lot of influence with Group A.”

### Relationships with Local Sites

CPVP encouraged violence interrupters to work with their neighborhoods’ local site staff – to refer clients, to share information. The success of these partnerships varied. Relationships were better when the violence interrupter respected and trusted outreach workers. This usually happened when there had been a prior relationship between the two. For instance, they may have been involved in illicit activity together. One violence interrupter, who was in close contact with outreach workers at his site, admired an outreach worker’s street connections that he thought

surpassed even his own. He described the outreach worker as having an “ear to everything,” because “his nephews are the leaders of two opposing gangs.” Another violence interrupter avoided the local site as a whole, but he was comfortable with one of its outreach workers. “We did some jail time in the same facility . . . I knew about his street rep. It’s a lot easier to deal with someone when you got history.”

Some of the worst relationships between violence interrupters and the local sites occurred when interrupters thought the outreach workers and lead agencies did not understand the street, or were even colluding with the police. During a meeting, one violence interrupter observed, “Each week, a lot of VI-brothers are having problems with outreach workers. Some outreach workers want to call the police. That won’t work.” At one site, the outreach worker supervisor believed the interrupter did not want to work with her, because, “bottom line, he has no respect for me.” She attributed this to her not being “from the streets.” Separately, this individual complained that the outreach workers at the site were afraid to talk to the gang who was responsible for the majority of shootings in the neighborhood.

Violence interrupters had special tensions with faith-based organizations. One avoided participating in a local faith-based site’s public events, saying “I can’t afford to be seen with them.” He explained, “We come from two different perspectives. They’re a church group.” In terms of his mediation work, he thought, “I’m involved in stuff that ain’t their business.” In a meeting, an interrupter on the West Side complained that the violence prevention coordinator at his faith-based site wanted “to make sure the people I talk to, talk to him.” He thought this was absurd, in part because “people in that community don’t like him.” Meanwhile, the coordinator had been proselytizing the interrupter, who was of another faith: “He wants me to come to church, so he can put his hands on me.”

Just as some violence interrupters complained about the naivete of local sites, some sites questioned their connections to the street. One violence prevention coordinator noted that her interrupters attended site events and distributed public education materials, but she was not satisfied with his ability to give the site “the information we need.” A suburban violence prevention coordinator complained about the interrupter in her community: “He lives in [a city neighborhood]. We’re in [a suburb]. We get calls from the community, police, and our staff about shootings he doesn’t know about. When he calls about a shooting, we usually know about it already.”

Violence interrupters’ relationships with the local sites improved over the span of our evaluation. One prevention coordinator said of her site’s violence interrupter, “He’ll call me when there’s been a homicide. He always knows what’s going on, who we need to talk to. He’s always with us.” Other violence interrupters not only provided street intelligence, they also referred clients. An outreach worker supervisor said of one at his site: “Our VI brings us clients, and they’re go-getters.” After one violence interrupter brought a man with fresh bullet holes in his jacket to the office, the violence prevention coordinator thought, “This particular violence interrupter is on his business.” Eight-nine percent of violence interrupters reported that staying in “close contact” with the outreach staff at their sites was very important to them. None said it was



not. Seventy-seven percent of violence interrupters reported speaking to the outreach workers or supervisors from their sites at least once a week. CPVP staff wanted these relationships to continue improving, because they believed increased communication between violence interrupters and the sites would help their efforts to reduce violence. At one time, CPVP seriously considered detaching violence interrupters from their central office, so the local sites could manage them. They became dubious about this plan because they believed interrupters needed discipline and structure that only some sites could provide.

## **Daily Issues in Violence Interruption**

### **Staying Connected to the Street**

Violence interrupters spent most of their time on the street, hanging out as they built relationships and waited for conflicts to erupt. As Table 5-2 below documents, 98 percent of violence interrupters reported walking around and hanging out in their neighborhoods at least several days a week, and 94 percent drove through the neighborhood at least several days a week. One violence interrupter estimated that he was on the street eight hours a day. He described his routine: “Riding, getting out. I see crowds and I talk to them.” He interacted with people on the streets in causal ways: “laughing, talking, doing whatever.” Another interrupter walked when he canvassed the neighborhood, because he hated driving. He described the time he spent with men on the street as “hanging out”: “90 percent of the time, we’re just shooting the shit.” For instance, he talked to men about “taking their ladies to prenatal classes.” He believed that if he was talking about “peace every day, they would shut the door in my face.” One suburban violence interrupter had a similarly casual approach: “We stand on the block, crack jokes, talk about women, talk about cars.”

Because violence interrupters’ work was so social, it was difficult to distinguish between their time off and their time on the job. A violence interrupter talked about how he learned of conflicts: “I hear about stuff through the grapevine. Guys know I work for CeaseFire. I might be eating in McDonald’s, and guys will say, ‘Let me holla at you!’” Another interrupter was relaxing at a friend’s music video shoot, when two other friends became embroiled in a physical altercation and threatened to use guns. Even as they spent time with friends, violence interrupters were working. They were strategic about how and where they socialized. One said, “I want to be by the liquor stores. That’s where they want to get drunk and fight.” Another violence interrupter hosted parties for his street contacts. On a Friday or Saturday, he described having 70 or 80 people at his house. “We get a bunch of chicken and barbeque. I talk to everybody. It’s easier when they come to you. They aren’t out drinking.” As violence interrupters hung out, they may have inadvertently prevented fights. Another observed, “They ain’t shooting while they with us.”

In addition to personally meeting with their contacts, violence interrupters also connected with them over the phone. Eighty-six percent of violence interrupters spoke to people on the phone to get street information at least once a week. This was true, even though some expressed apprehension about wiretapping. One observed, “I ain’t never have no one call me. That call can get you in trouble. The telephone is a mess. I might be talking to somebody, and then the police

will force you to testify.” Another noted, “I would rather spend gas money than use the phone. Phones are raggedy as hell. I don’t want my name running with men on the street.”

**Safety**

Violence interrupters felt unsafe on the job. They were vulnerable to shootings, to police abuse, and – at the same time – suspicion that they were somehow affiliated with the police. And, theirs threatened to be a dangerous occupation. In “Man shot trying to break up fight,” *The Chicago Tribune* (June 20, 2007) reported that a man was “critically wounded” in the Austin neighborhood “when he tried to break up a fight.” A police officer said, “As he approached, one of the [combatants] pulled out a gun and shot him.” No violence interrupter was shot while working for CeaseFire, but some of them were in the line of fire. One interrupter was hanging out on a block in the neighborhood where she worked, when a car drove up and began shooting at a crowd of people with whom she was standing. She was uninjured, but her close friend was hit. In another episode, a group of men shot up a softball game in which a violence interrupter was playing. CeaseFire expected violence interrupters to be in high-risk situations with high-risk people at high-risk times. And yet, CeaseFire did little to protect them, for violence interrupters on 900-hour contracts did not have healthcare benefits.

Table 5-2  
Frequency of Routine Violence Interrupter Activities

How do you spend your street work time? How frequently do you . . . ?	every day	several days a week	several times a month	about once a month	I do this, but not often	not at all
walk or just hang out in the neighborhood	64	34	2	0	0	0
drive through the neighborhood	79	15	0	0	2	4
talk to people to get street information	78	17	2	0	0	2
mediate conflicts with gang members	28	28	24	15	4	0
bring people to the office to mediate a dispute	11	8	11	8	45	17
stay on top of past conflicts	38	19	33	4	0	0
host or attend neighborhood gatherings	14	26	36	12	10	2

Note: N=53 violence interrupters

Violence interrupters were not only in danger of being shot; there were times when they could be arrested because of their proximity to guns and drugs. On the job, violence interrupters

were supposed to interact with people who carried firearms. But the repercussions for a convicted felon caught in association with a gun could be severe. One violence interrupter thought, “CeaseFire should have a plan, a legal structure,” for when the police might arrest one of them. He didn’t think CPVP was “watching our backs.” Another was stopped and “the police had me up on the car,” while he was working. They asked him if he was “purchasing narcotics.” Thirty-eight percent of violence interrupters were stopped and harassed by the police on the job at least once a month. To prepare themselves for police questioning, violence interrupters carried photo IDs that they asked CeaseFire to create. They found that the IDs were not entirely effective. When two were pulled over, they showed their IDs to the police, who commented, “You made that yourself,” because they looked so unofficial.

While the police were suspicious that violence interrupters were involved in illicit activity, men on the street were concerned that violence interrupters were the police. When one interrupter first began working, he recalls, “A lot of people got the wrong message. I ain’t trying to light these kids up,” a reference to how the police shine their car lights on people. Others thought CeaseFire employees were police informants, a classification that put them in physical danger. Combating these suspicions, violence interrupters disassociated themselves from the police, even as the organization as a whole attempted to build partnerships with law enforcement. While working for CeaseFire, 57 percent of violence interrupters reported that they never spoke to police on the street.

### **Where They Work**

When we first began our evaluation, CPVP staff encouraged violence interrupters to work outside CeaseFire’s zones (several police beats in a district). They gave them this leeway because arguments from their beats would spill into others, and arguments in other beats would cause shootings in their target areas. By following these dynamics, violence interrupters defined their work according to street boundaries, rather than CeaseFire’s or those of the police. After asking a violence interrupter whether or not he works within beats, he responded, “No, that’s the police.” Those boundaries were too restrictive for his work, because “one organization might be in 15 areas of the city.” Furthermore, disputants travel. “Someone on Bryn Mawr (a North Side street) could get killed in Auburn-Gresham (a South Side neighborhood).” One violence interrupter worked in three west side neighborhoods, even though he was only assigned to one. This “beat” ambivalence was not unusual. Thirty percent of violence interrupters estimated that half or less than half of the people they talk to for street information hang out in the target area. Forty percent of violence interrupters said that half or fewer of the conflicts they mediated would have occurred in their official target area.

During the evaluation period, CPVP staff began emphasizing that violence interrupters should work within CeaseFire zones. CPVP changed its policy, as they become more concerned about statistically documenting the program’s success. Interrupters were savvy about why CeaseFire wanted to work within beats. One said of this strategy, “That’s program talk. They need to be set up like the police for their statistics.” Despite some cynicism, over half believed it was important to be compliant with CeaseFire’s requests and geographically focus their work.

Sixty-four percent of the interrupters surveyed felt that keeping their street work to official target areas was very important, 57 percent agreed it was very important for them to collect street information only about their official target areas, and 53 percent reported that they only intervened in conflicts that happened in their official target areas.

### **Changes in Practice**

Initially CPVP envisioned the violence interrupters to be more connected to the street than the local outreach staff. While outreach workers wore clothing that identified them, interrupters shunned this. They initially did not hand out public education material, and did not participate in community-wide events. Their work was to be with high risk youth on the street, and they did not believe these campaigns were effective at reaching them. However, this changed. Interrupters began to attend shooting responses and participated in midnight barbecues as well as CeaseFire Week events. They passed out CeaseFire bumper stickers, posters, and pins to people in the community. Based on their survey reports, 62 percent of them reported going door-to-door to pass out flyers and talk to neighbors after a shooting had occurred at least several times a month. And, 53 percent of violence interrupters reported attending post-shooting marches or prayer vigils several times a month. They carried CeaseFire ID cards, in part to protect themselves from the police. Finally, they were given jackets. Theirs differed from the outreach workers' only in color; violence interrupter jackets were black, while the outreach workers' were orange. Their increased involvement in community activities was probably related to their improving relationships with the local sites, something CPVP pushed hard for. Their canvassing with CeaseFire paraphernalia also might have indicated the local community's greater comfort with the program.

Planning also became more frequent, as CPVP worked to systematize their daily activities. A 30-day violence interruption plan was developed in summer 2006, when violence interrupters in two beats on the West Side organized down their efforts in block-sized pieces. Each day, they would visit and become acquainted with men on a different corner. An interrupter designed this month-long strategy because he needed to become reacquainted with high-risk people after being away in prison for a number of years. He said, "I only made the plan because I was gone so long." His strategy had unintended and pleasantly surprising consequences: there were no shootings in these notoriously deadly beats during the same month as his intense canvassing. CeaseFire tried to export this block-by-block strategy to other neighborhoods. Implementing these 30-day plans was one objective within the violence interrupters' new regional "work plans." Another activity expected in the work plan was to "build relationships with those likely to shoot/be shot." These were things CeaseFire once assumed all violence interrupters did naturally, without planning.

## Conflict Mediation

Violence interrupters' central responsibility was to mediate conflicts. They were hired because CeaseFire believed their backgrounds and connections prepared them to do this work, and on the job, all of their activities were geared toward this effort. Their unique contribution to violence prevention and intervention was that they worked within street networks and street logics (values and rules) to stop shootings. In this way, they differed from official institutions, such as the police or social workers. Sometimes violence interrupters talked about the legal repercussions of shooting, although this can only go so far. When we asked one if he discussed the possibility of prison with a potential shooter, he said, "I didn't have to talk about consequences. They don't care about consequences. He's been to jail four times. He doesn't care."

Interrupters learned about conflicts and shootings through intimate connections to the communities where they work. One South Side staffer heard about a shooting from his daughter. She was walking with her friend when he was shot. In a meeting, a West Side interrupter told the group about a homicide and how he was notified: "A brother got killed in a drive-by. He got shot 11 times. I got a call from his dad." In another incident, a man called one violence interrupter after it seemed that his "baby mama" (the mother of his child) had been kidnaped. This man was affiliated with the interrupter's former gang. And, he said, "me and his mother used to be buddies."

Violence interrupters also used their personal connections to mediate conflicts. Often, violence interrupters spoke to those on one side of the dispute – the group they were familiar with or had influence over. In conflicts that required an agreement between two parties, interrupters worked in teams with other interrupters who were on better terms with the other gang or faction. In one conflict, a group of men from Chicago's South Side would drive to a suburb on the weekend to "wild out, terrorize, and pick on boys from the area." The suburban violence interrupter was familiar with the gangs in his community, but he asked for help from the South Side to talk to the itinerant group. From our survey data, we learned that 42 percent of violence interrupters help other CeaseFire sites mediate conflicts at least once a week. Forty-two percent also report getting help from other sites at least once a week. Only 4 percent of violence interrupters said they never help other sites, and only 6 percent reported never receiving help.

Interrupters' personal influence was only one component of conflict mediation. Dissenting from CeaseFire's larger goal, violence interrupters did not simply aim to "change the thinking" of potential shooters. While mediating conflicts related to gangs and drugs (which are, of course, interrelated), violence interrupters employed strategies that were sensitive to the political economy of the street. Through their work, violence interrupters incorporated these realities into the CeaseFire model, which treated shooting violence as a way of thinking, and not a politico-economic phenomenon. Mediation strategies varied by mediator, the disputants and the problem. Interrupters encountered a wide-range of issues and proposed a variety of solutions. Despite this diversity we observed patterns in mediation strategies, including treatment of retaliations and sensitivity to street logics in addressing property, gang, and personal conflicts.

Race and region inflected the disputes violence interrupters mediated. Latino violence interrupters mediated more conflicts that were rooted in longstanding rivalries between gangs and the territorial boundaries that separate them. Mexican-American interrupters seemed to face even greater challenges than Puerto Ricans when mediating these disputes, because the boundaries between street organizations in Mexican-American neighborhoods (Chicago's Southwest side, in terms of CeaseFire sites) were even more inflexible than those in Puerto Rican areas (for example, in Logan Square). Some interrupters argued that the black South Side had more gang structure than the black West Side, due to these regions' different histories of organized crime. The West Side gangs were always closely connected to the drug trade, while the South Side gangs had ties to community work, like political organizing. Everyone agreed that black violence interrupters mediated more conflicts related to the drug trade, because organized drug sales were omnipresent in most of the black communities where CeaseFire worked, while they were rarer in the Latino ones. One violence interrupter offered his own analysis of the differences between black and Latino youth crime. "Black gangs are not gang banging. They're trying to make money. They network with each other. At a dope spot [in a black neighborhood], there's a look-out, someone holding the money, and someone holding the drugs. It's elaborate," he explained. In the Latino neighborhoods where he worked, these schemes revolved around shooting people from the opposing gang. "There's a look out, someone who holds the gun, and a duck." In this case, a "duck" is a person who serves as bait for the other gang.

Although certain issues and mediation strategies were more common in some places than others, we found that retaliations, property conflicts, gang rivalries, and personal problems were issues in most CeaseFire communities. Since conflicts and their mediation strategies were intertwined, below we include descriptions of conflicts as well as violence interrupters' strategies in mediating them.

## **Retaliation**

Revenge is an age-old motivation for violence, and Chicago was no exception to this. Whenever a shooting occurred, some of the violence interrupters' first steps were attempts to prevent the victim or the victim's kin from retaliating. CeaseFire employees as well as outsiders viewed this prevention as among the most successful of interrupters' efforts. In one meeting, a CPVP staff member said to the violence interrupters, "A lot of what you guys do is prevent retaliations." When asked whether or not CeaseFire was effective, one Chicago Police Department commander responded, "shit, yeah." He believed the outreach workers and violence interrupters were "able to reduce potential retaliations." Of the conflict mediation forms violence interrupters completed, 40 percent concerned potential shootings that would have been retaliations.

A significant portion of the violence interrupter meetings was devoted to their attempts to interrupt retaliatory violence. In a West Side meeting an interrupter reported talking to a man who had been "jumped on" and beat up with "sticks," during the previous week. As he reported it, the victim "gave me his word he wasn't retaliating." Interrupters tried different strategies when asking people not to retaliate, often encouraging them to consider how much more vulnerable

they would become if they shot someone. One Northwest side violence interrupter convinced a man whose car had just been burnt not to retaliate, by pointing out that he had a child and could not move from his present location to protect himself from further violence. In other situations, violence interrupters simply surveyed conflicts to determine whether or not a retaliation was likely. In one suburb, a man shot an African immigrant in the head. The interrupter concluded that there would not be retaliation, in part because the crime was random and the immigrant was not a part of a gang. The shooter was also unknown; he was only described as wearing a “black hoodie.” He told the group: “Everyone has a black hoodie. The man who shot him got away.”

Violence interrupters learned about shootings that already happened from their personal networks, from CPVP staff, and from local outreach staff. Other CeaseFire employees received shooting information from hospitals and the police. Despite an often antagonistic relationship with the police, their supervisor estimated that his interrupters were able to stop 15 killings in 2005 based on intelligence that the police provided. For a period, CPVP was able to attend the police department’s weekly strategic deployment meetings in order to collect information on shootings, hot spots, and dangerous people and situations. They would then contact violence interrupters with this information or give it to them staff meetings. Hospitals sometimes provided more timely information than the police. One interrupter appreciated CeaseFire’s relationships with the largest trauma unit on the South Side because, otherwise, “if something happens on the block, it might not filter up until a week or two later.”

Since violence interrupters tried to prevent retaliations, they were a part of CeaseFire’s shooting responses. After a shooting, the violence prevention coordinator and outreach staff alerted community members about the incident and encouraged them to participate in marches and vigils. Meanwhile, violence interrupters (along with outreach workers) spoke to people who were directly involved in the shooting to try to prevent further violence. Interrupters reported responding to shootings relatively often. In the survey, 79 percent of them reported collecting information about shootings at least several times a month; 68 percent recalled meeting with gang leaders to mediate shootings; and 49 percent reported visiting a victim or family home after a shooting at least several times a month.

Preventing retaliations was challenging work. One West Side outreach worker said, “When somebody gets shot, we’ve gotta respond to those calls. You gotta intervene in these retaliations, cause you’ve got family members sayin’, ‘ I’m a blow this motherfucker up.’” One violence interrupter communicated how ruthless people could be when they were ready to retaliate. “If they can’t find you, they’re going to kill your wife. There are brothers out here who will straight-up kill your kids.” Some thought stopping retaliations were the most difficult mediations. One believed once someone was slain, “it’s hard to get people to walk away.” Navigating an area newly saturated by the police made this emotionally charged work even more difficult. Another recalled a time when he was out trying to prevent a retaliation, “the police was just so deep and heavy. . . the squad car came through, they was riding ready to pull people, I got off the street so they wouldn’t arrest me.”

Even though responding to shootings was a well-established strategy and far from easy, a CPVP staff member thought focusing on retaliations was insufficient. He believed, “If we’re really going to reduce shooting violence, then we have to get to things on the front-end.” This required violence interrupters to be embedded in the communities where they were assigned, so they knew about tensions between people in the area. Shooting violence was either retaliatory or it happened on the front-end. Both were related to the following three kinds of disputes: property, gang, and personal.

## **Property**

Disputes over property – narcotics, money, drug sale territory – lead to shootings all over the Chicago area. Interrupters appealed to their impact on the street economy, and to “street property rights,” rather than to mainstream law. For example, violence interrupters did not try to dissuade men from dealing drugs, because it was such a common occupation in the street economy. One CPVP staff member told the interrupters: “Don’t preach about dope. Preach about shootings.” A violence interrupter explained this stance: “drugs are bigger than us.”

When mediating conflicts over drug territory, the violence interrupters’ strategy was to encourage men to maximize their profits and peacefully compromise with one another. CeaseFire deterred men from shooting over drug territory by telling them it would be “bad for business,” because violence draws police surveillance. A South Side violence interrupter counseled men on the street: “Business over bullshit. If you’re out here shooting, you ain’t going to make money. Y’all better make sure you have your pistols put away, or else the whole [police] district will come over and stay until they find out what happened.” Addressing a large-scale West Side conflict in 2001, CeaseFire convinced several street organizations to agree to a cease fire. In the beat where the conflict was based, there was a 90-day period without shooting. A CPVP staff member knew “a lot of gang members and a lot of leaders” in that section of the neighborhood. They “made an agreement to just make money.” These agreements normally involved sharing a block. In one section of the west side, one gang controlled the drug market. But on a block inside this territory, a family from a different street organization sold drugs out of their house. Disputes erupted when the family left the area in front of their home, which was in the center of the block and tried to sell on the block’s corners. Mediating this conflict, he restricted the family’s selling area. He wanted to “keep them in the middle.”

Drug territory could become particularly contentious between crews led by men returning home from prison and young people. Returnees, who often need money to start over, tried to repossess drug corners that someone took over in their absence. The returnees and new drug dealers had conflicting notions of ownership. In one situation on the West Side, the newer dealer felt secure in his position, saying, “I built the clientele up,” with a more potent product, after the corner had been floundering. But the older dealer also felt entitled to the corner, because, as he said, “I started it.” Both groups wanted to make the most money possible, and felt the other crew was cutting into their profits. A violence interrupter described their motivations: “They was trying to eat.” He used the “business over bullshit” approach, telling both sides, “If someone gets hurt or someone goes to jail, then no one is going to get any more money.” He also encouraged



the warring crews to share the block, saying, “Both of you can make money, if you give each other room to make money.” In a similar incident between a young man and a recent parolee, another West Side interrupter convinced the younger man to share his spot, by saying the older man “isn’t going to be out here a long time. He’s just trying to make money” to get started after his release.

Without anyone to regularly enforce the terms of sharing arrangements, these resolutions could be tenuous. In the first argument between the newcomer and the returnee, a young woman was shot as the violence interrupter tried to mediate the incident. She had been “working the block with the new guy,” and competing with a young man who was selling for the parolee’s crew. Both were approaching the same passing cars in order to offer their products. At one point, the young man said to the woman: “If you run to another car, I’m going to slap you.” She ended up running to one, and he hit her. In retaliation, she sprayed him with mace. After that, “He shot and killed her.”

Conflicts also arise when men selling drugs fight over territory with mainstream property owners. In these arguments, similar to those between recent parolees and young dealers, disputants appeal to two divergent sets of property rights. In these situations, violence interrupters were sympathetic to dealers, but tried to persuade them to sell elsewhere because of a looming police crackdown. In this way, they still encouraged them to maximize their drug sale profits. In one suburb, there was a months-long argument between a store owner and the crew who was selling in front of his business. To deter them, the proprietor set up cameras to capture their activities. He planned to give the footage to the local police department. In retaliation, members of the gang removed the camera and even beat one of the employees with a baseball bat. Initially, the violence interrupter sided with the men who were dealing, because he was related to them and they had been selling on the corner long before the store opened. He compared each side’s history in one staff meeting: “We sold drugs there. Our big brothers sold drugs there. Our kids sell drugs there. He’s an Arab. He just bought the store.” One of the senior interrupters disagreed with this, saying, “You can only tell another guy who’s selling drugs that’s their corner. You can’t say that to a business owner and a taxpayer. You need to re-educate the guys about what belongs to them and what doesn’t.” Ultimately, this interrupter recommended the guys who were selling “move somewhere where there ain’t no cameras.”

In a similar incident, this time on the West Side, a feud developed between a man who owned several buildings on a block and young men who sold drugs in front of his properties. After the landlord asked the boys to stop selling multiple times, they “busted his car windows in,” because “he was nagging them.” The landlord was “fed up” and contemplated shooting the boys, at which point he called CeaseFire. The violence interrupter who mediated the conflict had known the boys almost all their lives. He also knew the landlord, because “he used to date my older cousin.” He did not tell the boys to stop selling by explaining the owner’s property rights. Instead, he advised them to sell elsewhere, because “they got a camera on this block.” But perhaps more frightening than the CPD, he hinted at the possibility of vigilante justice. He knew the landlord’s capabilities (he called him a “murderer”), and told the boys: “he will kill you.”

Interrupters did not appeal to mainstream property rights when settling disputes, but they do emulate some legal and financial practices. It was not clear how effective these were on the street. In one Latino neighborhood, a man gave a boy marijuana to sell and expected \$600 in return. The boy gave him only \$300, and said he didn't have any more money. Whenever the man saw the boy, he would beat him up. The boy eventually contacted a violence interrupter, who in turn brokered an agreement between them: a re-payment on an installment plan. The boy agreed to give the man \$20 every two weeks until he reached \$300. In another conflict on the West Side, a violence interrupter arranged for a woman to be compensated for damages she had suffered. In this incident, a woman double parked, and when a man asked her to move her car, she "cursed him out and called him a B." As she was pulling away, the man threw a brick through her car window. He intended to hit her; instead, he hit her passenger in the mouth, knocking out some of her teeth. The victim's cousins were "going to do something to the dude." But the violence interrupter stepped in and got the man to promise that he would pay for her dental work. This arrangement stalled her cousins. Both of these arrangements have since become uncertain. In the first incident, the older man went to prison on a narcotics-related charge. In the second, the man has still not paid for the woman's dental work.

In another incident, a customer attempted to buy a large package of narcotics from a man who was affiliated with a powerful gang. When he handed over his money, the dealer kept it without giving him any drugs. According to one violence interrupter, "He took his money and said, 'Fuck you. We're not giving you shit.'" In a transaction that was illegal from the start, the man who was robbed could not go to the police. Before CeaseFire was contacted, he planned to pay another person to recover his money forcibly. Intercepting him, CeaseFire and leaders of the thief's gang "made him realize this is what this guy does. He rips people off." In one meeting, a South Side violence interrupter expressed similar complacency: "Robbery – that's going to happen. The economy has to do with that."

Illicit economies were not secure: people's assets were always disappearing and they had no recourse to legal action. Violence could seem like the only way to guarantee a profit or recover one's losses. Dice games also led to shootings as people gambled with their assets. Conflicts occurred when there was a dispute over rules and when someone stole money from the game. One violence interrupter shared his opinion about why dice games led to shootings: "A dice game is a gambling game. It's a game of chance. Some people can't stand to lose. No one wants to be a loser," especially when the stakes were high. When playing dice, people gambled with "bill money."

Violence interrupters mediated these conflicts by regulating the otherwise unregulated game, and also putting a monetary loss into perspective. At a South Side homecoming (from prison) party, two men were playing dice. The older player, an off-duty security guard, believed he won the bet and thought a younger player owed him money. The younger player disagreed, and the guard began threatening to shoot him. Eventually, the interrupter recruited a respected person in the community (perhaps a gang leader) to "make things straight." He asked him to decide "who was wrong and who was right." It turned out that the younger man had won the bet as well, because the two guys had been "betting two different ways." Both men agreed to walk

away from the conflict. The same violence interrupter later confronted another dice game controversy, one in which resolution seemed more elusive. A spectator had stolen money from the pot, and a player schemed to get his money back, perhaps through gunplay. The interrupter told the player: “It’s not worth it. You lose more in the end. . . . It’s just \$10. Would you rather have 10 years or \$10?” This fight began after a person who wasn’t playing stole money from the pot.

Demonstrating their own sensitivity to the importance and scarcity of money, violence interrupters have given possible shooters cash to deter them from violence. One South Side interrupter quashed a dice game drama by paying off a man’s debt with his own money. Intoxicated, the man had made a bet he couldn’t pay off. In another event on the Northwest side, a man walked into a CeaseFire office with a hand gun and confessed that he was preparing to stick people up for money. He told the violence interrupter, “I need money for my baby’s Pampers and for food. How can you help me?” The violence interrupter gave him \$300 to buy the supplies. He gave up his gun, and the interrupter turned the gun into the police. Violence interrupters help people avoid costly interactions with lawyers and the police, thus assisting them in maximizing their assets by arranging settlements and, sometimes, bailing people out.

## **Gangs**

Similar to their position on drugs, CeaseFire violence interrupters did not try to persuade men to leave gangs. When we asked one Latino violence interrupter if he ever encouraged men to leave gangs, he replied, “I can’t really tell them that. . . . If I tell them to get out of the gang, they won’t listen to me.” This was important to note, because people sometimes misidentified CeaseFire as an anti-gang program. Street sovereignties were major forces in the neighborhoods where CeaseFire exists. In step with their stance on drugs, violence interrupters worked within – rather than against – street organizations and their structures when mediating gang-related conflicts. They used their street-earned influence over their former gangs, they facilitated communication between gangs, they relied on current leaders’ authority, and they respected territorial boundaries.

Violence interrupters described the structure of street organizations as varying by region and changing over time. Most black violence interrupters thought gangs and the rivalries between them had diminished in importance. A South Side violence interrupter said, “There ain’t been a real gang war in Chicago since the 1980s.” In black communities, violence interrupters believed that block-based gangs attached to the drug trade had replaced the larger organizations. These smaller circles trumped overarching gang affiliations. A violence interrupter on the West Side observed that in one clique members of the Mafias, Four Corner Hustlers, Traveling Vice Lords, and Gangster Disciples work together and were “cool.” He noted, “They make money together. . . . If me and you get money together, it’s like a brotherhood is formed. We’re going to fight together.” By contrast, Latino violence interrupters worked with gangs that had firmer structures and intense rivalries with one another. CPVP and violence interrupters labeled these organizations “old school,” and attached the following attributes to them: “they operate based on a code of ethics” and “structure and rules were enforced.” They called drug selling organizations

“modern” gangs and describe them in this way: “there is no code of conduct” and “leadership is based on dope.” The conflicts CeaseFire confronted over property, particularly those concerning the drug trade, reflected issues typical of modern gangs. Conflicts related to tensions between gangs were more typical of former gangs. These categories were not mutually exclusive. Many of the same violence interrupters who viewed themselves as interacting with modern gangs also relied on gang structures to resolve arguments. At the same time, violence interrupters who typically interacted with former gangs were challenged by more modern developments. An interrupter in a Latino neighborhood said that federal investigations were removing gang leadership. According to him, there was “chaos” on the street. There were “no rules right now.”

Proving that gang structures still exist, and ties to these structures remain relevant, violence interrupters primarily mediated conflicts with men in their old street organizations. They used the respect they commanded as leaders. One West Side violence interrupter described how he mediated one incident: “I sat them down together, and I told them both they was wrong.” He was able to do this because “when I was a part of that, I had more rank than them.” Another interrupter worked with his former organization, but in a different neighborhood from where he was active. When he introduced himself to men in this set, he showed them his old gang tattoos to prove his street credibility. Mediating conflicts involving members of one’s previous gang was so natural that at least one violence interrupter thought it was too “easy.” When asked why he did not work with his former organization, he responded: “I didn’t want that. That’s easy. I wanted to go somewhere different. I wanted to help people I didn’t have a connection with.” This was not CeaseFire’s approach; they wanted violence interrupters to begin with a number of built-in relationships. The campaign hired people according to which street organizations they could reach, usually the ones of which they were a part.

Interrupters’ street histories could be as restrictive as they were enabling. Many could not mediate conflicts involving people in their former rival organizations. One said, “Some people don’t want to let things go. People don’t see me for who I am now.” Members of his former rival gang thought, “I’m trying to pull it [the trigger of a gun],” when he visited their territory. Another interrupter, who was able to work with a variety of street organizations, attributed his flexibility to a neutral past: he was an active gang member in another city. He mused, “Maybe I have an edge because I wasn’t People or Folk.”

Connections came in handy when violence interrupters engaged in diplomacy between gangs over rivalries that had resulted in multiple shootings. Violence interrupters provided an important service in facilitating communication among street organizations. One West Side violence interrupter remembered, “If someone was into it with my gang, I was going to talk to the leader of the other gang.” These days, men in street organizations were “scared to talk to one another.” Interrupters helped gangs strike agreements over the phone and in face-to-face meetings. In one suburb, a staff member mediated a deadly feud between two gangs. He remembered, “I knew some of the key individuals on both sides. I gave them my word that if they left them alone,” then the other side would do the same. He met with one organization, his former gang, in person. He spoke to the other group over the phone. They did not come together. He explained why they were open to listening to him: “They needed someone they could trust.”

In another CeaseFire diplomacy effort, a Northwest Side violence interrupter brought two warring organizations together. The conflict originated in the early 1990s over turf, both symbolic and drug. These tensions were particularly acute, because although these gangs were under the same umbrella organization, they were also rivals. The interrupter decided to host the early 2007 mediation in a bar that had a hall in the back. Importantly, it was in a “neutral zone on the outskirts of [the neighborhood].” He remembered the bar’s owners “didn’t know what was going on. I told them it was a family reunion.” He did not tell men in either organization where the meeting would be held until the day it happened. He waited so there was a slimmer possibility that they would “scout it out” and ambush the other side. He explained how he was able to convince men in these gangs to participate in such a risky meeting. “I was a gunner. I was known to shoot people. I have a good reputation on the streets.”

At the mediation, the attendees turned up “strapped.” “They all had guns. They all showed their guns.” The violence interrupter told the men they could “pack” and “bring security,” because he wanted them to feel comfortable. In the beginning of the session he established a set of rules, including: “no disrespecting one another; don’t flash anything (referring to gang signs).” There was a DJ to entertain the two groups; there was also food. But, the primary aim of the event was for the two groups to talk to one another. He initiated this dialogue by asking the groups why they believed the war began. The older men said there were ‘murders’ on both sides. The younger men said things like, “they disrespect us; they spray paint stuff at school.” The interrupter tried to show the two organizations that they shared the same interests. “Gentrification will come through eventually. [This neighborhood] won’t be anyone’s hood.” He also asked about their families: “What about the safety of your children? How many of you feel comfortable walking with your kids or taking them to school? Violence plays a big factor in family life. Is that what we’re raising our sons and daughters to be—gangsters and hos?” The violence interrupter’s effort was effective for three months, at which point one side beat a boy affiliated with the other gang to death. This happened after the interrupter had been assigned to another position, away from the community.

Family was an important concept in gang mediation. Violence interrupters set up analogies between families and street organizations. In doing so, they used a common metaphor that gangs use, and turned a logic that could cause violence into one for peace. When two gangs under the same umbrella, People or Folk, were fighting, violence interrupters told them, “you’re supposed to be in the same family; you’re not supposed to be fighting.” In a different kind of incident, a man was planning to harm someone in his own street organization. The violence interrupter told the potential shooter, “This should be more of a family. You need to deal with things rationally.” When men considered committing violence on behalf of their street organizations, but the interrupters advised them against this, talking about how street organizations could pervert the idea of “family.” One of the interrupters asked a potential shooter: “Do you know that your chiefs [who are paternal figures] will fuck you in prison?” He also pointed out, “The gang will turn against you; there’s a lot of betrayal in gangs.”

Interrupters’ personal legitimacy on the street was not as strong as that of current leaders, and they sometimes relied on gang authority when mediating conflicts. In one dispute over

recruitment, a Northwest Side interrupter called the leader of the gang that was coercing boys to join them. He remembered, “[the leader] was embarrassed that he was forcing people to be a part of it.” The leader didn’t speak to the recruiters directly. Instead, he used the chain of command, and a middleman told them to discontinue coercing individuals into joining. violence interrupters seemed to struggle the most in conflicts where the gangs involved did not have a strong hierarchy to work with. In late June 2007, a 13-year-old girl was fatally shot in a city park when she was caught in an exchange of gunfire. The park was located in a CeaseFire zone. Interrupters had been trying to influence the gang who fired but were not successful because members were young and lacked a leader who could enforce a cease fire. In the same neighborhood where the girl was shot, a violence interrupter convinced his former organization to agree to a cease fire that lasted three years.

Interrupters also relied on street sovereignty when they tried to deflect potentially fatal retaliation to punishment by an offender’s own gang. In mediating conflicts, they suggested or went along with (but certainly did not participate in) “violations,” which are timed beatings that gangs inflict on their own members. In a Northwest side conflict, two cliques from the same umbrella gang started throwing punches. As one of the boy’s mothers tried to break it up, a man from the other crew misidentified her and punched her in the face. This woman’s son wanted to shoot him, but the violence interrupter asked him to consider other options: “there are ways to settle this without pistol play. Maybe there can be a violation.” In another Northwest side incident, two men from different organizations got into a fight over a woman. As they argued, one of the men knifed the other, “slicing his face.” The victim’s organization was considering retaliating by shooting the man who permanently scarred their friend. To avoid this, violence interrupters arranged a meeting between the leaders of the two organizations. The knifeman’s organization agreed that they would violate him if the other organization said they wouldn’t shoot him. One of the violence interrupters was impressed that the victim’s crew agreed to this deal. “It took something,” he thought, because their member was now “scarred for life.” In yet another incident, on the South Side, a man was selling drugs in a public housing building dominated by another gang. When members of that organization found out about his business, they attempted to rob him and in the process “hit one of the man’s children with a gun.” When the victim was preparing to retaliate, a violence interrupter stepped in and promised to mediate the conflict. He spoke to the other gang’s leader, who had not given the lower-ranking members permission to steal, saying of the robbers that they were “on some thirsty, thieving shit.” Their organization made them return what they had stolen and even “put some money on top of it for his daughter.” Furthermore, the men were violated by their own gang.

When mediating conflicts that involved gang territory, violence interrupters worked within and were not able to overcome these boundaries. In a Mexican neighborhood, a boy from one street organization was living in another gang’s territory. According to a violence interrupter, “his parents own the building,” where he resided. The gang who dominated that territory harassed and even shot at him. The interrupter attempted to convince the dominant set to allow the boy to stay in the neighborhood, but they responded, “Dude has to ride (move out), or he’s going to get turned out.” “Turned out” means the boy would be forced to become a part of the dominant gang, which would entail a violent initiation. After evaluating the situation, the

interrupter tried to convince the boy to move. On the Northwest side, the annual Puerto Rican Day Parade and preceding week-long festival could be riddled with violence. Violence interrupters thought that people were not prone to shoot the boy during the carnival, because of its strong police presence. The violence interrupters, then, turned their attention to fights and shootings outside the festival, as men travel to and from the fairgrounds. In an effort to prevent confrontations, they mapped routes, or “safe passages,” for each street organization to follow when they were going to the carnival. They developed these in consultation with street leadership, and when designing the routes, they adhered to existing street boundaries. Rather than challenging street rules or dismantling street authority, violence interrupters affirmed these sovereignties when they mediated conflicts.

## Women

Violence interrupters mediated many conflicts over women. Just as men compete over drug sales, they compete over women. But while they may be viewed as property, women do not behave like property. In one West Side club, a group of men slipped in front of a couple who was waiting in line to have their picture taken. This led to a huge barroom brawl. A violence interrupter explained why: “They be in competition for chicks.” Women are not inanimate or static like turf. “Girls have no boundaries,” another interrupter once said, while describing a drug turf dispute that was further complicated because the same girls were sleeping with men from the rival crews.

In most cases, when mediating conflicts over women, violence interrupters displace blame from the disputants (the men) to the women. A female interrupter recounted an ongoing incident:

*A little cat went crazy over this girl. He wants to kill this guy over his baby mama. Whenever she's in the house with the other dude, he wants to get a gun. I'm still working with this little fool. He's always asking for guns. We always catch him in the heat of the moment. He's going crazy over this female. I tell him, 'She ain't shit. I'll help you find a little chick.' But he's stuck over his baby mama.*

Here, the female violence interrupter described the potential shooter as “crazy” and a “little fool” to the other violence interrupters, and thus held him accountable for his actions. But when trying to prevent him from shooting, she criticized the mother of his child, saying, “she ain’t shit,” and suggested she was replaceable. This was the logic she believed would appeal to him. As violence interrupters blame women for most conflicts; their misogyny could mirror that of the street, as captured in hip-hop lyrics that degrade women. According to one, a number of conflicts happen “over females – stupid shit. Females always trying to bring everyone into it. They always wanna holler for help.” In a South Side incident, a woman disappeared from her home, leaving at least one small child behind. She contacted her family and told them a man had kidnaped her. The father of this child wanted to find the kidnapper and shoot him, since his baby was abandoned. The violence interrupter, working in tandem with an outreach worker, eventually convinced the kidnapper to produce his captive, thus preventing a shooting. Later, he learned that

the woman had voluntarily gone off with her “kidnapper.” He thought this situation taught the potential shooter a lesson: “females be lying.” In one Latino neighborhood, “two guys were fighting over a girl.” While driving around, the violence interrupter saw them arguing and knew “the girl’s got multiple partners—more than the two guys. Neither guy was aware of that.” He pulled one of the men aside and told him, “It’s not worth it. The girl is with more people than just you. You don’t know her background.” Although he hesitated, the man walked away from the fight.

Violence interrupters tended not to mediate domestic conflicts, for they felt they would be unable to influence the outcome of these conflicts. One wonders, however, if the generally held belief that women cause trouble (and perhaps deserve punishment) impacts this policy. In one meeting, an interrupter announced, “Guys beat up broads all the time.” Regarding these incidents, he thought, “That’s his broad. I won’t get involved in it.” Another thought that if he confronted men about domestic abuse, they would tell him: “stay out of my business.” This approach seemed inadequate for an anti-shooting campaign serving a region where people, usually boyfriends and husbands, do shoot and kill their current or former romantic partners. It is necessary to note that police departments have also faltered when addressing domestic violence, and continue to struggle over this issue. [References?]

## **Respect and Rivalry**

Violence interrupters mediated conflicts that were rooted in deep-seated rivalries and resentments. Others arose when people felt suddenly disrespected. To resolve both kinds of situations, violence interrupters needed to be familiar with the personalities and interpersonal dynamics of people in the neighborhoods they serve. In order to address such problems, a CPVP staff member said interrupters “need to know who got into an argument yesterday, who slapped who. If you don’t know that shit, you ain’t stopping stuff.”

Shootings and threats to resort to gun play were sometimes only the most recent iterations of problematic relationships. In one incident on the Northwest Side, two men got into a fist fight, and a third party shot one of the men in an attempt to protect the other fighter who was a member of his street organization. The violence interrupter noted that the two men who were fighting “grew up together.” They had “always been in competition” and were “constantly trying to establish who’s better than who.” Underlying factors like these complicated arguments that appeared to be about other issues, like turf. On the West Side, a man who had recently returned home from prison was trying to regain control of his former block, which required displacing a younger member of his organization. Later, the violence interrupter learned that the returnee was so persistent – even risking another incarceration – because he was angry the other man “didn’t send him money in jail.” He convinced the younger man to return this money retroactively, to keep the returnee from retaking the block.

Interactions with near strangers could also cause shootings, especially if a person felt disrespected. This most commonly meant questioning someone’s masculinity. Calling a man a “bitch” or a “ho” could be particularly inflammatory, since these evoked the stereotypical traits



of women, as addressed above. In one incident at a club, men became involved in a verbal altercation, and one man (who had a lot of money but little muscle) started calling other men (who were “heavy hitters”) “bitches, hos, pussy-ass niggas.” In retaliation, the heavy hitters “beat him up so bad. They cut him up. They beat him in the head with pool balls and sticks.” The victim and some of his friends considered retaliating with gun violence, but the violence interrupters convinced them not to. They advised the victim to “accept that ass-whooping.” And they told him, “You were disrespecting them. Those guys are gorillas. You’re lucky you aren’t dead.” Here, the violence interrupters understood the perspectives of the men who felt disrespected.

Drugs and alcohol could escalate any conflict, but it seemed they could make personal issues particularly volatile. Conflicts over “disrespect” often happened in party situations. One West Side violence interrupter said that on weekend nights, people “get together, go to clubs downtown,” and “bring shit [fights that happened downtown] back into the area.” He thought, “They drop too many pills [ecstasy] and they want to fight!” It was difficult to mediate conflicts when disputants were drunk or high. An interrupter shared one of his strategies: “I get two groups to talking when they’re not getting drunk and fighting with one another.” He believed his mediation strategies were sufficient until “someone gets drunk.”

Sometimes forces beyond violence interrupters’ control helped them resolve conflicts. These ranged from arrests to a gang’s own policies. In one violent argument over drug turf, the more senior disputant eventually returned to jail over a weapons possession charge, leaving his corner to his younger rival. On the South Side, a group of young men beat an older alcoholic man, who was intoxicated. The victim planned to retaliate by shooting them. The violence interrupter persuaded him not to, but the mediation received some reinforcement when one of the boys “got locked up.” In such situations he prevented a shooting from taking place. Another interrupter worked in a Latino neighborhood with one street organization, his former group. Most of the conflicts he mediated were within the gang, and he had an important advantage: internal shootings were not permitted. When one member of this gang shot another member, the gang found the same gun the shooter used, and they shot him or her in the exact same place where the fellow member was. The violence interrupter has “seen it done.”

### **Conflicts That Could Not Be Mediated**

Violence interrupters could not prevent all shootings. For instance, arguments were difficult or impossible for interrupters to address when they had no influence over the disputants. More importantly, violence interrupters could not always mediate conflicts through arguments based in street logic. Shootings could be illogical, random, and unpredictable. Due to the unpredictability of human action, conflicts violence interrupters believed they mediated sometimes led to homicides later. We mentioned two of these instances above – one after diplomacy between two warring gangs and one after mediation over drug turf. These two situations suggest how difficult it was to ensure continued peace between disputants. One violence interrupter spoke about a shooting that happened in late 2006. The incident was part of a “gang war,” and this most recent victim was killed in retaliation for a murder the opposition

suffered. Violence interrupters even talked about the shooting that caused the new retaliation at one of their meetings. “We thought it was over,” one remembered. “Nothing had happened.” The retaliation came “two years later.” In the interim, they believed the conflict was over and moved onto other situations.

In a similar situation, at the beginning of 2006, CeaseFire was able to settle a New Year’s Day conflict, but knew that tensions between the disputants still existed. One CPVP staff member decided to make the street intersection where the dispute occurred a test case, to see whether violence interrupters could prevent shootings on a hot corner over the long term. Throughout that winter, their supervisor referred to these cross streets during staff meetings, as evidence that his people were preventing retaliatory violence. But in March, a young innocent bystander was shot at that very corner. It was unclear to the evaluators whether the March shooters were a part of the New Years conflict. In explaining how this shooting could transpire, even with violence interrupter surveillance, one CPVP staff member said, “There’s nothing we could have done the day it happened.” In that particular neighborhood, violence interrupters had been working very hard; they were “out in the community, on the streets, right there.” Until the shooting in March, the CPVP staff member understood that one man involved in the New Year’s tussle moved out of town, and the “other side was okay” and the violence interrupters had “followed it for months.” The CPVP staffer said the fight “kicked off in another area,” and then the shooting happened at the intersection that CeaseFire was tracking. In the aftermath, he wondered if the interrupters should have been assigned to work in larger geographical area, since they were “checking in with people on [that corner] every day,” and yet they were not able to prevent this shooting. But, the supervisor said, “We don’t have a crystal ball. A lot of shootings just come up.”

## **Chapter 6 Community Collaboration**

Measured by the level of resources invested in each site, CeaseFire was a modest program. At best, fully funded sites received about \$240,000 yearly from CPVP or through state contracts arranged by program headquarters. But the program's operating theory, outlined in Chapter 1, required an extensive set of change agents who could set in motion factors leading to violence reduction. Each CeaseFire site thus had to engage with a diverse set of local partners, in order to leverage services and jobs for their clients, use their facilities, gain scale in the distribution of public education materials, and populate the marches and vigils that were held in response to shootings and killings. Because many of the sites were funded at the initiative of local politicians, having a broad base of support in the community was also an important aspect of partnership- building.

To achieve all of this, end, the sites were encouraged to organize a "coalition" of local collaborators, and holding regular coalition meetings was another of their responsibilities that was monitored at CPVP. Often these coalitions were formed by site leaders, but in some places CeaseFire attached itself to a existing coalition (for example, the Albany Park Human Services Coalition). Coalition meetings we observed typically consisted of reports on recent area crimes, a recounting of client "success stories," reports on program hiring and staffing, and descriptions of the activities of various groups in attendance. Their efforts were not necessarily co-planned or well-coordinated, but familiarizing the groups with each other's services was one of the agenda items.

This chapter examines the extent of these local collaborations. The first section draws upon surveys of site-level samples of CeaseFire's collaborators. As described below and in Appendix E, a total of 230 collaborators were interviewed. They were questioned about their familiarity with CeaseFire, contacts with program staff, involvement in program activities, experiences with clients, perceptions of the costs and benefits of involvement with the program, and assessments of the host organizations. The second section of this chapter reports on two detailed case studies of the collaboration process. Based on observations of meetings, in-depth personal interviews, and various staff and organization surveys, we examine the dynamics of involving two key collaborators in CeaseFire, the police and the clergy.

### **Collaborator Involvement in CeaseFire**

**Clergy.** Members of the local faith community were regarded as one of CeaseFire's most important local partners. In poor areas that are too often bereft of functioning local institutions, the city's many small churches are arguably one of the most vital elements of the community. Many (87 percent in our study sample, which is described below) of CeaseFire's collaborating churches had separately incorporated not-for-profit arm that provided services. These were supported by foundation grants and contracts with the state. Some larger churches also hosted non-profit housing and community-economic development activities. Clergy members were also seen as opinion leaders in the community, people who were strategically placed to help change

norms regarding violence. They were encouraged to talk about violence at Sunday services. Individual clergy members could also help mentor clients, and our survey found that 72 percent of them had direct contact with clients. Finally, some churches had recreational space and could serve as Safe Havens. Outreach workers encouraged clients to gather there during blocks of time devoted to CeaseFire so they could relax and interact with their peers in a secure setting, rather than on the street.

**Service Agencies.** One of the outreach workers' key tasks was to connect clients with appropriate services. As noted in Chapter 4, outreach workers were to develop an assessment of their clients' personal needs, which ranged from family and health issues to education and employment deficiencies to their emotional state. Following this plan, they were to try to get their clients back in school or in GED programs, help prepare them for the job-finding process, and enroll them in drug and alcohol treatment programs. Some needed to learn more about parenting and daycare, and anger management counseling was often called for. At the sites, violence prevention coordinators and outreach-worker supervisors were tasked with identifying local service resources and working to ensure ready acceptance of their clients when they showed up.

**Schools.** Schools were a local institution that could receive support from CeaseFire, and not just provide help to them. Ceasefire staff sometimes provided security on school grounds (but not always with the cooperation with the schools themselves), and they frequently gave presentations or mentored youth in schools. They worked with school principals, counselors and security personnel. At a local coalition meeting the violence prevention coordinator told principals that if they ask for CeaseFire to be present after school, their graffiti "will stop." She announced:

*At [school], CeaseFire staff will soon begin monthly presentations. The outreach staff will address freshmen and sophomores, and they'll talk about the ongoing gang violence there. That high school will begin referring students who are high-risk to Ceasefire as an add-on to their own disciplinary measures. For the referred students, participation in the CeaseFire program will be "mandatory."*

**Community Organizations.** Community organizations often were asked to participate in local coalitions to provide "citizen input" and link site activities to the "grassroots." Some also served on hiring panels, and helped generate turnout for marches and shooting responses. When CeaseFire needed support in the state capitol, they were asked to help fill buses with supporters who would make a journey to Springfield.

**Business Operators.** Local business owners and managers frequently were asked to display posters and signs that were distributed as part of the program's public education effort. Their establishments were also a natural place to turn to for possible job placements and contributions to support events. Merchants were asked to donate cash and merchandise, and to provide discounts for items such as food for late-night barbeques and other food events.

**Police.** Police turned out to be one of CeaseFire’s most frequent collaborators. While the program’s theory and many of its publications called for strict enforcement strategies, and promised to distribute information on prosecutions and sentences to the community, in practice the roles played by the police were quite different. One of CeaseFire’s needs was information. Usually police had the most immediate information on shootings and killings, and the sites all tried to keep a connection open with their district station so that they could receive a timely “heads up” when violence occurred. To plan their responses, CeaseFire staff needed information on victims and the circumstances of the crime; for violence interrupters to step in to discourage retaliatory shootings, the program needed to know the details of any gang involvement in the incident. As the police case study presented later in this chapter documents, this cooperation was not always automatic, and sometimes the connection was broken when new commanders took over or sites grew too openly anti-police in their public stance.

In many districts, police officers also provided security at and around CeaseFire events. They blocked traffic for larger marches, especially those that were scheduled in advance as part of CeaseFire Week, and they walked along during shooting responses. Police representatives also served on the panels that vetted candidates for staff positions. At the same time, many individual staff members kept an arms length from the police, fearful that being too closely identified could “de-legitimize” them among clients and even local gangs. Despite this, the collaboration survey found that police were among the most frequent collaborators with CeaseFire.

**Political Leaders.** As the chapter on funding the program indicated, local political leaders played key roles in funding CeaseFire’s operations, and even in determining which neighborhoods would be served. The key leaders for securing funding were state representatives, for many sites were funded as member initiatives. Local aldermen could provide general political support for the program, and aldermen showed up at site coalition meetings that we attended.

## **Collaboration Study**

For this study, we drew site-level samples of collaborating organizations in each of six “sectors” and interviewed their representatives. The sectors were business, clergy, community organizations, police, schools and service agencies.<sup>1</sup> All were identified as playing roles in CeaseFire’s program. Each of the six sectors required some unique questions, because they played different roles in CeaseFire’s program. However, we also developed a core of common questions that were relevant to all or most collaborators, so their responses could be aggregated across sectors to more accurately characterize the sites as a whole. The survey addressed six collaboration topics: familiarity with CeaseFire, contacts with program staff, involvement in CeaseFire’s activities, agencies’ experiences with CeaseFire clients, their perceptions of the costs and benefits of involvement with the program, and their assessments of the host organizations.

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<sup>1</sup> Politicians were not included because we did not believe it was possible to engage them in a frank interview by telephone about their essentially political contributions to the program.

Many questions focused on factors that past research suggested facilitate and strengthen the ability of community-based organizations and service agencies to collaborate effectively.

Samples of collaborating organizations were developed for each site. Lists of organizations that were working in some way with the program were drawn from the personal interviews conducted with site personnel, including executive directors, violence prevention coordinators, outreach worker supervisors, outreach workers, and a sample of violence interrupters. We also gleaned some information during interviews with commanders of the police districts serving each site. We examined resource lists developed by the sites, as well as the agendas, sign-in sheets, and minutes of the sites’ monthly coalition meetings. The resulting lists, which totaled 737 organizations, agencies, congregations, community groups, schools, and police department contacts, were submitted to the violence prevention coordinators at each site. They were asked to identify additional collaborators that were not included on their list, and to help us fill in missing contact information. Potential respondents also were classified by our staff, and separately by the violence prevention coordinators, in terms of their centrality to the program. For the survey we randomly sampled respondents from the resulting sub-list of organizations with some apparent connection to the program. Using the sampling information for this group, organizations were initially classified for later analysis by their apparent degree of centrality to the site’s programs. Overall, the evaluation staff judged 152 of them as “central” to the program, and 243 as involved, but less centrally.

Table 6-1  
Number of Community Collaborators by Sector and Centrality

sector	more centrally involved	less centrally involved	total collaborators
business	34	12	46
clergy	36	22	58
community	10	15	25
police	25	25	50
school	34	24	58
service providers	73	28	101
political leaders	31	26	57
Total	243	152	395

The goal was to conduct at least two interviews by telephone with respondents from each of the six sectors of collaborators. This goal was driven in part by the resources and time available for the project, and the large number (17) of sites involved in the study. A total of 230 representatives of collaborating groups were interviewed, with a survey response rate of 85 percent. Because there was a somewhat different mix of respondents by sector for individual sites, the site-level analyses reported here are based on data that was weighted to equalize the

number of sector respondents in each site, thus controlling for this source of variation. This and other details concerning the survey are discussed in Appendix E to this report, which also presents the six sector questionnaires.

Table 6-1 describes the 395 organizations that were identified as involved in CeaseFire at the site level, classed by their apparent centrality to the programs. The largest number of them (101, in total) were service providing agencies and associations. The highly rated organizations in this category included the Goodwill Career Center in Auburn-Gresham (job training), the Boys and Girls Club serving Little Village (recreation and outreach), the Gateway Foundation (drug treatment in North Chicago), and Rogers Park's Howard Area Community Center (job readiness, literacy programs). About an equal number of clergy, school administrators and political leaders were involved in the program. As is detailed later in this chapter, the clergy represented a variety of denominations (and non-denominations). Their contributions included attending marches and vigils, a victim's support program, and providing space for safe-haven basketball events. The schools invited CeaseFire representatives to make presentations and meet with their staff.


Next on the list came police commanders and liaison officers (50 program contacts, in total), then business owners and operators. The businesses ranged from McDonalds (providing jobs) to chain grocery stores that donated food and other products, and shops that donated gift certificates for use as raffle prizes. Last on the list were representatives of community organizations. This was a broad category that included health activists, anti-crime block clubs, local chambers of commerce, and a police district's advisory committee, which helped mobilize residents for marches. Concerned Citizens for East Garfield Park was active in that site, as was Maywood Citizens Fight Against Crime. The Rogers Park Community Council served on its site's hiring panels, while the Bronzeville Chamber of Commerce helped out in Grand Boulevard with networking events. Among the politicians mentioned were state legislators who secured program funding for their districts, aldermen who participated in shooting responses, and two local governments that served as the host organizations for CeaseFire in their communities.

Figure 6-1 below uses the same data to illustrate the number of local collaborators who were active in some way at each site, separately by sector. As the figure illustrates, Little Village, West Humboldt Park, and East and West Garfield Park involved the most community partners. The mix of collaborating organizations they assembled varied from site to site. Little Village, for example, involved a total of 35 community partners, but none of them were businesses or community groups. The large contingent of collaborating service agencies pushed Little Village up the list, on the other hand. Businesses were relatively heavily involved in West Humboldt Park (which coordinated with a total of 34 organizations) and West Garfield Park (32 organizations).

Toward the bottom of the list fell two sites that did manage to maintain a diverse set of partners, Southwest and Rockford. Both involved representatives of all seven sectors, while at the bottom Woodlawn managed to liaison with only four community partners. Woodlawn was the only site that could not identify a local political stakeholder (as noted in an earlier chapter, their host organization was involved in defeating the local alderman, who was running for reelection during the time that these data were being gathered). Woodlawn's relationship with the

police had been severed by the district commander, who did not approve of the alleged criminality of an individual that the host organization had hired to work on another project entirely. We did not turn up any business partners or community groups active in Englewood’s program.

Figure 6-1  
Number of Community Partners by Site and Sector



### Involvement in CeaseFire Activities

The extent to which each organization was involved in CeaseFire’s activities was gauged by responses to eight questions. Using appropriate terminology, respondents were asked if they or other representatives of their organization had:

- participated in any of the activities that were part of CeaseFire Week;
- been a member of any local CeaseFire committee;
- served on one of the hiring panels that CeaseFire uses to select new staff members;
- attended one of the regular coalition meetings that CeaseFire holds for organizations they work with;
- attended a CeaseFire vigil or march in response to a shooting;
- received posters to hang up or printed materials to pass out to people;
- attended a late-night BBQ or hot cocoa event; and
- organized any events that they invited CeaseFire to participate in.




Levels of participation varied by sector and by site. Overall, the most frequent form of involvement reported by these organizational representatives was distributing public education materials (82 percent). All of CeaseFire's community partners potentially could contribute to the program's public education component. As reported in Chapter 1, public education was aimed at both norm change and increasing awareness of the costs of violence to individuals, families and the community. "Pub ed" activities included distributing printed material: flyers, posters and bumper stickers. Outreach workers dropped off materials when they canvassed door to door, often in the context of mobilizing community members to attend a shooting response. Participants at rallies carried signs, and shops in the program areas sported window posters. All of these printed materials were centrally developed with the assistance of an advertising agency, and they were centrally produced as well.

Following public education, the most frequent form of involvement was attending shooting responses: 70 percent of the representatives we interviewed reported that they or someone else from their organization had participated. Sixty-two percent reported having invited CeaseFire staff to participate in one of their own events. Half of those interviewed had attended meetings of the local CeaseFire coalition, and 53 percent had participated in CeaseFire week activities. Almost 40 percent had attended one of the program's late light events. The least frequent forms of involvement were serving on a hiring panel (20 percent) and on a local CeaseFire committee (28 percent).

Most of these forms of involvement varied by sector. Overall, the most active collaborators were the police, who were involved, on average, in 67 percent of the activities on the list. They scored at the top because they were almost universally involved in hiring panels, as participants in local coalition meetings, by providing security at CeaseFire week activities and shooting responses, and as members of other site committees. The clergy came next, at 62 percent; their involvement paralleled that of the police, but they were particularly involved in shooting responses (95 percent) and site coalitions (65 percent). Third on the list came community organizations (55 percent). They were most involved in shooting responses and public education, and they frequently involved CeaseFire personnel in their own activities. Service agencies (48 percent) were frequently coalition members, their staff participated in shooting responses, and they also involved CeaseFire personnel in their own activities. Businesses (35 percent) and schools (32 percent) were heavily involved only in public education campaigns.

Figure 6-2 presents typical examples of this sector-by-sector involvement. Across all activities, only participating in the program's public education campaign did not vary much by sector, and it was high for all of them. The clergy, police, and community groups were most likely to get involved in another frequent activity – shooting responses. Except for schools, about half of all sectors considered themselves part of CeaseFire's local coalition, and police and the clergy were the only sectors heavily involved in site committees.

Figure 6-2  
Involvement in CeaseFire: Selected Activities




Responses to these questions also can be used to compare the breadth of collaborator involvement across the 17 CeaseFire sites involved in the survey. Figure 6-3 ranks the sites by the average percentage of the eight activities described above that their collaborators reported getting involved in. As noted earlier, this ranking was adjusted for the unequal distribution of sector respondents across sites. As the figure illustrates, there were only fine distinctions in the breadth of collaborator participation by site, except near the bottom of the list. Sites that were highest on this list included Little Village, Rogers Park, Englewood, West Garfield Park, Grand Boulevard and Albany Park. There, those we interviewed were, on average, involved in more than half of the program activities the interviewers described to them. Little Village scored at the top in particular because of the large proportion of collaborators involved in their local coalition (85 percent), plus high levels of community participation in their hiring panels (46 percent, more than double the average site) and late night events (60 percent). Rogers Park involved most of its community partners in its publication campaign (92 percent), two thirds of them in their site's

coalition meetings, and many of its collaborators had invited CeaseFire staff to participate in their own events (80 percent).

The most effective levels of involvement in shooting responses, a key program activity, were reported by community partners in Englewood (100 percent) and Austin (83 percent). Participation in responses was also high in Logan Square and East Garfield Park (79 percent in both locations). Involvement in shooting responses was least widespread in Grand Boulevard (46 percent), but the program ranked well on other measures.

Figure 6-3  
Collaborator Involvement by Site



At the bottom of this ranking of the breadth of participation in CeaseFire lay Woodlawn, which was really only involving its community partners in shooting responses. As Appendix E reports, we had difficulty finding community collaborators to interview concerning the program in Woodlawn. Maywood and North Chicago/Waukegan were not attracting many more community participants, but they conducted more aggressive public education campaigns. Brighton Park simply did not score well on any of the measures.

What factors were associated with involvement in CeaseFire activities? To examine this we created a subscale of five participation measures that clustered together at the site level with acceptable consistency (Cronbach's Alpha= .71). These were questions about involvement in CeaseFire week, program committees, hiring panels, shooting responses, and coalition meetings. We also relied on our field observations, meeting notes, staff interviews and staff surveys.

*Extensive contact with CeaseFire staff.* Of course, most of this contact would be a result of their involvement, but it is notable that few organizations that had much contact with CeaseFire were not involved. Further, one strong statistical correlate of low levels of program involvement was agreement in the survey with the statement, "You don't know as much as you'd like about CeaseFire." Survey reports that CeaseFire staff frequently dropped by their office, and that they had talked with staff about individual clients that they were working with, were strong positive correlates of both program awareness and participation.

*CeaseFire's apparent effectiveness at reducing neighborhood crime.* This was the strongest statistical correlate of involvement in the program. Respondents who agreed strongly that "CeaseFire is likely to reduce the number of shootings and killings" were much more heavily involved in the program.

*CeaseFire's apparent effectiveness with clients.* Collaborators who had contact with individual clients were more involved than others, and those who thought that CeaseFire's clients were well motivated and sticking with the program were even more involved.

*Having few in-house resources.* At least two programs – Woodlawn and Logan Square – provided their clients with extensive services, and did not have to rely much on others to do so. Woodlawn had the second-largest client caseload, and Logan Square fell in the middle of the pack, but their host organizations were themselves active service providers.

Broad involvement by other community institutions and organizations was not a simple function of differences in the *demographic and economic structure* of this set of communities. Some anticipated that "resource poor" neighborhoods would have a harder time identifying and involving community partners. To examine this, we operationalized community resources in several ways. Economically, no major indicator of the relative distribution of poverty or neighborhood stability was linked to the extent of collaborator involvement. In terms of median income, Maywood was one of the best-off sites, but its extent of collaboration was about the same as that of the poorest site, Woodlawn. Home ownership, another important indicator of community capacity, had the same distribution. Involvement was highest in the middle of the income distribution, where Little Village sat. Rogers Park was relatively well off and had a high level of collaborator involvement, but involvement was also high in East and West Garfield Park and Grand Boulevard, sites where home ownership was low and many households made less than \$15,000 per year.

We also examined the link between the *availability of a broad spectrum of community resources* and the extent of collaborator involvement. To do this we developed a systematic

inventory of community institutions for every Chicago police beat, using telephone listing and other guides and directories. For each study beat we generated a local availability measure (a rate per 10,000 residents) of the density of churches, health facilities (hospitals, clinics, doctors, drug stores), schools, community organizations, service agencies, and providers of services for youth. However, there was no clear link between the density of these resources and the extent of collaboration with CeaseFire, as measured in our survey. Based on a composite measure of the distribution of health facilities, youth services, service agencies and community organizations, low-resource neighborhoods surrounded both high-collaboration (Little Village) and low-collaboration (Brighton Park) sites. At the same time, some of the highest-resource areas (including Austin, West Humboldt Park and Auburn Gresham) were only middling with respect to the extent to which they involved community collaborators.

The relative paucity of simple correlates of the extent of collaborator involvement in Ceasefire lead us to probe deeper into the nature and functioning of these partnerships. We examined the program's relationship with two key partners, the police and the clergy.

### **Case Studies in Collaboration: The Police**

CeaseFire's official program model, summarized in its "8 Point Plan to Stop Shootings," promised collaboration with police and the criminal justice system. The program pledged to "ensure prosecutions" through community advocacy and direct lobbying for prosecution efforts aimed at persons involved in shootings. The plan envisioned a more expansive role for the police in coordinating "highly visible and sustained law enforcement geographic response and sustained presence to each shooting," and community and city hotlines to report gun activity. Otherwise, CeaseFire was not in the enforcement business. CPVP lobbied for access to tactical and strategic information on crime patterns, to serve its operational and managerial needs, and in some places they involved police in hiring some employees. But on other matters police and the program maintained a wary relationship, driven apart by the internal dynamics of the two organizations.

This section of Chapter 6 examines this relationship in detail. Data for this section were drawn from personal interviews, surveys of police officers and CeaseFire staff, and observation of meetings between police and program representatives. The collaborator survey examined the nature and extent of the involvement in CeaseFire by a diverse set of community partners. The evaluation staff also interviewed each district commander, questioning them in detail about their knowledge and involvement with CeaseFire. We also attended several meetings bringing together CeaseFire representatives and the department's command staff, and interviewed individual officers experienced in dealing with the program. Findings for the police include the results of the collaboration survey described earlier. It involved telephone interviews with 35 officers. The respondents were identified through interviews with CeaseFire staff, asking whom they worked with in the district, and by police district commanders, who identified their CeaseFire liaison officer, if they had one. The survey gauged the frequency with which officers were in contact with the CeaseFire staff, if they had personally visited the site's headquarters, district involvement in CeaseFire events, their views of the perceived costs and benefits of being involved with the program, the reputation and effectiveness of the local host organization

sponsoring their local CeaseFire site, and their estimate of the effectiveness and sustainability of the program. Finally, our survey of CeaseFire staff members included a number of questions about their relationship with the police.

## **Police Roles and Reality**

**Information Sharing.** CPVP was heavily dependent upon the police department for strategic, tactical and analytic information. In important ways they structured their entire initiative around the availability of timely information on shootings and killings from the police. The program's information needs drove the use of police beat boundaries to select and define their target areas. In conjunction with an internal data monitoring unit, this enabled CPVP to present statistical evidence of their successes. Timely information on individual incidents and even anticipated gang conflicts enabled them to deploy their street workers in a rapid and responsive matter. There were decided downsides to this data dependency, but this was their operating model.

One of CPVP's most important data needs was regular aggregate information on shootings ("aggravated batteries" in official parlance) and killings from the Chicago Police Department. The data came organized by beats, the department's lowest-level administrative areas. This allowed CPVP to monitor trends in shootings and killings in their target beat areas, and to make comparisons with beats outside their zones. They presented the findings of these comparisons at steering committee meetings, to foundations and politicians, and to the media. For some time, CPVP staff were also admitted to the department's weekly deployment meetings. There they observed presentations on very recent crime trends, discussions of anticipated gang conflicts, warnings to be on the lookout for highly sought-after individuals, and other "insider" information on crime and criminals. They were able to use this to give a "heads up" to key staff members in the field. More important, individual sites were to arrange mechanisms by which they would be rapidly informed of incidents in their area, either by fax or telephone calls from their district station house. This would enable them to organize their responses and dispatch staff to the scene.

However, there were issues in making this work on both sides of the relationship. Historically, police agencies do not share information easily, sometimes even within their own department. This tradition did little to promote a good working partnership with CeaseFire. One commander we interviewed articulated this point:

*In this organization, we're very dysfunctional. We are a paramilitary organization. We're linear thinkers. The department is not comfortable with collaboration in strategic decision-making. This has impeded our efforts to partner with community-based organizations and non-profits. You have to surrender some of that authority. The CPD is based on rank and its structure inherently creates conflict.*

Another commander observed, "We don't share intelligence with people from the outside; it's part of our culture." Further, although police headquarters knew that CeaseFire was

negotiating for access to information in districts all over the city, there were no directives from the top on how to respond. Local commanders were left to figure out how little or how much information they should give out, and if their superiors would tolerate it. They received no policy guidance.

The desire of police to remain as untransparent as possible undermined the relationship between CPVP and the department. The very specific nature of the information discussed at deployment meetings made them highly confidential. Commanders used the information from these meetings to direct the activities of officers in their districts, and special teams and units were dispatched based on the crime patterns that were described. During the evaluation period the senior CPVP staff members who attended the meetings were refused further admission. No plausible explanation for this move ever emanated from police headquarters, but CPVP attributed it to police distrust of the program. One officer shared with us that "They have misused confidential information and intelligence," but we were unable to verify this. Police managers we interviewed were very nervous about the whole situation, and we suspect the order came from the top. CeaseFire was offered less timely, watered down and far less useful information, but it was of little operational utility.

Sites that could not manage a smooth flow of information from their police district had to scramble to gather timely intelligence. One area purchased a radio that scanned police radio frequencies, so they could listen in and overhead dispatches. In another district a new commander shut down a pre-existing relationship with CeaseFire, but one of his top managers continued to fax information to the site when he could.

There were information sharing problems of at least as great a magnitude on the CeaseFire side of the relationship. In the neighborhoods, CeaseFire's public stance was that they were not "snitches," and did not collaborate with police. As detailed below, CeaseFire worked hard to convey the message that they were not closely associated with the police. In particular, they did not inform on their clients on the basis of information that they shared about themselves, and the violence interrupters did not turn to the police with any advance information they might gather on impending gang violence or about the perpetrators of specific crimes. This was well known to the commanders, and was clearly a source of tension, for the police hoped to receive information from CeaseFire about the perpetrators of shootings and killings. However, the program mostly expected this aspect of their relationship with the police to be a one-way street. This too was widely recognized; as one officer noted, "They have information they won't share, but expect us to give them information."

**Involvement in Hiring.** Many police districts associated with CeaseFire sent representatives, usually the commander, to serve on the hiring panels that selected outreach workers. The panels were composed of five or six people representing local institutions, in addition to CPVP managers. The panels we observed in action were composed of violence prevention coordinators, outreach worker supervisors, CPVP staff members, local pastors, staff of a drug treatment program, and police representatives. Two panel participants who could exercise a veto over hiring were the CPVP staff member and the police representative. The latter

contributed the findings of formal record checks of job applicants, and the results of informal canvassing at the station concerning the qualities of the applicants. Commanders we interviewed acknowledged having vetoed specific job candidates based on this insider information. From CPVP's point of view, this helped protect the program. As noted earlier, it gave them some defense against having to hire individuals with political connections. It also it gave them some cover if their hires later got into trouble with the law, and it lent legitimacy to the individuals they eventually selected for the program. But the recurring difficulty was that the very credentials that gave CeaseFire staff members "street cred" – being in the past a prominent gang member and serving time – at the same time threatened to be presumptive evidence against them when it came to the hiring process. This was most true for the violence interrupters, so although they were assigned to work individual sites, they were immune from this hiring process.

**Providing Security.** There was also a small role for police to play in providing security for CeaseFire's larger community events. Police were called upon to provide security cover for CeaseFire marches, vigils and rallies. Some were scheduled events, including a long list of activities that make up each year's CeaseFire Week activities. Others occurred in response to a killing. The police role at these events was generally to show support through their presence, control traffic, and occasionally participate. District commanders and others spoke at CeaseFire events as well.

### **Sources of Distrust: Police**

An important source of distrust for the program among police was the "once a scumbag, always a scumbag" mantra that is part of their culture. Officers varied in their views, but the belief that individuals who have committed crimes in the past and paid their debt to society are due the respect they would grant to any other citizen was not the most common one. Many were dismissive of the view that ex-offenders were capable of personal redemption. Some officers expressed the belief that "people deserve a second chance" or "they were young, and everybody makes mistakes," but they were more often in the community relations side of their districts rather than in line positions. On the other side, many officers (and supervisors, and commanders) had little time for the view that ex-felons are capable of personal transformation. Their attitude was one of distrust and caution toward "gang bangers," and they were typically quite vocal in their views.

*Once a gang banger, always a gang banger. The tiger doesn't change its stripes.*

*We are suspicious of any program that hires ex-cons and gangbangers. We always say there's no such thing as an ex-gangbanger.*

Police cited high recidivism rates and their personal experience with individuals from the community as reasons for their views. They also noted that it is contrary to department regulations to consort with convicted felons, and that in the recent past Chicago's chief of police was actually fired for doing so.



*We have a culture in the department; we tend to look at criminals as criminals. If someone has a criminal record, we write them off. We think, 'People haven't changed,' Once a scumbag, always a scumbag. Police are not supposed to be associated with known felons.*

Of course, this stance (and department regulation) ran counter to two of the most fundamental tenants of CeaseFire: that 1) their clients should be gun-carrying, drug-involved gang members with a history of arrests and doing jail time, and 2) that the program should be staffed by ex-offenders and prison returnees.

It did not help that the occasional CeaseFire staffer did clash with the law, and that it was common for staff members to be dismissed by CPVP because they failed drug tests. We knew outreach workers who lost their jobs and went to prison for dealing in drugs or harboring illegal weapons. In another case, a district commander broke his ties with CeaseFire when the local host organization hired someone whom he "knew" was a very bad character. CPVP fretted that this individual was not on CeaseFire part of the host's payroll, but that was looking past the real issue. These situations, though few, had a significant impact on the law enforcement partnership. Police became suspicious of an entire site when one or two of its workers were found to be "dirty." On the other hand, there were occasions when the police wrongly accused CeaseFire staff of committing crimes, and this also hindered the partnership. In one prominent case the CPVP staff intervened to challenge the assertion – made at a deployment meeting described above – that their employee was a hardened criminal.

Worst of all, this culture and the politics of the organization prevented the police department from issuing any clear instructions on how the districts should engage with CeaseFire. Frightened of endorsing a social program for gang members staffed by ex-cons, yet pushed to by support for the program in the community and among local politicians, they temporized by doing nothing. At the behest of the mayor's office, two different summit conferences were held between CPVP leaders and district commanders. CeaseFire leaders made presentations about their program and the cooperation they hope to obtain at the district level. However, the senior executives who attended (the chief was never there) abstained from sending any clear signals concerning what they wanted to happen at the meetings and after, even though everyone was in the same room. Not surprisingly, the commanders almost universally sat silently through these presentations, and nothing changed as a result.

One factor shaping the variable relationship that CeaseFire sites had with police in their district was the often pre-existing relationship that they had with the local host agency. Some host agencies had a history of working well with the police or made a substantial effort to involve them in CeaseFire. On the other hand, others had a decidedly checkered past when it came to dealing with the police. They had an activist reputation, sometimes dating from the 1960s, and a history of "head butting" with the police. The police in turn associated CeaseFire with the politics of the host agency, and in a few sites this had profound consequences. In one area, the commander had a rather philosophical view of the host organization's history. He explained that the agency's reputation dated from the 1960s and that many radicals, including some from the

host agency, have softened their positions. He went on to say that “some of them have even become corporate.” Perhaps because of the commander’s more tolerant attitude, that host agency’s reputation did not have devastating consequences for the program. However, the partnership there still could best be described as a “hands off” one. In another area, the consequences of a contentious history with the host agency were more profound. The host agency had engaged in residential picketing and, to make a point, they picketed the home of the mother of Chicago’s mayor. This was not well received at City Hall. The same organization verbally harassed the police chief during a press conference. So, when CPVP contracted with them to be their local partner, there was much criticism of the choice, and no relationship could develop between the host agency and the CeaseFire. Police there commented:

*I don’t want to jeopardize my relationship with the department by associating with [the CeaseFire site].*

*Their ‘us vs them’ mentality impedes working together.*

*[The CeaseFire site] is historically poor communicators. We have tried unsuccessfully to work jointly on an event.*

*Whenever we have gone to a rally or event, they act like they don’t want us there.*

Later, CPVP selected a different local host, and the district got a new commander. Both sides worked hard to develop a better partnership, and the commander ended up an active supporter of the program. But in another area, the commander described the building that housed CeaseFire as “a haven for gang activity,” and would have nothing to do with them. According to CeaseFire staff, other organizations that shared the building threw parties that catered to gang members. Just the selection of the program office could lead to conflict between CeaseFire and the police.

However, most of CPVP’s host selections were more felicitous, and they got along with the districts. In our collaborator survey, 62 percent of officers reported having worked with the host agency before CeaseFire began, so there was ample opportunity for police to have developed working relationship at the local level. Only 3 percent of officers reported the host agencies’ reputation made it hard work with CeaseFire, and only 4 percent reported that they had trouble with the host agencies’ political affiliations.

And by-and-large, the views of the district officers directly tasked with working with the program had positive views of CeaseFire. In the collaborator survey, 84 percent of these district officers either strongly agreed or agreed somewhat that CeaseFire was likely to reduce the number of shootings and killings in the area. Every respondent agreed to some extent that CeaseFire has been successful in getting along politically with “the powers that be” in the area, and police were also unanimous that the program had generated widespread public visibility. More than 90 percent reported that CeaseFire had been successful in organizing events that mobilized the community around reducing violence. Police were less certain, however, about

whether CeaseFire had changed the thinking of the community around violence. Twenty-four percent felt CeaseFire had been very successful in changing community thinking and another 68 percent felt that CeaseFire had been only “somewhat successful” in its efforts to change community thinking about the issue of violence.

When asked their opinion about whether CeaseFire has been successful in reducing shootings and killings in the area, 39 percent reported that they had been very successful and another 52 percent reported they had been somewhat successful. We often heard announcements from police headquarters that the department had reduced crime, but out in the districts police were willing to extent some credit to CeaseFire as well. But not too much credit. One commander observed, “There is no substitute for manpower initiatives. [CeaseFire] cannot match the effect of saturating hot spots with officers”.

**Sources of Distrust: CeaseFire**

From the point of CeaseFire’s staff, there was a long list of practical and experiential reasons to avoid having anything to do with the police.

One was that many CeaseFire staff harbored bad feelings from when they were active offenders and had-less-than-friendly encounters with police. In parallel, outreach workers described how their similarly-situated clients were being abused or treated unlawfully by the police. In the client study, 42 percent of respondents reported being abused by the police. Some CeaseFire staff members felt that they were being harassed during their duties as well. In the staff surveys we asked outreach workers and violence interrupters how often they were stopped or harassed by the police as a suspect. Table 6-2 summarizes replies to this and other questions about their relationship with the police.

Table 6-2  
CeaseFire Staff Interactions with the Police

	Outreach Workers				Violence Interrupters			
	daily or weekly	at least monthly	less often than this	not at all	daily or weekly	at least monthly	less often than this	not at all
get stopped or harassed by the police as a suspect	4	13	16	67	25	11	15	48
attend a police roll call	1	8	20	71	0	0	2	98
meet at a police station	3	12	14	71	0	4	8	88
attend a beat meeting	1	42	21	36	4	6	14	76

Note: 78 outreach workers and 53 violence interrupters

Overall, 17 percent of outreach workers and 36 percent of violence interrupters reported such harassment at least monthly. One violence interrupter described how he copes with the situation:

*I no longer record information about conflicts when I'm on the streets, because police pull me over and asked about my documentation. If they ask a question, I won't answer it. Trust no one.*

In practice, CeaseFire made a conscious decision to pursue “distancing” strategies that defined their arms-length relationship with the police. At a coalition meeting, the director of one of the sites went out of her way to emphasize the distinction. She noted to the group, “There is a relationship and a respect, but we do not work together.” She stressed that “outreach workers do not take information to the cops.” “There is no exchange of information unless the client confesses, then they have to help the client do the right thing.”

This arms-length relationship extended to the issue of whether staff members should attend the monthly police-sponsored beat meetings that are an important component of Chicago’s community policing strategy. There was division among the outreach staff over the value of attending the meetings. Some believed that it signaled to their clients and others in the community that they were “on the side of the police.” Members of the outreach staff reported seeing active gang members at the beat meetings, keeping an eye on the community, and they felt pressure to move away from a visible law enforcement partnership. In one dramatic event, an outreach worker’s car was set on fire after he attended a beat meeting. He thought that gang members were sending him a message to “stay away from the police.” In one of our outreach staff interviews, it was explained this way:

*I don't attend beat meetings. A lot of police don't like CeaseFire because of who they are hiring. I don't need anyone saying I'm running around and talking to the police. I don't need guys saying, 'He's a trick..' This would cause me to lose credibility. If there is a CeaseFire activity with a strong police presence, I don't attend.*

In our staff survey, 43 percent of the outreach workers reported attending beat meeting at least monthly, but only 10 percent of the violence interrupters went much at all. Violence interrupters, on the whole, did not interact with the police when they could control the situation, staying away from police stations, roll calls, and beat meetings. One violence interrupter’s view was that being seen with a police officer could “cost me my life.”

The aversion by some to dealing with the police contributed to a list of issues in their relationship with CeaseFire. Because of hostility toward the police by many of the field staff, their clients, and significant components of the community, CPVP avoided directly addressing the question of whether responses, marches, leafleting and memorializing should take place under three specific and divisive circumstances: when 1) a police officer shot a neighborhood resident, presumably lawfully and in the line of duty; 2) the victim of a shooting was a truly nasty character;

and 3) a police officer was shot while on duty in the area. Any CeaseFire response in the first and second occasions drove a wedge between them and the police. A failure to respond in the third instance could have had a more devastating effect, for it sent a signal that police lives were not valued by the program. The program faced another conundrum in communities where it was the custom for gang members of construct small "memorials" to their slain members. These were collections of glittering candles, personal artifacts, and liquor bottles left to provide for the fallen in the next life. Police were denounced when they kicked memorial materials asunder; in one community they removed the stuffed teddy bears that were being assembled as fast as they were laid down. Police did not appreciate memorializing the dead despite their transgressions. Thus, on both sides, not everyone's life was to be valued to the same extent, a message that was counter to CeaseFire's messages to the public.

The central office certainly understood the complexity and power of these situations. We observed these issues being discussed at staff meetings:

*To demonstrate that CeaseFire does not work with the police, we need to respond to police shootings. We've gotten calls from people who say, 'the police killed our son.' They want to know where we were at.*

*I don't look at the police or the city as a funding source. We're never going to be able to play it right to appeal to them. On the other hand, CeaseFire could survive if people in the community were behind us.*

*We are considered an ally of the police. The commanders got awards, they are a partner, they are at the table. They have veto power over our workers and we struggle with them in every neighborhood. [Site name] is pushing to do responses to police shootings. If [site name] tried to do a response to a police shooting things would blow up.*

*What should we do?" In a very loud and exasperated voice [another staff member] says, "We need to do responses to police shootings!"*

But paralyzed by the contrary passions that these situations provoked, CPVP remained mute regarding what action the sites should take. These situations highlighted the clear disjunction between the program's theoretical foundation and official public stances, and the partnerships they were actually willing to form with the police in practice.

## **Partnership Activities**

Where collaboration did take place, a key role was played by the officer chosen to be the district's liaison with CeaseFire. Some districts appointed detectives to the job, while others relied on their community policing office. Overall, detectives could supply more rapid and detailed information. Further involvement included inviting the CeaseFire staff to the station to meet other officers or to attend roll calls so that beat officers can become familiar with them. Some liaisons

kept CeaseFire’s telephone numbers in their cell phones, enabling them to provide information as quickly as possible on problems in the area. Beat officers stopped by the local CeaseFire office to get to know the staff on a first-name basis.

Table 6-3  
Frequency of Police Contact with CeaseFire

During the past year, how often . . .	every week or so	at least monthly	once every three months	less often than that	not at all
been in telephone contact with a CeaseFire staff member?	40	34	3	23	0
have they typically dropped by to see you in person?	20	31	14	17	17
have you ended up attending the same meetings as CeaseFire staff?	20	54	9	9	9
have you discussed individual clients that they are working with?	12	21	9	18	41

Among the liaison officers interviewed in the collaborator survey, more than 70 percent reported having visited the local CeaseFire site, and 82 percent reported that the CeaseFire staff had been introduced to district personnel. Eighty-eight percent of the officers reported having a regular way of contacting the local CeaseFire office following a shooting, and 61 percent acknowledge releasing data to CeaseFire on patterns of shootings and killings. We also asked about their involvement in CeaseFire activities. Most (88 percent) police allowed CeaseFire to put up posters and bring printed materials to the station, and nearly an equal number (82 percent) had attended a CeaseFire vigil or march in response to a shooting. Seventy-seven percent of the officers we spoke with reported participating in CeaseFire Week, the annual anti-violence awareness event that kicks off the summer. More than half (58 percent) reported being a member of a local CeaseFire committee, and 56 percent of the officers attended a CeaseFire coalition meeting. Another half (52 percent) reported attending a late night BBQs.

But always the program staff were wary of being seen in public contact with the police. Their clients had to believe that they were unaffiliated with the police. As one outreach worker told us:

*A lot of the guys [on the street] feel that you’ve betrayed them. I see that a lot. They just feel like you went to the other side. They just don’t understand. I’ve done had guys to tell me that they don’t want to talk to me, that I work with the police department.*

Some police, especially the officers who worked closely with CeaseFire, understand the tightrope the program’s staff walked, and that they needed to remain in the background to enable CeaseFire to maintain the trust of high risk individuals in the community. One astute commander said, “I advise our officers not to spend many time with CeaseFire workers; the last thing I want is

for men on the street to suspect CeaseFire workers are informing the police. We do not want to interrupt the work they are doing.” This was not always a straightforward or easy position for the police to make. When they see “high risk” individuals or gang members hanging out on the street, and they are not particularly familiar with the CeaseFire outreach workers, they often attempted to break the group up. At other times, when an officer both knew the outreach worker and had a basic trust of the work CeaseFire was doing, she or he would allow the outreach worker some space and time with the individuals on the street without interfering. In another area, the commander had a unique way to handle street issues. He told us,

*Officers have been instructed to threaten [CeaseFire outreach staff] like anybody on the streets. This is done purposefully because officers are keenly aware that outreach workers must maintain their credibility with gang members, which means being stopped and questioned by the police. The outreach workers [in this district] prefer it this way.*

### **Case Studies in Collaboration: The Clergy**

In many neighborhoods in which CeaseFire operated, local churches were one of the few visible centers of organizational life. Active congregations could be found in areas that too often were otherwise virtually denuded of a civic infrastructure. Experts who helped formulate the program stressed the importance of involving the clergy, pointing to the positive experiences of other cities. In principle, the clergy could play at least three roles in the theory of violence reduction underlying CeaseFire. Through their position and legitimacy in the community clergy could lend weight to the message that killing is wrong. CeaseFire wanted pastors to actively preach a “no shooting” message in their sermons, contributing to the norm change component of the program. CeaseFire could also hope that local pastors would support the mobilization of the community around vigils, marches and other collective responses to shootings and killings. The goal was to develop partnerships with clergy who would participate in and offer prayers during vigils after shootings. Importantly, they could also encourage their parishioners to participate in CeaseFire events, lending the program instant access to large numbers of residents. Also, churches would contribute to the program’s outreach work with high-risk youth, by hosting “safe haven” programs where they could gather in safety and by providing pastoral counseling and support. Reiterating why a partnership with the clergy was so important, a CPVP staff member exclaimed: “God forbid – if someone’s murdered, who does the funeral? Who reaches out to the family? Who visits the hospitals? Who counsels the community? I put the clergy second only to outreach workers and violence interrupters.”

However, CeaseFire was far from successful in sustaining involvement by the clergy, and in leveraging on their status, legitimacy and congregations. The reasons for this are of some importance, for the truth remains that in many poor and high crime communities the faith community is virtually the only organized community. In order to learn more about the role that the clergy played, and why, 45 local were interviewed as part of the CeaseFire collaborators survey. We conducted additional in-person interviews with nine pastors who were active partners with the program. We also attended CPVP meetings where these issues were discussed, and clergy events sponsored by CeaseFire.

## **Clergy and Violence**

Many clergy did have an interest in criminal justice and anti-violence issues, making them ideal potential partners for CeaseFire. Of those we interviewed in our collaborator survey, 52 percent reported that their churches sponsored ministries and outreach programs specifically focusing on criminal justice issues, including programs for incarcerated prisoners, former inmates recently returning to the community, and gangs. Some clergy were motivated to initiate their own anti-violence work, because shootings had impacted their congregations. In the survey, we asked if respondents had been touched or influenced by violence in their personal lives; it turned out this included 60 percent of the clergy. One priest talked about how he started working with high-risk youth. He remembers the “very first incident” he lent support in. A 11-year-old had been shot in the knee, and his mother called him. The priest was busy, and did not think it was that important, so he took two weeks to return her phone call. When he did, she “dragged me down to the house.” The boy “hadn’t been going to school,” and the priest started working with him. In addition to working with guys in the neighborhood, he is in communication with men who are “locked up in jail”: “They write and want jobs. They need lawyers.” A Latino minister, who partners closely with CeaseFire, described his response to street violence that has affected his congregation. “Even in our church, we’ve had mothers whose kids were killed. I buried these kids. I’m on the street. I’ve been with these kids. We’ve had peace marches and prayer meetings in front of buildings and homes that are drug havens.” Another priest, who has a longstanding relationship with CeaseFire, was also engaged in anti-violence work. His bookshelves were filled with texts about gang violence, and he had posted maps from the local police district outlining the neighborhood’s gang territories. He viewed working with high-risk youth to be a part of his calling. “We find in Christ’s words, ‘When I was in prison, you visited me.’ We’re not dealing with physical prison. We’re dealing with hardened hearts. All they feel and taste is vengeance.” One minister led a “historic peace church.” She explained their stance: “One of our tenets of faith is that we’re involved in peacemaking.” Her congregation conducted antiwar protests, and they broke up fights in the neighborhood. The church decided to move to its current location to create a “peacemaking presence.” This area had been a location for “turf violence between gangs,” and a fatal drive-by shooting happened on the corner of their current location. Their peacemaking mission motivated them to work with CeaseFire.

## **Partnership History**

Early in CPVP’s development of CeaseFire, clergy were an important part of the model. Consulting on CeaseFire, Eugene Rivers (a Boston minister) and David Kennedy (then of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government) visited Chicago in April 1998. As leaders of CeaseFire Boston, they were acting as consultants to Chicago’s program. Rivers encouraged CeaseFire to focus on clergy relationships, because of churches’ resources and power. Rivers returned to Chicago six months later and hosted three sessions in one day with ministers in various Chicago neighborhoods. One CPVP staff member recalled that the gatherings each drew 100 people. Rivers encouraged attendees to work with CeaseFire. He leveled the charge that “Churches have failed the community. It’s time to do something about it.” The following year, clergy began heeding this advice through large-scale events. In April 1999, Chicago’s Francis Cardinal George hosted a



CeaseFire breakfast that clergy and other local leaders attended. And in September 1999, CeaseFire hosted a faith-based event near the University of Illinois at Chicago. One hundred seventy clergy attended and signed CeaseFire's Covenant for Peace in Action. Mounted on a poster board, the Covenant called for clergy to contribute to CeaseFire's mission in a variety of ways. The display became ubiquitous at CeaseFire's clergy gatherings. And yet, spoken and written clergy commitments did not translate into widespread action. After the September 1999 event, one CPVP staff member remembers, "A couple of them would show up to events. If we called them, some of them would come, but not to the level we were expecting."

While CeaseFire never completely stopped courting the faith-based community, their relationships with clergy did not remain a priority. When CeaseFire finally received funding from the State of Illinois, they decided to use this money to hire outreach workers rather than fund church-based programs. Many pastors had expected to receive contracts from CPVP. Grants and contracts are a routine way in which Chicago's churches sustain their often very substantial social service and community development projects. Of the clergy we interviewed in our collaborator survey, 87 percent reported that their churches had a nonprofit services arm. Still, some clergy were committed to working with CeaseFire, and faith-based organizations were instrumental in beginning several CeaseFire sites. One minister at a South Side site brought CeaseFire to her community. Her desire for the program grew from her own congregation's efforts to take back drug corners in the neighborhood. In a North Side neighborhood, one church had been preoccupied with issues of youth and safety. Providing an alternative to community policing, the church began leading group walks through the neighborhood. An executive director of a CeaseFire host agency told a church representative about CeaseFire, and they were able to bring the campaign to their neighborhood.

Despite pockets of participation, the clergy-CeaseFire partnership did not yield the broad support that was expected. Site and central office staff members spoke with frustration about faith-based leadership. A suburban outreach worker supervisor lamented, "We have 75 churches in the community. When it's time for them to show up, they don't come through for us." One of these churches has 3,000 members. "We're lucky if five people show up from that church." A CPVP staff member criticized clergy for failing to partner with CeaseFire, saying, "I don't mind you saving souls, but how about saving a few lives? A lot of them do their [Sunday] services, lock up the door, and don't have anything to do with the community." For this staff member, failing to work with CeaseFire was equivalent to failing to do any work with community. In this section, we will explore some of the factors explaining why the clergy partnership, initially imbued with so much hope, in fact faltered.

## **Who Gets involved?**

There is huge variation in the character of churches serving CeaseFire sites. At one end of the spectrum are predominately African American mega-churches with hundreds of parishioners. There, pastors and assistant pastors lead often raucous Sunday session featuring large choirs, loud music, and vocal and enthusiastic audiences. Larger churches usually sport nonprofit arms that garner grants and contracts to provide health and welfare services, and even to build low-income

housing. They are big businesses, often among the biggest in the community. Those in our sample reported hosting senior citizen and after school programs, food pantries, and counseling and tutorial sessions. Down the block can be found their small, storefront counterparts, staffed by part-time ministers with a “day job” and struggling to survive. Roman Catholic churches provide for largely Latino neighborhoods, staffed by Spanish-speaking priests with an eye for the social gospel. But they are in hot competition with Pentecostal and charismatic Protestant churches that have been successful in cleaving off a significant number of parishioners, not only in Chicago but throughout Latin America as well.

The clergy subsample of the collaboration survey examined their support for, and involvement in, CeaseFire. From the survey we created a five-item clergy participation scale. It included responses to questions about:

- how frequently they attended the same meetings as CeaseFire staff members
- if they had been a member of a local CeaseFire committee
- if they had attended a regular coalition meeting
- if they had attended a vigil or a march in response to a shooting
- if they had offered prayers for CeaseFire, or spoke at a vigil

The theoretical range for this scale was 0 to 5, and the average actual score was 3.2, indicating a high level of involvement by some clergy. The reliability of the scale is .62, eroded a bit because responses to the items were “yes-no” dichotomies.

The collaborator survey also gathered their assessments of the practical advantages and disadvantages of with being involved with CeaseFire. The resulting measure gauged their views of:

- the strength of CeaseFire’s local political connections
- whether CeaseFire demands too much of their time
- whether they believe they know enough about CeaseFire
- if CeaseFire staff turnover impeded the partnership
- if turnover at their own church impeded the partnership
- if CeaseFire’s financial instability impeded the partnership

With responses coded so that a high score pointed to practical advantages in working with CeaseFire, the theoretical range for the measure was 0 to 6. The actual average score was 3.5, indicating that the average pastor surveyed responded positively to a slim majority of these questions.

**Denomination.** CeaseFire worked with clergy leading a diverse array of congregations, in part because they worked in communities across the city and suburbs. Most of the clergy we surveyed, and all of those we interviewed in person, were Christians. However, the campaign was also connected to Muslim and Jewish leaders as well, and 4 percent of the clergy we surveyed fell in these categories. Of all the respondents, 20 percent were Catholic, 24 percent were Baptist, 16 percent were mainstream Protestant, 7 percent were Pentecostal, 11 percent were Evangelical, and

18 percent described themselves as nondenominational. Denomination affected clergy partnerships. In a steering committee meeting, one CPVP staff member complained about the difficulty of partnering with priests, despite the Cardinal's vocal support of CeaseFire. One priest explained why working with Catholic clergy is tough: "Catholic clergy have a lot on our plates. When you're running a parish, even if you have an associate priest, everything is on your shoulders." Both the Archdiocese and their parishioners "make demands." Participating in CeaseFire requires yet another commitment.

In our survey, we found that Catholic clergy had lower participation rates than Protestant <sup>2</sup> ministers. Catholic clergy's mean participation rate was 2.0, while Protestants' mean involvement score was 3.4 out of a possible 5.0. Catholic clergy also had more concerns about working with CeaseFire. Their average score on our measure of the practical advantages of working with the program was 2.0; that of Protestants was 3.8, out of a possible 6.0. (These differences were statistically significant.)

**Size.** Congregation size also affects the quality of the CeaseFire partnership. Thirty-one percent of clergy we surveyed had congregations with fewer than 200 members, 30 percent had between 200 and 645 members and 37 percent had more than 650 members. CeaseFire employees were sensitive to congregation size, believing that small and large churches each present their own challenges. One CPVP staff member recalled Rev. Eugene Rivers's warning that leaders of large churches would not make time to support CeaseFire. In one inter-community forum, a suburban violence prevention coordinator described his attempts to contact a minister: "We can't get into contact with him. He's the pastor of the biggest church in [the suburb]." A West Side VPC recommended that he work with small churches, because "big churches have big agendas." But the suburban VPC had already targeted smaller churches by sending letters to 18 pastors in the community with congregations ranging from 30 to 100 people. He received no responses. A CPVP staff person pointed out that pastors of "little churches" often have second jobs and little time to spare for the CeaseFire partnership. One minister calls these clergy "bi-vocational" and describes them as "overworked."

Although leaders of both small and large congregations experienced barriers to partnering with CeaseFire, leaders of smaller congregations seemed to overcome them more often. In the survey data, churches with a large membership had, on average, a lower participation rate than churches with smaller congregations. Churches with 200 parishioners or less had a mean participation rate of 3.93; between 200 and 649 it was 3.15; and pastors of the largest churches – those with more than 650 congregants – scored only 2.56. We observed a parallel trend in assessments of the practical advantages of working with CeaseFire. Churches with fewer than 200 members had the most positive attitudes (5.21), followed by those in the 200-649 range (4.15), while the largest churches stood at only 3.69. Both of these relationships were confounded by denomination, however. Among Catholics, participation and support went in the opposite direction, increasing with congregation, while among Protestants participation and support were

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<sup>2</sup> Protestant included: Baptist, Pentecostal, Non-Denominational, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical.

even more strongly rooted in small churches. (All of these differences were statistically significant.)

**Ego.** In explaining why the clergy partnership was relatively stunted, both CeaseFire staff and clergy themselves pointed to “ego” as a characteristic of some faith-based leaders that impeded the development of partnerships between them. “Big egos” can make projects outside their purview and people outside their congregations seem unimportant. One minister who works closely with CeaseFire says, “Religious folks are interesting people. You have egos, not unlike other professions. [When you work with clergy] you work with people who have to be the kings of the roost.” One VPC turned a minister’s ego to his advantage, saying, “The biggest success we’ve had [with the clergy partnership] is leaning on their egos.” This VPC approached the most powerful minister in his neighborhood and “asked who he knew.” To warm him up, the VPC said, “We’ve come to you for advice. We know you’re a powerful guy.” The pastor helped them by putting CeaseFire in contact with other churches in the area.

**Competition Among Churches.** In addition to a sense of a self-importance, churches compete sometimes hotly over territory and parishioners. This is detrimental to CeaseFire-pastoral partnerships, because many CeaseFire initiatives, such as shooting responses, are ideally cooperative endeavors involving representatives of many churches. To avoid offending other faith-based leaders, some clergy do not participate in CeaseFire activities outside their immediate area. Other clergy will not get involved in CeaseFire activities outside of their neighborhood because they do not want to offend neighboring faith-based leaders. A north side minister noted, “I think it’s true on the South Side that churches have competitive relationships with one another.” To counter this, she believes collaborations with clergy “take trust and relationship building.” One priest only participates in responses when the shooting has taken place inside his parish boundaries. If a shooting takes place outside of them, “another priest will go.” In situations like this, he is open to attending the response, but thinks, “I don’t take the place of another priest.”

**Inward Orientation.** More particular than territory, some clergy aspired to work only with their own congregants. They were not particularly interested in working with other organizations or participating in activities in the surrounding community. One violence prevention coordinator felt, “clergy like to deal with their own congregations.” A Latino pastor encountered many churches that “dichotomize between the spiritual and the social.” His congregation was different, he was quick to note: “At our church, in keeping with our value, we don’t dichotomize. Our engagement with the community is just as spiritual as our engagement in prayer.” He described most clergy as only “focused on building their church up.” A priest agreed with this analysis, but he viewed his church and the surrounding community to be one and the same. He talked about the importance of addressing violence, “We see it as part of our local ministry. If we don’t establish relationships with them [street organizations], we’ll forsake them.” Furthermore, if violence is not addressed and reduced, parishioners “will move on.”

**Money.** CeaseFire staff and the clergy believed that monetary incentives would boost pastoral participation. CeaseFire once had small financial contracts with a few ministers, but for most of the period no longer had funding for these. Some ministers supported CeaseFire before the

campaign received state funding, and when the new budget arrangement went into effect, CeaseFire did not allocate any to them. According to one CPVP staff member, some felt that they were “left behind by CeaseFire . . . They saw money coming and they didn’t get any of it. We received some money to hire outreach workers and then we abandoned the clergy. We created ill-will.”<sup>3</sup> Another CPVP staff member attributed strained clergy-CeaseFire relationships to these budgetary issues: “We have failed miserably with the clergy. They want to be paid for their services. If you pay one, everyone has to be paid.” While certain CPVP staff members were sympathetic to clergy’s desire to be compensated, others disparaged the idea. But, clergy point out that CeaseFire was asking them to volunteer to do things for which the program is being funded, such as organizing shooting responses and counseling clients. Individual sites found ways to compensate clergy, in cash or in-kind for their services. In one community, CeaseFire outreach workers helped paint a church where they hoped to house a safe haven. This same site paid a church member who would open and close the church gym for their outreach events. These informal arrangements were not widespread. And either because clergy weren’t interested in getting paid, or because they didn’t think CeaseFire could pay them, many did not expect to receive any funding through CeaseFire. In the survey, 56 percent of clergy disagreed that working with CeaseFire would put them in a position to get more or new funding. On the other hand, they did not see themselves in direct financial competition with CeaseFire, which was principally funded by the State Legislature. About 70 percent of the clergy surveyed indicated that CeaseFire was not diverting funding from other local initiatives.

That said, clergy members still expressed disappointment in their financial relationship with CeaseFire. In one neighborhood, CeaseFire had a close relationship to, and rented space from, an organization that ministers described as “not indigenous” to the community. The minister of a church that has long been a part of the neighborhood complained, “CeaseFire has never rented space from us. We rent space, too!” This minister wondered, “do these funds get used to strengthen indigenous institutions?” With little opportunity for CeaseFire to spread their wealth, space rental becomes a “big issue.” This minister noted, “Black leaders look at that. They are very skeptical about a program that gets funds and hires people who are not necessarily connected to our institutions.” At one point, this minister and CeaseFire came together to negotiate a lease. “We tried to work something out,” but it fell through. One of the reasons the deal could not be realized was, “members of my board felt they weren’t offered enough money to rent the space.”

**Secular Values.** CeaseFire was a secular organization, and this too turned out to lead to difficulties in forming partnerships with faith-based organizations. One minister pointed out that the “superstructure of CeaseFire is non-clergy,” and he thought that was a challenge to Christian values. In truth there was a debate within the headquarters staff over the appropriateness of the contracts they had with faith-based organizations to manage several program sites. Staff members thought it wrong that these groups looked within their congregations to hire staff and encouraged clients to attend their services. To temper these differences, CPVP hired a clergy coordinator to

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<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, a priest in one neighborhood lobbied the powerful state representative in his neighborhood to provide funding for outreach workers. He remembers telling him, “We need funding for outreach workers.” And then, “once we got the funding, we had a huge rally. We did a prayer over the outreach workers.”

work with church leaders. CPVP staff believed clergy would be most responsive to another faith-based leader; as a CPVP staff member noted, “We need clergy to work with clergy.” This person believed clergy members were most inclined to work with “people who speak their language.” One CPVP staff member attributed the weakness of the clergy partnership to their failure to secure a consistent faith-based liaison sooner. Comparing the campaign to the Boston model, she says, “In Chicago, we haven’t kept a dedicated person [on staff] to work with them, to nurture them. We have to keep them excited, involved, engaged.” CeaseFire’s last coordinator was a minister himself. He believed that clergy responded best to people who share their profession: “They’re just like the police, firemen, and executive directors. We’re all in the same field.”

If clergy members preferred to work with other clergy members, CeaseFire’s faith-based host agencies would have the strongest clergy partnerships, but this was not the case true. Perhaps this was due to inter-clergy competition over territory and parishioners. A violence prevention coordinator at a faith-based site noted there was not good communication between the churches in the neighborhood, and he had difficulty recruiting clergy to his coalition. Other clergy in the community did not view his organization as indigenous. Because the faith leaders at this site were white, in a predominately African American community, they were seen to be taking a missionary role, supported in part by social and financial connections to wealthy suburban congregations. At another faith-based site, there was a strong faith-based presence, but the strongest clergy partnerships seem to be rooted in the congregation attached to the host agency. One police official detected competition between this faith-based organization and another large church in the community that was also engaged in social justice and community work.

In part because competition might deter faith-based partnerships, it was not clear that having clergy on staff was necessary for forming mutually beneficial relationships with churches and their leaders. One priest mused, “How do you work with somebody? In any situation, it’s about building relationships. How often does [one of the CPVP staff members] stop by?” The priest had seen him in his neighborhood only once in three years. He sensed that CeaseFire thinks, “we don’t have time for [building relationships with the clergy].” This priest believed one CPVP staff member treats clergy as “cast-asides,” and says, “he doesn’t hold them close to his heart.” A minister with a strong relationship with CeaseFire believed their approach was too distant for clergy. He describes faith leaders as “tactile . . . you touch people. You hug people.” He wonders to what extent “this kind of engagement” is possible “when you have a well-defined, structured approach?”

**Street Orientation.** While CeaseFire worried that clergy would not want to work with the campaign because it was secular, a more pressing issue for some clergy and congregations was the proximity of clients and CeaseFire employees to the street. Many religious groups were loath to work with individuals involved in gangs and drug sales. This was a considerable barrier to a partnership with CeaseFire, a program that hired high-risk staff to work with high-risk clients.

Even though many clergy reported involvement in criminal justice issues, a contingent hesitated to work with people involved in gang and drug-related activities. One suburban faith-based host agency ended up relinquishing their CeaseFire program, in part because it did not want

to be associated with the young people who turned out to be their clients. A night-basketball safe haven at a Northwest side church “fell apart,” according to an outreach worker, because the pastor did not want his young parishioners to be “influenced by gang members.” A priest reported that his fellow clergy were worried about how partnering with CeaseFire would affect their image. They feared that “maybe someone will think that if we try to establish a relationship with a high-risk gangster, it might seem that the church is in support of violence.” Clergy anxiety about this matter was not unfounded. The same priest received negative feedback from his parish for working with CeaseFire. “I heard someone say that I was dishonoring the parish, because I was doing this. My involvement in CeaseFire activities may be equated with being sympathetic to gang activity.” A church board that considered renting space to CeaseFire debated whether or not doing so would be consistent with their mission. The church considered their building “sacred ground.” The minister spoke of what could be problematic: “Things as simple as music. There are certain types of music I don’t want to be associated with.” He cited a local hip-hop and R&B music station and added that he understands why CeaseFire, as a secular program, “doesn’t make these kinds of judgments,” or set certain standards. But his responsibilities were different. His church has youth ministries, and he did not want young members to be “subjected to that carnality.”

CeaseFire staff members were aware of these perspectives, and it added to their wariness about working closely with the clergy. One violence interrupter said of a faith-based host agency, “Everything there is church-related. Clients don’t want to talk to them because they feel like the church people are turning people in [to the police]. Guys aren’t interested in dealing with people like that.” In another Chicago neighborhood, a minister at the host agency told his outreach workers that one of their responsibilities was to notify the police when they knew something about a crime. According to the violence interrupter who works in this neighborhood, “He’s praying for their souls (referring to men on the street). These church people’s mind sets are really different. They’re going to mess up everything we’ve been working on.”

CeaseFire tried to build bridges between clergy and men on the street. Toward the end of our evaluation, clergy in several neighborhoods began hosting Friday night sessions among violence interrupters, their street contacts, and ministers. Before this initiative, one minister expressed an interest in forming partnerships between “pastors with significant congregations and guys being hired (violence interrupters and outreach workers).” He thought this would help the pastors “because of the kind of access these guys have to the underside,” a contingent with whom the pastors would like to work. He thought these relationships would benefit CeaseFire staff. “These guys are in stressful positions. They need pastoral care.” Some clergy were pastors for CeaseFire employees; 27 percent of those surveyed said CeaseFire staff attends their church or mosque.

### **Working Partnerships**

Despite these impediments to partnering, working relationships did emerge between clergy and CeaseFire throughout the Chicago area. Clergy reported being in regular contact with CeaseFire: of the clergy we surveyed, 69 percent were in telephone contact with them at least once a month, and 49 percent attended the same meetings as CeaseFire at least once a month. Clergy

members also provided assistance to CeaseFire clients, lead shooting responses, and attended CeaseFire clergy events.

**Assistance to clients.** CeaseFire’s Covenant for Peace in Action asked pastors to “adopt, mentor, and open safe havens for the youth in our communities.” Safe havens were peaceful places that served as alternatives to hanging out at parties or on the street. Among the pastors surveyed, 36 percent reported hosting safe havens, usually basketball games at church gyms during high-risk times. Some churches were more attractive locations for safe havens than others, because of their resources (gyms) and their locations (neutral gang territory). One West Side church hosted Friday night basketball from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. and CeaseFire called the event Holy Hoops. A church in a Latino neighborhood lent CeaseFire space for a Saturday night with basketball and DJ training courses. A South Side church hosted a safe haven every other Thursday. The minister described the activities: “It’s an open mic session. Guys get on the mic and rap and sing.” Some churches hosted open gym nights for high-risk men before CeaseFire began. In 1990, one priest remembers having an “open sports night and an open gym” at his parish. Eventually, the event drew “40-45 guys, and these young men were gang bangers.” Through these weekly events, the priest came to realize, “we’re not dealing with evil kids. We’re dealing with kids who are confused. They’re looking for something. They’re looking for a place to belong.”

Beyond safe havens, clergy also report providing pastoral care to clients. The Covenant for Peace in Action asks clergy to “counsel and support those who seek to change their lives through provision of positive alternatives.” Seventy-two percent of the clergy members we interviewed said they had direct contact with CeaseFire clients. They were positive about their prospects. Eighty-six of those in contact with clients reported that they generally stuck with the program, and 56 percent thought CeaseFire clients were more successful than most other high-risk youth with whom they work. One South Side minister said he had conversations with clients about “God and faith.” They also talk about “who they are in God—they have a purpose, they have destiny.” He helps them judge themselves in terms of “not who they have become, but who they hope to be.” Some clergy knew CeaseFire clients through their church. Forty-five percent of clergy reported that clients or their families were a part of their congregations. A priest gave us an example of how CeaseFire helped him work with high-risk youth in his congregation. He suspected that a child of one of his parishioners was involved in a gang, or hanging out with people who were. He did “a little exploring,” and learned the names of people with whom this young man was hanging out. The priest then asked the neighborhood’s outreach workers “to check it out” and find out whether or not these young people were “hooked up.” This gave the priest evidence to talk to the parents, which was important, because “denial is the biggest enemy.”

**CeaseFire Sermons.** CeaseFire hoped that the clergy would spread the campaign’s no-shooting message during sermons. They did, but not always with an attribution to the program. The Covenant for Peace in Action asked the clergy to “preach for peace and against violence from our pulpits the first weekend of every month; exhort our congregations to work for peace; pray and speak for peace in our congregations and on the street.” In the survey, 86 percent of the clergy had discussed CeaseFire with other employees or members of the church. One priest likened his Sunday church services to “gigantic weekly community meetings.” Another priest reported, “We



have a large number of community residents in churches on the weekends. You don't have another institution in the community where you have that many people at one time."

Some clergy showcased CeaseFire in their sermons, while others simply preached a gospel of anti-violence. One priest planned to "saturate everyone with CeaseFire" at his parish. He was determined to talk about it during sermons and hand out "pamphlets, buttons, and stickers." He described Catholic congregations as "very sensate. Talking about an issue is not enough. They need to see things. Everyone is going to wind up with printed (CeaseFire) materials." Other clergy simply announced upcoming CeaseFire events during their Sunday services. By contrast, a West Side minister delivered sermons concerning anti-violence, but did not reference CeaseFire in them. For him, these sermons were "all-youth messages." He told the young people in his congregation: "When you're running with certain kinds of people, you have the possibility of meeting a violent end. The hard guy doesn't get killed. It's always the person who doesn't belong there." A South Side minister expanded his anti-violence messages beyond youth. He told his congregants, "You're not just here to experience spiritual euphoria. You're here to become activists. It's not enough to sit and worship. It's important to take your worship to another level and help people."

**Shooting Responses.** Clergy's most visible role was participation in shooting responses. In these public events clergy could become the face of CeaseFire to the area's residents, while the local outreach staff mixed with the mourners. The Covenant for Peace in Action asks clergy to "assert a strong presence on the streets in response to every shooting in designated CeaseFire zones." Point four of CeaseFire's Eight Point Plan requests clergy "respond to each shooting." According to our survey, clergy participation rates in shooting responses were high. Ninety-five percent of clergy interviewed attended a CeaseFire vigil or march in response to a shooting, while 86 percent offered prayers or spoke at a vigil. Clergy approaches to shooting responses vary, and these events are often multifaceted. One priest adjusted to each incident, doing "whatever seemed to fit." Shooting responses ranged from marches to prayer vigils to simply gathering where the shooting took place.

Clergy usually prayed for the victim and the victim's family at the response. One minister dissected why she participated in shooting responses: "I feel it's important to show up and pray. I pray for those who are impacted. I pray for the victim." During a response, a minister in a Puerto Rican neighborhood leveraged his power to assist the victim's family. He informed those who had assembled that the mother had no money to pay for a "proper funeral." He asked two other clergy members present to raise money at their churches for a funeral. He then asked everyone there to donate money to CeaseFire's host agency in the victim's name. This minister was not initially prepared to take such an active role, even after the CeaseFire prayer vigil. "I didn't expect that I would be burying kids, doing funerals." One site passed out a photocopied picture of the victim. At another response, the victim's teenaged brother brought out a video camera, and asked each of his brother's friends to share their feelings. One had looked at the victim's yearbook picture "before coming here last night," after he was shot. He told the family that he's sorry, but he knows "not all the sorries in the world can bring him back."

In addition to praying for the victim and assisting the family, pastors also reported discussing how shootings impacted the community. One minister wrote a “Litany of Mourning for A Shooting in our Neighborhood.” In it, she talks about what she perceives to be the broader causes of violence in the community: “We cry out to you, God, in repentance for the ways our lifestyles of consumption, self-protection, indifference, classism, racism and addiction to violence create the climate where the fabric of our community can be torn so easily.” Part of her ritual at every shooting response is “cleansing the ground,” where the shooting takes place, by pouring water on the surface. In her prayer, she asks for the community to be restored, “We ask you to come with your healing water and in the power of your Holy Spring, to renew the face of the earth, to renew the peace in our neighborhood, and to renew the hope in our own hearts.”

References to community damage could easily transition into speeches about the importance of CeaseFire. One community handed out flyers at each of its shooting responses. The flyer read, “The problem of violence will not go away on its own. We need people from every walk of life to join us in the Campaign to Stop the Shootings . . . The time is now to provide the resources needed to expand the work.” The minister, who was leading the response, echoed this in his address to the community. Before getting started, he noted the shooting demonstrated why CeaseFire needs more funding. Reminiscent of a political rally, after reciting “The Lord’s Prayer,” he began a call and response chant: “What do we want? Peace! When do we want it? Now!”

During these rituals, pastors tried to affect change politically and at the community level. They aspired to reach the highest risk to shoot and be shot. At one response in a Mexican neighborhood, 30 to 40 of the victims’ teenage peers gathered. The priest not only read scriptures, but asked the young men and women not to retaliate. He told the group that he realized that when people lose loved ones to violence, they are angry, and might even want to kill the person who took their loved one’s life. But he asked the group to celebrate the victim through life and not death. Shooters were more difficult to access. The minister believed CeaseFire’s intention for the shooting response is to “give the statement to perpetrators of violence that the community will not tolerate it.” But perpetrators did not attend these events; as she puts it, “the gang bangers are not around.” She has asked herself: “Are you giving the message to people who want to hear it? Are you preaching to the choir?”

In at least one case, the clergy assumed an adversarial position to the street, even degrading those who could be CeaseFire clients. At this response, six different pastors offered prayers. Save one, all of the clergy were white men (while much of the shooting violence in this neighborhood occurs between Puerto Ricans), except for the minister who spoke last. One minister thanked God for the police, then stumbled when thanking CeaseFire, as if he had temporarily forgotten the campaign’s name. Most referenced the “sin” that was overtaking the neighborhood, and the need for God to “redeem” the community. In a similar vein, at another response in this same neighborhood, a clergy member asked the Lord to “take over this block.” Shooting responses could alienate residents in other ways, too. In a mixed-race neighborhood we studied, white homeowners were the predominant participants in responses to black and Latino shootings. These events were interpreted by some as aggressive statements against people of color. The minister who led responses in this community admitted, “It would probably be better if I was a person of color.”

Overcoming divisions in the community, clergy rely on messages of peace that have universal appeal. A minister spoke about “Peace, Joy, and Hope” at the end of one response. A priest describes his approach at a shooting response: “The message is always ‘praying for peace.’ We always emphasize peace and forgiveness. Everyone can identify with praying for peace. Even gang bangers on the street want peace. Their involvement is a result of them not finding peace in their families.”

Although most clergy we surveyed participated in shooting responses, some expressed ambivalence about doing so. They led their own shooting-related events, resented being expected to volunteer, something CeaseFire is funded to do. A priest who did not attend CeaseFire shooting responses led 300 people from his predominantly Mexican parish to a corner where police shot an African-American man. After marching, the priest blessed the site with holy water. As he described it, “the kids did their own posters,” as opposed to waving the mass-produced “Stop Killing People” signs that marchers carry at shooting responses. He thought that CeaseFire should join these community-initiated events. One West Side minister’s church would “show up when a kid gets killed and pray,” without CeaseFire. The minister recalled one of his church’s anti-violence efforts: “Our folks had a march on violence,” and they were “taunted by CeaseFire workers.” CeaseFire staff apparently yelled at them: “You’re supposed to be marching with us.” The minister understood CeaseFire’s frustration, saying, “It’s human. When another group does anti-violence work, it’s threatening to CeaseFire, because that’s how the program justifies its budget.” Unlike his congregation, CeaseFire receives “program funds” to do shooting responses. He believes it problematic that “CeaseFire wants us to show up with volunteers. We can do our own thing. When it comes to the money part, we aren’t players in that.” Early on, he made an executive decision: “We’re not going to provide voluntary labor for CeaseFire events . . . All of us are interested in this work, but we all got shops to run. CeaseFire is not altogether consistent with what we’re doing, and we’re not interested in being taken advantage of.”

**Clergy Events.** The dilemma of reconciling CeaseFire’s mission and expectations with the objectives of neighborhood pastors was highly visible during CeaseFire’s faith-based events. These citywide workshops were held periodically by CeaseFire in the hope of recruiting new clergy to the campaign. At these gatherings, CeaseFire asked them to sign the Covenant for Peace in Action. Consistent with the Covenant, these events emphasized CeaseFire, and not the anti-violence work clergy already performed. They were case as recruitment events rather than opportunities for relationship development. One clergyman concluded, “I’m not sure what the agenda was. The meeting ended up making a case for why clergy should be involved.”

The Covenant was a key element of CeaseFire’s faith-based initiative. At one clergy event, a CPVP staff member said to the group, “The thing about a covenant is you can’t break it.” Some clergy who signed the Covenant took the exercise more lightly. One described signing the board as a “solidarity move.” For another clergy member, the Covenant was not necessarily about a partnership with CeaseFire, but a broader commitment to do anti-violence work. A priest indicated, “I signed it because I’m committed to demonstrating with words and also with action that we’re not going to tolerate violence. I want to promote peace.” In addition to signing the Covenant, CeaseFire asked clergy to fill out a Covenant Commitment Registry. The registry, more than the

Covenant or the actual CeaseFire clergy gatherings, acknowledged clergy expertise. The sign-up included listing the activities they were currently engaged in, and those they felt “committed to do.” For each activity, the signatories could indicate whether they needed training, or if they could provide training for other clergy. These activities include “marches against shooting/violence,” “gang mediation,” and “tutoring.” The registry was consistent with at least one CPVP staff member’s philosophy. He said of the clergy: “I listen to their experiences and learn from them. I don’t believe I’m a person who has the answer to everything. They all have their own expertise.”

Clergy events, however, did not reflect a belief in mutual expertise. At a West Side meeting, CeaseFire sought support for their endeavors. One CPVP staff member announced that there were three goals for the event: to impart the CeaseFire model to the clergy; gain clergy commitment to partner with CeaseFire; and motivate them to advocate on CeaseFire’s behalf. During this session, clergy and CeaseFire staff broke into neighborhood-based groups to develop a list of activities for which clergy could volunteer. Before the exercise, CeaseFire made suggestions: “educate faith-based leaders about CeaseFire” and “lead responses.” Fulfilling the assignment, many of the small groups proposed CeaseFire-related projects, like “participate in monthly coalition meetings,” “provide safe havens,” and increase clergy participation in shooting responses. But other groups proposed goals that were more tangential to CeaseFire’s model, including: “direct attention to block clubs,” “have a class on anger management,” “have a martial arts class,” “have a food pantry,” offer “church Bible study.” With these activities, clergy asserted their own priorities.

The disconnect between the vision of many pastors and CeaseFire’s model became clearer at a summer 2007 meeting, in which CeaseFire met with Rev. Jesse Jackson, Operation Push activists, and a large contingent of ministers. The event began with the goal to collaborate. Rev. Jackson asked all attendees to repeat after him the following sentences: “The lack of collaboration, coordination, communication weakens us. Collaboration, coordination, communication using best practices will move us to victory.” Rev. Jackson had recently turned his attention to the issue of gun violence, and connecting this issue to his past causes, he told the group, “We have to see ending gun violence as a civil rights issue.” Although he seemed interested in forming a partnership with CeaseFire to tackle this issue, he did not otherwise seem to understand the program’s public health approach to violence reduction. His preferred strategy was to interdict the gun trade. Shortly before the meeting, he had drawn tremendous attention with a widely publicized appearance before a suburban gun shop. In response, CeaseFire’s executive director told those who gathered: “Guns need to go, but this won’t happen so fast. We need to do CeaseFire, too, and change people’s minds.” In this dialog, Rev. Jackson seemingly attempted to understand the CeaseFire model. He asked, “Everybody needs more jobs and less guns. Is that CeaseFire?” The executive director responded, “It’s not exactly CeaseFire, but it’s highly relevant.” In the end, Rev. Jackson concluded that he wanted to support CeaseFire, but his most immediate task was traveling to another Chicago suburb “to shut down a gun shop.” Collaboration was important to both CPVP and Operation Push, but so was articulating their own agendas, and not backing down in the face of competing strategies.

## CeaseFire and the Clergy

Despite problems we observed during our fieldwork, CeaseFire was successful in developing a relationship with selected churches. Eighty-nine percent of the clergy we interviewed said they had never had any problems or difficulties in working with CeaseFire. They also think it works. Eight-eight percent of the pastors agreed that CeaseFire was likely to reduce the number of shootings and killings in their area.

The clergy seem to most admire CeaseFire's commitment to saving lives. One pastor thought it was important to "help young people grow to be a ripe old age." Another admired CeaseFire because, "This intervention makes possible the realization of what kids are created to be. People are created for meaning and purpose in life. If you die too soon, you're not able to realize the person you're supposed to be." Part of the clergy's critique of CeaseFire was of what the initiative did once a life is saved. A minister notes that once the initiative prevents someone from dying, "there is all this other kind of support that's necessary, so they can realize their God-given ability. Life is essential, but life is saved for what?" Referencing CeaseFire's commitment to change people's thinking, a minister says, "I don't know how you transform people's lives if you don't transform their spirits. I don't think a secular program can do the trick. I think young people should have access to congregations, surrogate families, and prayer mothers — relationships end up making a difference in people's lives." For this minister, churches offered real alternatives in neighborhoods where CeaseFire is active. He dubbed them "oases." They represented "a counterculture . . . we value education and nonviolence. We want to elevate people's way of thinking and way of life." Finally, said the minister, "CeaseFire can save a life, but we're in the business of transformation."

To improve their relationships with clergy, the CeaseFire campaign could reverse its current strategy, and instead join the clergy's anti-violence initiatives. One South Side minister thinks the clergy's attitude is often, "You have CeaseFire, that's nice. But we have our own thing." He proposed a solution: "Maybe somehow CeaseFire could engage, create dialogue, and become a part of what the pastors are doing." In some communities, CeaseFire and the clergy did provide mutual support. It was in these places that the Covenant became something approximating a true partnership.

## **Chapter 7**

### **The Impact of CeaseFire on Violent Crime**

This chapter examines the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings, using statistical models, hot spot maps, and gang network analysis. Appendices A-C present details of the conclusions for each individual site; this chapter illustrates and summarizes the findings. The first section examines the effects of the program on crime rates. It utilizes statistical models to identify trends in violence and unravel the effects of the introduction of the program on those trends over a 210-month period. Separate analyses are presented for shootings and killings, in both CeaseFire sites and in matched comparison areas. There is a description of the impact of the program hiatus which closed many CeaseFire sites in the summer of 2007, and of the possibly confounding impact of another anti-violence program active in selected Chicago neighborhoods, Project Safe Neighborhoods. This section reports an 18-month update of analyses presented in an earlier version of this report dated May 7, 2008.

The following section focuses on shootings, which were much more common than homicides in these study areas. This section utilizes crime mapping technologies to examine the impact of the introduction of CeaseFire on short term trends in the micro-level distribution of crime. Each CeaseFire site featured initially at least one “hot spot” of violent crime. This section tracks what happened to those hot spots over time in the program and comparison areas, looking for possibly disruptive effects of the introduction of the program. The third section of this chapter focuses on gang homicide. It utilizes graph theory and social network analysis to examine the effect of CeaseFire on within-gang and between-gang homicides, and the number of violent gangs active in the area. Like the mapping study, it probes for possibly disruptive effects of the program, in contrast to trends in comparison areas. A final section reviews all of the findings. It also presents an important discussion of the limitations of the data and research design for assessing the impact of CeaseFire.

#### **Impact on Trends in Shootings and Killings**

This section of the report examines the statistical impact of CeaseFire on monthly trends in recorded crime. It describes the sites and comparison areas that were selected for study, the data and statistical models, and changes in crime trends associated with the introduction of CeaseFire. Another segment addresses the impact of the hiatus in funding that forces many CeaseFire sites to close their doors in the summer of 2007. Finally, this section address the overlap between CeaseFire and another prominent anti-violence program in Chicago, Project Safe Neighborhoods. There are inevitably a number of methodological limitations of the data, the statistical models, and the research design, and these are considered in detail at the end of the chapter.

#### **The Sites**

One important limitation of time series analysis in evaluation research is the relatively long period of time that it takes to accumulate post-intervention data. Often the time-dependent

need of policymakers for “findings” works against the accumulation of post-program data for a long-enough period to have sufficient statistical power to identify reasonable program effects. CeaseFire is no exception. While the evaluation was underway, in the summer of 2007, the program was or had recently been in operation in 27 sites, with another three just getting started. However, only seven sites in the City of Chicago had been in operation long enough to accumulate comparable and a relatively lengthy post-program data series.<sup>1</sup> These sites were selected for statistical analysis. As more data became available we were able to extend the time series for these sites until June, 2008. Because of the funding hiatus imposed in the summer of 2007, 11 months of this new data became “post-program” information for several sites, and it is examined in a separate section which considers what happened in the sites when the program was suspended.

Figure 7-1  
CeaseFire Program and Comparison Areas




Figure 7-1 illustrates the location of the seven analysis sites. They ranged from Rogers Park, on the city’s far north side, to Auburn Gresham on the south side. The figure also identifies the beats that were selected to serve as comparison areas for this and other statistical analyses of the impact of CeaseFire on crime.

<sup>1</sup> An eighth, long-established site in Rockford, Illinois, was also open, but the city’s information system could not generate data comparable to that available for the City of Chicago sites, or for a long-enough time series..

Table 7-1 summarizes the length of the pre-program and post-program data series for these seven sites. Overall, the average post-implementation, pre-hiatus period was 68 months, ranging from 40 to 97 months. Combined with the overall length of the time series (there were between 188 and 210 total months of data), the analyses have sufficient statistical power to identify reasonable program effects. Table 7-1 details the dates at which the sites either closed or reduced staff during the funding hiatus.

Table 7-1  
Features of Target and Comparison Beats

Site	months of data	number of beats	percent Black	percent Latino	percent female heads	percent public aid	percent home owners
Auburn Gresham hiatus 07/2007	127 pre	2 target	98	1	18	14	45
	72 during	4 comparison	99	1	18	12	50
Englewood hiatus 07/2007	159 pre	1 target	98	1	23	21	44
	40 during	3 comparison	99	1	22	20	43
Logan Square brief staff reduction	113 pre	2 target	6	78	15	8	32
	97 during	4 comparison	7	73	12	7	35
Rogers Park hiatus 07/2007	158 pre	4 target	31	30	9	1	18
	41 during	3 comparison	24	12	4	7	26
Southwest open with partial staff	141 pre	1 target	78	19	23	12	42
	69 during	2 comparison	83	7	16	7	47
West Garfield Park closed 08/2006	109 pre	2 target	98	1	25	21	29
	79 during	2 comparison	98	1	22	19	30
West Humboldt Park closed 08/2006	110 pre	2 target	84	14	24	16	42
	78 during	4 comparison	84	11	20	16	41

### Comparison Areas

In this study, comparison areas represent the counterfactual situation of the target areas existing without CeaseFire during the same period of time. They are important because crime plummeted in Chicago following 1991. For example, by 2006 the number of reported crimes in the city involving a gun had dropped by two-thirds. Over this period, crime was down in both the target and comparison areas. In the seven study areas, shootings declined significantly in every targeted beat after the program began, but shootings also declined significantly in every comparison area as well. Killings declined significantly in six of the seven comparison areas. As a result, the statistical analyses presented here in essence focus on whether crime was down more in the target areas than the comparison areas following the implementation of the program. The comparison areas essentially represent the host of known and unknown factors that lie behind this general decline in crime, helping us isolate the independent effects of CeaseFire. Crime



trends in the comparison areas provide a baseline to be contrasted with trends in the program areas. For example, a decrease in crime in a program area – but not in its matched comparison areas – suggests that CeaseFire might have been successful there. Even a stable level of crime in a target area could be evidence of program success, if the forces at work in the matched comparison areas were causing crime rates there to move up at the same time.

Suitable comparison beats were identified by matching CeaseFire areas with beats with similar demographic features. The matching variables included racial composition, family organization, poverty and home ownership. We avoided selecting beats that we knew were involved in other significant programs, but we could not have complete knowledge of them. It was rarely possible to select only noncontiguous beats, even though the sites often did not rigorously constrain their efforts to the official boundaries of the target beats. We attempted to identify three or so comparison areas for each CeaseFire site. This spread the risk that other events or even programs might affect trends in some of the comparison areas, and smoothed out the impact of those factors on crime trends in those areas. Table 7-1 summarizes the number of beats involved in the study, the length of the pre-program and post-program time series in each area, and some indicators of the match between the program and comparison beats. There was an average of three comparison beats series for each site, a number that varied from two to four. The comparison area for Rogers Park was particularly ill matched, and the implications of this are discussed at the end of the chapter.

## **The Data**

Crime data for the study were aggregated from a citywide database including 9.9 million individual incidents of all kinds that were reported to the Chicago police beginning in January 1991. Using Chicago's detailed type of crime codes we were able to identify incidents that should have been amenable to influence by the program. Incidents were geocoded into a consistent set of police beat boundaries to account for the fact that beat definitions changed twice during the time period under consideration. The data examined here are monthly counts of shootings and killings for CeaseFire's target police beats and matched sets of comparison beats.

In this analysis, killings are defined as homicides involving a firearm. Currently, about 72 percent of homicides in Chicago involve a firearm; most of the remainder are stabbings or physical assaults. A separate analysis is presented on the impact of the introduction of CeaseFire on gun killings. However, even in the targeted neighborhoods these crimes were relatively rare as a monthly time series. Here and in the detailed appendix we discuss some of the statistical problems that this presented.

Analyses are reported here using two different definitions of shootings. First we examine shots fired, which we defined by combining incidents identified by Chicago police as aggravated batteries with a firearm and aggravated assaults with a firearm. Both would be counted as "aggravated assaults" in UCR reports, but the distinction between the two is significant. Broadly speaking, the difference between assault and battery is marksmanship – whether or not the intended victim was hit by the gunfire. Combining the two also discounts slippage in the

classification of shootings as a battery or an assault. Prior to 2003, officers often erroneously placed too many incidents in the battery category, a situation that became a training focus that subsequently reduced somewhat the apparent number of aggravated batteries. For the entire period, 53 percent of shootings in the program and comparison areas were classified as batteries, and 47 percent as assaults. At the site level, the percentage of shootings that were assaults rather than batteries ranged from 40 to 54 percent.


A second analysis focuses on persons shot. These were defined by combining the gun-related aggravated batteries described above with gun homicides, to form a count of the number of persons actually shot each month, in each site and comparison area. This measure is closer to that employed by CeaseFire to evaluate their own program. It combines incidents that were most likely to be reliably reported to the police, because people were shot or killed; there was concern that the aggravated assaults included in the shots fired measure were under-reported, because in many instances no one was seriously injured when shots missed their mark. It also overcomes any problems associated with differences across sites in the proportion of shots (by the definition above) that were assaults rather than actual shootings. Using this measure accepts the fairly plausible assumption that the police mis-recording of aggravated assaults prior to 2003 that was described above was broadly similar across program and comparison areas, and would thus not differentially influence the findings. Combining gun-related batteries with gun homicides produced a single measure that was frequent enough for robust statistical analysis. Across the sites, gun-related homicides constituted 11-18 percent of the combined measure. Not surprisingly, there were few differences between gun-related shootings and killings in terms of their perpetrators and locations – almost all involved young men and took place in public locations.

The analyses presented here examine rates of crime rather than the number of incidents. The focus on rates was driven by (a) size differences between the aggregated target and comparison areas, leading incident counts to differ greatly and, (b) the fact that beats changed in population over time, because of the long period involved and the city's shifting demography. In general, predominately African-American beats shrank and Latino beats grew in size between 1991 and 2007. As a result, a beat's crime count could go up or down because the size of the population at risk changed. In the case of shots first and persons shot we examine incidents per 10,000 in the population. Killings demanded a different statistical model (see below), one in which population was included as an explanatory variable rather than in a rate calculation. This produces estimates of program effects that are essentially rate-based.

Between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, monthly estimates of beat populations were calculated by interpolating linearly between the census months. Post-2000 estimates were calculated based on small area population estimates provided by Claritas Corp., a leading demographic data provider. We estimated the 2007 population for each beat using Claritas' block group projections, and then interpolated linearly between that figure and the April 2000 population count.

## Illustrative Trends

Figure 7-2  
Monthly Shots Fired in Southwest, 1991-June 2008



The actual monthly time series data are more difficult to examine visually with any confidence. Like all crime time series, the data are extremely seasonal. To illustrate this point, Figure 7-2 presents a time series plot of the rate at which shots were fired for Southwest. It indicates the importance of the statistical analyses presented here. The symbols differentiate between monthly rates for the program and comparison areas, but it is very difficult to see much with the naked eye, except that there were fewer high-shooting months in the program area later in the series. The LOESS regression lines presented in Figure 7-2 are very heavily smoothed, to illustrate possible trends in extremely messy data. Only fairly sophisticated analyses can reveal much about shifts in these series associated with the introduction of CeaseFire. In this case, the statistical analysis indicates that shootings in the Southwest site declined significantly following the introduction of the program, even relative to a decline before that point. Shooting rates in the combined comparison beats declined before the program began, but then rose a bit.

## Statistical Approaches

**Shootings.** Box-Jenkins-Tiao ARIMA Intervention Analysis is employed here to examine contrasting shooting trends in the program and comparison-group data. The spirit of the ARIMA approach lies in letting data “speak for themselves,” rather than testing the fit of a hypothesized pattern on them. Every analysis proceeds following a few steps. First, any data series evidencing a strong over-time trend are transformed into stationary series, a procedure called “pre-whitening.” Second, the parameters of an analysis of remaining fluctuations in the data are estimated, and the ARIMA model is corrected to take into account the properties of the data. For intervention analysis, this is done based on time series data from before the intervention. The intervention component of the analysis estimates the effect of an outside intervention on the post-intervention series. An important feature of this approach is that it can distinguish the speed and duration off any effect associated with the intervention. As Table 7-2 illustrates, it can a) identify interventions with gradual or immediate effects following the intervention, and b) determine whether those changes were – through December 2006 – temporary or persistent in nature. Examples of several of these patterns were apparent for CeaseFire. The effects of the intervention on the duration of change are estimated using a “transfer function” which models any significant effects of the program onto corresponding levels of crime. The results provide an estimate of the difference in the level of crime before and after a program. Finally, this approach can c) untangle whether trends in the evaluation beats were unique or just matched trends in the comparison areas. The use of a comparison series is a research design rather than statistical feature of the study, and it provides a basis for inferring that the observed changes could be attributed to the introduction of CeaseFire.

Table 7-2  
Types of ARIMA Intervention Effects

Pace of Change	Duration of Change	
	Persistent	Temporary
Gradual	A	B
Immediate	C	D

**Killings.** Killings were examined using a different statistical model, but the same research design. The statistical difficulty was the very large number of “zero” months in the homicide time series, and the very low frequency count of incidents when there were gun-related killings. Areas or trends with a large fraction of zeroes create a statistical “floor effect” below which predicted values cannot descend, which violates the assumptions underlying OLS regression models<sup>2</sup>. The alternative of aggregating the time series data to quarters would cut the number of post-intervention data points by a factor of four, which would force us to drop about half of the qualifying sites. Since even in these neighborhoods murder is a fairly rare event that

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<sup>2</sup>Kubrin, Charis E. and Ronald Weitzer, "New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40: (4): 374-402 (2003); Osgood, D. Wayne, "Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 16: 21-43 (2000).

takes a small monthly integer value (e.g., 1, 2 and only rarely sometimes 3), Poisson regression is instead an appropriate model choice. The Poisson regression takes the following form, where T is a 0-1 predictor variable that takes a value of “1” after the program (“treatment”) was introduced, and POP is the log of the size of the estimated population of the area that month. As noted earlier, this accounts for the shifting size of the populations at risk in the program and comparison areas.

$$\text{Log}(E(Y)) = \log(\text{POP}) + a + bT$$

All statistical analyses were conducted using STATA. Appendix A to this report presents a more thorough technical discussion of both the ARIMA and Poisson regression analyses, and a set of tables detailing the findings.

## Findings

Table 7-3 summarizes the results of the intervention analysis for shots fired, the combined measure of gun-related batteries and assaults. More details concerning the analysis can be found in Appendix A. In four sites, changes in shots fired associated with the introduction of CeaseFire were statistically significant and “instant and persistent”; in another site the shift was significant but “gradual and persistent.” These sites included Logan Square, where the decline in shootings was significant and estimated to be –21 percent. In Southwest the decline was about –20 percent, and it was –22 percent in West Garfield Park. In West Humboldt Park the estimated decline was –14 percent, which also was statistically significant. In Auburn-Gresham, CeaseFire’s apparent impact was gradual, but also (through July 2007) persistent. Its impact on the level of shootings was estimated to be –16 percent. ARIMA indicated that this stable, lower post-program shooting rate was reached in about 15 months. The analysis found no statistically significant shifts in Rogers Park, where rates were low, and in Englewood, where they were very high, based on the “shots fired” measure. In both cases there were also no significant changes in shooting rates in the matched comparison areas.

The rightmost column of Table 7-3 relies on the research design to identify what we infer to be the causal implications of the findings. Again, the comparison areas in the study represented the counterfactual, that the program areas were not targeted by CeaseFire. In Auburn Gresham, Logan Square and Southwest, only the program areas demonstrated any significant decline associated with the point in time at which the program was implemented. Their declines are flagged as “Yes” in the “due to the program” column. In West Garfield Park, the reduction in the shooting rate due to the introduction of CeaseFire was –22 percent, compared to the pre-program shooting rate. Shootings also declined significantly in the comparison area, but we flagged the “effect of the program?” column as “probably” because the program area decline was twice that in the comparison area. The decline in West Humboldt Park, on the other hand, was real and significant, but probably not due to the program. There shootings declined by –14 percent, but they were down by –10 percent in the matched comparison areas at the same time.

Table 7-3  
Summary of ARIMA Estimates of CeaseFire’s Impact on Shots Fired

CeaseFire Site	trend in program area	percent decline	due to the program? (contrast with comparison area)
Auburn Gresham	gradual and persistent	– 16%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
Englewood	insignificant		decline in the comparison area was also insignificant
Logan Square	instant and persistent	– 21%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
Rogers Park	insignificant		comparison area decline also insignificant; shooting levels low and not much change
Southwest	instant and persistent	– 20%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
West Garfield Pk	instant and persistent	– 22%	Probably; program area decline was more than twice that in the comparison area
West Humboldt Pk	instant and persistent	– 14%	Probably not; program area decline was similar

Table 7-4 on the following page presents a comparable summary of the analysis of the impact of the introduction of CeaseFire on the rate at which persons were actually shot, which combined gun-related batteries with gun murders. It indicates that there was consistent evidence of an effect of CeaseFire on actual shootings in three areas: West Garfield Park, Southwest and Auburn- Gresham. In each case there was no significant decline in shootings in the comparison areas that paralleled substantial declines in the matched program area. These declines ranged from 21 percent to 28 percent. For West Humboldt Park, where shootings declined an estimated –18 percent, both the program and comparison areas saw similar, significant drops. The rate at which persons were shot in Logan Square, –19 percent, was also roughly matched by its comparison area. The effect of the program in Auburn-Gresham was more subtle than most, with the shooting time series taking about 15 months (“gradual but persistent”) to settle at its eventually low level. This is testimony of the importance of accumulating enough post-program data to provide an adequate assessment of program effects.

Table 7-4  
Summary of ARIMA Estimates of the CeaseFire’s Impact on Persons Shot

CeaseFire Site	trend in program area	percent decline	due to the program? (contrast with comparison area)
Auburn Gresham	gradual and persistent	– 21%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
Englewood	insignificant		comparison area decline was also insignificant
Logan Square	instant and persistent	– 19%	No; similar decline in the comparison area
Rogers Park	insignificant		comparison area decline was also insignificant; shooting levels low and not much change
Southwest	instant and persistent	– 23%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
West Garfield Park	instant and persistent	– 28%	Yes; decline in the comparison area was insignificant
West Humboldt Park	instant and persistent	– 18%	Probably not; program area decline was similar

Table 7-5 on the next page presents an analysis of trends in gun-related homicides, in this instance based on the results of Poisson regression analyses. A detailed statistical table can be found in Appendix A. Killings were down in three areas: Auburn Gresham, Rogers Park and West Garfield Park. The drop in killings in Auburn Gresham was about twice that in its comparison area, where they were also down significantly (recall that they were down about everywhere in the city), so we flagged “due to the program?” as “Yes.” The declines in killings in Rogers Park and West Garfield Park paralleled those in their comparison areas, so the logic of our research design is that these declines were not attributable to the program. Killing did not decline significantly in the remaining three program sites, while trends in their comparison areas did not indicate that this was a program success.

Table 7-5  
Summary of Poisson Regression Estimates of CeaseFire’s Impact on Gun Homicides

CeaseFire Site	trend	due to the program? (contrast with comparison area)
Auburn Gresham	Down	Yes - the decline in program area twice that in comparison area, where it was also down significantly
Englewood	Insignificant	Significant decline in the comparison area
Logan Square	Insignificant	Significant decline in the comparison area
Rogers Park	Down	Probably not - there was a parallel drop in the comparison area
Southwest	Insignificant	
West Garfield Park	Down	Probably not - there was a parallel drop in the comparison area
West Humboldt Park	Insignificant	Decline in the comparison area, but not significant

### Impact of Program Hiatus

As described in Chapter 3, Many CeaseFire sites were temporarily closed in the summer of 2007, due to a disruption in the stream of funding flowing from the state legislature. Three of the sites we selected for statistical analysis then promptly closed: Auburn-Gresham, Englewood, and Rogers Park. On the other hand, two other sites – Logan Square and Southwest – secured full or partial re-funding within a few months, and continued to field visible programs. The remaining two analysis sites had already closed, in August 2006: West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park. CeaseFire operations in these area were reorganized, and a new (but reconfigured) 11<sup>th</sup> District site including the original target beats was opened in August 2007.

This complicated sequence of events created “post-program” data for the period during which most of the sites were in hiatus. For Auburn-Gresham, Englewood, and Rogers Park, it add eleven months of post-program data, and for West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park there are 12 months of post-program data prior to the re-opening of the program in the originally targeted beats. The two remaining sites – Logan Square and Southwest – continued to operate, so they will not be considered here. The data and organizational features added to the analysis of trends in crime by these program changes are summarized in Table 7-6.



Table 7-6  
Changes in Program Status and Data

Site	Program Hiatus	Months of Data		
		Pre	During	Post
Auburn Gresham	07/2007	127	72	11
Englewood	07/2007	159	40	11
Logan Square	brief reduction	113	97	--
Rogers Park	07/2007	158	41	11
Southwest	reduced program	141	69	–
West Garfield	08/2006	109	79	12
West Humboldt	08/2006	110	78	12

These data are not particularly suited for formal statistical analysis, due to the relatively short period for which there are post-CeaseFire data, 11 or 12 months. These series are too short to use ARIMA to model “during-post” changes in the data. A limitation of the ARIMA approach to modeling the impact of an intervention on a timeseries is that it cannot accommodate interventions which later “disappear,” so the question of the effect of the imposition of the funding hiatus could not be combined with the analyses presented earlier on “before-during” trends.

As a result, the tables and figures displayed here are entirely descriptive. Table 7-7 presents a summary of mean changes in violence following the closure of CeaseFire in five areas. Because there were often time trends within the period that CeaseFire was open, this analysis is confined to the 12 months immediately preceding the hiatus in each area, and to the 11 or 12 months immediately following closure. There is no pattern of significant changes in Table 7-7. Violence went both up and down, in both the program and comparison areas, following closure, and by-and-large the changes were small. Two of these twenty tests, both in West Humboldt Park’s comparison area, were statistically significant, but this could be due to chance. Stretching the length of the pre-closure period to 24 months in order to increase the statistical power of the tests somewhat made no difference with regard to the significance or (mixed) direction of these trends.


Table 7-7  
Rate Changes During Program Hiatus

Site	shots fired - mean rate		persons shot - mean rate	
	program before - after & significance	comparison before - after & significance	program before - after & significance	comparison before - after & significance
Auburn Gresham	3.50 3.31 p=.76	3.34 3.27 p=.90	1.38 1.47 p=.80	1.08 1.42 p=.27
Englewood	4.38 5.01 p=.66	4.27 4.46 p=.84	2.66 2.42 p=.81	1.63 2.51 p=.20
Rogers Park	0.41 0.41 p=.98	.108 .176 p=.40	.164 .233 p=.47	.027 .118 p=.13
West Garfield Pk	4.46 2.85 p=.19	3.58 3.02 p=.46	2.53 1.50 p=.22	1.82 1.54 p=.66
West Humboldt Pk	3.40 2.64 p=.31	2.49 1.63 p=.02	2.54 1.61 p=.12	1.22 0.79 p=.05

Note: time periods are one year before and one during the hiatus; significance test does not assume equal variances.

We also examined these data visually. Figure 7-3 below illustrates trends for four of these sites. It depicts shots fired before and after the August 2007 program hiatus, or the 2006 closing of West Humboldt Park. The trend summaries are linear regression lines. These charts too indicate that there was no large changes in violence rates in the months immediately following the closing of the program in these areas, especially in light of the relatively small number of months of post-program data and the visibly outliers in several pre-hiatus trends.

Figure 7-3  
Pre-Post Hiatus Trends in Shots Fired, Four Areas



### Impact of Project Safe Neighborhoods

Of course, other programs were operating in and around the study areas. In a large and neighborhood-oriented city like Chicago, programs typically have a geographical focus, and there are many of them. One program of note is the federally-funded gun violence reduction program Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). PSN’s efforts paralleled those of CeaseFire. Chicago’s version of PSN focused on three broad goals: to (1) reduce demand among young gun offenders, (2) reduce the supply of guns by identifying and intervening in illegal gun markets, and (3) prevent the onset of gun violence.<sup>3</sup> To do so the project worked to increase the perceived costs of illegal gun trafficking and gun use, and to alter the social norms and preferences within the social networks of young gang members and other adolescents involved in gun violence. At the community level PSN included community outreach and media campaigns, and school-based programs. “Offender notification meeting” were held both pre-release and after federally-

<sup>3</sup> This description of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago relies on Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan (2007) “Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago,” *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 4 (No. 2, July), 223–272.

sentenced gun officers returned to the community. Local and federal prosecutors cooperated to enhance the prosecution and sentencing of selected gun offenders, and the program also fostered multi-agency gun recovery efforts.

In Chicago, Project Safe Neighborhoods was organized around police districts, not specific beats. Between January 2003 and July 2006 it grew to encompass five police districts. Three CeaseFire sites selected for analysis here, or their matched comparison areas, overlapped four PSN areas: the 7<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> police districts. In every case, CeaseFire began first in the targeted area, then PSN came later. The question here is, were any declines in violence we observed in the CeaseFire sites due in whole or in part to the later introduction of PSN?

Table 7-8  
Overlap of CeaseFire and PSN Areas


CeaseFire Site	Program Beats	Comparison Beats	PSN Begins	CeaseFire Begins
Englewood	733	725 732 734	11/2005 (07)	04/2004
West Garfield Pk	1114, 1115	1113 1122	01/2003 (11)	02/2000
West Humboldt Pk	1111, 1112	1022 1121 1513 2531	01/2003 (11) 01/2003 (15) 07/2006 (10)	03/2000

Table 7-8 details the CeaseFire-PSN overlap. In Englewood and West Garfield Park, PSN expanded to encompass both the program sites and all of their comparison areas, at the same time. The relationship between the two programs was more complicated for West Humboldt Park, where three PSN districts overlapped our matched comparison beats, and in addition one comparison beat did not overlap with PSN at all.

In the broadest terms, because any effects of PSN would presumably spread across both the program and comparison areas for CeaseFire, it is plausible that any remaining differences between them could still be attributable to CeaseFire; that is, confounding effects of PSN “wash out.” However, because in each case CeaseFire began in the program areas in advance of the introduction of PSN, this section of the report examines in detail trends in violence before and after PSN became operational.

Figure 7-4 below illustrates trends in shots fired and persons shot in the West Humboldt Park CeaseFire site and its matched comparison beats. It excludes 86 months of data for a period prior to the beginning of the program, in order to focus on the period in which CeaseFire was operational and then PSN was introduced in overlapping police districts.

Figure 7-4  
Impact of PSN in West Humboldt Park



As we reported earlier, ARIMA modeling found parallel and significant declines in both the program and comparison areas for West Humboldt Park during the operation of CeaseFire. PSN was activated at about the midpoint of the program period there; Figure 7-4 illustrates the timing of the inauguration and cessation of the two initiatives. It is apparent that violence decelerated at about the time CeaseFire was inaugurated. The rate at which crime declined later slowed, though even during the post-PSN period it dropped noticeably. Table 7-9 below documents mean violence rates before and after the introduction of PSN, during the span of time in which CeaseFire was active in these three sites. The Table also indicates the percentage decline in each measure in the program and comparison areas, and the statistical significance of that decline. The results parallel the conclusions of the ARIMA analysis. Crime was down significantly in the West Humboldt Park program area, but because that decline found a close parallel in the comparison area, we discounted any independent effect of CeaseFire. Similarly, Figure 7-4 suggests that the declining rate of violence that had already been established continued, but with some leveling off later in the period.


Table 7-9  
Rate Changes Following Introduction of PSN

Site	shots fired - mean rate				persons shot - mean rate			
	program		comparison		program		comparison	
	before - after	pct change - sigf	before - after	pct change - sigf	before - after	pct change - sigf	before - after	pct change - sigf
Englewood	6.20	4.97	5.45	4.28	3.53	2.31	2.25	1.51
19 months pre/20 post	-20%	p=.30	-23%	p=.11	-35%	p=.21	-33%	p=.11
West Garfield Pk	7.61	5.86	5.93	3.72	5.21	3.23	4.24	2.01
35 months pre/44 post	-23%	p=.06	-37%	p=.00	-38%	p=.00	-53%	p=.00
West Humboldt Pk	5.23	3.49	4.29	2.68	3.79	2.09	3.08	1.34
34 months pre/44 post	-33%	p>.00	-38%	p>.00	-45%	p>.00	-56%	p>.00

Note: before and after PSN, during the period in which CeaseFire was active; see the temporal spacing in the Figures; significance test does not assume equal variances

Figure 7-5 extends this analysis of trends to West Garfield Park and Englewood, the two remaining CeaseFire sites that intersected with PSN. In each case PSN encompassed both the program and comparison areas. The Figure presents only trends in all shootings in the two areas; trends in persons shot closely mirrored these findings. ARIMA analyses found statistically insignificant declines in Englewood’s program and comparison areas, following the introduction of CeaseFire. Figure 7-5 suggests that the declines that did take place were earlier, before the introduction of PSN in the 7<sup>th</sup> police district. As Table 7-9 reports, changes in violence rates following the introduction of PSN were not significant.

Figure 7-5  
Impact of PSN in West Garfield Park and Englewood



For West Garfield Park, ARIMA analyses found significant declines in both the program and comparison area. The decline in the program area was twice that in the comparison area, so we concluded that CeaseFire had an independent effect on crime decline. Figure 7-5 and Table 7-9 suggest that the introduction of PSN in West Garfield Park contributed to the further decline in the comparison beats, and perhaps in the CeaseFire target area. Before PSN, violence trends in the 11<sup>th</sup> district's comparison beats were flat; after it began, both shots fired and persons shot dropped significantly in the comparison beats. The drop in violence in the program area continued unabated, and post-PSN trends there could reflect progress that was already underway.

## Changes in Crime Hot Spots

This section examines geographical patterns of crime at the same seven CeaseFire sites. Hot spot maps are presented that contrast shooting patterns before and after the introduction of CeaseFire in these areas. Parallel maps detail changes in shooting patterns in the matched comparison areas. This section includes two examples of the analyses to illustrate the technique and introduce the reader to the summary statistical measures we developed to assess trends in hot spots. It then reports our conclusions regarding changes in shooting density patterns in all seven sites. In four of the seven there was evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of CeaseFire. In two other areas shooting hot spots waned, but evidence that this decline could be linked to CeaseFire was inconclusive. Complete details and maps for all of the study areas can be found in Appendix B to this report. All of the maps can be viewed in color on our web site. The spacial distribution of homicides is not examined here; in these small areas homicides were a relatively rare event, and they did not lend themselves to density mapping.

### Mapping Hot Spots

Hot spot maps enable us to examine geographical patterns of crime, and how they differ in two time periods. The changes that could take place are numerous. They include:

- concentrations of shootings could decline in density, evidencing fewer shootings per square mile;
- shootings might relocate, from one section of an area to another; there could also be visual evidence suggesting displacement from a program area to a near-by comparison area;
- shooting gradients might flatten, with hot spots spreading to cover a wider but lower-density area, or hot spots could grow smaller but more intense.

The interpretations of the maps that are reported here thus differ from the statistical analyses of time series data presented above and in Appendix A. Those sections examine monthly trends in crime rates by aggregating all incidents in the program and comparison areas over a 192-month period. The analyses presented here disaggregate the same incident data, and examine their distribution across space within the program and comparison areas. The time frame that is considered here is also much shorter, because it uses only two years of pre-program data and data for the first two years following the implementation of the program.

There is not an established literature on the use of crime mapping in program evaluation, especially within the context of the research design employed in this study. The use of Geographic Information Systems to identify areas of crime concentration has developed rapidly since these systems became available for desk top computers. Kernel Density Interpolation has



generally been shown to be one of the best ways to describe variation in crime rates over an entire area. While there is agreement on the proper statistical technique to analyze departures from randomness in a single kernel density interpolation, there is no agreement on how to look simultaneously at before and after maps that include experimental and control conditions. The analyses that follow combine a systematic analysis of changes in hot spot density with a detailed visual inspection of the data. Before-after changes in the program areas, and differences in patterns we detect between the program and comparison areas, could be attributable to the program.

## **Methods**

Crime data for the study were aggregated from a citywide database including shootings reported to the Chicago police during two-year periods before and during the implementation of CeaseFire in an area. These data were geocoded by the evaluation team to longitude and latitude coordinates. The analysis examines trends in the targeted police beats and in a matched sets of comparison beats. Two-year time samples were used to ensure that the maps were based on enough observations to establish clear before and after patterns, and to reliably identify changes in patterns over time. Detailed crime hot spot maps were generated using a uniform mapping procedure that is described in detail in Appendix B. The analyses of each area examined the relative size and movement of these hot spots over time.

The analyses that follow present three maps for each CeaseFire site. The first two depict hot spot densities pre- and post-implementation in the program and comparison areas. A legend documents the cutting points associated with each color on the map; in general, denser concentrations of shootings are identified by lighter colors, with red being reserved for the “hottest” density concentrations. Blues and greens were reserved for “cooler,” low-density areas. The cutting points defining the density gradients differ from site to site, reflecting differences in the frequency of shootings. In Rogers Park, for example, the highest number of shootings per square mile gradient (marked in red) was 68 to 105 per square mile; in West Garfield Park all of those areas would have fallen in the lowest density category (marked in blue), which extended to include subareas with up to 113 shootings per square mile.

The third map in each series examines percentage changes in shooting densities over the period. Areas in which shootings went up were assigned the color red, while blues and greens identify places where shooting densities declined. The percentage cutting points vary from area to area, reflecting differences in the general decline in shootings. Note that percentage changes are based on the pre-program data, so in areas where densities were low in the early period, large percentage changes could be based on small numeric shifts. It is necessary to examine both maps in each set. Both sets of maps include a small inset map that identifies where the beats are located in the city, with the program beats shaded to contrast them with the comparison beats.

## Auburn Gresham

Auburn Gresham is an example of an area in which CeaseFire appears to have affected geographical patterns in shootings. To examine the spatial distribution and change in patterns of shootings in Auburn Gresham’s program and comparison beats, estimates of shootings per square mile were calculated for two years before and two years after the implementation of CeaseFire. The data prior to implementation were then divided into seven approximately equal shooting gradients. These are depicted in the left panel of Figure 7-6, a full-page map that is presented below. CeaseFire’s program beats in this area – beats 611 and 612 – lie to the upper left of the figure. As can be seen there, before the program began, CeaseFire beat 612 shared a shooting hot spot with comparison beat 621 to its east. Within this hot spot, the estimated number of shootings ranged from 182 to 224 per square mile. In general the comparison beats had fewer shootings per square mile than the CeaseFire beats. The fewest shootings were in comparison beat 622, but much of this beat is industrial or railway yards.

The right panel of Figure 7-6 retains the same density ranges. Because there was a general decrease in the number of shootings per square mile, the post-implementation map does not include any areas falling in the highest-density category. Over time, the central core of the prominent pre-program hot spot shrank and broke apart. The hottest areas were still in program beat 612 and comparison beat 621, but the hottest areas were no longer continuous. More of its decline was concentrated in the comparison area, and the size of the hot spot in 621 was considerably smaller than in 612. Much of program beat 612 was still hot, but the beat as a whole cooled down. As the change map presented as Figure 7-7 below documents, the density of shootings dropped (colors blue and green) over most of the two program beats, more so than in the comparison areas.

Table 7-10  
Before-After Shooting Densities for Auburn-Gresham

shootings per square mile	two years before program		two years after program	
	Comparison	CeaseFire	Comparison	CeaseFire
3 to 42.99	20.7%	1.7%	16.2%	3.0%
43 to 67.99	17.6	8.8	20.7	12.6
68 to 94.99	14.4	11.8	19.6	15.3
95 to 119.99	13.3	13.1	16.4	15.9
120 to 149.99	14.5	15.6	13.8	15.8
150 to 181.99	10.4	20.6	11.4	23.8
182 to 224	9.8	28.4	1.9	13.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 7-6 describes the overall distribution of estimated shootings per square mile for two

years prior to the implementation of CeaseFire and for two years after implementation. The table shows the percentage of the program and comparison beats' land area that fell in each of the seven ranges of "dangerousness," measured by the density of shootings per square mile. As the table illustrates, shooting densities were noticeably higher in CeaseFire's target areas than in the comparison area. Before the program began, more program land area was found in the most dangerous categories and much less in the least dangerous areas.


Two measures of the effect of the program can be calculated from the findings presented in Table 7-10: the percentage of each area that shifted into the two least dangerous categories, and the percentage of each area that shifted out of the two most dangerous areas. In Auburn Gresham, the percentage of the program area that fell in the most dangerous two categories (above 150 per square mile) declined by 48 percent, from 10.5 percent to 15.6 percent. At the same time, the percentage of the comparison area in the safest categories (below 68 per square mile) actually declined a bit, from 38 percent to 37 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of the comparison area that lay in the two most dangerous shooting categories declined more in the comparison area, by 34 percent compared to 24 percent.

In addition, there were shifts in the median number of shootings per square mile in each area. For the two years prior to implementation of CeaseFire, half of the area of the CeaseFire beats had 148 shootings per square mile or less compared to 91 shootings per square mile in the comparison beats. For the two years after implementation half of the area of the CeaseFire beats had 126 shootings per square mile or fewer compared to 86 shootings in the comparison beats. Thus, the median number of shootings per square mile declined by 15 percent in the CeaseFire beats and only 6 percent in the comparison beats.

In summary, the hot spot centered in CeaseFire beat 612 remained visible during the two years following implementation of the program, but it grew smaller, and the cooler areas of the CeaseFire beats grew more quickly than they did in the comparison beats. While the level of shootings before and after implementation was higher in the CeaseFire beats than in the comparison beats, the decline was greater in the program area by several measures. The median number of shootings per square mile declined more in the program area. Also, almost half of the targeted area shifted into the safest categories, a very large change in a generally quite dangerous area, while things moved very slightly in the wrong direction in the comparison area.

Figure 7-6: Changes in Shooting Hot Spots Auburn-Gresham

Before CeaseFire



After CeaseFire





Figure 7-7: Hot Spot Percent Change Auburn-Gresham



## Englewood

Englewood provides an example of another common hot spot pattern: a decline in the size and intensity of the program area’s central hot spot, but evidence that same trend was occurring in the comparison area. Englewood’s CeaseFire program area – Beat 733 – was located in the center of the beats depicted in Figure 7-8. It was an underfunded site, with about half the standard budget, and was run from the Auburn-Gresham office. Shooting patterns during the two years preceding the introduction of the program are located in the upper-left quadrant. The program area was home to a large shooting hot spot before the program began. As indicated by the red hot spot, shootings per square mile were clearly greatest in the CeaseFire area. Within this hot spot, the estimated number of shootings ranged from 261 to 322 per square mile. In general, the comparison beats had fewer shootings per square mile than the CeaseFire beats.

The right panel of Figure 7-8 retains the same density ranges, but because there was a general decrease in the number of shootings per square mile, the post-implementation map does not include any areas falling in the highest-density category. Overall, the general decline in shootings per square mile post-implementation was large. Prior to implementation 55 percent of the CeaseFire beat had 261 shootings per square mile. After implementation, no part of the program area reported more than 202 shootings per square mile. As Figure 7-9 illustrates, over most of its surface area shooting densities in the program area declined by 30 percent or more. The location of the hottest area changed very little, but the density of shootings in that area was much lower.

Table 7-11  
Before-After Shooting Densities for Englewood

shootings per square mile	two years before program		two years after program	
	Comparison	CeaseFire	Comparison	CeaseFire
30 to 124.99	19.1%	0.9%	63.2%	24.0%
125 to 159.99	16.4	8.7	25.8	25.3
159 to 184.99	16.4	5.1	9.1	34.2
184 to 203.99	17.3	4.6	2.0	16.5
203 to 221.99	15.6	7.6	0	0
221 to 261.99	12.1	18.4	0	0
261 to 322.99	3.1	54.7	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 7-11 describes the overall distribution of estimated shootings per square mile for two years prior to the implementation of CeaseFire and for two years after implementation. While the CeaseFire beats were hotter two years after implementation than were the comparison


beats, the proportion of the area in the two most violent categories declined from 73 percent prior to implementation of CeaseFire to 0 percent after implementation and the percentage of the CeaseFire beat in the lowest category increased from 0.9 percent to 24.0 percent. At the bottom end, the percentage of comparison beats that fell in the safest two categories rose by 150 percent (from 36 percent to 89 percent), while the percentage of program beats that were in these two safe categories rose by 410 percent, from 9.6 percent to 49 percent.

For the two years prior to implementation of CeaseFire, half of the area of the CeaseFire beats had 269 shootings per square mile or less compared to 181 shootings per square mile in the comparison beats. For the two years after implementation half of the area of the CeaseFire beats had 160 shootings per square mile or fewer compared to 112 shootings in the comparison beats. The median number of shootings per square mile declined 40 percent in the CeaseFire beats and 38 percent in the comparison beats.

In summary, the most dramatic fact about shooting densities in Englewood is that they declined greatly over much of the area. The hot spot centered in CeaseFire beat 733 remained visible during the two years following implementation of the program, but it became much cooler. A change from 73 percent of the CeaseFire beat having more than 221 shootings per square mile to zero percent falling in our two highest-density categories is quite remarkable. As noted in Chapter 2, Englewood was also home to a partially funded site that received only about 60 percent of the budget allocated to most CeaseFire areas. The density of crime also declined in the comparison area, and the median number of shootings per square mile declined at about the same rate in the comparison and CeaseFire beats. However, the drop of program subareas into the safest two shooting density categories, and out of the two most unsafe categories, was noticeably greater in the CeaseFire program area.

Figure 7-8: Changes in Shooting Hot Spots Englewood

Before CeaseFire



After CeaseFire








Figure 7-9: Hot Spot Percent Change Englewood



## Hot Spot Analysis Summary

This section summarizes trends in hot spot patterns in all seven study areas. Note again that these analyses were based only on the two years preceding the introduction of CeaseFire and during the first two years of the program in each area. The 192-month time trend analysis presented earlier in this chapter is the most definitive word on the long-term impact of the program on crime rates; this section focuses on possible short-term, perhaps disruptive, effects of CeaseFire on the detailed geographical distribution of crime within the program and comparison areas. Each CeaseFire beat was characterized by an initial hot spot, and the mapping procedures utilized here were geared toward tracking its fate over the ensuing period.

Table 7-12  
Hot Spots Measured Before and Following the Introduction of CeaseFire

	two years hot spot relocated	two years hot spot declined	percentage change in median shooting density		percentage shift to two safest categories		percentage shift from two most dangerous categories	
			program	compare	program	compare	program	compare
Auburn Gresham	No	Yes	- 15%	- 6%	+ 48%	neg	- 24%	- 34%
Englewood	No	Yes	- 40%	- 38%	+ 410%	+ 150%	- 100%	- 100%
Logan Square	No	Yes	- 6%	- 4%	neg	neg	- 5%	- 49%
Rogers Park	No	Yes	- 40%	- 32%	+ 78%	+ 46%	- 98%	na
Southwest	No	Yes	- 30%	- 5%	slight	+ 19%	- 3%	- 15%
West Garfield Park	No	Yes	- 24%	- 5%	slight	+ 10%	- 47%	- 92% on small base
West Humboldt Park	No	Slightly	- 17%	- 7%	+ 68%	+ 18%	-2.5%	0%

Note: “neg” indicates a shift in the wrong direction; ‘na’ indicates none of the area in the initial category so decline cannot be calculated

Table 7-12 presents a variety of measures of shooting densities, and how they changed over time in the seven study areas. In no case was there evidence that the hot spots that helped attract the attention of the program in the first place shifted within the sites or to the comparison areas. They were very persistent in character, although in all but West Humboldt Park they declined noticeably in intensity.

In every program area there was a substantial decline in the median density of shootings in the two years following the introduction of CeaseFire. In four of the seven study areas there was no comparable decline in shooting densities in the matched comparison areas, suggesting the change might be attributed to CeaseFire. These included Auburn Gresham, Southwest, West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park. The smaller difference between changing shooting densities in Rogers Park and its comparison beats (-40 percent vs -32 percent) are paralleled by

other indicators of hot spot decline, so we count that shift in the positive column as well.

Table 7-12 also examines the shift of areas within the program and comparison beats into safer categories and out of the most dangerous categories. For example, as was noted above, in Auburn Gresham the percentage of beats in the two most dangerous categories shifted from 49 percent to 37 in the program area, a decline of 24 percent. In the comparison area those percentages fell from 20 percent to 13 percent, or 34 percent. In Englewood, shooting densities shifted into the safest two categories by 410 percent (from 9.6 percent to 49 percent) in the program area, and by 150 percent (from 36 to 89 percent) in the comparison area.

Based on these measures, the program area grew noticeably safer in six of the seven sites, excepting only Logan Square. Inferring that these changes could be linked to CeaseFire depended on trends in the matched comparison areas, on the other hand. For example, Englewood reported as substantial a decline in shooting density as any area in the study, but parallel trends were occurring in Englewood’s comparison area, making this shift difficult to attribute to the program.

Table 7-13  
Summary Changes in Hot Spot Patterns

	Evidence CeaseFire had a positive effect on shooting density?
Auburn Gresham	Yes, on several measures
Englewood	Inconclusive; a considerable decline in the program area but some comparable declines in the comparison; underfunded site
Logan Square	No evidence of impact; not much decline in shooting density
Rogers Park	Highly probable; problems with comparison area but relatively large declines in program area hotspots
Southwest	Inconclusive; some evidence of impact
West Garfield Park	Yes, on several measures
West Humboldt Park	Yes, on several measures

Table 7-13 summarizes our judgment about the impact of CeaseFire on short-term, small-area crime patterns. It identifies sites with consistent evidence that CeaseFire disrupted crime patterns: Auburn Gresham, West Garfield Park and West Humboldt Park. Rogers Park probably did as well; the difficulty in making that inference is found in the inadequately matched comparison area. Rogers Park experienced a large decline in dangerousness that was not paralleled in its comparison area. In Rogers Park the percentage of the program area that fell in the two most dangerous shooting categories fell from 50 percent to less than 1 percent. The Rogers Park comparison area was “too safe” to compute a comparable shift, but this change paralleled a noticeable shift into safe categories that outstripped the comparison area.

## Impact on Gang Homicide Networks

A third approach to understanding the possible impact of CeaseFire's outreach and intervention efforts on violence is to unravel how disputes within and among gangs changed over time. Intervening to reduce the level of gang violence was perhaps CeaseFire's most important goal. At the individual level, outreach workers attempted to extract their clients from the world of danger in which they lived. As we saw in Chapter 5, about a third of CeaseFire's clients indicated that they needed help leaving a gang, and virtually all of them reported receiving help with this issue. At the collective level, violence interrupters tried to anticipate conflicts between gangs, and when violence broke they interceded in an attempt to halt reciprocal, tit-for-tat shootings and killings. As a result, the introduction of CeaseFire could have played a role in disrupting patterns of gang violence in the target neighborhoods.

In this section of the report we use social network analysis techniques to analyze patterns of gang homicide. The data are drawn from homicide files maintained by the Chicago Police Department. Incidents were individually coded to ensure stability in the definition of gang-related homicides over time. The analysis contrasts patterns of gang homicide before and after the introduction of CeaseFire, and compares any changes to trends in matched comparison areas. The focus is on how gangs "exchanged" murders in reciprocal fashion, and how murderous disputes between gangs changed over time.<sup>1</sup> Here we present two examples of gang network analysis, for Auburn Gresham and Englewood, followed by tables summarizing our conclusions about all of the study areas. A more detailed methodological report and the results for all of the sites included in the study can be found in Appendix C to this report.


Social network analysis maps the social landscape of gangs within a given area – which gangs are present, who they are in conflict with, when violence occurs, and the intensity of conflict. To illustrate the network approach, Figure 7-10 depicts a homicide in which a member of Gang A (Member A1) kills a member from Gang B (Member B1). This can be seen in panel A of Figure 7-10. Given the retaliatory and reciprocal nature of much gang violence, the victim's gang (Gang B) may respond to the murder with its own acts of violence, up to and including retaliatory homicide. The subsequent event would involve another member of Gang B (Member B2) killing a member of Gang A (Member A2). In network terms, a bi-directional exchange of violence emerges between members of Gangs A and B, as seen by the direction of arrows in the figure. In actuality, the illustration in Panel A represents disputes/conflicts between gangs, not simply individuals. Extant research demonstrates that individual incidents such as murders are often translated as threats to the collective and, therefore, often demand some sort of collective response. In other words, individual acts of violence become "triggers" for subsequent intergroup violence. In the case of gang homicide, gangs can and frequently do engage in violence to avenge fallen comrades or to settle ongoing disputes.

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
<sup>1</sup>For greater detail on how to apply network analysis to the study of gangs and gang violence, see Papachristos, Andrew V. 2006. "Social Network Analysis and Gang Research: Theory and Methods." in *Studying Youth Gangs*, edited by James F. Short and Lorine A. Hughes. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Figure 7-10  
Networks of Gang Homicide

PANEL A. Individual Murders between Members of Two Gangs



PANEL B. Reduced Representation of Reciprocal Murders between two gangs



A network approach to gang homicide seeks to understand how these individual murders create a larger “social structure,” i.e., enduring patterns of interactions between gangs. One of the most basic principles of social network analysis is that such social structures influence subsequent behavior of network actors. In the case of gang murders, a network analyst might suggest that prior patterns of conflict would be a crucial predictor—if not a prime indicator – of future patterns of violence: gangs who have a history of contentious relations and interactions are more likely to engage in future exchanges of violence. Put another way, prior murders create structural highways over which future acts of violence flow.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, network analysis can capture the dynamics and interactions of any number of gangs within a specified geographic area. Thus, the simple two-gang network depicted in Figure 7-10 can be extended to include other disputes between Gangs A and B, as well as with other groups in a specified area. The resulting network graph would represent the overall patterns of gang conflict in the neighborhood. In sociological terms, social network analysis provides a detailed overview of the social topography of gang violence in an area.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See Papachristos, Andrew V. 2004. "Murder as Interaction: The Social Structure of Gang Homicide in Chicago." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association. San Francisco, CA.

<sup>3</sup>As a point of comparison, whereas a geographic map of gang homicide provides an analysis of the spatial configurations of patterns of gang violence, a social network graph provides an analysis of the social configurations of gang violence.

In this report we recreate gang homicide networks for each of the program and comparison areas. By “gang homicide networks,” we mean the social mapping of incident-level patterns of gang murder between gangs within the specified geographic area. Following panel B in Figure 7-10, we coded each homicide incident to indicate the gang of the offender and the victim. The unit of analysis is the gang, not the gang member, and we analyze all murders between gangs during comparable sets of years before and following the introduction of CeaseFire. When either the victim or offender is a non-gang member, they are treated as a separate network entity, i.e., non-gang member 1, non-gang member 2, etc. So, each social network map will at a minimum contain all of the gangs present in the specified area and all murders that are committed among them. The goal of the ensuing analysis is to detect any changes or variations within and between such social networks of murder.

To summarize, using social network analysis to examine gang homicide patterns in the CeaseFire areas is used to:

understand which gangs are engaged in institutionalized disputes and patterns of homicide;

analyze the impact of institutionalized conflict on subsequent patterns of homicide; and

assess the extent and/or degree of any changes in the structure of gang homicide in the program areas, in contrast to matched comparison areas.

The goal of CeaseFire’s outreach efforts was to attempt to mediate gang disputes before they escalated into further violence; in other words, to disrupt or dissipate observed networks of gang violence/contention or, at least, to mitigate the overall levels of violence within such networks of contention. Under this assumption, several standard network measures can be used to analyze the effect of CeaseFire on patterns of gang homicide in Chicago.

### **Network Measures**

Several network measurements are of interest in the analysis of gang murder networks. In the present analysis, we rely on four such measures: density, degree centrality, degree centralization, and proportion of reciprocal ties.

The density of a network is simply the proportion of all homicidal “ties” reported in a network of all possible ties between the parties. Density is a measure of overall network activity. A dense network is one in which a greater number of ties exist among actors. The density of a gang homicide network, then, represents the proportion of actual killings among all gangs in an area of all possible killings. Density measures will be presented in the area and over-time comparisons that follow. Because density is linked to network size they are only meaningful for analyzing gang homicide patterns within an area; they are not comparable across areas.

A second important network property is degree centrality. Degree centrality, or simply “degree,” is a measure of the activity of any individual gang in the network. In its raw form, degree is the number of murders in which a gang was involved as either victim or offender. Individual gangs higher in degree centrality are more active in murders as either victims or offenders relative to all other gangs in the network. Analyzing the degree of gangs serves two important purposes. First, it identifies point sources of conflict and violence, i.e., individual gangs that are a locus of gang murder. Second, it allows the examination of the spread of degree across the gangs in a given population, i.e., the average degree represents how active the “average” gang is in an area vis-à-vis all other gangs in the network. Thus, fluctuations in either individual degree or average degree indicate changes in the levels of gang murder in an area.

Whereas degree centrality is a gang-level measure, degree centralization is a network-level measure. Briefly, degree centralization measures the extent to which the total degree distribution of a network is concentrated among a small number of gangs within the network. Networks in which the distribution of degree centrality is concentrated in a small number (or single) gang is said to be highly centralized. The index ranges from zero to 100. When degree centralization is zero, degree centrality is evenly distributed among all gangs, whereas when centralization is 1, degree is concentrated in a single gang.

Centralization is important for evaluation purposes insofar as it gives indication of the concentration of violence – or the network of violence – in a given area. In short, it helps to identify “pockets of violence” and how they might change over time. Say, for instance, that analysis reveals a highly centralized network in which murders are concentrated among three gangs. Analysis of the same network at later time periods would give indication of how concentrated said violence remains: if centralization remains high, conflict patterns would appear stable, whereas a decrease in centralization would suggest a dissipation of violence.

The centralization index is also particularly useful when used in conjunction with degree centrality. Using both measures in tandem permits the identification of high activity gangs as well as the identification of clusters or hierarchies of violence.

A final property of relevance in the understanding of these gang networks is that of reciprocity, defined here as the bi-directional exchange of murders between gangs. As a general matter, reciprocity is one of the strongest and most pervasive norms in network research. Gang research continues to demonstrate that reciprocity is one of the defining characteristics of gang violence. In the present analysis, we code an event as being “reciprocal” when it is followed by another exchange of murder between two gangs. Essentially, reciprocity is coded in accordance with the Figure presented above. While this includes the more specific case of revenge or retribution, this definition of reciprocity also captures a more general process of negative exchange. Levels of reciprocity in the network are then compared across the pre- and post-intervention periods to detect any changes in the proportion of all homicides that were reciprocal in nature.

As one of the goals of CeaseFire was to mediate gang disputes that could potentially become deadly, then a decline of reciprocity in gang networks might indicate the successful mitigation of violent encounters. Clearly, however, this is a highly conservative estimate, as many acts of retribution and disputes do not end in lethal encounters.

## **The Data**

Data used in the creation and analysis of gang homicide networks were taken from homicide records originally compiled by homicide detectives in the Chicago Police Department. The data span from 1994 through 2006. They were available at the incident level and included detailed information about the victim, offender, motive, geography, and circumstances around the event. Such data make it possible to recreate in each instance the motive for the event, as well as the potential gang membership of victim and offender.

Two common definitions of “gang-related” are found within the literature on gangs and gang violence: motive-based definitions and member-based definitions. The former classifies a homicide as “gang-related” only if the crime itself was motivated by gang activity, such as turf defense, organized drug dealing, or prior gang conflicts. In contrast, the member-based definition classifies any homicide involving a gang member as gang-related. Because the interest here is on patterns of group relations, the gang motivation definition errs on the side of sampling too heavily on the dependent variable, by capturing only those cases in which a group motive was determined, whereas the member-based definition errs on the side of capturing too many incidents. To further complicate matters, the Chicago Police Department recently changed its formal operational definition from a motivated-based definition to a member-based definition.

In the present analysis, we code any murder that includes a gang member as an offender or victim as “gang-related.” This is done on the basis of whether the victim or offender have a reported gang status by the Chicago Police Department. While this provides a broad definition of a gang-related event, it has three major benefits. First and foremost, it ensures that the networks are constructed similarly in each time period, regardless of the definition provided by CPD. Second, defining gang murder in this way ensures the minimization of sampling on the dependent variable. Finally, unlike the aggregate analysis of gang murder, social network analysis still allows one to isolate patterns of non-gang homicide involving gang members: essentially, non-gang members become unique actors in the network whose patterns can also be examined. Therefore, the inclusion of non-gang members in the sample in no way detracts from the analysis of gangs as groups.


The following reports findings for two CeaseFire sites to illustrate how the analyses were done and the findings interpreted. It then presents a summary of the findings for all study areas. A complete set of area results can be found in Appendix C.



## Auburn Gresham

Auburn-Gresham illustrates an area in which the involvement of CeaseFire probably decreased the extent of gang violence. CeaseFire activities began in Auburn-Gresham (beats 611 and 612) in August of 2002. In the four years preceding the beginning of outreach work in the area, there were seven gang murders – roughly 23 percent of all homicides in the area. Extending the gang homicide trend line even further back in time, as in Figure 7-11, one can see that the number of gang homicides peaked in Auburn Gresham in the late 1990's, declined steadily and significantly shortly thereafter, and experienced another spike in 2001. Yet, another spike in gang murders occurred in 2005, roughly two years after the start of CeaseFire.

Figure 7-11  
Gang Homicide Trends in Auburn Gresham



The comparison area for Auburn-Gresham (beats 613, 621, 622 and 623) experienced a slightly different gang homicide problem during both the before and after periods. First and foremost, in the aggregate, the larger comparison area generally had a higher level of overall and gang-specific homicide. Prior to August 2002, the comparison area averaged approximately 10 gang homicides per year, dropping slightly to an average of 8.6 per year after CeaseFire began. However, unlike in the CeaseFire area, this drop was not statistically significant. At the same time, gang homicides actually increased in the comparison area, although the increase was not statistically significant.

In addition, gang homicide in the comparison area differed from that of the CeaseFire target area with regard to its fluctuations. For instance, the CeaseFire area experienced a spike in gang violence in 2005, whereas the comparison area experienced a dramatic fall during the same year.

As summarized in Table 7-14, prior to the start of CeaseFire in Auburn-Gresham, the gang homicide network was composed of five African American gangs and one non-gang member who killed a member of the Gangster Disciples. The pre-CeaseFire network is actually two sub-networks, one that is a completely internal war between members of the Vice Lord

Nations, and a second network made up of members of the Gangster Disciple Nation, the Black Stones, and a non-gang member. As with other areas in this report, much of the gang violence in this area during the pre-program period appears to have occurred within the same gang nation. Degree centralization, a measure of the concentration of gang homicides in a single group, stood at 48. This describes a homicide network that was moderately concentrated around a single gang – in this case, the Gangster Disciples, who were involved in three murders in this period. With regard to network density, roughly 16.7 percent of all possible ties among the gangs were present. Finally, roughly 28 percent of the homicides were reciprocal in nature.

Table 7-14  
Summary Network Statistics for Auburn Gresham

	Program Area		Comparison Area	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
Average Annual N of Homicides	7.8	4.2**	10.0	8.6
Average Annual N of Gang Homicides	1.75	0.75	2.0	3.4
N of Gangs in Network	5	4	5	6
Total Network Density	0.17	0.12	0.25	0.27
Average Degree Centrality	1.00	0.60	1.50	1.87
Degree Centralization	48.0	43.7	30.0	20.1
Gangster Disciples Degree Centrality	32		4	6
Percent Reciprocal Homicides	28%	0%	33 %	25%

Note: \*= $p < .05$ ; \*\*= $p < .01$ ; asterisks indicate statistical significant on standard t-tests or network equivalent.

The post-Ceasefire network shows a reduction in the number of gangs involved in murders in the area from five to four gangs.<sup>4</sup> The density of the network decreases slightly over time to roughly 12.0 percent, although the change is not statistically significant. Similarly, the concentration of activity measured as degree centralization, also decreased slightly, although the change is not statistically significant. Thus, even though the activity of the Gangster Disciples decreases to a degree of 2.0, they remain the most active gang in the network, around which much of the violence is organized.

Two other important changes occurred in the post-CeaseFire network. They are illustrated in Figure 7-12, a full-page diagram that appears below. First, much of the intra-nation conflict – both within the Vice Lords and Disciples nations – appears to have dissipated. Notice, for example, that the two Vice Lord Nation gangs did not murder one another after the program began. Second, and perhaps most important, none of the murders after CeaseFire began were reciprocal in nature. Intervening to break the cycle of reciprocal shootings and killings was one of the key jobs of violence interrupters, and this is consistent with their mission.

<sup>4</sup>One murder was committed by a member of gang, but the actual affiliation was “unknown” to the police at the time of this report.

In contrast, the gang homicide network in the comparison area showed an increase in number of gangs involved (from five to six), density (from 0.25 to 0.27), and average murderous activity of any single gang (from 1.50 to 1.87). Like in the nearby program area, the Gangster Disciples were the most active gang in the network, and their murderous activity increased from four murders in the pre-CeaseFire period to six during the program period. This increase, plus the addition of a sixth gang into the network, had the effect of diffusing violence within the network. Indeed, the distribution of activity in the network, measured as degree centralization, actually decreased post-CeaseFire. Also, the percent of all murders that were reciprocal in character also decreased in the comparison area, from approximately 33 percent pre-program to 25 percent post-CeaseFire, but was still above the level in the program area.


A note of caution is warranted when comparing these networks, however. The contexts of the networks – as well as their form – were somewhat different in two respects. First, the program networks were never fully connected. That is, there were pockets of violence rather than a complete network of violence. In contrast, there appears to have been a consolidation of violence in the comparison areas, i.e., the network moves from small pockets of violence toward a completely connected network.

Second, the pre-CeaseFire network in the program area suggests that a significant portion of violence in the area is intra-nation homicide. In contrast, other than the internal homicides of the Gangster Disciples (the loops), there are no murders between gangs of the same nation in either period. It is quite possible, especially from an intervention perspective, that the motivations for intra- vs. inter-nation violence are quite different.

To summarize, the program area experienced a significant drop in total homicides during the observation as well as a non-significant drop in gang-homicides. The comparison area also experienced a drop in overall homicides, but an increase in gang homicides. However, neither the decrease in the program area nor the increase in the comparison area were statistically significant.

With regard to the homicide networks, the networks in the CeaseFire area demonstrated a drop in number of gangs involved in murders, the overall density of the network, and the average number of murders committed by any gang. More importantly, there was a drop in the activity around the area's most active gang (Gangster Disciples). There was also a dramatic drop in reciprocal homicides in the area. In contrast, networks in the comparison area experienced increases in activity throughout the network, a general diffusion of murders among all the gangs present, a new gang entering the network, and a smaller decline in reciprocal homicide, which still accounted for one-quarter of the total in the years following the implementation of CeaseFire in the program beats.


Figure 7-12  
Gang Networks in Auburn Gresham



## Englewood

Englewood provides an example of a site in which there was a decline in gang violence, but changes in the program area were to a certain extent mirrored in the comparison area. As noted earlier, it was an only partially funded site, albeit one that fielded elements of a full program. The impact of CeaseFire in Englewood was difficult to assess because of the small number of months of data (33) available following the start of outreach work. Given the relative rarity of gang homicide, this shorter data series means that most statistical tests might be unable to capture statistical changes in the area. That said, both overall homicides and gang homicides dropped in the program and comparison areas, though neither change was statistically significant. These trends are depicted in Figure 7-13.

Figure 7-13  
Gang Homicide Trends in Englewood



The gang homicide network in the program area also evidenced several changes, though the overall structure of the network remains relatively unchanged. Figure 7-14 below illustrates these points. Before the intervention, the network represented a “star-like” configuration with a single gang – the Gangster Disciples – at the center of the network. This can be seen in the relatively high centralization score of 59.0. On average, the four gangs in the network were involved in 1.5 murders, while the Gangster Disciples were involved in six murders. As reported in the last line of Table 7-15, roughly half of all murders in CeaseFire’s Englewood site were reciprocal in nature before the program began.

After the intervention, the structure remained largely the same: a star-like configuration with the Gangster Disciples at the center (Degree Centralization = 50.0). The most important change was in degree, of both the average gang in the network (0.67) and the Gangster Disciples (2.0). Moreover, none of the homicides during the post-intervention period appeared to be reciprocal in nature.

Network changes in the comparison areas, however, mirrored those in the program area. Just as in the program area, the murder network in the comparison area was a star-network with

the Gangster Disciples at the center. Similar to the program area, the overall activity of the network dropped – including the proportion of reciprocal homicides – but the network still remained centralized around the Gangster Disciples.


Table 7-15  
Summary Network Statistics for Englewood

	Program Area		Comparison Area	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
Average Annual N of Homicides	5.5	3.5	7.0	4.0
Average Annual N of Gang Homicides	3.0	1.0	4.0	2.0
N of Gangs in Network	4	3	4	5
Total Network Density	0.38	0.22	0.43	0.37
Average Degree Centrality	1.50	0.67	1.00	0.88
Degree Centralization	59.0	50.0	88.9	74.8
Gangster Disciples Degree Centrality	62	4	2	
Percent Reciprocal Homicides	50%	0%	33.3%	0%

Note: \*= $p < .05$ ; \*\*= $p < .01$ ; asterisks indicate statistical significant on standard t-tests or network equivalent.

In short, there appears to have been a decline in activity in the network in both the program and comparison areas, but the overall structure of homicide remained the same. To use an analogy, if the network were considered a highway, the exits and entrance ways remained open, but the flow of traffic decreased slightly. Because the network changes that did occur happened in both the program and comparison area – especially, the drop in reciprocal homicides – these positive changes do not provide strong evidence that they were due to the introduction of CeaseFire in the target area. Overall, changes in homicide networks appear to have occurred in parallel in the program and comparison areas.

Figure 7-14  
Gang Networks in Englewood



## Gang Network Analysis Summary

This section presents a summary of patterns of change in gang-related homicide in all of the study areas. It considers evidence of the effect of CeaseFire on gang-related homicides and homicide networks, both within and between areas. To summarize the basic evidence, Table 7-16 presents a variety of measures considered in the previous analysis. Four measures are of particular importance: (1) changes in the absolute level of gang murder; (2) changes in network density; (3) changes in the average number of murders committed by a single gang; and (4) changes in the proportion of reciprocal homicides.

To begin, no area displayed a statistically significant drop in gang homicides using our most basic indicators of change. Note that, because of the small numbers involved, this was not surprising. Four areas did display a decrease in the number of gang homicides, while four areas experienced either an increase or no observable change in the number of gang homicides.

Table 7-16  
Summary of Network Analysis Metrics

	Absolute Level of Gang Homicide	Percent Change in Overall Network Density		Percent Change in Average Degree Centrality		Percent Change in Proportion of Reciprocal Murders	
		Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control
Auburn Gresham	down slightly not significant	-28%	+8%	-40%	+24%	-100%	-25%
Englewood	down slightly not significant	-41%	-15%	-55%	-12%	-100%	-100%
Logan Square	down slightly not significant	+82%	-15%	+26%	-12%	-100%	+100%
Rogers Park	up slightly not significant	+120%	n/a	+40%	n/a	no change	n/a
Southwest	down slightly not significant	+133%	+108%	-11%	+25%	-100%	no change
West Garfield Park	up slightly not significant	-17%	-37%	-12%	-24%	-46%	+41%
West Humboldt Park	up slightly not significant	-58%	-6%	-43%	-25%	-50%	-57%
East Garfield Park	no change	+10%	-3%	-12%	+30%	-100%	+60%

The overall evidence in support of the reduction of the various network properties is generally mixed. Only a single area – Auburn Gresham – demonstrated consistent change in all of the measures vis-à-vis the comparison area. Still, there was some variation across the four measures.

With regard to changes in network density, or the overall level of activity within the network, three of the eight areas experienced percentage changes greater than the comparison



areas. Network density in the remaining areas either increased or did not decrease as much as the comparison area.

Considering the average gang involvement in murder – the average degree centrality – the CeaseFire sites experienced a substantially greater decrease in three areas and experienced marginal differences in an additional two areas. Here, however, the findings should be noted with caution as this measure is sensitive to (a) the number of gangs in the area as well as, (b) the overall level of gang homicide and, (c) the time factors discussed above.

One measure in which the CeaseFire areas displayed consistent changes was with regard to reciprocal murders. In five of the eight areas, levels of reciprocal homicides in the CeaseFire area declined more than in the comparison areas. Thus, evidence of a CeaseFire effect – even within the observed areas – might be circumscribed to reciprocal murders, not to levels of overall murder, gang activity, or network density.

Table 7-17  
Summary Assessment of Gang Network Analysis

	Was there evidence that CeaseFire had a positive effect on changes in gang homicide networks?
Auburn Gresham	Yes, on almost all measures
Englewood	Probably not, changes mirrored in the comparison area, not significantly different
Logan Square	Inconclusive, but program area did worse on all measures except reciprocity
Rogers Park	Probably not; program area grew worse and comparison area did not provide adequate comparison data
Southwest	Perhaps; mixed results on measures, but a major decline in reciprocal murders in the program area
West Garfield Park	Inconclusive; changes were mirrored in comparison area on all indicators except reciprocal murders, which were down in the program area and up in the comparison area
West Humboldt Park	Inconclusive, but most likely no; program area changes mirrored in weaker fashion in the comparison area on most measures, no better drop in reciprocal murders
East Garfield Park	Yes; program area did better on two main network indicators: average degree and reciprocal murders

Table 7-17 provides a final assessment of all of these measures for each of the CeaseFire areas, i.e., whether changes in these measures provide empirical support of a positive effect of CeaseFire on the gang homicide networks in any given area. Only Auburn-Gresham displayed a consistent effect across all of the network indicators. Two of the areas – East Garfield Park and Southwest – may be able to boast some positive program effects. In East Garfield Park, the program area did considerably better on two main network effects. The program area experienced a decline in average gang involvement in killings (average degree, in Table 7-17) and reciprocal

murders. Southwest evidenced mixed patterns on the indicators, but there was evidence of a substantial decline in reciprocal killings.

Findings for the four remaining areas – Logan Square, Rogers Park, West Garfield Park, and West Humboldt Park – were inconclusive. In large part, as seen in Table 7-17, these areas show little differences in changes over time vis-à-vis the comparison area, on most network indicators. However, West Garfield Park and Logan Square saw more positive changes in the frequency of reciprocal murders. Apparent network changes for Englewood were not statistically significant, although they were in a positive direction.

## Impact Analysis Summary

This section of Chapter 7 provides a brief summary of our findings with regard to the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings. The tables below highlight general changes in patterns and changes associated with the introduction of CeaseFire in the program areas. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the data and the research design for assessing the impact of CeaseFire.

Table 7-14  
Summary Impact of CeaseFire on Trends in Violence

	Shots Fired		Persons Shot		Gun Homicides	
	Change in Target Area	Due to the Program?	Change in Target Area	Due to the Program?	change in Target Area	Due to the Program?
Auburn Gresham	-42%	-16%	-61%	-21%	-52%	Yes
Englewood	-27		-41		+41	
Logan Square	-40	-21%	-43		-16	
Rogers Park	-66		-73		-74	
Southwest	-35	-20%	-52	-23%	-92	
West Garfield Park	-42	-22%	-47	-28%	-43	
West Humboldt Park	-42		-43		-14	

The time series analysis of trends in three measures – all shots, actual shootings, and gun homicides – found mixed but positive results. These are summarized in Table 7-14. As we saw earlier, violence was down by almost every measure in almost every program and comparison area, so the statistical analysis in essence focused on whether it was down more in the program beats. In four sites it appears that the introduction of CeaseFire was associated with distinct and statistically significant declines in all shots that ranged from –16 to –22 percent. In three overlapping sites there were distinctive declines in actual shootings ranging from –21 to –28 percent. Gun homicides were down in Auburn Gresham, due to the program. The largest percentage declines recorded were in Rogers Park, but the low level of crime there and mixed trends in the (inadequate) comparison area did not give us a basis to infer that these declines were due to the program.

The analysis of crime hot spot maps contrasted shooting patterns before and after the introduction of CeaseFire, with parallel maps detailing changes in shooting patterns in the matched comparison areas. This approach to examining crime patterns also yielded short-term, before-after measures of shooting densities in the areas, and information about shifts in and out of the safest and most dangerous violence categories. The results are summarized in Table 7-15. Overall, the program areas grew noticeably safer in six of the seven sites. In four of the seven

areas there was evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of CeaseFire. In two other areas shooting hot spots waned, but evidence that this decline could be linked to CeaseFire was inconclusive.

Table 7-15  
Summary Impact of CeaseFire on Hot Spots and Gang Homicide Networks

	Shooting Hot Spots			Gang Homicide Networks
	Hot Spot Declined?	Change in Density	Due to the Program?	Changes Relative to Comparison Areas
Auburn Gresham	Yes	-15%	Yes	killing density down more average gang involvement down more reciprocal killings down more
Englewood	Yes	-40%	can't tell	declines on most measures not significantly different; declines in comparison area
Logan Square	Yes	-6%		killing density down more reciprocal killings down more
Rogers Park	Yes	-40%	highly probable	no evidence of an effect; inadequate comparison area
Southwest	Yes	-30%	can't tell	average gang involvement down more
West Garfield Park	Yes	-24%	Yes	reciprocal killings down more
West Humboldt Park	Slightly	-17%	Yes	declines on most measures not significantly different
East Garfield Park	not evaluated			reciprocal killings down more average gang involvement down more

Note: only gang homicide networks were examined for East Garfield Park

The third approach to understanding the possible impact of CeaseFire's outreach and intervention efforts was to examine how homicides within and among gangs changed with the introduction of the program, in contrast to short-term trends in the comparison areas. One statistical measure of interest was changes in the density of gang homicide networks. A dense network was one in which killings between the gangs in an area were a large proportion of all killings; by this measure, gang homicide density was down more in two program areas. A second measure examined here was the proportion of gang homicides that were reciprocal in nature; that is, they were seemingly sparked by an earlier killing. These incidents were a special focus of CeaseFire's violence interrupters, and in four sites reciprocal killings decreased more in the program beats than in the comparison areas. A third measure, average gang involvement in homicide, pointed to greater improvements in three of the areas. Of the sites' changes that are classified above as "not significantly different," gang networks declined more in the program areas in two of three measures in Englewood and West Humboldt Park.

## Data and Design Limitations

There are a number of problems with the research design and limitations of the analyses which are reported here.

The analyses did not incorporate any measures of the strength of the programs. Rather, a simple before-after dichotomy identified pre-program and post-program months of data. Clearly the strength of the programs varied across areas and, in principle, stronger programs should produce clearer effects. However, we have no monthly CeaseFire records of staffing or activity levels before 2004, which is well after most of the sites examined here became operational.

There may have been issues with our designation of when the program began. The possible start dates for a site ranged from its announcement there to the point at which all of its components were fully staffed. We choose the month by which community mobilization and public education efforts were underway and outreach workers were on staff and beginning to identify and mentor clients. The violence interrupter component of the program was developed later, so early sites evidence some spacing between the inauguration of the violence interruption components of the program and other temporal measures of program implementation. However, in recently opened sites this and other components of the program tended to be introduced within a short period of time, making it difficult to separately estimate the impact of the various program elements.

There was also a great deal of spillover in the geographical targeting of interventions. Clients were active in a variety of areas in the vicinity of the officially targeted beats. In fact, when we gave them area maps (this was described in Chapter 4), only half of the clients surveyed indicated that they lived or hung out in the targeted zone. As described in Chapter 5, violence interrupters ranged even more widely, as they followed gang activities. Much of this was required as part of field operations, and this was not a neat laboratory experiment. When the staff completed their conflict mediation paperwork, CeaseFire was able to monitor this, and maps showed that programmatic activities were spread over broad areas of the city. However, effects of those dispersed interventions could not be captured using the analytic approaches utilized here. Outreach worker and violence interrupter activity in the evaluation's matched comparison areas could lead us to underestimate the impact of the program in nearby target areas, because the intervention was not neatly contained within their official boundaries.

Other programs were operating in and around the study areas. In a large and neighborhood-oriented city like Chicago, programs typically have a geographical focus. Just one example of this is the federally-funded gun intervention program, Project Safe Neighborhoods. However, Project Safe Neighborhoods was organized around police districts, not specific beats. It encompassed several of the program areas considered here, but it also included most of their comparison areas, which tended to be nearby.

Of course, the statistical analysis could examine only events that were reported to the police and recorded by them. This should not have been much of a problem for homicide, but may have affected the accuracy of reports of shootings. This would be especially true of aggravated assaults, the attempted shootings in which victims by-and-large went uninjured.

The analyses also focused on crime rates. As noted above, the rate focus was driven by (a) size differences between the aggregated target and comparison areas, leading the counts to differ greatly and, (b) the fact that beats changed differentially in population over time, because of the long period involved and the city's shifting demography. But as a result, crime could apparently go "up" or "down" because of inaccuracies of the population estimates, as well as because of changes in levels of crime. In particular, our small area population estimates for the years following the 2000 Census, which were based on tract-level projections by Claritas Corp., were a venture in forecasting with uncertain accuracy.

In addition, the research design adopted here relies on matched comparison groups to represent the counterfactual situation of CeaseFire sites being with without programs. However, in principle researchers always under-match. That is, non-randomized comparison groups will inevitably differ from their program counterparts on a host of unmeasured factors, and the matching variables themselves may be differentially accurate. For example, areas facing large-scale immigration or emigration may not actually resemble the most recently available measures of their character. Unmeasured and mis-measured factors in principle could explain any observed differences in trends in the program and comparison areas, and there is no way around that problem. Further, as we saw in Table 7-2, several comparison areas were on their face under-matched. The comparison areas for CeaseFire sites in Rogers Park and Southwest were not as well matched as the others to the targeted beats, despite our best efforts to identify reasonable comparison areas.

Finally, lying in the background is the fact that there was a huge and ill-understood secular trend in violence in Chicago. Crime dropped sharply between 1991 and when the programs began in the sites, and continued to drop through the end of 2006. In general (this was described in Table 7-2), crime declined in both the target and comparison areas, before and after CeaseFire began. The reasons for this general decline in crime are, as elsewhere in the nation, ill-understood, and we could not account for possible remaining differences between the target and comparison areas in terms of those obviously important factors.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Summary of Findings**

This report presented the findings of an evaluation of CeaseFire, a Chicago-based violence prevention program. After a period of development, the program began in 1999. During the 2000s, it expanded to encompass about 25 program areas in the Chicagoland region and other parts of Illinois. It did not aim to directly change the behavior of a large number of individuals. Rather, CeaseFire focused on affecting a small number of carefully selected members of the community, those with a high chance of either “being shot or being a shooter” in the immediate future. The program’s violence interrupters worked alone or in pairs on the street, mediating conflicts between gangs and intervening to stem the cycle of retaliatory violence that threatens to break out following a shooting. Outreach workers recruited clients on the street, provided mentoring, and steered them to a range of services.

CeaseFire’s interventions were “theory driven.” The program was built upon a coherent theory of behavior that specified the “inputs” to be assembled and set in motion and how they caused the “outcome,” reductions in shootings and killings. Some of the core concepts and strategies were adapted from the public health field. The program aimed at changing operative norms regarding violence; providing on-the-spot alternatives to violence when gangs and individuals on the street were making decisions; and increasing the perceived risks and costs of involvement in violence among high-risk young people. The risk component of the model led to a strategic decision to largely hire staff members who could gain the attention of target audiences and communicate these messages credibly.

The evaluation of CeaseFire had both process and outcome components. The process portion of the project involved documenting how the program actually looked in the field. This included issues involved in selecting target neighborhoods, choosing local host organizations, and staffing, training, and management practices. This phase of the evaluation involved scores of personal interviews, observations of meetings, and site visits. Systematic surveys were conducted with the field staff. To gauge the extent of CeaseFire’s collaboration with local agencies and other stakeholders, we conducted interviews with samples of potential collaborators in 17 sites. They included representatives of organizations in six community sectors: business, churches, community organizations, the police, schools and human service agencies. To learn more about CeaseFire’s clients – the issues they were facing, the level of help they were receiving, and their assessments of the program – we conducted personal interviews with a sample of 297 clients from 13 CeaseFire sites. The outcome evaluation used statistical models, crime hot spot maps and gang network analyses to assess the program’s impact on shootings and killings in selected CeaseFire sites. In each case, changes in the target areas after the introduction of the program were contrasted with trends in matched comparison areas.

### **Selecting and Organizing Sites**

CeaseFire adopted a decentralized, “local host” model adopted for delivering a neighborhood-based program in numerous sites in Chicago and around the region. One job of

CPVP was to identify areas that could benefit from CeaseFire, and to select a community-based organization to administer and house the program locally. A formal contract was signed with the host agency that included a description of the scope of work they were to conduct. Once a site and partner host organization were selected, CPVP continued to be involved in the operation of the program. The central office provided technical assistance and training to the sites, helped them develop a comprehensive violence reduction plan, and prepared staff for their various roles within the program through an extensive training program. CPVP actively monitored the workload of the sites, and reviewed their files to ensure that suitable clients were being served. In addition, they facilitated a variety of weekly and monthly meetings for the sites' steering committees, violence prevention coordinators, and the CeaseFire outreach staff. CPVP also provided information, guidance and models of best practices for the CeaseFire staff through workshops. Program headquarters also produced printed materials, signs, bumper stickers and tee-shirts for the sites to distribute locally. Crucially, CPVP also played a major role in securing and maintaining funding for the sites, generally passing through state and federal monies to their local partners. Once CeaseFire was established at a site, CPVP shifted from a central management role to a provider of technical assistance, though we saw the central management role prolonged when host agencies were not performing adequately, and at times CPVP reasserted control over faltering programs.

The neighborhoods involved in the program were typically plagued by high rates of violence, and the residents were quite poor. Most were located in the City of Chicago, but others were scattered around the region and Illinois. Among the programs we monitored, eleven served predominately African American neighborhoods, six were largely Latino, and four served diverse populations. An analysis of the sites located in the City of Chicago, places for which we have consistent crime data, found that most program sites were well above the city median in terms of both crime and poverty.

High need areas could be difficult to serve. In some, it was difficult to find a suitable host agency, due to the limited organizational infrastructure of the area. Because there was a weak community base, implementing the CeaseFire program could be challenging. It could take a great deal of effort to get the "ear" of community residents in areas where crime and violence were commonplace. Many residents had experienced the failure of other initiatives, programs that were begun with great fanfare, but then the funds were cut and the programs subsequently disappeared.

In other areas there was competition to host a CeaseFire site, and this could lead to tension among rival organizations. Sometimes existing groups believed that CeaseFire's mission was similar to their own, and that they were being displaced. There also could be competing agendas. A difficulty with the host agency model for delivering a program with a clearly articulated strategy was that active and experienced local organizations almost inevitably had their own agendas and interests, and their own programs to promote. This could particularly be the case when CeaseFire sites were hosted by faith-based organizations. Their inclination was to use religion as the means for helping clients move away from violence, and to hold standards for hiring that involved church membership. At other sites, established leaders sometimes simply did



not agree with aspects of CeaseFire's program model, and neglected tasks they thought made little sense in their community.

Funding politics also played a role in selecting sites and host organizations. Politically influential places had some advantages: they often had strong community-based organizations and vocal political representatives, and activists were able to bring CeaseFire to the community through their political clout. Occasionally CPVP had to resist the entreaties of political leaders who hoped to play a role in hiring, and all politicians apparently felt that, because they supported CeaseFire, they could use the program in their campaign materials. In a few sites we found host agencies whose political agendas strained their relationships with the police. Other politically active host agencies did not have these problems, and we also observed some of the positive features of being known for passionate community commitment. In particular, hosts with strong activist ties evidenced a strong capacity to build and participate in local coalitions, and they were able to surround themselves with organizations that could provide needed services for their clients.

Size also mattered. Larger and longer-established host organizations typically had a solid financial base, and regarded CeaseFire as an add-on, bringing additional capacity to their programs. Most had established salary and benefit packages, as well as a full range of human resource policies that addressed matters such drug-testing and employee conflict resolution. In contrast, smaller hosts who would suffer financially if the CeaseFire program did not continue at their site were being asked to devise and adhere to personnel systems they had never before needed and conduct administrative tasks with which they were unfamiliar. Many of these sites employed poorly paid hourly workers and offered no employee benefits. At the smaller single-focus sites, handling a problem employee often meant termination rather than attempts to resolve the problem positively. Several large host agencies were themselves service providers. They were able to provide services directly to clients, and had little need to make outside referrals. Larger service providers were also very familiar with the grant-writing process, program documentation, staff management, and day-to-day office functions. A downside to this was that they were less likely to develop extensive partnerships or work building on their community base, because they were so self-contained.

During the evaluation period we saw a tightening of policies and procedures on the part of CPVP that reflected the adoption of a more centralized management role. This was ensure that site activities focused as much as possible on the highest-risk person, hours, and activities, and that all of this was better documented. CPVP took a more active role in regulating program activities and reviewing site records. Their staff made an increasing number of site visits to ensure better program implementation, and new central office positions were created to handle program implementation and documentation issues. Sites were held more accountable to with regard to shooting responses, client caseload size, and other program activities. CPVP also became more assertive about the hours that sites were to be open, to parallel the hours when violent crime actually occurs. However, at the same time many sites became more self-sufficient, and CPVP was able to hand many of the responsibilities they previously bore.

This included taking charge of organizing CeaseFire Week, political lobbying for program support, and handling day-to-day crises in program administration.

### **Staffing the Program**

For CeaseFire, staff hiring, training and supervision were key issues, because hiring was itself a strategic consideration. As part of their strategy of recruiting clients who were at the highest risk of being a victim or perpetrator of violence, and to facilitate access to the world of street gangs, CeaseFire aimed at hiring people who would be credible messengers among these groups. Violence interrupters and outreach workers normally did not have much experience in the traditional workplace, and many had themselves run afoul of the law. This set CeaseFire apart from many social service programs, although it is common for public health interventions around the world to hire and train indigenous people to handle their public interface. It also placed a greater-than-usual burden on its human resources operations.

Hiring high-risk individuals presented unique challenges, and CeaseFire implemented safeguards to ensure – to the extent possible – that their staff stayed out of trouble. These measures included drug testing and background checks, and eligibility requirements such as having a high school diploma following their release from prison. When hiring violence interrupters and outreach workers, CeaseFire faced a challenge: the staff needed to be able to connect with potential shooters and victims, but to have successfully extracted themselves from street crime and gangs. CPVP struggled to find a violence interrupter for one neighborhood; they kept finding candidates who "wanna work, but at the same time, they wanna still be in the gang." Indeed, CeaseFire occasionally and unknowingly hired individuals who were still involved with drugs and may have still been active gang members, although all of its policies and procedures were aimed at preventing this. The instability of CeaseFire funding, the demands of the job, the high-risk backgrounds of most violence interrupters and outreach workers, and drug testing contributed to staff turnover. And, this came with a cost, most visibly in outreach worker-client relationships that could not be easily rebuilt with another staff member.

Hiring Panels. Each site hired outreach workers and outreach worker supervisors using a formal decision-making process. Hiring panels involved five or six members representing CPVP, district police, and local leaders. The panels helped protect the program from hiring pressures by politicians or by friends and relatives already on the staff, and to forestall (as one CPVP representative put it) "hiring someone because they need a job, not because they can do the job." Both CPVP and the police representative had veto powers, the police because they conducted background checks on applicants.

Background Checks. While CeaseFire wanted its outreach workers and violence interrupters to be close to the streets, they did not want them to be involved in illegal activities or to slip back into a life of crime. Police background checks, the hiring panels, and CPVP staff oversight were all aimed at preventing this. There was particular vigilance regarding crimes against women or children, either of which was unacceptable because of the need to protect

clients and staff members. Some sites had even more stringent hiring requirements, and could not take on anyone with a felony conviction.

**Drug Testing.** CPVP encouraged host agencies to test their outreach staff for drug use. They wanted drug-free employees serving as examples to their clients, and felt a positive drug test "raises questions about fitness for duty." They also wanted to avert the potentially negative press coverage that the arrest of a staff member would spark. CPVP employed the violence interrupters directly, and they were regularly tested. They also tested every candidate recommended by hiring panels. This policy made hiring challenging, and most sites had stories about finding a perfect job candidate who then failed a drug test. Whether to test for marijuana was another issue, because of its widespread use and acceptability in many circles.

**Credentials.** CeaseFire generally required that its outreach workers have a high school diploma or its equivalent. They felt this helped ensure that candidates could be trained to handle their paperwork and keep their files orderly. However, the program also believed that street credentials could trump educational ones, and sometimes they reinterpreted candidates' life experiences as qualifications for a position. The harsh world of Chicago's street gangs also guaranteed that former gang affiliations played a major role in qualifying individuals for a job. Sites had to balance the associations of their staff with the distribution of gangs in their area, adding to the complexity – and ramifications – of hiring.

**Turnover.** CeaseFire had high employee turnover, leaving sites short-staffed and clients without outreach workers. This turnover had a number of sources, beginning with the job's evening. There were also frequent short-term layoffs for budgetary reasons. When the program lost outreach workers and violence interrupters, it jeopardized its links to high-risk men on the street. Many sites did not offer health and retirements to its employees, undermining their long-term commitment to the job. Wage policies were set locally by the host organizations, but in the winter of 2005, CeaseFire recommended that outreach workers be paid \$25,000 annually. Most violence interrupters were hired on a series of 900-hour short term contracts that brought few benefits, and they were in the most precarious position.

**Training.** Because they usually came to the job without any formal qualifications, CeaseFire invested heavily in staff training. Outreach workers began with six-day training sessions combining classroom work and site visits, and there were subsequent monthly in-service classes. These two-hour meetings targeted issues that emerged on the street. Our staff survey found that almost two-thirds of outreach workers felt they were adequately prepared before they first went out on the job, and more than 90 percent of them felt prepared at the time we questioned them.

Unlike outreach workers, violence interrupters did not have regularly scheduled training sessions. However, they met weekly with their supervisor in sessions that featured exchanges about problems they were facing and the strategies they adopted to address them. According to our survey, more than 85 percent of them were very satisfied with the meetings, and 83 percent reported that they were "very satisfied" with their level of preparation for the job.

## **Funding the Program**

From the late 1990s, CeaseFire spawned 25 or so sites in Illinois, and CPVP took the lead in identifying diverse funding streams to support prevention activities. While they varied a bit, a typical CeaseFire site budget was about \$240,000 per year. This enabled the host organizations to pay their violence prevention coordinator, supervisors, and outreach staff. Almost all sites operations were funded by the State of Illinois, which channeled the money through the budget of the State Department of Corrections. By contrast, the violence interrupters working in each site were funded by a federal grant as well as some state funds, and they were paid directly by CPVP. The 2007 budget for violence interrupters was \$189,000. Federal, foundation and corporate funding supported central office operations by CPVP and the production of public education materials.

Reliance on state funding for field operations led to instability in the program. Headquarters operations were less affected by budgetary ups and downs because they were funded by multi-year grants, leading to a stable and predictable flow of funds to support central office activities. Site funding was quite another story. Almost all site operations were supported through yearly appropriations by the state legislature. In some years this brought prosperity, when politicians were supportive and old and new sites were and funded by the State. But there were lean years as well, as funding ebbed and flowed in response to legislative politics and election cycles. Needy places sometimes had to be dropped because they failed to maintain support in the legislature, while others were created because their champions spoke up during the budgetary process.

Another negative consequence of this funding arrangement is that CeaseFire evolved into a large number of small and arguably underfunded and understaffed projects that targeted small areas, because each member initiative was capped. Everyone involved knew that this was not a desirable situation. To mount a sustained campaign the program needed to be a regular budget item that was monitored and assessed by administrative officials. CPVP believed that, to be more effective, there should have been fewer and more well-staffed sites that could focus on larger and more naturally-defined target areas that might span legislative district lines. But they were unable to break out of a funding trap that eventually snapped closed.

So, although CeaseFire expanded during the 2000s, there were down sides to being a politically-driven program with a yearly budget. The short, one-year funding cycle for most sites created job uncertainty and service interruptions, and drew staff time from operations in order to work on perennial funding crises. Site offices were regularly forced to close temporarily, work with a skeleton staff, or let staff members work on a voluntary basis until a budget was finally approved. Once the state budget was finalized, some sites would learn that they had been dropped, and had to let their staff go on short notice. In some areas the program came and went several times, each cycle forcing CeaseFire to shut down, leaving the staff unemployed and clients unserved. The political nature of CeaseFire's funding led to needy sites being passed over, while sites with more political clout but less violence received funding. In some sites, politicians also demanded too large a hand in operations. Their role also interfered with the proactive

selection of CeaseFire sites based on need and capacity. In addition, the budgetary process which evolved ensured that each site, regardless of size or need, was awarded the same amount of money. The politically driven nature of CeaseFire also did not allow the program to grow in deliberate fashion. In some years sites were cut unexpectedly, while in others perhaps too many sites had to be opened too quickly. Start-up sites were especially impacted, due to the time it took to become operational in the first place, including recruiting and training staff, and developing a client base. Trying to recruit, hire, train and provide technical assistance to as many as a half a dozen new sites all at once was difficult, particularly when there was only a one-year commitment to funding them.

All of this came to a head in summer 2007, when state politics slipped into a stand-off between the governor and the General Assembly. Legislators' requests to fund specific CeaseFire sites were among the many initiatives listed in a routine "pork barrel" bill, and the governor's staff systematically axed the program from the final budget. Depending on yearly state funding via legislators' personal initiatives proved near-fatal for CeaseFire, and other fund-raising efforts failed to restore the program's budget base. By the end of September 2007, all but two CeaseFire Chicago sites had closed. Two others raised enough money to reopen, but neither continued to operate under the CPVP umbrella. CPVP turned its focus to developing its CeaseFire program model and expanding to other cities. They also managed a federally-funded demonstration site on Chicago's West Side, and twenty or so violence interrupters continued to do mediation work in the field.

### **Client Outreach**

Identifying and providing counseling and services to individual clients was one of the most significant components of CeaseFire, and may have been the most successful elements of the program. Client work was the domain of outreach workers. They were individuals with street experience and strong local ties that enabled them to navigate their world safely. They had to be able to navigate the dangers of the streets as well as manage complex client relationships. They were hired because their background helped deliver a credible message to clients and the community, and because their own experiences lent them insights into the issues facing clients. Their usually being from the neighborhood helped neutralize potential resistance to the program among residents, activists, and local gang factions. As one measure of their street savvy, when we asked clients how connected outreach workers were to the street, 82 percent reported "very connected." Clients' ties to gangs set constraints on staffing; it was difficult to recruit clients in areas where there were multiple competing gangs, unless the outreach staff included members with ties to each. The staff often had personal connections to potential clients. Many saw themselves as paying back a debt to society they had accumulated when they were young, and they found a great deal of personal satisfaction in giving back to the community.

From a larger perspective, the benefits of CeaseFire having hired ex-offenders was considerable. During the evaluation the program employed more than 150 outreach workers and violence interrupters, most of whom at one time or another had been active gang members and many of whom had served time in prison. CeaseFire offered them a chance for employment in an

environment where ex-offenders have limited employment opportunities. Working for CeaseFire also offered them an opportunity for personal redemption, and a positive role to play in the communities where many had once been active in gangs.

But reliant on their personal experience rather than professional backgrounds, outreach workers often had little to no formal training other than that provided by CPVP and the host agencies. Outreach workers were expected to build and maintain a caseload of about 15 high-risk clients, within four months of starting the job. They also took primary responsibility for carrying out CeaseFire's public education campaign, by door-to-door canvassing and distributing printed material. They also reported doing a significant amount of conflict intervention, backstopping the violence interrupters.

Initially, CeaseFire did not have a client outreach component. From 1997 until 2001, the focus was on fostering clergy partnerships and community involvement, organizing collective responses to shootings, and public education. Between 2001 and 2005 the outreach program went through a period of steady growth, with new sites being added nearly every year. The most dramatic growth in the outreach program was between 2004 and 2005, when the number of outreach workers grew from 20 to 70. In 2005, the outreach program shrank in an equally dramatic fashion due to a temporary loss in funding. While the number of outreach workers fluctuated, in early 2007 they numbered approximately four per site. At time they were monitoring approximately 660 clients in the 15 sites we selected for study.

Client selection was a courting process. Outreach workers often initially encountered prospective clients hanging out on the street, and the staff was expected to spend 80 percent of their time there rather than in the office. There they engaged likely-looking candidates on a one-to-one basis in order to gauge their situation, and asked around to find out what was known about them. One of their immediate tasks was to assess whether potential candidates were appropriate for the program. CeaseFire tried to focus on candidates rated as "high risk," using seven criteria. A survey of almost 300 clients and an analysis of program records indicates that this goal was largely achieved. By their own report, 82 percent of clients had been arrested, one quarter of them before age 14. Overall, 45 percent reported having been arrested five times or more, and 56 percent had spent "more than a day or two" in jail at least once. More than 90 percent were involved in gangs. More than 70 percent of the clients interviewed were African American, and 26 percent were Hispanic.

They were a difficult set of "cases" to "manage." High risk clients could easily get themselves into trouble and disappear for periods of time, making it difficult for their outreach workers to maintain a relationship with them. Despite efforts by CeaseFire staff to steer their clients into job readiness programs or an actual job, some were just not capable of the follow-through necessary to do so. Some outreach workers perceived that their clients were not motivated to work, and that others came from home environments that were both disorganized and dysfunctional in terms of supporting them in their efforts to hold down a job.

They reported that their biggest problem was joblessness – 76 percent of the almost 300 clients we interviewed reported that they had needed work. Other issues they raised frequently in personal interviews were getting back into school or into a GED program (37 percent), wanting to disengage from their gang (34 percent), resolving family conflicts (27 percent), and getting into a program to help them deal with their emotions (20 percent). Many outreach workers maintained that their clients were not ready to just step into a steady job. Eight-five percent of outreach workers cited a lack of "job readiness" as a major issue for clients. This stemmed, in no small part, from the fact that many clients (82 percent) had been arrested or had been in even deeper trouble with the law. So, they began with preparing them for seeking a job and coping with the requirements of the world of work. Among clients needing a job, 82 percent got help preparing a resume, 87 percent described receiving help preparing for a job interview, and 86 percent reported that CeaseFire helped them find a job opening. The client survey revealed that those who received this kind of help were almost twice as likely as others to have a job at the time we interviewed them. As one satisfied client told us, "Last summer I was selling dummy bags out there, I was bogus. I joined CeaseFire to get a job. CeaseFire hooked me up with it [the job]."

After job-related services, outreach workers invested the most energy in working with clients to improve their educational credentials, through enrolling them in GED programs or alternative schools. Beyond improving clients' job prospects, getting back in school offered them an avenue for developing a more positive self-image and a sense of personal progress. Alternative schools also offered clients a positive social environment where they could interact with other young people away from many pressures of the street. In the survey, among those who reported receiving assistance from CeaseFire in this matter, 30 percent later had completed high school or even had some college or trade school training. In contrast, only 8 percent of those who needed help but did not report receiving any graduated from high school. One of the clients we interviewed had recently enrolled in a plumbing program. "Over the winter [outreach worker] asked me what profession I wanted to do and I decided on plumbing or carpentry. [The outreach worker] hooked me up with the apprentice program at [local college skills center]. I like the program very much, especially the hands-on training they give you."

Clients also needed assistance with mundane yet practical issues. Another basic service commonly provided to clients was obtaining official forms of identification. Forty-three percent of outreach workers report helping get clients drivers licenses, social security cards, or state identification cards every few weeks or so more than once a month, and 63 percent of outreach workers did so at least once a month. These documents were essential for clients as they pursued jobs and navigated life outside of their home turf. Outreach workers helped in other ways. When clients were asked if their outreach workers had ever gone to court with them or talked with a lawyer on their behalf, 72 percent answered in the affirmative. Another 24 percent indicated that their outreach worker had gone with them to talk to their probation or parole officer.

However, as the list above indicates, clients' problems were often complicated, so linking them to services was only part of outreach work. These largely young men had personal and interpersonal needs that included improving their self-esteem, developing healthier relationships

with others, and finding a more positive self-identity. In the client survey, 92 percent of clients with anger management issues talked to their outreach workers about them. Sixteen percent of clients interviewed reported that they had issues with drinking, and 81 percent of these clients talked to their outreach worker about it.

In the survey, 34 percent of clients indicated that one of their problems is that they wanted to disengage from a gang. The clients who participated in follow-up in-depth interviews were able to articulate many of the messages that outreach workers conveyed to them. In particular, they included “stay away from others in trouble,” and “don’t hang out with known gang members.” The survey identified clients who indicated that they had needed help leaving a gang, which was 34 percent of the total. Fully 94 of 95 (99 percent) of them reported that they had received assistance from the program. Among this group, 70 percent were still in a gang at the time of the interview. This is far from a high success rate, but it is movement in the right direction. After one client returned home from prison he shared with us that "I was tempted to return to my street organization and drug dealing. [The outreach worker] told me that ‘I’d spent enough time on the street; it’s time to move on.’” About deciding to leave the organization permanently, he said, "I didn't want to be around the same people doing the same things. [The gang] didn't want me to go, but I told them I had put my time in and that I was ready to retire. I wanted to help people instead of hurt people." This particular gang gave the client its "blessing" to leave.

One striking finding of the interviews was how important CeaseFire loomed in their lives; after their parents, their outreach worker was typically rated the most important adult in their lives. Well below CeaseFire came their brothers and sisters, grandparents. Spouses, coaches, teachers, counselors and, in last place, clergy, came after, at below 10 percent. Clients mentioned the importance of being able to reach their outreach worker at critical moments in their lives – times when they were tempted to resume taking drugs, were involved in illegal activities, or when they felt that violence was imminent.

### **Intervening in Violence**

Observers of CeaseFire regard violence interrupters as an original development in the violence prevention arena. CPVP grafted interrupters to the CeaseFire model in the Winter of 2004, because most outreach workers could not gain access to key decision-makers in the gang underworld. Many sites had at least two interrupters, and in addition violence-interrupter-only sites were opened in two very violent communities. Interrupters cruised the streets, striving to identify and intervene in gang-related conflicts before they escalated into killings, and to step in and halt retaliatory spirals of violence if the shooting had already begun. Themselves former gang members, and often graduates of the state’s prison system, violence interrupters capitalized on their background to develop relationships with people on the street in order to gain access to information and the parties to conflicts, and they attempted to negotiate workable settlements to rivalries both within and between gangs.



Violence interrupters had unique experiences that helped in their efforts to convince high-risk people on the street not to use guns. They could approach them and speak their language because the interrupters largely had themselves been gang members, had gotten in trouble with the law, and served time. Some had struggled to adjust to a new lifestyle, and one job of their supervisor was to help keep them from slipping back into trouble. Most violence interrupters grew up in the neighborhoods where they were assigned, which helped connect them to gangs and young men on the street. It also helped connect them to residents who could be good sources of information and support.

Both supervising and evaluating the work of violence interruptions was challenging. They worked alone or in pairs, almost always at night, frequently in dangerous areas and under threatening circumstances, and on an irregular schedule driven by events. Many of the people they dealt with were dangerous and prone to violence, immersed in activities that they did not want to become widely known, and highly suspicious of outsiders. The interrupter's job was to keep things from happening in the first place, making the assessment task even more difficult. Unlike outreach workers, who reported to their local site, violence interrupters were directly managed by CPVP, where they met for weekly debriefing and review sessions. They were encouraged to coordinate and exchange information with their assigned sites, but how well they did so varied widely.

Violence interrupters spent most of their time on the street, hanging out as they built relationships and waited for conflicts to erupt. This was inherently risky, because of where they worked. They were vulnerable to shootings, to stop-and-frisks by police, and – at the same time – suspicion by gang members that they were somehow affiliated with the police. Being in the proximity of guns and drugs, they were particularly at risk because the legal repercussions for convicted felons caught in association with a gun could be severe.

Interrupters' central responsibility was to mediate conflicts. They were hired because their backgrounds and connections prepared them to do this work, and all of their activities were geared toward this effort. Violence interrupters learned about conflicts and shootings through intimate connections to the communities where they worked. They used their personal *entre* to mediate conflicts. Often, interrupters spoke to those on one side of the dispute – the group they were familiar with or had influence over. In conflicts that required an agreement between two parties, they teamed up with other interrupters who were on better terms with the other gang or faction. At all times they had to work carefully within the boundaries and rules established by the dominant street gangs in the area. While mediating conflicts related to drugs, they had to be sensitive to the political economy of the street.

Intervening in potential retaliatory shootings took a great deal of their time. Whenever a shooting occurred, the interrupter's first steps were to try to the victim or his friends or kin from retaliating. In the paperwork they filed, 40 percent of the intervener's mediation efforts concerned potential shootings that would have been in retaliation for an earlier imbroglio. Violence interrupters learned about shootings that already happened from their personal networks, from CPVP staff, and from local outreach staff. Other CeaseFire employees received

shooting information from hospitals and the police. Interrupters also participated in the marches and vigils that CeaseFire organized in response to killings in order to prevent retaliations. They would speak to residents and individuals people who were directly involved in the shooting, to try to prevent further violence.

Property disputes – over narcotics, money, and drug corners – lead to shootings all over Chicago. Drug territory could become particularly contentious between crews led by men returning home from prison and younger people who had occupied their corners. Returnees, who needed money to start over, would try to repossess their turf. To get the disputant's attention, interrupters appealed to their impact on the street economy, and to "street property rights." One strategy was to encourage men to maximize their profits and peacefully compromise, because outbreaks of gang warfare were "bad for business." Another was to persuade one faction to sell elsewhere, in order to not attract a police crackdown. They also mediated conflicts that arose out of transactions that had gone awry, because one party or another tried to take off with both the money and the drugs. Similar disputes arise out of robberies of dice games. The loser in such encounters occasionally look for a "hit man" to set things right; hearing word of this and dissuading them from doing so was another role for interrupters.

In step with their strategy with regard to drugs, violence interrupters worked within – rather than in conflict with – street organizations when mediating gang-related conflicts. They used their influence with their former gangs and facilitated communication between them while respecting current leaders' authority and territorial boundaries.

Race and neighborhood shaped the disputes violence interrupters mediated. Latino violence interrupters faced conflicts that were rooted in longstanding rivalries between turf-based fighting gangs and the territorial boundaries that separate them. Boundaries between Mexican-American gangs seemed particularly inflexible when compared to other demarcation lines. Latino gangs also had firmer hierarchies and maintained intense rivalries with one another. West Side African American gangs were always closely connected to the drug trade, while South Side black gangs also had ties to political organizing and more closely resembled classic organized crime. Black violence interrupters mediated more conflicts related to the drug trade, because organized drug sales were omnipresent in most of the communities where they worked. They thought many of those gangs had no effective codes of conduct, and leadership was only about the money.

Competition over women is another leading cause of homicide in Chicago, and violence interrupters needed entirely different strategies to deal with those situations. They tended to avoid getting involved in domestic conflicts, feeling they would have no special influence over the parties or the outcomes. Apparent disrespect is another homicidal flashpoint, and questioning someone's masculinity can be fatal. Drugs and alcohol could escalate any conflict, but it seemed they could make personal issues particularly volatile. Conflicts over "disrespect" often happened in party situations. It helped that interrupters were familiar with the personalities and interpersonal dynamics of people in the neighborhoods they worked.

Interrupters were supposed to focus on areas in close proximity to CeaseFire's official site boundaries, but many found them too restrictive, and the gangs they monitored were mobile. In the staff survey, 30 percent of violence interrupters estimated that less than half of the people they talked to for information hung out in the target area, and 40 said fewer than half of the conflicts they mediated would have occurred in their target area. The statistical analyses described later in the report monitored crime only in the official sites, and the freewheeling activities of the interrupters did not fit this evaluation model very well.

### **Forming Community Partnerships**

CeaseFire itself was a modest program. The site hosts of necessity had to engage with a diverse set of local partners in order to leverage services and jobs for their clients, access their facilities, gain scale in the distribution of public education materials, and populate the marches and vigils that were held in response to homicides. Building a broad base of support in the community was also an important aspect of partnership-building. To achieve all of this, end, the sites were encouraged to organize a coalition of local collaborators and hold regular coalition meetings. The report examines the extent of collaboration between the sites and various sectors of the community, including service providers, churches, schools, businesses, community organizations, the police and local political leaders.

Members of the local faith community were regarded as one of CeaseFire's most important local partners. In poor areas that are too often bereft of functioning institutions, the city's many small churches are one of the most vital elements of the community. Most collaborating churches turned out to have separately incorporated not-for-profit arms that provided services; some larger churches also hosted nonprofit housing and community economic development activities. Clergy members are opinion leaders in the community, and they were encouraged to talk about violence, mentor clients, and provide recreational space for programs.

Community organizations provided public input and helped link site activities to the "grassroots." Some also served on hiring panels, and helped generate turnout for marches and shooting responses. Local business owners and managers were asked to display posters and signs as part of the program's public education effort. Their establishments were also a natural place to turn for possible job placements and contributions to support events. CeaseFire staff sometimes provided security on school grounds, and they frequently gave presentations or mentored youth in schools. They worked with school principals, counselors and security personnel.

One of the outreach workers' key tasks was to connect clients with appropriate services. Outreach workers were to develop an assessment of their clients' personal needs, which ranged from family and health issues to education and employment deficiencies to their emotional state. Following this plan, they were to try to get their clients back in school or in GED programs, help prepare them for the job-finding process, and enroll them in drug and alcohol treatment programs. Some needed to learn more about parenting and daycare, and anger management counseling was often required. At the sites, staff members were tasked with identifying local service resources and working to ensure ready acceptance of their clients when they showed up.

Police turned out to be one of CeaseFire's most frequent collaborators. CeaseFire's supervisory staff needed the immediate information police usually had on shootings and killings. To plan their responses, they needed information on victims and the circumstances of the crime. This cooperation was not automatic, and sometimes connections were broken because of distrust on both sides. In many districts, police officers also provided security at and around CeaseFire events, and blocked traffic for larger marches. Police representatives served on the panels that vetted candidates for staff positions. At the same time, many individual staff members kept an arms length from the police, fearful that being too closely identified could "de-legitimize" them with clients and local gangs.

As the discussion of funding the program indicated, local political leaders played key roles in financing CeaseFire's operations, and even in determining which neighborhoods would be served. The leaders for securing funding were state representatives, for many sites supported funded as member initiatives. Local aldermen could provide general political support for the program, and aldermen were present at some of the site coalition meetings we attended.

### **Impact of CeaseFire**

The report examines the impact of CeaseFire on shootings and killings. The first approach to this issue utilized statistical models to identify the effect of the introduction of the program on shootings and killings. These analyses employed 210-months of data on selected sites and matched comparison areas to examine trends in violence. We also used crime mapping techniques to examine the impact of the introduction of CeaseFire on short-term trends in the micro-level distribution of shootings. Each CeaseFire site featured initially at least one "hot spot" of violent crime, and the analyses examined what happened to those hot spots over time in the program and comparison areas. Another statistical analysis focused on gang homicide. It utilized social network analysis to examine the effect of the introduction of CeaseFire on networks of within-gang and between-gang homicides, and the number of violent gangs active in the area.

A limitation of time series analysis in evaluation research is the relatively long period of time that it takes to accumulate post-intervention data. CeaseFire is no exception, and only seven sites, all located in the City of Chicago, were suitable for pre and post-program analysis. Trends in matched comparison areas represented the counterfactual situation of the program areas not being served by CeaseFire during the same period of time. Monthly data, comparison areas and fairly complex analysis methods were required because crime has plummeted in Chicago, and violence was down in both the target and comparison areas. As a result, the report in essence focuses on whether crime was down more, if crime hot spots moved around or cooled more visibly, and if networks of gang homicide weakened more in the program sites than in the comparison areas, following the implementation of the program.

The table presented below summarizes the main findings. The time series analysis found positive results. In four sites it appears that the introduction of CeaseFire was associated with distinct and statistically significant declines in broad measures of actual and attempted shootings, declines that ranged from 16 to 28 percent. Shootings were also down significantly in West

Humboldt Park, but they declined in parallel fashion in the area’s comparison beats. The program helped push gun homicides down only in Auburn Gresham, but the report discusses the statistical problems associated with analyzing these relatively rare events. The largest simple percentage declines in violence were actually recorded in Rogers Park, but the low level of crime there and mixed trends in the (inadequate) comparison area did not give us a basis to infer that these declines were due to the program.

Table 8-1  
Summary of Three Approaches to Impact Analysis

	Changes in Violence Due to the Program		
	shootings down <sup>a</sup>	hot spots cooler	gang homicide decline
Auburn-Gresham	-16/- 21%	-15%	gang involvement in homicide down reciprocal killings down
Englewood			
Logan Square	-21%		gang involvement in homicide down reciprocal killings down
Rogers Park		-40%	
Southwest	-20/-23%		gang involvement in homicide down
West Garfield Park	-22/-28%	-24%	reciprocal killings down
West Humboldt Park		-17%	
East Garfield Park	not evaluated		reciprocal killings down gang involvement in homicide down

Note: <sup>a</sup> Two measures: all actual and attempted shootings, and all persons shot or killed; gun homicide alone also lower in Auburn-Gresham due to the program

The analysis of crime hot spots contrasted shooting patterns before and after the introduction of CeaseFire, with parallel maps detailing changes in shooting patterns in the matched comparison areas. Overall, the program areas grew noticeably safer in six of the seven sites, and we concluded that there was evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of CeaseFire in four of these areas. In two other areas shooting hot spots waned, but evidence that this decline could be linked to CeaseFire was inconclusive.

The report also considers how homicides within and among gangs changed with the introduction of the program, in contrast to short-term trends in the comparison areas. One statistical measure of interest was changes in the proportion of killings in an area attributable to gangs; by this measure, gang homicide density was down more in two program areas. A second measure was the proportion of gang homicides that were reciprocal in nature; that is, they were seemingly sparked by an earlier killing. These incidents were a special focus of CeaseFire's

violence interrupters, and in four sites reciprocal killings in retaliation for earlier events decreased more in the program beats than in the comparison areas. A third measure, average gang involvement in homicide, pointed to greater improvements in three of the areas.

The report considers a number of difficulties with the data and research design. Even the findings of three different approaches only provide a general indicator of the effectiveness of the program. The analyses did not incorporate any measures of the strength of the programs; rather, a simple before-after dichotomy identified pre-program and post-program months of data. There also may have been issues with our designation of when the program began; we choose the month by which community mobilization and public education efforts were underway and outreach workers were on staff and beginning to identify clients. The violence interrupter component of the program was developed later. We obviously could examine only events that were reported to the police and recorded by them. Also, the time series analyses examined crime rates because beat populations changed differentially over the 16-year time frame, and there doubtless were errors in projecting site population figures forward from the 2000 Census.

This was not a neat laboratory experiment, leading to other problems. There was a great deal of spillover in the geographical targeting of interventions. The survey of clients revealed that they frequently lived or were active in areas in the vicinity of the officially targeted beats. Activity reports completed by violence interrupters indicated that they ranged widely, following gang activities. Outreach worker and violence interrupter activity in the evaluation's matched comparison areas could lead us to underestimate the impact of the program in nearby target areas, because the intervention was not neatly contained within their official boundaries. Other programs were operating in and around the study areas, although we avoided the most significant of them when selecting comparison areas, and they could further contaminate the findings.

In addition, all of the analyses relied on matched comparison groups to represent the counterfactual situation of CeaseFire sites being without programs. However, in principle researchers always under match, and non-randomized comparison groups will inevitably differ from their program counterparts on a host of unmeasured factors. This is linked to the last problem: lying in the background of the evaluation is a huge drop in violence in Chicago, one that began in 1992. The reasons for this decline are, as elsewhere in the nation, ill-understood, and we could not account for possible remaining differences between the target and comparison areas in terms of those obviously important factors.